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King's Cross Underground fire, the Piper Alpha disaster, the Clapham Junction Railway 
accident and the capsize of the ferry "Herald of Free Enterprise" at Zeebrugge. 
Although the following inquiries and reports highly criticised corporations for their poor 
management and organisation relevant to the risk of harm inherent in their activities, 
very few prosecutions for manslaughter have followed. Since the occurrence of these 
disasters, however, an increasing perception that deaths caused through corporate 
operations should comprise a category of corporate manslaughter has gradually become 
embedded in the public mind, and the publication on March 1996 of the Law 
Commission Paper dealing with corporate killing has brought about legal debates 
concerning how to hold corporations criminally liable for manslaughter. In addressing 
these legal issues, this thesis first traces the historical development of corporate criminal 
liability in English law and examines the current status of corporate liability for 
manslaughter. Then, it indicates practical and theoretical flaws from which most 
existing theories for corporate manslaughter suffer, and propounds a new theory of 
corporate liability for manslaughter by which both corporate and individual offenders 
can be held liable under the same conditions. Finally, it considers corporate defences 
and sentencing factors in the context of corporate manslaughter. 
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CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1980s, a series of disasters took place in Britain. On 18 November 1987, a 
catastrophic fire was caused by people smoking on the escalator in the Underground as 
they prepared to leave the King's Cross station. An official inquiry,1 conducted by Mr. 
Fennnell, revealed that the fire, which started at about 19:25 in the escalator, was carried 
up to other sites nearer the top and, then, transformed into a flashover. Five minutes 
later, the alarm was raised by a passenger and one of the station staff, who had received 
no fire training, went to inspect the area. Unfortunately he informed neither the line 
controller nor the station manager. By chance two police officers were present and one 
of them ran to surface to call the London Fire Brigade. However, because they neither 
knew the geography of the station nor anticipated the flashover of the fire, their 
subsequent evacuation activities proved unsuccessful. By the time the London Fire 
Brigade reached the station it was too late to do anything. No single drop of water was 
applied to the fire that erupted into the tube lines ticket hall, killing 31 people. In his 
report, Mr. Fennell criticised London Underground for having failed to guard against the 
unpredictability of the fire, have effective systems to train staff in the fire drill, establish 
good communication systems for necessary evacuation, and organise a hierarchical 
system of responsibility for safety. 
Within a year, on 6 July 1988, the Piper Alpha disaster took place abroad the 
North Sea oil platform, claiming the lives of 165 of the 226 persons on board and two 
of the crew of the fast rescue craft (FRC) of the Sandhaven during their rescue activities. 
At about 22.00 hours there was an initial explosion on the production deck which led 
immediately to a large crude oil fire in B Module of Piper Alpha. Due to oil from the 
platform and a leak from the main oil line to the shore, the fire rapidly extended into C 
Module and caused a number of other explosions on Piper Alpha. The intense fire and 
explosions destroyed the FRC of the Sandhaven, killed most of its occupants, and 
caused the structural collapse of large sections of Piper Alpha. The subsequent public 
Department of Transport, Investigation into the King's Cross Underground Fire (1988, HMSO, 




inquiry conducted by Lord Cullen2 revealed that the immediate cause of the disaster was 
a failure in the permit to work system which caused communication errors between the 
day shift and the night shift. This led night shift personnel to restart one of the 
condensate injection pumps which had been shut down for replacement of a pressure 
safety valve taken off during maintenance. Their lack of awareness of the removal of 
the valve resulted in the leakage of gas from a blank flange assembly which had been 
fitted at the site of the valve and was not made leak-tight at the material time. However, 
a series of errors and faults on the part of the owners of the platform (Occidental 
Petroleum) were criticised in the Cullen report as contributing to the overall scale of the 
disaster. A number of emergency systems on the platform failed immediately or within 
a short period of the initial explosion: in particular, the fire-water system was rendered 
inoperative either due to physical damage or loss of power. Occidental management 
were not fully aware of the need for a high standard of the assessment of the risk of 
major hazards inherent in oil and gas production. Neither did they provide for 
appropriate emergency training for evacuation and fire-fighting as they intended: the 
safety policies and procedures were in place, but the practice was deficient. 
Then on 12 December 1988, the Clapham rail crash claimed 35 deaths and 
caused nearly 500 injuries when a crowed commuter train ran head-on into the rear of 
another train, which was stationary in a cutting just south of Clapham station, and then 
struck a third oncoming train. A public inquiry conducted by Mr. Hidden3 revealed that 
the immediate cause of the tragedy was the signalling system which failed at a critical 
time. Before the accident, alternations had been made to the signalling system (at the 
weekend) and an old wire should have been removed. Owing to an error it was still in 
the system and was making an electrical contact with its circuit. As a result, the old wire 
fed current into the new circuit and prevented the signal from turning red. In relation 
to this immediate cause, British Rail was severely criticised in Mr. Hidden's report for 
several reasons: there was no proper system of allocating meaningful descriptions to 
Department of Energy, The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster (1990, HMSO, London, 
Cm 1310). For a discussion of this disastrous case, see, for example, K. Miller, "Piper Alpha and 
the Cullen Report" (1991) 20 Industrial Law Journal 176. 
Department of Transport, Investigation into the Clapham Junction Railway Accident (1989, 





particular staff concerning their duties, no effective system of communicating to the 
workforce the proper standards required of installation and testing work, no effective 
planning of the weekend work to prevent individuals working excessive overtime or to 
ensure sufficient numbers of appropriately qualified staff were available to match the 
particular weekend's workload, and the like.4 
Common to these disastrous incidents are two facts that should be emphasised 
here. Firstly, although having successfully identified human errors made at the material 
time as the immediate causes of the disasters, the subsequent inquiries and reports were 
highly critical of prior corporate management and organisation relevant to the risk of 
harm inherent in business activities. In particular, the failures on the part of the 
corporations to have or effectuate proper systems for detecting the risk, training or 
supervision of staff, and communicating information in relation to particular operations 
were considered to contribute to the overall scale of disasters. Consequently, a series 
of these disasters drew increasing public attention that corporations should be held liable 
for deaths of victims. 
Secondly, despite the public inquiries' strong criticisms of the relevant corporate 
risk-averting systems, the corporations were not prosecuted for manslaughter. Several 
reasons for this have been indicated by commentators: conceptual difficulties that the 
phenomenon of corporate harms were not perceived as crimes because they did not fit 
the socially constructed image of criminal behaviour;5 failure of the legal system to 
respond to the cultural shift towards blaming corporations for technical hazard that 
threatened people's safety; 6 and the fact that, in cases of occupational hazards, 
prosecutions of corporations had been left to the regulatory authorities and violations 
of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 were generally viewed as "a means of 
safeguarding public safety rather than as means of attributing blame and punishing 
Ibid, para. 17.13., listing 16 serious relevant errors on the part of British Rail. 
C. Wells, "The Decline and Rise of English Murder: Corporate Crime and Individual 
Responsibility" [1988] Criminal Law Review 788 at pp. 795-796. 
C. Wells, "Corporations: Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability" [1993] Criminal Law Review 551 
at 558. See also C. Wells, "Corporate Manslaughter: A Cultural and Legal Form" (1995) 6 









Yet, a corporation was actually indicted for manslaughter after the Zeebrugge 
tragedy in which a ferry, Herald a/Free Enterprise, capsized killing 192 people in 1987. 
The public inquiry, as found in the other disastrous cases mentioned above, revealed that 
"from top to bottom the body corporate was infected with the disease of sloppiness .... 
The failure on the part of the shore management to give proper and clear directions was 
a contributory cause of the disaster."s More importantly, Turner J., the trial judge in R. 
v. P & 0 European Ferries (Dover) Ltd., suggested the possibility that corporations can 
be held liable for manslaughter under English law.9 
Since this P & 0 case, commentators and influential proponents of corporate 
liability have been increasingly vocal in their demands for creating a legal category of 
unlawful conduct of corporations which has been neglected by the legal system,10 and 
more significantly, for establishing appropriate legal theories which can be applied to 
corporate manslaughter. The latter demand is particularly due to the condition 
established by Turner J. in the P & 0 case that for corporations to be held liable for 
manslaughter, it is necessary to prove that "a person who is the embodiment of a 
corporation and acting for the purposes of the corporation is doing the act or omission 
which caused the deaths". 11 The application of the rule "the embodiment of a 
corporation" (called the identification principle) to corporate manslaughter cases has 
been the subject of strong criticism in that "[t]he larger and more diffuse the company 
---~-
structure, the easier it will be for it to avoid liability.,,12 Since the identification 
principle enables the company to incur liability only when individual defendants who 
are its "embodiment" can be guilty of the offence charged against it, such a derivative 
A. Ridley & L. Dunford, "Corporate Killing - Legislating for Unlawful Death?" (1997) 26 
Industrial Law Journal 99 at 99. 
Department of Transport, mv Herald of Free Enterprise (Report of Court No. 8074), Formal 
Investigation (1987, HMBO, London), para. 14.1. The detailed facts of this case will be described 
in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 72-85. 
[1991] 93 Crim. App. R. 73 at pp. 88-89. 
Ridley & Dunford, supra note 7 at 99. 
[1991] 93 Crim. App. R. 73 at pp. 88-89. 
C. Wells, "Manslaughter and Corporate Crime" (1989) l39 New Law Journal 931 at 931. 
4 
nature of corporate liability has been considered to limit the scope of criminal liability 






Although the present trend established in the P & 0 case towards holding 
corporations criminally liable for negligent and reckless manslaughter is a welcome 
departure from the legal system's prior stilted and inflexible notions of corporate 
manslaughter,14 an issue still remains unresolved concerning how to establish new, 
feasible legal theories by which corporations can properly be held liable for 
manslaughter. Given that deaths and personal injuries as a result of the activities of 
corporations continue to happen 15 and prosecutions of them are expected, the design of 
new principles of corporate manslaughter is an urgent matter. 16 
The main purposes of this thesis are to examine the current status of corporate 
liability for manslaughter, to indicate practical and theoretical flaws from which most 
existing theories suffer in the context of corporate manslaughter, and to submit a new 
model of corporate liability for manslaughter by which individual and corporate 
offenders can be held liable under the same conditions. 
Chapter 2 provides a general survey of the historical state of corporate criminal 
liability in English law. This chapter points out how two main theories have hitherto 
developed to hold corporations liable: the doctrine of vicarious liability and the principle 
of identification. In examining the adequacy of both theories in holding corporations 
liable generally, Chapter 2 addresses two questions: how these theories have been made 
This is concerned with the issue of "over- and under-inclusiveness" of the identification principle, 
which will be critically analysed in Chapter 3. 
In R. v. COry Brothers [1927] 1 K.B. 810, private prosecutions were brought against three directors 
of the company and against the company itself for manslaughter. However, the trial judge was 
simply persuaded that a corporation could not be indicted for an offence against the person. The 
detailed facts of this case will be described in Chapter 3. 
In 1994, four young people on an activity holiday at the centre died because of the company's 
gross negligence in the running of the centre. In Kite, Stoddart & OLL Ltd. (unreported, The 
Times and The Independent, 9 December 1994), the company and its managing director were 
successfully convicted of manslaughter. The facts of this case will be examined in Chapter 3. 
See, for example, D.J. Miester, "Criminal Liability for Corporations that Kill" (1994) 64 Tulane 
Law Review 919 at 920 (arguing that "[t]he unresponsiveness of the legal system in prosecuting 
corporate killers extracts a great cost from society by eroding confidence in our judicial 
institutions. "). 
5 
compatible with the traditional criminal law aimed at individual offenders in English 
law and whether or not they are justifiable. The argument is advanced that although the 
origins of corporate liability in English law can be found in the court's attempts to put 
a company in an analogous position with an individual employer, theories of corporate 
criminal liability are not analogous to those of individual liability developed in criminal 
law. 
Chapter 3 shifts its focus from the general survey of the status of corporate 
liability to case studies of corporate manslaughter The aim of these case studies is to 
define theoretical problems inherent in both the vicarious liability doctrine and the 
identification principle. The flaws from which both theories suffer stem from their legal 
technique of imputing individuals' fault to a company. Namely, under both theories, the 
company's fault is captured through individual actors' fault and their criminal 
responsibility, so that corporate liability is always derivative from individual liability. 
In addition, both theories suffer from a problem of over- and under-inclusiveness. The 
derivative nature of corporate liability and the problem of over- and under-inclusiveness 
suggest the need for new theories that emphasise the collective nature of corporate 
liability. That is, the corporation should be held collectively liable even when no 
individual is liable. 
Based on the observations made in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 critically examines the 
aggregation theory and the existing organisation theories (proactive fault, reactive fault, 
and corporate policy), both of which hold a corporation liable even when there is no 
proof of individual faults. While indicating some of the advantages of these theories 
over the vicarious liability doctrine and the identification principle examined in Chapter 
2, this chapter also reveals two major flaws from which they suffer: one operational and 
the other conceptual. Operational flaws stem from uncertainty as to certain notions used 
in each theory. Conceptual flaws, by contrast, involve some difficulty in reconciling 
each theory with fundamental principles of criminal law such as concurrence of mens 
rea with actus reus, culpability, and descriptive and normative usages of concept of 
mens rea. This chapter, in conclusion, emphasises the need for synthesising the existing 
theories of corporate liability. 
Chapter 5 propounds a new model of corporate liability for manslaughter, called 
6 
"the risk-oriented theory," a key feature of which attempts to equate the requirements 
of conduct and mental states for individual manslaughter (proposed by the Law 
Commission) with those for corporate manslaughter. The risk-oriented theory is 
formulated by addressing the following three issues: (1) whether a corporation, rather 
than its personnel, can be blamed for causing death of victims; (2) for what type of 
conduct it should be held liable; and (3) how to construct the requisite mental states on 
thee part of the corporation (namely, corporate recklessness and corporate gross 
carelessness in cases of manslaughter). This chapter then demonstrates how the risk-
oriented theory works, as compared to the existing theories of corporate liability. 
Chapter 6 is concerned with the issues of corporate defences and corporate 
sentences. This chapter first provides the appropriate circumstances in which a 
corporation should be granted defences based on the broken chain of causation between 
corporate conduct and the prohibited result, and on the impossibility of foreseeing or 
avoiding the risk. Next, it addresses the issue of what factors should be considered to 
be aggravating or mitigating factors at corporate sentencing, in particular, under the risk-




THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN ENGLISH LAW 
2.1. Introduction 
It is in the common law that the criminal liability of business corporations took root. 
As will be discussed later, since the Industrial Revolution the scope of corporate 
criminal liability has gradually been extended from public nuisance to mens rea 
offences. From comparative perspectives, however, the doctrine of corporate liability 
has not necessarily been agreed upon within a number of jurisdictions. The maxim that 
societas delinquere non potest (corporations are incapable of crime) is still pervasive in 
certain countries in the European Continent. Whilst the revised Dutch Criminal Code 
(1976, Article 51) and the new French Penal Code (1992, Section 121-2) provide 
express provisions for corporate criminal liability, corporate liability in German and 
Italian Penal Code is vigorously rejected. 1 Arguments for the maxim in Germany, for 
example, can be summarised as follows: a corporation has no body so that it is incapable 
It has been reported that Article 33 of the new Slovenian Criminal Code (promulgated on 24 
September 1994, enforced since 1 January, 1995) followed the French Penal Code position on the 
matter. By contrast, the new Spanish Penal Code (codified on 8 November 1995, promulgated 
on 23 November 1995) does not prescribes any express provisions of corporate criminal liability. 
Instead, Article 31 of the Code prescribes corporate manager's liability. It is implied by Morishita 
that the new Spanish Code might follow the German position. See, T. Morishita, "Gaikoku no 
Rippo (Foreign Legislation)" (1996) 1569 Hanrei Jiho 33 and (1997) 1584 Hanrei Jiho 38. The 
same can be said of the revised Portuguese Penal Code (promulgated on 17 February 1995, 
effective on 1 October 1995). Article 12 of the Code provides corporate manager's liability. T. 
Morishita, "Gaikoku no Rippo" (1998) 1651 Hanrei Jiho 1214 at pp. 1214-1215. In Italy, the 
maxim that societas delinquere non potest is considered to be a constitutional principle. Article 
27 of the Constitution of Italy is that criminal responsibility is personal (personale). For 
comparative works on this subject, see, for example, G.O.W. Mueller, "Mens Rea and the 
Corporation: A Study ofthe Model Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability" (1957) 
19 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 21; L.H. Leigh, "The Criminal Liability of Corporations 
and Other Groups: A Comparative View [hereinafter cited as A Comparative View] (1982) 80 
Michigan Law Review 1508; G. Stessens, "Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative 
Perspective" (1994) 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 493; H.D. Doelder & K. 
Tiedemann (eds.) La Criminalisation du Comportement Collectif (Criminal Liability of 






of criminal conduce; it has no mind of its own and therefore cannot entertain guilt 
(Schuld) that is based upon the ability to recognise the unlawfulness of the impugned 
act3; criminal penalties are not always suitable for corporations; and imposing penalties 
on corporations may affect many innocent parties.4 These difficulties have been, 
according to Leonard H. Leigh, "overcome in common-law countries," but "European 
scholars look askance at common-law doctrines" for corporate criminalliability.5 
Two major concerns result from this remark. The first question to be asked here 
is how the doctrine of corporate criminal liability has been made compatible with the 
traditional criminal law aimed at the individual offender in English law.6 It is apparent 
in English law that this doctrine was theoretically denied centuries ago. However, as 
the corporation played an increasingly important role in our society, these obstacles 
gradually disappeared.7 By tracing the history of the development of corporate criminal 
See, for example, R. Maurach & H. Zipf, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil (1992, 8th ed., Carl Winters 
Universitatsbuchhandlung, Heidelberg), Vol. 1 , p. 165. 
See, for example, H-H. Jescheck, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil (1988, 4th ed., 
Dunker & Hwnbolt, Berlin), p. 204. 
See, in general, E. Schmidhauser, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil (1975, 2nd ed., lC.B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck), TUbingen), pp. 195; A. Huss, "Die Stratbarkeit der juristischen Person" (1978) 90 ZStW 
(Zeitschrift/ur gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft) 237 at 238. 
Leigh, A Comparative View, supra note 1 at pp. 1509 and 1527. 
It is comprehensively suggested by several commentators that the doctrine of corporate criminal 
liability was historically not compatible with the tradition of such countries' legal system as 
Germany, Belgiwn, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, and Russia. 
In these countries, on the other hand, it is well accepted that it is necessary to confiscate the 
illegally accrued gains derived from corporate activities. This necessity may be a starting point 
to realise or develop "reformatory ideas" concerning the criminal liability of corporations within 
or outside the tradition of individualistic legal systems. See, Doe1der & Tiedemann, supra note 
1 at pp. 1-9 (Introductory Note by Tiedemann). 
For a historical development of corporate criminal liability in English law, see, for example, L.H. 
Leigh, The Criminal Liability o/Corporations in English Law (1969, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
London) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Liability]. Whilst Leigh's book is mainly concerned with 
how corporate criminal liability has been attained in English law, this chapter is concerned with 
how the theoretical impediments against corporate liability, which are still dominant in some 
countries, have disappeared in English law. The phenomenon of the development ofthe doctrine 
of corporate criminal liability in common law is compared by Mueller to the growth of weeds. 
See Mueller, supra note 1 at 21, stating: 
"Many weeds have grown on the acre of jurisprudence which has been allotted to the 
criminal law. Among these weeds is ... a few genes from tort law and a few from the law 
of business associations. This weed is called corporate criminal liability ... Nobody bred 






liability in English law, the questions of how the theoretical impediments are now 
"overcome" will be answered. 
The second issue to be dealt with is whether the theoretical principles behind 
corporate criminal liability are justifiable. It is well known today that corporate criminal 
liability in the common law world is established by imputing the acts and mental states 
of the actor(s).8 From a historical point of view, it has also been brought to light that 
this technique of imputation was established with an analogy to the tort doctrines of 
respondeat superior and the alter ego.9 What is not widely understood, however, is why 
the English criminal law had to rely upon such tort doctrines in the context of corporate 
criminal liability. In addition, little is known as to why the relevant concepts of English 
criminal law, such as actus reus and mens rea, have not been tailored to cases of 
corporate crime.lO Several attempts have been made by both civil law and common law 
scholars to solve the problem of how to deter corporate crime; by the use of civil, 
administrative and criminal sanctions. 11 However, as long as criminal sanctions are used 
to do so, the question should be how the existing criminal law concepts or theories can 
become workable, and if not, how they can possibly change. English courts appear to 
prefer to borrow the imputation techniques for corporate criminal liability from tort, 
rather than changing or enlarging the relevant criminal law concepts. The technique of 
imputation of one's actus reus and mens rea to another is rarely found outside the area 
See, for example, E. Lederman, "Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: Rethinking a 
Complex Triangle" (1985) 76 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 285 at 296. 
Ibid. at pp. 288-293. 
James Gobert poses a similar question: 
" ... [Courts] have perforce turned to conventional criminal law. Such laws were not created 
with corporation in mind. They were conceived in terms of human concepts such as actus 
reus and mens rea. The application of such concepts to companies was inevitably going 
to prove problematic. How does a company commit an actus reus, and where does one 
locate the company's mens rea?" 
J. Gobert, "Corporate Criminality: Four Models of Fault" (1994) 14 Legal Studies 393 at 394. 
Unfortunately, Gobert does not demonstrate his attempt to change an actus reus and mens rea from 
"human"concepts into ones applicable to the corporate context. When applied to human actors, 
these concepts are st>ill considered to be human ones. 
For a comparative discussion, see Leigh, A Comparative View, supra note 1 at 1526, suggesting: 
" ... But corporate criminal responsibility is not necessarily the only way to cope with 
problems of economic power.... Whether the range of sanctions is seen as penal or 
administrative in nature, the important point is that the sanctions be available." 
10 
of employer's criminal liability. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the concept of 
imputation ought to be viewed as exceptional. 12 In terms of critical arguments against 
the adequacy of an analogous approach between tort and criminal law, 13 the current and 
next chapters will examine practical and theoretical problems inherent in the exceptional 
concept of imputation. 
2.2. Corporate Personality 
The issue of corporate criminal liability can be traced back to the Middle Ages in 
English Law. The corporations of medieval England were ecclesiastical bodies created 
for the management of church property, public organisations of the English boroughs 
and the crafts and mercantile guilds. 14 In the Middle Ages, "when the idea of an 
incorporate person was new, and the law relating to it was meagre, the lawyers do 
occasionally indulge in speculations of a crude and somewhat anthropomorphic kind .... " 
to distinguish "this new entity from human persons who composed it.,,15 According to 
these "speculations" found in the Year Books, a corporation "was said to be invisible, 
12 See, for example, lC. Smith, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (1996, 8th ed., Butterworths, London), 
p. 174. This is also true of the principle of identification. Under this principle, even ifboth a 
company and its controlling officer are regarded as the same, the controlling officer is still held 
personally and independently liable by statutes. Hislher actus reus and mens rea are utilised to 
convict both him/herself and the company. Ibid. at p. 190. Thus, there is little difference in theory 
between "imputation" and "identification." See also Lederman, supra note 8 at 296-298; W.B. 
Fisse, "The Distinction between Primary and Vicarious Corporate Criminal Liability" (1967) 41 




One commentator insists that: 
"Today the question is no longer whether it is possible to impute the acts of corporate 
agents to the corporation; the real question to be asked when determining the criminal 
responsibility of corporations is one of policy: Will the criminal sanction imposed on the 
corporation deter it from committing these wrongful acts in the future?" 
See B. Coleman, "Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?" (1975) 29 Southwestern 
Law Journal 908 at 920. This view is based on an erroneous assumption that theoretical problems 
can be solved by policy considerations. As will be seen later, the real problem inherent in the 
history of common law doctrines for corporate criminal liability lies in methodology of avoiding 
theoretical difficulties or establishing exceptional categories, rather than reestablishing the 
traditional rules applicable to the company. See, for example, R.S. Welsh, "The Criminal Liability 
of Corporations" (1946) 62 Law Quarterly Review 345 at pp. 350-352. 
1.R. Elkins, "Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance" (1976) 65 Kentucky Law 
Journal 73 at pp. 85-86. 
W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol. 9 (1926, 1st ed., Methuen & Co. Ltd., 









of no substance, a mere name, and yet a person.,,16 This led to several negative 
conclusions as to corporate criminal liability that "it could not be outlawed or 
excommunicated," "be assaulted or imprisoned," or, indeed, "commit treason or 
felony.,,17 It is reported that the medieval lawyers' deductions drawn from the nature of 
corporate personality were summarised by Lord Coke in the Case of Sutton's Hospital, 
and incorporated into modem law. I8 
"[ A] corporation aggregate of many is invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment 
and consideration of the law .... They cannot commit treason, not be .... outlawed nor 
excommunicate, for they have no souls, neither can they appear in person, but by 
attorney .... A corporation aggregate of many cannot do fealty, for an invisible body can 
neither be in person, nor swear, .... it is not subject to imbecilities, death of the natural 
body, and divers other cases.,,19 
This old authority concerning corporate incapacity to commit crime and to suffer 
punishment, deducted from the nature of corporate personality, was followed by 
subsequent generations. It had repeatedly been said that a corporation is "[t]he 
metaphysical entity,"20 a "impalpable thing,,,21 and "an abstraction.,,22 More clearly, it 
was expressed by Lord Wrenbury that: 
"The artificial legal person called the corporation has no physical existence. It exists only 
w. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol. 3 (1935, 4th ed., Methuen & Co. Ltd., London), 
p.484 [hereinafter cited as Holdsworth, Vol. 3], citing the Year Book of Edward IV, Y.B.21 Ed. 
IV, f.13. 
Ibid., citingY.B. 21 Ed. IV. P.13-14perChoke,perPigot, andperCatesby. 
(1612) 77 E.R. 960, 973 (10 Co. Rep.23, 32b) (K.B.). See also R. Burrows, "The Responsibility 
of Corporations under Criminal Law" (1948) 1 Journal of Criminal Science 1 at 4; J.D. 
Barnett, "The Criminal Liability of American Municipal Corporations" (1938) 17 Oregon Law 
Review 289 at pp. 292-293. 
(1612) 77 E.R. 973 at 973. At that time, it was considered that a corporation could not swear 
fealty, but a corporation sole such as a bishop could. See Burrows, ibid. at pp. 1-2. Burrows holds 
that "it was probably because such an offence was not conceived of as an entity apart from the 
actual holder until Tudor developments." Therefore, "[a] bishop who committed treason against 
a Plantagenet king found that his person and his lands were seized without regard to the fact that 
the office of Bishop had done no wrong although the actual holder had." Ibid. at 2. 
Per Lord Blackburn in Pharmaceutical Society v. London & Provincial Supply Association (1880) 
5 A.C. 857 at 870. 
Per Jessel M. R. in Flitcroft's Case (1882) L.R. 21 Ch. D. 519 at 533. 
Per Lord Haldane L. C. in Lennard's Carrying Co v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. [1915] A.C. 705 at 
713. 
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in contemplation oflaw. It has neither body, parts, nor passions. It cannot swear weapons 
nor serve in the wars. It can be neither loyal nor disloyal. It cannot compass treason. It 
can be neither friend nor enemy. Apart from its corporators it can have neither thoughts, 
wishes, nor intentions, for it has no mind other that the minds of the corporators.,,23 
The consequence of these deductions is that "[t]he company itself cannot act in its own 
person, for it has no person; it can only act through directors, and the case is, as regards 
those directors, merely the ordinary case of principal and agent.,,24 It had been said that 
a corporation "cannot possibly have a competent knowledge,,,25 "malice or motive,,,26 
and "an intention.,,27 In addition, procedural obstacles concerning corporate appearance 
at trial and the applicable penalties were regarded as critical. 28 Since personal 
appearance was necessary at assizes and quarter-sessions, a corporation could not be 
triable for indictable offences.29 Although in the Court of King's Bench appearance by 
attorney was allowed, there was the difficulty that a corporation could not enter into a 
recognisance.30 This difficulty was pointed out by Coleridge J., as follows: 
23 Continental Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Daimler Co. [1915] 1 K.B. 893 at 916. In the eighteenth 
century, the rule of corporate incapacity was also summarised and extended by Blackstone to 








"A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony or other crime, in its corporate capacity; 
though its members may in their distinct individual capacities." 
Blackstone, Commentary, Book (1765) 1, c. 18, p. 476, cited in F.P. Lee, "Corporate Criminal 
Liability" (1928) Columbia Law Review 1 at 12, n.56. 
Per Cairns J.L. in Ferguson v. Wilson (1866) L.R. 2 Ch. App. 77 at 89. 
Per Lord Blackburn in Pharmaceutical Society v. London & Provincial Supply Association (1880) 
5 A.C. 857 at 870. 
Per Lord Bramwell in Gustav Adolph Abrath v. The North Eastern Railway Co. (1886) 11 A.c. 
247 at 251. 
Per Lord Reading, C.J. in R. v. Grubb [1915] 2 K.B. 683 at 690. 
The other possible obstacle was ultra vires; a corporation can only do acts that are legally 
empowered by law since it is a creature of the law. However, the ultra vires objection was never 
considered seriously by English courts not only in criminal law, but also in tort. See Smith, supra 
note 12 at p. 183; Leigh, Criminal Liability, supra note 7 at pp. 8-9; Welsh, supra note 13 at pp. 
346-347. 
Today, this is no longer necessary and a corporation may appear and plead through its 
representative by Criminal Justice Act 1925, s. 33. For procedural obstacles to corporate liability, 
see Leigh, ibid. at pp. 9-12. 
The word "recognisance" is defmed by D.M. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law (1980, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford), as 
"[a]n obligation or bond acknowledged before a court of record or authorised magistrate 






"[O]n the supposition that the corporate body had been the prosecutors removing the 
indictment, there would have been a difficulty in strictly complying with the statute 
[requiring a recognisance] because they could not enter into a recognisance, although we 
are aware that in practice this is evaded by one or more members of the body entering into 
one for them: evaded, we say, rather than overcome.,,3! 
Moreover, at common law the penalty for treason and felony (except petty larceny) was 
death; therefore, even though a corporation was convicted of these crimes, it could not 
be made subject to the prescribed penalties. As a matter of fact, the difficulty of 
suffering from the penalty was employed as one of the main reasons for corporate 
incapacity to commit crime. Lord Blackburn, for example, stated: 
"I quite agree that a corporation cannot, in one sense, commit a crime - a corporation 
cannot be imprisoned, if imprisonment be the sentence for the crime; a corporation cannot 
be hanged or put to death, if that be the punishment for the crime; and so, in those senses 
a corporation cannot commit a crime. ,,32 
Likewise, conceptual difficulties with mens rea, derived from the principle that 'Actus 
nonfacit reum, nisi mens rea' (an act does not make a man guilty, unless his mind were 
guilty), was indicated in the corporate context by Baron Manwood's following syllogism 
in the seventeenth century: 
"[N]one can create souls but God, but the King creates [a body corporate], and therefore 
they have no souls ... ,,33 
It was considered by Manwood that 'having no souls' means 'having no conscience' or 
criminal intent. This view was also endorsed by Channell 1., holding that: 
"By the general principles of the criminal law, if a matter is made a criminal offence, it is 
essential that there should be something in the natures of mens rea, therefore, in ordinary 
cases a corporation cannot be guilty of a criminal offence ... ,,34 
The authorities mentioned above were mainly concerned with corporate incapacity to 
bound to secure the performance of some act as to pay a debt, keep the peace and be of 
good behaviour, appear to stand trial, or otherwise." 
R. v. Mayor etc. of Manchester [1857] 119 E.R. 1317 (7 E & B 453-456). However, this difficulty 
was later removed in Leyton V.D.C. v. Wilkinson (1926) 43 T.L.R. 35, by allowing a corporate 
agent to enter into a recognisance. 
Pharmaceutical Society v. London & Provincial Supply Association (1880) 5 A.c. 857 at 869. 
Tipling v. Pexall (1688) 80 E.R. 1085 (2 Bulstrode 233). 






commit treason or felony or any misdemeanour involving personal violence. However, 
there exists dicta of wider import: notably a famous dictum by Chief Justice Holt in an 
anonymous case. "A corporation is not indictable but the particular members of it 
are.,,35 The credibility of this report is doubtful given that neither facts accompanying 
the remarks nor the context in which it was made are apparent.36 Nevertheless, it is 
reported that as late as 1851 a similar general statement was followed by Shadwell V.C., 
holding that "the general law of England was that a corporation could not be indicted 
for crime.,,37 
From these old authorities, which appeared until the middle of nineteenth 
century, several points become clear. Firstly, the issue of corporate criminal liability 
in English law was always analogised with that of individuals. Adherence to the nature 
of corporate personality, which obviously results in corporate incapacity both to perform 
an act and to entertain mental states, may serve as evidence of the analogical approach. 
To hold a company criminally liable, it was necessary to prove that the company 
fulfilled actus reus and mens rea requirements in exactly the same way as a natural 
person. The purpose of this view was not to analyse whether the nature of corporate 
personality is fictitious or real, but to exclude the liability of corporations from criminal 
law on the basis of corporate incapacity for an act and mental states.38 
Anonymous (1701) 88 E.R. 1518 (K.B.) 
For example, Burrows comments that "That is undoubtedly true of some crimes, but, as the words 
cited constitute the whole report, it is impossible to speculate what limitation, if any, Lord Holt 
meant to be placed on his words. The series has not the highest reputation and Holt himself once 
wondered what posterity would think of the judges of his time when reading these "skimble 
skamble reports"." Burrows, supra note 18 at 7. See also Lee, supra note 23 at 4; K.F. Brickey, 
Corporate Criminal Liability: A Treatise on the Criminal Liability o/Corporations, Their Officers 
and Agents (1984, 1st ed., Callaghan, Illinois) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Criminal Liability], 
YoU, §2.01; Barnett, supra note 18 atp. 293. 
The Two Sicilies v. Willcox (1851) 61 E.R. 116 at 130 (1 Sim. (N.S.) 301 at 335). 
In contrast, the legal scholars in the European Continent argued for and against corporate criminal 
liability by way of the nature of corporate personality; that is to say, whether it is fictitious or real. 
The conclusion arrived at by these scholars was that corporate criminal liability might be accepted 
under the Realist Theory whilst it might not under the Fiction Theory. The Realist Theory and 
Fiction Theory were represented by the following works respectively: O.v. Gierke, Die 
Genossenschaftstheorie und die deutsche Rechtsprechung (1963, Hildesheim, reprinted by Georg 
alms Verlagsbuchhandlung) and F.K.v. Savigny, System des heutigen romischen Rechts (1840, 
Veit und Comp., Berlin). 
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Secondly, there were several rationales against corporate criminal liability which 
were submitted by the courts: corporate incapacity to act; to entertain guilt; to appear at 
trial; and to suffer from the appropriate punishment. A close look at these objections 
may reveal that they are not in logical accordance with criminal law. Given that the first 
step in ascertaining criminal responsibility is proof of the objective elements such as 
conduct, if no criminal act is proved, it is not necessary to determine whether or not the 
defendant has capacities for mental states, appearance at trial and punishment. Thus, 
the objections of corporate liability based on corporate incapacities for guilt, appearance 
at trial and punishment are superfluous or pUZzling. As cited above, the objection of 
corporate liability often stemmed from corporate incapacity to suffer from the 
punishment.39 But an issue of whether or not the defendant is capable of suffering from 
punishment is usually addressed after it is proved that s/he can commit a crime.40 
Viewed in this light, it is suggested that the objections to corporate criminal liability 
submitted until the middle of nineteenth century in English law cannot be regarded as 
theoretically sound. 
Thirdly, the objections derived from the nature of corporate personality would 
lead to the conclusion that a corporation could not be held liable not only for crime but 
also for tort. In the case of the quo warranto proceedings against the City of London in 
1682,41 this argument was advanced by counsel on behalf of the City of London. 
"[A corporation] is but a name, an ens ration is, a thing that cannot be seen, and is no 
substance [sic]; and for this name or corporation, it is impossible they [sic] can do or suffer 
any wrong, as to be beat or be beaten, as such a body; but the wrong is made to every 
member of the body, as to his own proper person, and not as to the name of corporation; 
nor can the corporation do a personal wrong to another; nor can they [sic] commit treason 
39 See Lord Blackburn's argument in Phannaceutical Society v. London & Provincial Supply 
Association (1880) 5 A.C. 857 at 869, supra note 31. 
40 It is interesting to compare the state of affairs concerning corporate criminal liability at that time 
in England and those at present in Gennany. Theoretical objections advocated by Gennan 
scholars can fall into corporate incapacity either to perfonn a criminal act or to entertain guilt 
(Schuld). Those who are opposed to corporate capacity for guilt (Schuld) usually acknowledge 
corporate capacity for act. See, for example, Jescheck, supra note 3 at p. 204. 
41 (1682) 8 St.Tr. 1039. In this case, the mayor of London and other officers were charged with 
usurping the powers entrusted to them as directors of a body politic. They taxed the citizens and 
pocketed the money. 
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or felony as to the corporation, nor against any other person. ,,42 
This argument, based on the speculations deduced from the nature of corporate 
personality, was not seriously considered by the court in this case. On the contrary, the 
court held that a corporation could be liable for seditious libel and other 
misdemeanours.43 The following comment by Pollock on this case may help account 
for the outcome of the acknowledgement of corporate liability for misdemeanours. 
"[Counsel]'s interest, of course was to suggest every possible objection, technical as well 
as substantial, to penal proceedings against a corporation. The King's advisers, on the 
other hand, were prepared to go very far in ascribing both wrongful acts and wrongful 
intention to a corporate body, for they charged the City of London with a malicious and 
seditious libel. No general inference can be drawn except that there was no settled rule 
either way to prevent either argument from being plausible.,,44 
Theoretical difficulties of imputing to a corporation malicious torts committed by its 
agent in the course of his employment have been "slurred over" by the courts for 
centuries.45 As long as the human agent can be guilty of malice, and his master can be 
held liable for his servant's act, the courts saw no reason why the master should escape 
liability for his acts because he is a corporation.46 In this sense, a corporation was 
viewed just as capable of being held liable for torts as a natural person. When public 
nuisance cases, mixtures of civil and criminal proceedings in nature, were brought to 
court, what Pollock calls "the court's preparation to imputing a corporation its agent's 
act and intention" led to the commencement of corporate criminal liability in English 
Law. 
2.3. The Rules of Command or Consent, Vicarious Liability and Public Nuisance 
In the previous section, the early impediment to corporate criminal liability stemming 





Ibid. at pp. 1266-1267. The court also ordered forfeiture of the city charter, holding that the acts 
of the officials are to be the acts of the corporation. 
F. Pollock, "Has the Common Law Received the Fiction Theory of Corporations?" (1911) 27 Law 
Quarterly Review 219 at pp. 231-232 
Holdsworth, Vol. 9, supra note 15 at 51. 
See, for example, Western Bamk of Scotland v. Addie (1867) L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. App. at p. 167 
per Lord Cranworth. 
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from the nature of corporate personality was outlined. As seen in the case of the guo 
warranto proceedings against the City of London,47 this bar was not incorporated by the 
court to deny the body politic's liability for the misdeeds of its officers. The technique 
used by the court was vicarious liability, imputing the wrongful acts and intention of the 
agent to the corporation. To explore the origin of corporate liability, it may be useful 
to make a few remarks concerning both the history of the doctrine of respondeat 
superior in tort and the early cases in which liability was imputed to corporate bodies 
in English law. 
According to Francis B. Sayer,48 the doctrine of respondeat superior (let the 
superior person answer) can be traced back to the time of Edward 1. At that time, this 
doctrine meant "the statutory liability of a public official for the misfeasance of his 
subordinate in the performance of a public duty.,,49 Between the fourteenth and 
eighteenth centuries,50 the reported cases hold that a master was rendered liable for his 
servant's act only when the master gave his servant an express command to commit the 
tortious act or gave his consent to it.51 In Kingston v. Booth, 52 the express command and 
consent rule was identified. 
"[1]f1 command my servant to do what is lawful, and he misbehave himself, or do more, 
I shall not answer for my servant, but my servant himself, for that it was his own act; 
otherwise, it was in the power of every servant to subject his master to what actions or 






F.B. Sayer, "Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another" (1930) 43 Harvard Law Review 689. 
Ibid. at 690 [footnote omitted]. 
Before the fourteenth century, there was a certain period during which a master was held liable 
for his slave's acts. This master's ancient liability, according to some historians, was far more 
severe than the present liability of the master for his servant's acts. For further details of the 
history of the doctrine of vicarious liability, see, for example, O.W. Holmes, "Agency" (1891) 4 
Harvard Law Review 345; lH. Wigmore, "Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History" (1894) 
7 Harvard Law Review 315; H.J. Laski, "The Basis of Vicarious Liability" (1916) 26 Yale Law 
Journal 105; R.S. Gruner, Corporate Crime and Sentencing (1994, The Michie Company, 
Virginia), §3.3.1. 
Sayer, ibid. at 691. 
(1685) 90 E.R. 105 (2 Skinner 228). 
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penalties he pleased.,,53 
At the end of the seventeenth century, however, Lord Holt modified the express 
command or consent rule. In light of the then commercial necessities, Lord Holt 
replaced the requirement of an express command or consent with a command implied 
from general authority in the following two important cases in 1690 and 1697. In Boson 
v. Sandford,54 goods were spoiled during transmission in a vessel owned by several 
proprietors and an action for the damage was brought against all the proprietors, rather 
than against the master of the vessel hired by them. It was declared by Lord Holt that 
the owners of the vessel who employed the master were to be held liable for his 
negligence in respect of the freight; "for whoever employs another is answerable for 
him, and undertakes for his care to all that make use ofhim.,,55 In Turberwill v. Stamp, 56 
a master was indicted for a fire kindled by his servant. The fire in question was driven 
by a storm into his neighbour's field. Lord Holt declared that: 
"[1]f a stranger set fIre to my house, and it bums my neighbour's house, no action will lie 
against me.... But if my servant throws dirt into the highway, I am indictable. So in this 
case if the defendant's servant kindled the fIre in the way of husbandry and proper for his 
employment, though he had no express command of his master, yet his master shall be 
liable to an action for damage done to another by the fIre; for it shall be intended, that the 
servant had authority from his master, it being for his master's benefIt.,,57 
The rule made by Lord Holt, which was supported by the ancient maxim that qui facit 
per alium facit per se (one who does something through the agency of another, does it 
by himself), transformed into the modem form of respondeat superior in the nineteenth 
century. The requirement of express command or consent disappeared, and the 







(1690) 91 E.R. 382 (2 Salkeld 440); 90 E.R. 125 (Skinner 277); 90 E.R. 377 (Comberbach 116); 
89 E.R. 427 (1 Show. K.B. 29); 87 E.R. 212 (3 Mod. 322); 90 E.R. 638 (Carthew 58); 83 E.R. 
678 (3 Lev. 258). 
(1690) 91 E.R. 382 (2 Salkeld 440). 
(1697) 90 E.R. 303 (Skinner 681); 90 E.R. 590 (Comberbach 459); 91 E.R. 1072 (1 Ld. Raym. 
264); 90 E.R. 846 (Carthew 425); 91 E.R. 13 (1 Salkeld 13); 88 E.R. 1228 (12 Mod. 152); 90 E.R. 
903 (Holt. K.B. 9) 
(1697) 91 E.R. 1072 at 1073 (1 Ld. Raym. 264 at 264-265). 
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requirement of "within the scope of employment."58 According to the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, "the principal is held liable for the acts of his agent committed 
within the scope of his employment and in the course of the business; the principal 
cannot escape liability even by proving that the tort was committed against his express 
command."59 This doctrine is often referred to as absolute liability, that is, liability 
without fault. 
On the other hand, the idea of liability for acts of another in criminal law has 
developed differently from respondeat superior. The early notion of criminal law was 
that one was not held liable for the criminal act of another unless he procured, 
commanded, or counselled them. The doctrine of respondeat superior was rejected in 
criminal law during the eighteenth century.60 Instead, the liability of one for the acts of 
another was determined by the degree of his participation.61 The different terminology 
is reflected in the two fields of law in the context of master-servant relationship. In 
criminal law, the act of the servant would not affect the liability of the master who did 
not command his servant to commit the offence, while it would in tort. Even when the 
master counselled or procured his servant to commit it, it is the servant in criminal law 
who must be treated as the principal, whilst in tort it is the master. It is for this reason 
that liability for acts of another in criminal law has an origin different from that in tort. 62 
Furthermore, unlike the law of torts, the requirement of the scope of the other's 
commands was exceedingly narrowly interpreted in criminal law. In Regina v. 
Saunders,63 for example, the scope of the command or procurement of the accessory was 







Ibid. at pp. 694-695. 
The term "causation" is used in Sayer's article. Ibid at pp. 694. According to his defmition of 
this term, causation may be proved either "(1) by authorization, procurement, incitation, or moral 
encouragement, or (2) by knowledge plus acquiescence." Ibid at 702. This defmition of what he 
calls causation is totally different from the modem meaning of the term. Therefore, the term 
"participation" is used by this thesis in this context. 
Sayer, ibid. at 694. 
(1575) 75 E.R. 705 (2 Plowden 473) 
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very narrowly restricted to apply to the accessory's liability. Saunders, who intended 
to kill his wife in order to marry another woman, consulted his friend Archer. Archer 
advised him to put an end to her life by poison, and bought the poison "arsenic and 
roseacre" for him. Saunders accordingly laced an apple with the lethal poisons and gave 
it to his wife. She ate a small part of it and, having felt ill, gave the rest to their three 
year old infant, whom neither Saunders intended to kill nor Archer advised him to kill. 
While their daughter was eating the poisonous apple in the Saunders' presence, 
Saunders did not offer to take it from her lest he should be suspected. As a 
consequence, the intended victim, Saunders' wife, recovered, but the daughter died of 
the poison two days later. 
Upon the daughter's death, Saunders was charged as principal and Archer as 
accessory to the murder. Saunders' conviction was not in doubt. The real issue was 
whether Archer could be convicted as accessory to the murder of Saunders' daughter, 
because "[f1or the offence which Archer committed was the aid and advice which he 
gave to Saunders, and that was only to kill his wife, and no other.,,64 By denying the 
probability that the murder of the daughter was "a thing consequential to the first act (of 
Saunders)", the judges concluded that Archer's "assent cannot be drawn further than he 
gave it, for the poisoning of the daughter is a distinct thing from that to which he was 
privy, and therefore he shall not be adjudged accessory to it.,,65 The decision of this case 
reflects the general principle of criminal law at that time: that the liability of participants 
to the principal crime is based strictly upon their express command or procurement. 
Further in 1730, the issue arose as to whether the rule of implied command, then 
being incorporated by Lord Holt into the law of torts, could apply in criminal cases. In 
Rex v. Huggins,66 the defendant Huggins was the warden of the Fleet and was in charge 
64 (1575) 75 E.R. 705 (2 Plowden 473) at pp. 708-709 (2 Plowden 475). Archer's conviction would 
not be doubtful in the following cases: (1) if the wife died; (2) if Archer also counselled poisoning 
the daughter; or (3) if Archer counselled Saunders to use the poison to make the wife gravely ill 
so that she died from its effects. On this point, see K.F. Brickey, "Corporate Criminal 
Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation" (1982) 60 Washington University Law 
Quarterly 393 [hereinafter cited as A Brief History] at 418, n.148 and n.149. 
65 (1575) 75 E.R. 705 at 709 (2 Plowden 473 at 475). 
66 (1730) 93 E.R. 915 (2 Strange 882) 
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of the care and custody of the prisoners. He was indicted as an aider and abetter for the 
murder of one of the prisoners which was committed by his deputy warden, Barnes. 
Barnes took one of the prisoners against his will, and carried him to a newly built room 
in the prison without fire, chamber-pot or closet stool, the walls being damp and 
unwholesome. The victim had been kept in the room until he contracted sickness and 
died. Huggins knew the awful conditions therein, but he neither had knowledge of, nor 
gave Barnes the command to, transfer the victim. The central issue was whether 
Higgins could be guilty of Barnes' acts. The court held that despite Barnes' guilty 
conviction for the murder, Huggins was not guilty. The decision of this case clearly 
denied the doctrine of respondeat superior in criminal law, as can be seen in the 
following remark by Raymond C.J.,: 
"It is a point not to be disputed, but that in criminal cases the principal is not answerable 
for the act of the deputy, as he is in civil cases; they must each answer for their own acts, 
and stand or fall by their own behaviour. All the authors that treat of criminal 
proceedings, proceed on the foundation of this distinction; that to affect the superior by 
the act of the deputy, there must be the command of the superior, which is not found in 
this case. ,,67 
The repudiation of the doctrine of respondeat superior and the requirement of the 
express command or consent rule in criminal law were repeatedly confirmed as a 
general rule by English courts in subsequent years,68 and were greeted favourably by 
English commentators.69 When applied to a corporation, the general rule led to an 
obvious conclusion: a corporation is not capable of giving command or consent and, 
accordingly, was generally exempted from criminalliability.70 One of the exceptions 
to the express command or consent rule was that a master was held liable for a public 




Per Lush, J. in The Queen v. Holbrook (1878) 4 Q.B.D. 42, at 46,47 and 51; per Cave, J. in 
Chisholm v. Doulton (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 736 at 741;per Collins, J. in Hardcastle v. Bielby [1892] 
1 Q.B. 709 at 712. See also Roberts v. Woodward (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 412 at 415; Pearks Gunston 
& Tee, Ltd. v. Ward [1902] 2 K.B. 1 at 11. 
See, for example, Welsh, supra note 13 at 348; C.R.N. Winn, "The Criminal Responsibility of 
Corporations" (1929) 3 Cambridge Law Journal 398, at pp. 405-415. 
T.J. Bernard, "The Historical Development of Corporate Criminal Liability" (1984) 22 
Criminology 3 at 6. 
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nuisance created by his servant, such as non-repair of roads, bridges or canals.71 The 
rest of this subsection is devoted to the historical development of the master's vicarious 









It has been said by some commentators that Rex v. Medley72 and The Queen v. 
Stephens 73 are the leading cases which established an exception to the express command 
or consent rule in criminal law. 74 In Rex v. Medly, the directors and workers of the 
Equitable Gas Company were indicted for conveying waste from its plant into the river 
Thames. The waste destroyed fish in the river and consequently deprived many 
fishermen of their livelihood. The effluent was described as "nasty stuff fit to poison 
a horse.,,75 The defendant directors of the company, the chairman, deputy chairman and 
the superintendent raised in defence their ignorance of the situation because they rarely 
visited the plant or interfered in the management of the works.76 The dumping of the 
sludge into the river "was only an expedient resorted to by the workmen,,77 as a 
consequence of the failure of the evaporation system designed to dispose of the refuse. 
They also argued that if the engineer had not established a mode of consuming the 
noxious matter by evaporation, "the company must have ceased for a time to light the 
distinct. ,,78 
The other exceptions are the master's vicarious or strict liability for his servant's criminal libel 
and statutory offence. Welsh, supra note 13 at pp. 348-350 ; Sayer, supra note 48 at pp. 708-714. 
Of these three exceptions, the emphasis in this chapter is placed both upon the public nuisance 
offence and upon statutory ones, since, as will be analysed later, it is considered to be the offences 
for which a corporation was held liable at first, and with which the limits of corporate liability had 
been extended to mens rea offences in English law. 
(1834) 172 E.R. 1246 (6 Car. & P. 292). 
(1866) L.R. 1 Q.B 702. 
See, for example, Sayer, supra note 48 at 708; Welsh, supra note 13 at 348, n.25; Brickey, A Brief 
History, supra note 64 at pp. 418-421. See also Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: 
Involuntary Manslaughter (1996, HMSO, London, Law Com. No. 237) [hereinafter cited as 
Legislating], p. 69. 
(1834) 172 E.R. 1246 at 1247 (6 Car. & P. 292 at 294). 








However, Denman C. J., in his instruction to the jury, held that the directors' 
ignorance of what had been done made no difference, provided that they gave authority 
to the others to operate the plant. "[I]fpersons for their own advantage employ servants 
to conduct works [sic], they must be answerable for what is done by those servants.,,79 
Consequently, the directors (chairman, deputy chairman and superintendant) and 
engineer were found guilty by the jury for the nuisance charge, but workers employed 
by them were not. 
In another nuisance case, The Queen v. Stephens,80 the defendant, an owner of 
a slate quarry, was indicted for obstructing the navigation of the Tivy River by virtue of 
his workmen having thrown slate stone and rubbish into the river. Since he was eighty 
years old and unable personally to superintend the working of the quarry, the business 
was managed for his benefit by his son. He was prepared to offer evidence that the 
employees had been prohibited by both himself and his son from depositing the rubbish 
in the river. The court, however, held the defendant liable for public nuisance on the 
basis that a principle concerning civil cases was applicable, since the proceeding in this 
case was criminal in form, albeit essentially civil in nature. The principle was that a 
master was held liable for his servant's wrongful conduct provided the servant acted in 
the scope of his employment, even if the conduct was against the master's orders.81 
Mellor J. held that: 
"Inasmuch as the object of the indictment is not to punish the defendant, but really to 
prevent the nuisance from being continued, I think that the evidence which would support 
a civil action would be sufficient to support an indictment. ,,82 
As for the nature of the indictment in this case, Blackburn J. also declared that: 
"[W]here a person maintains works by his capital, and employs servants, and so carries 
on the works as in fact to cause a nuisance to a private right, for which an action would 
lie, if the same nuisance inflicts an injury upon a public right the remedy for which would 
be by indictment, the evident which would maintain the action would also support the 
Ibid. at 1250 (6 Car. & P. 292 at 299). 
(1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 702. 
Per Mellor J. in ibid. at pp. 708-709. 









The reason why in this case the indictment, proceedings of which were criminal, lay 
against the defendant is that the nuisance, "instead of being merely a nuisance 
affecting .... individuals, affects the public at large, and no private individual, without 
receiving some special injury, could have maintained an action. ,,84 More noteworthy is 
the remark by Blakbum, J. in this case that "the general rule that a principal is not 
criminally answerable for the act of his agent" in criminal law was not infringed by this 
case.
85 As Welsh argued, "although the exception seems to be established, it is regarded 
as anomalous, and the Courts have shown no disposition to extend it. ,,86 
Before these cases, however, the master's vicarious liability for public nuisance 
had already been accepted and established by English courts in the corporate context 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 87 During this period, the inhabitants 
of local governmental units, such as boroughs, municipalities, parishes, counties and the 
like which were called "quasi-corporate entities" or "quasi-municipal corporations,,,88 
were held liable for creating a public nuisance if the local officials failed to repair a 
public convenience. The failure of these corporate entities to maintain roads, waterways 
or bridges was viewed at law as a breach of the common law duty, that is, a nuisance 
Ibid. 
Per Mellor J., supra note 81. 
Per Blackburn J., supra note 80 at 710. 
Welsh, supra note 13 at 348. 
See, for example, Bridges & Bichol's Case (1623) 78 E.R. 204 (Godb. 346); King v. The Mayor 
& Commonality of London (1632) 79 E.R. 920 (Cro. Car. 252); The Case of Langforth Bridge 
(1635) 79 E.R. 919 (Cro. Car. 365); King v. Mayor & Burgesses of Warwick (1682) 89 E.R. 890 
(2 Show. 201); The Queen v. Inhabitants of Cluworth (1705) 87 E.R. 920 (6 Mod. 163); The 
Queen v. Saintiff (1705) 87 E.R. 1002 (2 Mod. 256); Regina v. Inhabitants of Com. Wilts (1705) 
91 E.R. 313 (1 Salkeld 359); Rex v. Inhabitantes Civitatis Norwichi (1718) 93 E.R. 458 (1 Stra. 
177); King v. Inhabitants ofthe West Riding of Yorkshire (1770) 96 E.R. 401 (2 Black. W. 684). 
Barnett, supra note 18 at 289. For the history of the development of corporations before the 
nineteenth century, see, in particular, S. Williston, "History of the Law of Business: Corporations 
before 1800" (1888) 2 Harvard Law Review 105, 149 
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abatable by criminal proceedings.89 This exception to the command or consent rule in 
the criminal law is said to be the original source for criminal liability of corporations in 
English law.90 The indictments of public corporations for nuisance offences continued 
to be prosecuted until mid-nineteenth century.91 
At the tum of the nineteenth century, a wave of incorporation of a number of 
large corporate bodies took place as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution in 
Britain. In particular, the advent of the railroads led private business corporations to be 
set up under private acts.92 These corporations were chartered to construct and maintain 
public facilities such as transportation, and were directly comparable to the local 
governmental units prior to the nineteenth century in England, which assumed the 
municipal duties to maintain and repair bridges, canals and roads.93 It followed that the 
next step was to hold private business corporations liable for public nuisance offences 
when they failed in their duties to maintain public facilities. At first, a railway company 
was held liable for non-feasance in The Queen v. Birmingham & Gloucester Railway 
89 It is interesting to note that the master-servant relationship in old cases were ascertained by the 
English courts between such a public corporation and its individual local officials. The reason 





"In decisions imposing liability on such public entities, the courts ordinarily observed that 
the public convenience in question (usually a bridge or road) had been erected before the 
present inhabitants had taken on the responsibilities of the town, parish, or county; that it 
had been maintained by former inhabitants; and that present inhabitants were bound to do 
the same. The corporation was responsible for making the needed repairs before the present 
mayor, aldermen, and burgesses became its directors, and the duty to repair followed the 
corporation, not its former members." 
Brickey, A Brief History, supra note 64 at 402. See also Bernard, supra note 70 at 6. 
Bernard, ibid. 
For cases reported during the nineteenth century, see, for example, King v. Mayor of Liverpool 
(1802) 102 E.R. 529 (3 East 348); King v. Mayor of Stratford upon Avon (1811) 104 E.R. 636 
(14 East 348); King v. Seven & Wye Ry. (1819) 106 E.R. 501 (2 B. & Ald. 646); Henry v. The 
Mayor & Burgesses of Lyme Regis (1828) 130 E.R. 995 (5 Bing. 91), (1934) 131 E.R. 1103 (1 
Bing (N.C.) 222; Wilkes v. Hungerdord Market Company (1835) 132 E.R. 110 (2 Bing (N.C.) 
282); Queen v. The Mayor & C. of the City of Lincoln (1838) 112 E.R. 760 (8 AD. & E. 65); 
Queen v. The Eastern Counties Railway Company (1839) 113 E.R. 201 (10 AD. & E. 531). 
For the legislative development concerning corporate liability during this period, see Leigh, 
Criminal Liability, supra note 7 at pp. 20-22. 
Bernard, supra note 70 at 7. See also C. Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (1993, 








Company.94 A railway company was indicted for disobeying an order of the justices 
which had been confirmed at the Quarter Sessions, for constructing a bridge over a road. 
Parke B. pointed out that the only difficulty in this case was how the company was to 
appear on Assize,95 and ordered the removal of the indictment by certiorari to the 
Queen's Bench. In the Queen's Bench, counsel for the corporation put in a demurrer 
that a corporation could not be indicted,96 as pointed out in the Case of Sutton's 
Hospital97 and by Chief Justice Holt in an Anonymous case. 98 Patteson J., relying upon 
precedents concerning the public corporation's liability for nuisance, overruled this 
demurrer and stated: 
"What the nature of the offence was to which the observation [of Holt c.J.] was intended 
to apply does not appear; and as a general proposition it is opposed to a number of cases, 
which shew that a corporation may be indicted for breach of a duty imposed upon it by 
law, though not for a felony, or crimes involving personal violence, as for riots or 
assaults. ,,99 
What was established from this case was the indictment of a business corporation for 
non-feasance. 100 During the middle of the nineteenth century, "a brief hesitation was 
shown by the courts [in the US.] in extending the criminal liability [of corporations for 
(1842) 114 E.R. 492 (3 Q.B. 222). See also Regina v. The Binningham & Gloucester Railway 
Company (1840) 173 E.R. 915 (9 Car. & P. 469). 
(1840) 173 E.R. 915 at 916 (9 Car. & P. 469 at 470). If the indictment were in the Court of 
Queen's Bench, the company would appear by attorney. 
(1842) 114 E.R. 492 at 493 (3 Q.B. 222 at 225). 
See supra text accompanying notes 18 and 19. 
See supra text accompanying note 35. 
(1842) 114 E.R. 492 at 496 (3 Q.B. 222 at 232). 
100 Patteson J. admitted that the avoidance of the requirement of personal appearance by corporations 
at sessions "may indeed impose some difficulty upon the prosecutor, and render his proceeding 
more circuitous, as he will be obliged to remove the indictment by certiorari into this Court in 
order to make it effective". "[B]ut the liability ofthe corporation is not affected." Ibid. (3 Q.B. 
232 at 233). The "circuitous" problem was solved by Summary Jurisdiction Act, c. 49, allowing 
a company to be brought before a court of summary jurisdiction by its attorney. Later, section 33 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 extended the removal of this procedural obstacle to the case of 
trial on an indictment, by providing that a corporation may appear and plead through its 
representative. 
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non-feasance] to misfeasance."lOl Frederic P. Lee observes that the American courts' 
adherence to the distinction between non-feasance and misfeasance as to corporate 
criminal liability was based upon "a vague feeling that their artificial persons can be 
more easily conceived of as failing to act than having the physical body necessary, for 
example, to carry logs with which to obstruct rivers and highway."lo2 As compared to 
American situations mentioned above, this argument against corporate liability for 
misfeasance, what Lee calls the "quixotic battle,,,lo3 did not last for a long time in 
English law. In The Queen v. Great North of England Railway,104 a railway company 
was indicted for misfeasance in cutting through and obstructing a public highway with 
its railway line, which did not satisfy the statutory provisions. The corporation's 
defence was to distinguish between a misfeasance and a non-feasance, arguing that an 
indictment against a company would not lie in relation to the former. lo5 Lord Denman 
found, however, that a clear line between an omission and a positive act was not always 







Lee, supra note 23 at 5, examining some American cases where corporate criminal liability for 
misfeasance was refused during this period. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. n.! O. Unfortunately, this quixotic battle is replayed in the Law Commission, Criminal Law, 
Involuntary Manslaughter (Consultation Paper No. 135) (1994, HMSO, London) [hereinafter cited 
as Consultation Paper], para. 5.77., stating: 
"It is in our view much easier to say that a corporation, as such, has failed to do something, 
or has failed to meet a particular standard of conduct than it is to say that a corporation has 
done a positive act, or has entertained a particular subjective state of mind." 
An erroneous point made by the Law Commission lies in its vagueness in distinguishing between 
a positive act and an omission in criminal law. This point will be critically analysed in Chapter 
5. 
(1846) 115 E.R. 1294 (9 Q.B. 315). 
Ibid. at 1297 (9 Q.B. 315 at 323), arguing that: 
"For a nonfeasance there would be no other remedy, except in the cases where mandamus 
lies, inasmuch as the omission cannot be the omission of any particular individual: but 
where an indictable act is done, the individual doing it may be indicted, and so may any 
individual members ofthe corporation who have given the illegal command." 
What is apparent in this extract is that it was, and it is believed, as suggested in supra note 103, 
that a corporation is only capable of an omission offence; that is, a positive act can only be done 
by individual members ofthe company. 
"If A. is authorised to make a bridge with parapets, but makes it without them, does the offence 
consist in the construction of the unsecured bridge, or in the neglect to secure it?" Ibid. at 1298 
(9 Q.B. 315 at 325). 
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erecting a bar across a public road as with the non-repair of it; and they may well be 
compelled to pay a fine for the act as for the omission."lo7 It was also for this reason 
that Lord Denman held that, even if it were possible to distinguish the two, there was 
no legal reason why a corporation should be liable for the one type of offence and not 
for the other. 
Finding it impossible to adhere to a logical distinction between a non-feasance 
and a misfeasance, Lord Denman extended the limits of corporate criminal liability from 
the former to the latter. The background for this extension can be explained by public 
policies imposing criminal liability upon corporations as well as individuals under the 
development of vicarious liability for torts during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. lOS Lord Denman goes on to state: 
"[T]he public knows nothing of the former [individuals who concur in voting the order]; 
and the latter [ones who concur in executing the work], if they can be identified, are 
commonly persons of the lowest rank, wholly incompetent to make reparation for the 
injury. There can be no effectual means for deterring from an oppressive exercise of 
power for the purpose of gain, except the remedy by an indictment against those who truly 
commit it, that is, the corporation acting by its majority: and there is no principle which 
places them beyond the reach of the law for such proceedings."lo9 
As Leonard H. Leigh points out, Lord Denman might expect that imposing liability upon 
the corporation could foster a check by shareholders of the company on corporate 
management, which is quite similar to the rationale for the imposition of vicarious 
liability upon a master for his servant in tort "that the master was responsible for the 
actions of his servants because he had the selection ofthem."llo 
The scope of corporate liability for non-feasance was extended to misfeasance 
in the case of Great North of England, and general corporate liability for public nuisance 





Ibid. (9 Q.B. 315 at 326). 
Leigh, Criminal Liability, supra note 7 at 17. During this period, corporate liability had been 
accepted for trover, trespass and negligence. Lord Denman also referred to a case of trespass in 
which a corporation was held liable. Ibid. 
Ibid. A similar account is taken of in G.F. Canfield, "Corporate Responsibility for Crime" (1914) 
14 Columbia Law Review 469 at pp. 472-473. 
Leigh, Criminal Liability, supra note 7 at 19. 
public nuisance in English law until the middle of the nineteenth century was premised 
upon a mixture of two parallel liability models whose development then concurred with 
each other: an individual master's vicarious liability for his servants' tort and the 
liability of quasi-municipal corporations to maintain and repair the public facility.III 
Although still considered fictitious and, thus, incapable of criminal conduct and mental 
states of its own, a corporation was not viewed in the history of English law as "so 
abstract, impalpable or metaphysical"II2 that it could not be deemed comparable to an 
individual principal or master in the case of public nuisance. This helped for the 
analogous approach between individual master's liability for his servant's tort and 
liability of a corporate "master" for nuisance. Furthermore, in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the role which the governmental units used to play to maintain 
transportation had been taken over by private corporations in England. I 13 Especially, 
when railroad corporations were chartered to construct and maintain transportation 
facilities, the emphasis on the maintenance and responsibility of them was transferred 
from the governmental units to private corporations. 
On the other hand, new limits were also established in the case of Great North 
of England. Lord Denman concluded that corporations could not be guilty of treason, 
felony, perjury, offences against the person or acts of immorality, by stating: 
"These plainly derive their character from the corrupted mind of the person committing 
them, and are violations of the social duties that belong to men and subjects. A 
corporation, which, as such, has no such duties, cannot be guilty in these cases: but they 
may be guilty as a body corporate of commanding acts to be done to the nuisance of the 
community at large."II4 
In other words, a new distinction concerning corporate liability was drawn between 





Wells, supra note 93 at 98. 
Welsh, supra note 13 at 347. 
Bernard, supra note 70 at pp. 6. 
(1846) 115 E.R. 1294 at 1298 (9 Q.B. 315 at 326). Later, this statement was referred to in Cory 
Brothers. Ltd. [1927] 1 K.B. 810, the fIrst case in which a corporation was indicted for 
manslaughter in English law. Factual backgrounds of this case will be examined in the next 
chapter. 
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offences, it was not any member of the corporation, but the corporation itself on which 
a legal (and absolute) duty was imposed by law to maintain and repair the public facility. 
Therefore, it was not necessary for the court to deal with the issue of corporate capacity 
for mental states. Whether or not a corporation was capable of its own mental states, 
a corporation could absolutely be held liable for public nuisance offences. It is for this 
reason that the liability of corporations for crimes not involving mens rea was firmly 
established in the first half of the twentieth century. 
2.4. Corporate Criminal Liability for Strict Liability Offences 
At the end of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century, a steady 
extension of corporate criminal liability was observed. With the accomplishment of the 
Industrial Revolution and the rapid development of a capitalistic economy, various kinds 
of social problems occurred, and state intervention to solve them was thought necessary. 
As a result, with the increasing need for the regulation of social life, numerous statutes 
were codified. Furthermore, since the stock company legislation was established with 
the codification of the Companies Acts of 1863, the number of business entities taking 
corporate form dramatically increased. This caused business corporations to start 
assuming critical roles in most fields of enterprise. Accordingly, most of these statutes 
were necessarily concerned with corporate business activities and subjected them to 
regulation. I 15 
To begin with, public nuisance offences, which played an important part in 
holding public and private corporations liable in the last century, not only became 
subject to the intervention of equity in granting injunctions to restrain public nuisance 
but were also transformed into summary conviction offences. A number of statutes 
(called "clauses acts") were codified during the middle of nineteenth century for the 
purpose of regulating the activities of corporations carrying out public utility functions 
such as railway and gas works. 116 
115 
116 
Leigh, supra note 7 at 21. 
Leigh, ibid., referring to the Gasworks Clauses Act 1847, the Town Improvement Clauses Act 
1847, the Waterworks Clauses Act 1847, the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847, the 
Cemeteries Clauses Act 1847 and the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act 1845. 
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Moreover, the general principle of criminal law was forced to change under the 
influence of the comprehensive introduction of new types of liability: that is, strict 
liability and vicarious liability.117 Most offences provided by these newly codified 
statutes were not considered by the English court to be real crimes, but quasi-criminal 
acts similar in nature to public nuisance offences. 118 More specifically, these "public 
welfare offences" did not require proof of mens rea on the part of the offender for two 
reasons: (l) the penalties for this type of crime were petty fines; and (2) the express 
provision of the statute requiring the proof of mental states or fault was omitted by the 
legislature. 119 Moreover, as the new statutes were aimed at regulating various kinds of 
economic activities, their applicability to business corporations, as employers taking 
vicarious responsibility for their servant's violative acts, was taken for granted. 120 Under 
the vicarious liability doctrine, neither the proof of the corporate employer's mens rea 
nor conduct were strictly required; instead, only the proof of its employee's violative 
conduct sufficed for holding a company vicariously liable. 
Most important of all for the expansion of corporate liability during this time is 
the definition of "person" in the Interpretation Act 1889 Section 2 (1), prescribing " ... the 
expression 'person' shall, unless the contrary intention appears, include a body 
corporate." 121 The inclusion of corporations in "person" contained in statutes certainly 






For detailed outlines of some significant changes in criminal law between the latter half of the 
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, see, for example, L. Hall, "The 
Substantive Law of Crimes - 1887-1936" (1937) 50 HarvardLaw Review 616; A.1. Harno, "Some 
Significant Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure in the Last Century" (1951) 42 Journal 
of Criminal Law, Criminology & Police Science 427. 
See, for example, Sherras v. De Rutzen [1895] 1 Q.B. 928 at 932. 
For a full account of the formative period of strict liability or public welfare offences, see, for 
example, F.B. Sayer, "Public Welfare Offenses" [hereinafter cited as Public Welfare Offenses] 
(1933) 33 Columbia Law Review 55; R.A. Wasserstrom, "Strict Liability in the Criminal Law" 
(1960) 12 Stanford Law Review 732; C. Manchester, "The Origin of Strict Criminal 
Responsibility" (1977) 6 Anglo-American Law Review 227; L.H. Leigh, Strict and Vicarious 
Liability: A Study in Administrative Criminal Law [hereinafter cited as Strict & Vicarious 
Liability] (1982, Sweet & Maxwell, London) pp. 11-18. 
For the formative period of vicarious liability, see Leigh, Strict & Vicarious Liability, ibid. at pp. 
18-24; Sayer, Public Welfare Offenses, ibid. 
Leigh, Criminal Liability, supra note 7 at pp. 22-23. 
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time. 122 It is likely that the following remark of Lord Blackburn in Pharmaceutical 
Society v. London & Provincial Supply Association influenced the legislation of this 
Act: 
" ... But a corporation may be fined ... If you could get over the first difficulty of saying that 
the word "person" [contained in 31 & 32 Vict. C.121, s.l (the Pharmacy Act)] here may 
be construed to include an artificial person, a corporation, I should not have the least 
difficulty upon those other grounds which have been suggested.,,123 
The issue of whether a corporation was included in the word "person," which appeared 
in the statute, was also considered by the English court in Pearks Gunston & Tee v. 
Ward. 124 The focal point in this case was whether the term "person" contained in 
Section 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875 included corporations. The 
affirmative answer was submitted by Channel J. The reasoning of his judgement seems 
to place special emphasis upon the distinction between strict liability offences and mens 




" ... But there are exceptions to this rule [that a corporation cannot be guilty of a criminal 
offence involving mens rea] in the case of quasi-criminal offences, as they may be termed, 
that is to say, where certain acts are forbidden by law under a penalty, possibly even under 
a personal penalty, such as imprisonment, at any rate in default of payment of a fine; and 
the reason for this is, that the Legislature has thought it so important to prevent the 
Leonard H. Leigh may disagree with this point. See ibid. at 23, stating: 
"[N]o writer of authority writing at that time when the Interpretation Act was passed 
contemplated that the effect of the section would be to extend liability for all, or even most 
statutory offences, to corporations. Nor was such a possibility contemplated by the judges." 
[Footnotes omitted] 
However, it cannot be denied that such legislative or interpretative steps made it easier for the then 
judges to apply the doctrines of strict liability or vicarious liability to corporations. Considering 
that in most jurisdictions in which corporate criminal liability is accepted, the inclusion of 
corporations in "person" provided in laws was the first step to deal with the issue of corporate 
criminal liability in criminal law. The importance of the existence of an express provision of 
corporate liability cannot be overemphasised. See, for example, Article 121-2 of the New French 
Penal Code; Article 51 of the Dutch Criminal Code. This point is more clearly indicated by an 
American scholar, Elkins, supra note 14 at pp. 98-99, as follows: 
"Today, both state and federal criminal law are statutory in origin. Thus, courts called upon 
to impose corporate criminal liability will generally consider as a threshold question 
whether the statute which creates the offense charged contemplates corporate wrongdoing. 
The criminal statute involved may, by its terms, expressly apply to corporations and in such 
cases the courts have little difficulty in imposing liability." [Footnotes omitted] 
(1880) 5 A.C. 857 at 860-870, referred to in supra note 20. It is noteworthy that before the 
Interpretation Act 1889 was codified, the Lord Brougham's Act 1850 excluded corporations from 
the defmition of the term "person". 
[1902] 2 K.B. 1, referred to in supra note 34. 
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particular act from being committed that it absolutely forbids it to be done; and if it is done 
the offender is liable to a penalty whether he had any mens rea or not, and whether or not 
he intended to commit a breach of the law. Where the act is of this character then the 
master, who in fact, has done the forbidden thing through his servant, is responsible and 
is liable to a penalty. There is no reason why he should not be, because the very object 
of the Legislature was to forbid the thing absolutely. It seems to me that exactly the same 
principle applies in the case of a corporation. If it does the act which is forbidden it is 
liable." 125 
As hinted at in the last two sentences of the above extract, the corporation was in effect 
considered to be analogous to an individual master; this enabled it to incur vicarious 
liability for this servant's "absolutely forbidden" conduct. Similar to the case of public 
nuisance, an absolutely forbidden act means that a legal duty is imposed by statute upon 
a corporation, as a master, to prevent that act from being carried out by its servants. The 
issue of why a breach of such duty constitutes a criminal offence was addressed by the 
court more than a decade before this case. In The Queen v. Tyler & the International 
Commercial Co. Ltd.,126 an issue at point was whether the proceedings before the 
magistrate against a joint stock company for the recovery of penalties under Section 27 
of the Companies Act 1862 was a criminal cause or matter. The defendant corporation 
argued that the proceeding was not criminal, since a corporation could neither be guilty 
of a criminal act nor have a mens rea. The reasoning expounded by Bowen L.J. in 
answering this issue in the affirmative helps account for the development of corporate 




"It was ... contended on behalf of the appellant that no criminal proceedings can be taken 
against a company... It would seem contrary to sound sense and reason, if such a technical 
objection could succeed. Where, for instance, a statute creates a duty upon individual 
persons, it would be a strange result if the duty could be evaded by those persons forming 
themselves into a joint stock company. The point becomes still more incapable of 
argument where the statute prescribes the duty in the company itself. How can 
disobedience to the enactment by the company be otherwise dealt with? The directors or 
officers of the company, who are really responsible for the neglect of the company to 
comply with the statutory requirements, might not be stuck at by the statute, and there 
would be no way of enforcing the law against a disobedient company, unless there were 
in such cases a remedy by way of indictment. It may, therefore, I think, be taken that 
Ibid. at 11. Legislative emphasis in absolutely prohibiting certain conduct is on administrative 
convenience rather than the importance of the forbidden conduct itself. Burrows, supra note 18 
at 15. 
[1891] 2 Q.B. 588. 
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where a duty is imposed upon a company in such a way that a breach of the duty amounts 
to a disobedience of the law, then, if there is nothing in the statute either expressly or 
impliedly to the contrary, a breach of the statute is an offence which can be visited upon 
the company by means of an indictment.,,127 
It is apparent from this reasoning that the English courts attempted to hold both a 
company and an individual equally liable. Otherwise, any individual member of the 
corporation would easily escape criminal liability in cases where a "person" in the 
statute was a corporation. As a matter of fact, when the courts applied the doctrine of 
vicarious liability to the case of the corporate defendant, it did not matter whether the 
breach of a duty imposed by law upon a corporation was civil or criminal in nature. 
What did matter to them was how to hold a master vicariously liable for the acts of his 
servant even when he had neither authorised nor expressly forbidden those acts. There 
was no reason for the courts to refrain from holding the company vicariously liable 
when they found the indictment against the company was the only effective way for the 
enforcement of the statute. 
Since the cases of Pearks Gunston and Tyler, English courts had held 
corporations for indictment of nuisance, 128 offences under the Factories Acts, 129the Sales 
of Food and Drugs Acts,130 the Public Health Acts, 13l the Coal Mines Regulation Acts, 132 
and the Merchandise Marks Act. 133 In these cases, the issue of whether or not corporate 
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for instance, a corporation was charged with a violation of the Sales of Food and Drugs 
Acts 1899. Although the offence at issue did not require mens rea, there was a defence 
provided in Section 20 of the Act that when "he gave the warranty he had reason to 
believe that the statements or descriptions contained therein were true." It was 
contended by the defendant corporation that since the exempting clause made an 
innocent belief a defence, the offence could only be committed by a defendant who was 
capable of mens rea, and that a corporation not being so capable could not therefore 
commit the offence. 135 The magistrate held in favour of the defendant corporation that 
it was not liable under the section because such a defence could not be open to it. 
However, the Divisional Court held the contrary, on the ground that the interpretation 
of "the person" in the section made by the magistrate which excluded the corporation 
was too narrow. Lord Alverstone C.l. held that: 
"There is no reason why a warranty should not be given by a corporation. It can give a 
warranty through its agents, and through its agents it can believe or not believe, as the case 
may be, that the statements in the warranty are true. A similar point has been raised in 
cases concerning the liability of a corporation in actions which, in the case of an 
individual, would involve an inquiry into a state of mind, such as fraud, libel, or malicious 
prosecution. It is well settled that a corporation may be liable in all those actions.,,136 
The crucial point in the reasoning cited above is that the mental states including the 
exculpatory belief were determined by corporate agents, not by the corporation itself. 
The doctrine for this imputation of the state of mind of an agent to a principal, which 
was used by the court, clearly referred to the vicarious liability method in tort.137 The 
troublesome issue of how a corporation itself can entertain its own mental states was not 
addressed in this case. What was important to the court was the social fact that the 
warranty in question could be given not only by an individual but by the corporation 
through its agents. While the theoretical justification for the imputation of the mental 
states of corporate agents to the corporation in criminal law was evaded, the court 
attached importance to the social reality that various kinds of business had been 
135 Ibid. at 834. 
136 Ibid. at 836. 
137 The liability of corporations for tort involving malice was well established by the English court 
at the early stage ofthe twentieth century. See Leigh, supra note 7 at 22. 
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conducted in the corporate form since the tum of the twentieth century. 138 The 
conceptual obstacle that a corporation is not capable of mens rea, adhered to by lawyers 
and courts until the nineteenth century, was undermined by this case. 
The following civil case may provide a good example of how English courts 
dealt with the issue of imputation of the state of mind of corporate agents to the 
corporation. In Citizen's Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Brown,139 the defendant company 
was held civilly liable for libels published by its agents. Lord Lindley denied the 
argument of counsel for the company that malice cannot be imputed to the company, 
and delivered the opinion of the Privy Council. 
"If it is once granted that corporations are for civil purposes to be regarded as persons, i.e., 
as principals acting by agents and servants, it is difficult to see why the ordinary doctrines 
of agency and of master and servant are not to be applied to corporations as well as to 
ordinary individuals.... To talk about imputing malice to corporations appears to their 
Lordships to introduce metaphysical subtleties which are needless and fallacious. If [one 
of the corporate agents] published the libel complained of in the course of his 
employment, the company are liable for it on ordinary principles of agency. ,,140 
The reasoning developed by Lord Lindley is quite simple: when the imputation of the 
acts of corporate agents is acknowledged according to the principle of agency, there is 
no reason why the imputation of their mental states to the corporation cannot be 
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"As for the question, 'utrum universitas delinquere possit [whether corporations can 
commit crime],' our modem way has been to circumvent it. The real difficulty was to 
make out how any man, any natural man, could be vicariously liable to pay damages for 
the wrongful act or negligence of his servant, which he had in no way authorized and 
might even have expressly forbidden. When this was overcome, the difficulty of ascribing 
wrongful intention to an artificial person was in truth only a residue of anthropomorphic 
imagination.,,141 
Another example for the application of the doctrine of vicarious liability to the 
corporation is to be found in Mousell Brothers Ltd. v. London & North-Western 
Railway CO. 142 In this case, a corporation was charged with giving a false account with 
intent to avoid payment of railway tolls, which amounted to the violation of Section 98 
of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845. This illegal conduct was actually done 
by a corporate employee and branch manager. The main point at issue was whether or 
not the legislative purpose of this statute was aimed at holding a company, as well as an 
individual principal, liable for its servant's act. Considering the object of the statute, the 
words used, the nature of the duty laid down, the person upon whom it was imposed, the 
person by whom it would in ordinary circumstances be performed, and the person upon 
whom the penalty was imposed, the court held that the legislative intent of the statute 
was to impose liability for the prescribed "quasi-criminal act" upon the principal when 
his servant committed the absolutely forbidden conduct within the scope of his 
employment. 143 As for an intent to avoid payment, which was necessary to constitute 
the offence, Atkin J. viewed the intent as that of the servant who "has to deal with the 
particular matter,,,144 whilst the penalty is imposed upon the owner of the servant. In 
other words, the principal was held absolutely liable for such quasi-criminal acts of his 
servant as long as his servant had the required mens rea. Once mens rea on the part of 
the principal was considered unnecessary, the court saw no difficulty in holding that a 
corporation was exactly in the same position as an individual principal. 
The same reasoning for the imposition of vicarious liability upon a corporation 
141 Pollock, supra note 44 at 235. 
142 [1917] 2 K.B. 836. 
143 Per Lord Reading C.J., ibid. at 845. 
144 Per Atkin J., ibid. at 846. 
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was extended by the court to statutory offences involving proof of mental states. In a 
notorious case, Moore v. I. Bressler Ltd,145 the limits of corporate criminal liability were 
widened in the extreme. A corporation was charged with a violation of Section 35 (2) 
of the Finance (No.2) Act 1940 when its two officials, the secretary and general 
manager of the Nottingham branch and the sales manager of that branch, sold certain 
goods of the corporation with fraudulent intent to keep proceeds of the sale for 
themselves. Certain false returns were then made by them in respect of purchase tax on 
the sales. The corporation was convicted but on appeal to Quarter Sessions the 
convictions were discharged by the Recorder on the ground that the sales in fraud of the 
corporation had been made by the officials. The Recorder's decision was later reversed 
by the Divisional Court. At the Divisional Court, the central issue to be addressed was 
whether the two corporate officials acted within the scope of the authority of the 
corporation, rather than whether their conduct was done to benefit the corporation. Lord 
Caldecote C.J. held: 
"These two men were important officials of the company, and when they made statements 
and rendered returns which were proved in this case, they were clearly making those 
statements and giving those returns as the officers of the company, the proper officers to 
make the returns. Their acts, therefore, ... were the acts of the company.,,146 
There had been similar authority before the decision in the Moore case was decided. 147 
Nevertheless, commentators have criticised the Moore case for extending the limits of 
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held liable for offences involving mens rea in D.P.P. v. Kent & Sussex Contractors 
Ltd. 150 In this case, a corporation was indicted for a violation of the Defence (General) 
Regulations 1939, reg. 82, when, for the purpose of obtaining petrol coupons, it sent to 
the appropriate authority on the prescribed fonn a fortnightly vehicle record containing 
a falsification, which was signed by the transport manager. The Glamorgan Justices 
dismissed the infonnation on the ground that a corporation could not be guilty of the 
offences involving an act of will or state of mind, which could not be imputed to a 
corporation. This decision was reversed by a Divisional Court. Although having 
reached the same conclusion that the corporation was guilty of the offences as charged, 
each Judge held the different reasons for it. The reasoning of Hellett J. seems to place 
emphasis on the analogy between corporate vicarious liability for tort and corporate 
criminal liability for offences involving intention. 
"[T]here has been a development in the attitude of the courts arising from the large part 
played in modem times by limited liability companies. At one time the existence, and 
later the extent and conditions of such body's liability in tort was a matter of doubt, due 
partly to the theoretical difficulty of imputing wrongful acts or omissions to a fictitious 
person, and it required a long series of decisions to clear up the position. Similarly, the 
liability of a body corporate for crimes was at one time a matter of doubt, partly owing to 
the theoretical difficulty of imputing a criminal intention to a fictitious person and partly 
to technical difficulties of procedure. Procedure has received attention from the 
legislature, as for instance, in s. 33 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1925, and the theoretical 
difficulty of imputing criminal intention is no longer felt to the same extent.,,151 
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a "'corporate" person, both of whom incur statutory duties to furnish honest information 
in order to obtain petrol coupons. Thus, if a corporation, furnishing dishonest 
information, was able to escape the liability which would be incurred by an individual 
employer in a similar case, it would be considered "strange and undesirable."152 It is 
clear that this reasoning rendered the corporation vicariously liable for the act and 
mental states of its transport manager. 
The reasoning by McNaghten l. was also concerned with corporate vicarious 
liability, considering that the issue addressed by him was whether the knowledge of the 
transport manager regarding the false returns could be imputed to the corporation. 
"[A] body corporate is a "person" to whom, among other attributes which it may possess, 
there should be imputed that of a mind capable of having knowledge and of forming an 
intention... It is true that a corporation can only have knowledge and form an intention 
through its human agents, but circumstances may be such that the knowledge and intention 
of the agent must be imputed to the body corporate... If the responsible agent of a 
company, acting within the scope of his authority, puts forward on its behalf a document 
which he knows to be false and by which he intends to deceive, ... his knowledge and 
intention must be imputed to the company.,,153 
In considering whether the knowledge of the transport manager could be imputed to the 
corporation, however, this reasoning appears to limit the human agent, whose intent and 
action should be imputed to the corporation, to "the responsible agent." Whilst any 
reason why the acts and mental states of such an agent could be imputed to the 
corporation was neither submitted nor clarified, the difference should be identified in 
this reasoning between corporate vicarious liability for the act and state of mind of a 
mere agent and corporate personal liability for the act and intention of the responsible 
agent. The difference between a mere agent and the responsible agent was more 
conspicuously mentioned in the reasoning of Caldecote C.l. 
"[T]he real point which we have to decide ... is ... whether a company is capable of an act 
of will or a state of mind, so as to be able to form an intention to deceive or to have 
knowledge of the truth or falsity of a statement.. .. [A ]lthough the directors or general 
manager of a company are its agents, they are something more. A company is incapable 
of acting or speaking or even of thinking except in so far as its officers have acted, spoken 
or thought.... The officers are the company for this purpose... The offences created by the 
152 Ibid. at 158. 
153 Per McNaghten J., ibid at 156. 
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regulation are those of doing something with intent to deceive or of making a statement 
known to be false in a material particular. There was ample evidence ... that the company, 
by the only people who could act or speak or think for it had done both these thingS ... ,,154 
The Divisional Court's decision in Kent & Sussex was approved in Rex v. LC.R. 
Haulage Ltd.,155 in which the new concept of "the responsible agent" was more 
strikingly upheld. The appellant company and ten other defendants were charged at 
Assizes with conspiring to defraud in that they agreed to charge another company for 
a quantity of goods in excess of that which was in fact delivered. Counsel for the 
appellants argued that an indictment alleging a common law conspiracy to defraud 
would not lie against a corporation because it is devoid of forming an intention or act 
of the will. In addressing the question whether a corporation can be indicted for a 
conspiracy to defraud, Stable 1. denied automatic imputation of a criminal intention in 
the mind of a servant or agent to a corporate principal, as acknowledged in the case of 
Mousell. 156 Instead, by relying upon the rule of the responsible agent implied in the case 
of D.P.P. v. Kent & Sussex Contractors Ltd.,t57 limitations were established as to the 
type of a corporate agent for whose acts and mental states a corporation was to be held 
liable. 
"[W]hether the jury are satisfied that it has been proved, must depend on the nature of the 
charge, the relative position of the officer or agent, and the other relevant facts and 
circumstances of the case.,,158 
In this case, the acts of conspiracy to defraud were done by the managing director of the 
company, "probably the most important figure in the managerial hierarchy of the limited 
company,,,159 thus the court was content with regarding his conduct and state of mind 
as those of the company.160 
154 Per Caldecote C.]., ibid. at 151, 155-156, referred to by Welsh, supra note 13 at 357. 
155 [1944] KB 551. 
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As a result of the Haulage case, two propositions were, according to Leonard H. 
Leigh, clearly established: (l) the distinction made between corporate personal and 
vicarious liability; and (2) the imputation of the acts and mental states of certain agents 
to the company in the appropriate circumstances. 161 That is to say, apart from cases of 
strict liability offences, a corporation may be held personally, not vicariously, liable for 
offences involving mens rea when a responsible agent, sufficiently high in the corporate 
hierarchy, is involved in the offence in question. This leads to new questions as to who 
is the responsible officer and in what circumstances. The next section will examine how 
the English courts dealt with these questions. 
2.5. The Principle of Identification for Corporate Personal Liability 
The result of one of the three cases delivered in 1944, the case ofLC.R. Haulage Ltd., 
can be described as "revolutionary,,162 in the historical development of corporate 
criminal liability in English law for two reasons. Firstly, it was ruled that a corporation 
can be held liable for mens rea offences. Secondly, the application of the doctrine of 
vicarious liability was narrowly limited in such cases: a corporation could be held liable 
for mens rea offences only when one of its responsible agents was involved. Whilst a 
corporation was held liable for the acts of another under the vicarious liability doctrine, 
the new rule of responsible agent, which is later called "the identification principle," 
rendered it liable as if it acted by itself. This principle originates from a civil case, 
Lennard's Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. 163 A cargo of the 
respondents, loaded in a steamship of the appellant company, was destroyed by fire 
during her voyage. In the Court of Appeal it was revealed that the fire and consequent 
loss of the cargo were caused by unseaworthiness due to the defective condition of her 
boilers. It was also found that one of the managing owners of the company knew of the 
defects in the condition of the ship. In interpreting the words "his actual fault or privity" 
161 Leigh, Criminal Liability, supra note 7 at 34. 
162 Welsh, supra note 13 at 346. 
163 [1915] A.C. 705. 
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of s. 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894,164 Lord Haldane ruled in the following 
passage that his fault was viewed as the company's fault: 
"[A] corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a body 
of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the person of 
somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who is really the directing 
mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of the personality of the 
corporation .... [One of the managing owners of the appellant company] took the active part 
in the management of this ship on behalf of the owners ... [H]is action must, unless a 
corporation is not to be liable at all, have been an action which was the action of the 
company itself within the meaning ofs. 502 .... It must be upon the true construction of 
that section in such a case as the present one that the fault or privity is the fault or privity 
of somebody who is not merely a servant or agent for whom the company is liable upon 
the footing respondeat superior, but somebody for whom the company is liable because 
his action is the very action of the company itself."165 
Although not cited in LC.R. Haulage Ltd., the Lennard case and the passage mentioned 
above has been considered the landmark for establishing "the directing mind and will" 
doctrine in the context of corporate liability,166 which stemmed from the alter ego 
doctrine in tort. 167 In 1957, the directing mind and will doctrine was also described by 
Lord Denning in another civil case, H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v T.J. Graham 






"A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve 
centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in 
accordance with directions from the centre. Some ofthe people in the company are mere 
servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said 
to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers who represent the 
directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does. The state of mind of 
Merchant Shipping Act 1894, s. 502 provides: 
"The owner of a British sea-going ship, or any share therein, shall not be liable to make 
goods to any extent whatever any loss or damage happening without his actual fault or 
privity in the following cases; namely -
(i.) Where any goods, merchandise, or other things whatsoever taken in or put on 
board his ship are lost or damaged by reason offrre on board the ship .... " 
[1915] A.C. 705 at pp. 713-714. 
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these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as SUCh.,,169 
The alter ego doctrine, under which the mental states and conduct of the figure of the 
directing mind and will of the company is regarded as those of the company, has 
infiltrated into criminal cases since the 1960s,170 and the English courts have addressed 
the question of who constitutes the directing mind and will of the company. In John 
Henshall (Quarries) Ltd. v. Harvey,171 a corporation was indicted as an aider and abetter 
for violations of the Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1955 and the 
Road Traffic Act 1960. A weighbridge operator of the defendant corporation weighed 
an eight-wheeled lorry driven by an independent contractor, and issued a conveyance 
note showing that the laden weight of the lorry was in excess of the permitted weight 
prescribed in regulation 68 of the Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 
1955. The weighbridge operator was aware of the excess in the permitted weight but 
in oversight had allowed the independent contractor to drive the lorry away. It was 
found that he took no part in the general management of the defendant corporation but 
was employed to weigh the vehicles which were driven onto the weighbridge and to 
issue a conveyance note for them. Moreover, it was customary for the manager of the 
defendant corporation to perform periodic checks on the weighing of the vehicles on the 
weighbridge to see to it that the regulations were complied with. However, neither the 
manager nor anyone else in the defendant's office was aware that the weighbridge 
operator had allowed the lorry to be driven away carrying a load in excess of the weight 
permitted by the Regulations. Pursuant to the precedent that required the master to have 
actual knowledge of the circumstances which constitute the principal offence,l72 the 
court considered whose actual knowledge should be identified with that of the defendant 
corporation regarding the circumstances in which the offence was committed by the 
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Bolton, Lord Parker concluded that the weighbridge operator was a mere hand of the 
company, but the manager, who was not aware that the lorry was allowed to be driven, 
was the brains of it. 
"There is no doubt that there are many cases where the knowledge of somebody in the 
position of the brain, maybe the directors, the managing director, the secretary, the 
responsible officers of the company, has been held to be the knowledge of the company. 
It seems to me that is a long away from saying that a company is fixed with the knowledge 
of any servant: again to quote Lord Denning: the knowledge of the hands as opposed to 
the brain merely because it is the servant's duty to perform that particular task. [Footnote 
omitted],,173 
Furthermore, Lord Parker submitted an additional standard for the delegate of the 
corporate management by the corporation. 174 Under the delegation standard by Lord 
Parker, there can be cases where the knowledge of a servant is identified with that of his 
master who completely hands over the effective management of a business. In the case 
of the corporate master, the corporation cannot escape its responsibility by such 
delegation, since the knowledge of the delegate is identified with that of the corporation. 
The identification of the company with its manager whom the corporate "brains" 
have delegated full power and discretion of its affairs was also described in Regina v. 
Stanlay Haulage Ltd. 175 In this case, a road haulage company was charged with 
conspiracy with its three employees to commit or encourage the commission of breaches 
of the statutory provisions as to keeping records relating to goods vehicles and the hours 
of duty of drivers. The question raised was whether a conspiracy of the transport 
manager of the defendant company, who had a complete discretion to manage, direct 
and control the corporation's business affairs, was identified with a conspiracy by the 
company itself. In terms of considerations of his position and managerial capacity, the 
court held that decisions taken and acted on by those, such as the transport manager in 
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further reference, were regarded as decisions of the company. 
The rule of "the power to make managerial decisions without further reference" 
mentioned above was applied in Magna Plant Ltd. v. Mitchell. I76 The defendant 
company's depot engineer was convicted of breach of reg. 73 (1) of the Motor Vehicles 
(Construction and Use) Regulation 1963. He repaired a car of the hirer and signed a 
certificate that it was roadworthy, but some parts of the car were not maintained in the 
condition that the regulation required. As for the liability of the corporation, however, 
the court denied the identification of the defendant company with the depot manager to 
whom the company had handed over its responsibility, for he was not considered to be 
in the position of being part of the "brains" of the company. 
In the 1970s, the issue of who should be identified with the corporation was dealt 
in detail with in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass. l77 In this famous case, a company, 
which owned hundreds of supermarkets, was charged with a violation of Section 20 (1) 
of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968. Soap powders at the Northwich branch store of the 
company were offered at a price less than they were in fact listed, thereby amounting to 
violation of Section 11 (2) of the Act. It was revealed that the branch manager, who was 
responsible for display of the poster and the items advertised, had to remove any display 
notices ifhe was informed by his assistant that any special offer stock was sold out. His 
assistant, whose duty was to replenish the soap powder shelves, discovered that no 
packs of the soap powder for the special offer remained on display. Having filled the 
soap powder shelves with packets of the soap powder, each of which was marked with 
the normal price, she did not report the shortage of the goods or her action to the 
manager. Consequently, during the display of the poster for the special offer, packs of 
the soap powder marked with the normal price were on display. It was also alleged that 
the manager failed both to check the soap powder on the shelves and to instruct or 
supervise his assistant. 
176 
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According to Section 24 (1) of the Act, it was a defence for the defendant to 
[1966] Criminal Law Review 394. 
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prove "(a) that the commission of the offence was due to .... the act or default of another 
person, ... " and "(b) that he took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due 
diligence to avoid the commission of the offence." Since the defendant company raised 
this defence,178 the main points at issue considered by the court were whether or not the 
branch manager was another person prescribed in Section 24(1 )(a) and whether or not 
the defendant took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to prevent 
the branch manager from committing the offence as prescribed in Section 24(1 )(b). 
The Magistrate's Court, the Queen's Bench Divisional Court and the House of 
Lords delivered different decisions. The Magistrate's Court held that the defendant 
company "had exercised all due diligence in deciding a proper system for the operation 
of the store and by securing so far as was reasonably practical that it was fully 
implemented and thus had fulfilled the requirements of Section 24(1)(b)." Since the 
manager represented the defendant company in his supervisory capacity, however, he 
was not considered to be "another person" prescribed in Section 24(1)(a). Accordingly, 
his failure to instruct or supervise the assistant was regarded as preventing the defendant 
company from establishing the defence provided by the Section 24. The defendant 
company was fined and subsequently appealed. 
The conviction was upheld by the Divisional Court,179 but the reasoning for the 




The reasonable precautions and due diligence alleged to be taken and exercised by the defendant 
company were: providing a properly equipped store; properly selecting the manager to manage 
it; providing a proper detailed and adequate system and instructions as to how such system and 
the store were to be operated; providing adequate and proper supervision to see that the 
defendants' system was followed and their instructions observed. [1972] A.C. 153 at 160. It was 
the practice in the grocery trade for all stores to be under the immediate instruction of a shop 
manager. The ladder of responsibility from the manager upwards was: the manager - the branch 
inspector - the area controller- the regional director - the board of directors. Ibid. at 158. 
[1971] 1 Q.B. 133. 
Section 20(1) of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 provides: 
"(1) Where no offence under this Act which has been committed by a body corporate is 
proved to have been committed with the consent and connivance of, or to be attributable 
~ to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of 
the body corporate, or any person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he as 
well as the body corporate shall be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded 
against and punished accordingly .... " 
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the manager in this case could not be included in the word "manager" which appeared 
in Section 20, and therefore fell into the category of the word "another person" of 
Section 24(l)(a).18l In addition, Fisher J. interpreted the meaning of the taking of 
precautions and the exercise of due diligence as: (1) the setting up of an efficient system 
for the avoidance of offences under the Act; and (2) the proper operation of that 
system. 182 As found in this case, Fisher J. observed that the second part, the operation 
of the system, would have to be delegated by the company to employees falling outside 
those mentioned in Section 20. Inevitably, if the manager, to whom the defendant 
company had delegated its duty to take all reasonable precautions and exercise all due 
diligence to avoid the commission of such an offence, failed properly to carry out that 
duty, the company would be held responsible for his negligent operation of the system 
and thus fail to establish the defence of Section 24(1 )(b). In this manner, the Divisional 
Court dismissed the appeal. 
In the House of Lords, the conviction was quashed unanimously. To sum up, the 
two issues whether the manager falls into the category of "another person" provided in 
Section 24(l)(a) and whether the company had exercised all due diligence were dealt 
with in the following ways: 
(l) The branch manager of the company, which owned hundreds of shops, was not in 
a position to manage the affairs of the company nor embody the company's directing 
mind and will, centre ego and brains and, thus, would not be identified with the 
company. As a result, he fell with the category of "another person" provided in Section 
24(1)(a). 
(2) In order to fulfill the requirements of the defence that appeared in Section 24(1)(b), 
the company had established the efficient system to avoid the commission of the offence 
under Section 11(2), and, in terms of its branch inspectors and area controllers' regular 
attendance to supervise the shop managers and the operation of shops, properly operated 
that system. This kind of duty to avoid the commission of the offence by employees and 
181 
182 
[1971] 1 Q.B. 133 atpp. 142-143. 
Ibid. at pp. 143-144. 
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to secure their observance of instructions could not be delegated to or fulfilled by the 
manager, namely, another person who was not identified with the company. Therefore, 
even if the contravention of Section 11 (1) was due to the act or default of the manager 
of the store in question, there was no failure on the part of the company's system. The 
defence provided in Section 24(1 )(b) should thus apply in this case in the defendant 
company's favour. 
There are several principles established in dicta of this well-known case. The 
first to note is the theoretical basis for corporate criminal liability. With reference to the 
famous phrase advanced by Lord Denning in Bolton, Lord Reid differentiates corporate 
personal liability from its vicarious liability by holding that: 
"A living person has a mind which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent and 
he has hands to carry out his intentions. A corporation has none of these: it must act 
through living persons, though not always one or the same person. Then the person who 
acts is not speaking or acting for the company. He is acting as the company and his mind 
which directs his acts is the mind of the company. There is no question of the company 
being vicariously liable. He is not acting as a servant, representative, agent or delegate. 
He is an embodiment of the company or, one could say, he hears and speaks through the 
persona of the company, within his appropriate sphere, and his mind is the mind of the 
company. If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is the guilt of the company.,,183 
Under the identification principle quoted above, the person who speaks and acts as the 
company or, to borrow Lord Pearson' phrase, who is the company's "directing mind and 
will, its centre and ego, and its brains,"184 is identified with the company. 
The scope of persons who can be identified with the company was also clarified 
in this case. In addressing this issue, the Divisional Court, as well as the House of 
Lords, referred to and cited the word "any director, manager, secretary or other similar 
officer of the body corporate", which appears in Section 20( 1) of the Act. Nevertheless, 
more specific and substantial standards for the identification were suggested by the 
House of Lords. Lord Reid, for example, ruled that "the board of directors may delegate 
some part of their functions of management, giving to their delegate full discretion to 
act independently of instructions from them," and "within the scope of the delegation 
183 Per Lord Reid, in [1972] A.c. 153 at 171. 
184 Per Lord Pearson, in ibid. at 190. 
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he can act as the company."185 Viscount Dilhorne also held that "a person who is in 
actual control of the operations of a company or part of them and who is not responsible 
to another person in the company for the manner in which he discharges his duties in the 
sense of being under his orders, cannot be regarded as "another person" within the 
meaning of sections 23 and 24(1)(a)",186 but can be identified with the company. Thus, 
the standards for the identification displayed in this case do not depend on the title of 
a person's post in the corporation, but on whether the person is in full control of the 
operations of the company or part of them, or whether the person had been delegated by 
the board of directors full discretion to act independently of its instructions. 
The final point to bear in mind is whether the manager's supervisory fault 
concerning his assistant's negligence nullify the company's due diligence defence 
provided in Section 24(1 )(b). As described earlier, the Divisional Court considered that 
the company's duty to take precautions and exercise diligence was delegated to the 
manager of a particular store who failed to supervise his assistant, and that his fault 
prevented the company from completing its duty necessary for such a defence. 187 
However, the House of Lords, in particular, Lord Morris, denied any possibility of the 
delegation of the company's duty to exercise due diligence to "another person."188 By 
comparing his status in the company to "a cog in the machine which was devised," Lord 
Morris ruled that: 
If the company had taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to 
ensure that the machine could and should run effectively then some breakdown due to 
some action or failure on the part of "another person" ought not to be attributed to the 
company or to be regarded as the action or failure of the company itself for which the 
company was to be criminally responsible. The defence provided by section 24 (l) would 
otherwise be illusory.,,189 
That is to say, the distinction between corporate personal liability and corporate 
185 Per Lord Reid, in ibid. at 171. 
186 Per Viscount Dilhome, ibid. at 187. 
187 [1971] 1 Q.B. 133 at pp. 145-146. 
188 Per Lord Morris ofBorth-y-Gest, [1972] A.C. 153 at 180. 
189 Ibid at 181. 
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vicarious liability was adhered to by the House of Lords in relation to the interpretation 
of Section 24 of the Act. As long as the company itself, or the board of directors who 
were identified with the company, took all precautions and exercised due diligence, the 
act or default by another person (servants or agents) would not affect the establishment 
of the defence provided by Section 24( 1 )(b). 190 
Before turning to a brief examination of criticisms against the identification 
principle in the 1970s, it may be helpful to note some other points as to this principle 
itself. The first point lies in Lord Reid's dictum. 191 After considering "the nature of the 
personality which by fiction the law attributes to a corporation," he goes on to say that 
"It must be a question of law whether, once the facts have been ascertained, a person in 
doing particular things is to be regarded as the company or merely as the company's 
servant or agent."I92 Consequently, the judge should direct the jury that they must find 
that the act and intention of the person who had the relevant status and authority are 
those of the company itself. It does not suffice to instruct that the natural person in 
question is a "responsible agent" or "high executive," since not every such person can 
be identified with the company. 193 
The second point to note relates to the requirement of "the scope of the 
controlling officer's employment." Under the identification principle, a company is held 





See also per Lord Pearson, in ibid. at pp. 192-193. 
Supra text accompanying note 183. 
[1972] A.C. 153 at 170. See also Law Commission, A Criminal Code, supra note 148, Clause 
30(3)(c), which provides that "Whether a person acting in a particular capacity is a controlling 
officer is a question oflaw." 
Rex v. Sporle [1971] Criminal Law Review 706 at 707. See also Reg. v. Andrews-Weatherfoil 
Ltd. [1972] 1 W.L.R. 118 at 124, in which Eveleigh J. held that: 
"It is not every "responsible agent" or "high executive" or "manager of the housing 
department" or "agent acting on behalf of a company" who can by his actions make the 
company criminally responsible. It is necessary to establish whether the natural person or 
persons in question have the status and authority which in law makes their acts in the matter 
under consideration the acts of the company so that the natural person is to be treated as 
the company itself. It is often a difficult question to decide whether or not the person 
concerned is in a sufficiently responsible position to involve the company in liability for 
the acts in question according to the law as laid down by the authorities." 
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scope of his employment. It is thus the director or controlling officer, not the company, 
who is held liable for acts done outside the scope of his employment. 194 It is also 
required to prove that the director or controlling officer, whose conduct constitutes the 
offence, was acting in his capacity on behalf of the company at the relevant time. 195 
The final point to note is concerned with the requisite mens rea. Where the 
offence with which a company is charged requires mens rea, it is a controlling officer 
who should have the mens rea in order for the company to be held liable for the 
offence. 196 Where a company has available to it a defence which requires proof of 
mental states such as a belief, it is also the controlling officer who should have such a 
state of mind. In an Australian case, G.]. Coles & Coy Ltd. v. Goldsworthy,197 a 
company was charged with a violation of Sections 220 and 233(1) of Health Act 1911 
for selling contaminated food which was manufactured and packaged by a third party. 
The food became contaminated without knowledge or fault of the company or any 
practical method of inspection available to the company. The company appealed 
pleading honest and reasonable but mistaken belief pursuant to Section 24 of the 






See, for example, International Sales and Agencies Ltd. v. Marcus [1982] 3 All ER 551; G.R. 
Sullivan, "Company Controllers, Company Cheques and Theft" [1983] Criminal Law Review 512 
at pp. 519. G. Williams takes a similar view that: 
"[I]t can be argued that identification applies only in respect of acts done on company 
business, not in the manager's private concerns, and that it applies only in respect of acts 
done in a managerial or directorial capacity." 
Supra note 148 at 974 
Per Stuart-Smith, L.J. in Rex v. Dovermoss Ltd. (1995) 159 JP 448 at 456. 
Law Commission, Criminal Code, supra note 148, Clause 30(2); Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. 
Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153. 
[1985] WAR 183. J.C. Smith cites another Australian case, Brambles Holdings Ltd. v. Carey 
[1976] 15 S.A.S.R. 270, for the situations where the belief of one is incongruous with that of 
another who is superior to the first and knows that belief is ill founded. Smith, supra note 12 at 
187. Yet, this Australian case is of more significance for the theory of aggregation or the 
collective knowledge doctrine than for the issue of corporate defence. The theory of aggregation 
will be analysed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Section 24 of the Criminal Code provides: 
"A person who does or omits to do an act under an honest and reasonable, but mistaken, 
belief in the existence of any state of things is not criminally responsible for the act or 
omission to any greater extent than ifthe real state of things had been such as he believed 
to exist.. .. " 
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of the corporation. By referring to the Tesco case,199 Burt C.l. held that the belief of the 
company might entail "the belief of the directors"of that company or "the person to 
whom the directors had delegated the function of management relative to the detection 
of contamination of products being manufactured for the appellant [ company] by 
independent manufacturers. ,,200 
It must be stressed that the three points noted above are all related to criticism 
made just before and after the Tesco case was decided. The criticism that will be 
examined in the next and final section in this chapter is based on the difficulty of 
distinguishing between corporate primary liability and its vicarious liability, and still 
remains unresolved at the present time. 
2.6. The Criticism of the Identification Principle 
The early bars to corporate criminal liability which had appeared since the Middle Ages 
have gradually been removed by the English courts. Most stemmed from corporate 
incapacity to do something which individual offenders were expected by law to do in 
order to incur criminal liability: to do positive acts; to entertain culpable mental states; 
to give command or consent; to appear at trial; and to suffer physical punishment such 
as imprisonment. The way the bars, both procedural and substantive, were removed 
should not be viewed as "overcome" as described by Leonard H. Leigh. Since the 
requirements of personal appearance, actus reus and mens rea were technically 
considered by the court at the level of individual agents in the context of corporate 
liability, it is fair to say that the bars were virtually evaded201 or circumvented.202 
It is two principles in tort that are borrowed by the court to establish corporate 
criminal liability: the doctrines of respondeat superior and the alter ego, both of which 
are now utilised on different occasions. In English law, a company is to be held 
199 Per Lord Reid, in [1972] A.C. 153 at 171, considered in supra note 185. 
200 Per Burt C.l., in [1985] WAR 183 at 188. 
201 Per Coleridge l., in R. v. Mayor etc. of Manchester [1857] 119 E.R. 1317 (7 E & B 453-456), 
cited in supra note 31. 
202 Pollock, supra note 44 at 235, cited in supra note 141. 
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vicariously liable for strict liability offences, and personally liable for offences 
involving mens rea.203 The scope of the application of both doctrines, the vicarious 
liability doctrine and the identification principle, has been subject to criticism.204 The 
most problematic issue is how to draw a clear line between two cases: a case in which 
vicarious liability should be imposed on a company and a case in which the 
identification principle should be applied. A good place to start is to examine several 
criticisms against the Tesco case, which have been made since the case was decided. 
It has been suggested that the establishment and adoption of the identification 
principle in the Tesco case restricts the scope of corporate liability in two ways. Firstly, 
the liability of corporations is based solely on the successful location of the guilty 
controlling officers in the corporate hierarchy.205 Secondly and more importantly here, 
the identification principle, rather than the doctrine of vicarious liability, may apply in 
the case of violations of consumer protection statutes such as the Trade Descriptions Act 
1968, which may not be thought of as truly crimina1.206 Thus, the application of the 
identification principle in such regulatory offences would be favourable to employers 
whose statutory duties are to supervise and ascertain that their employees do not violate 
the relevant regulations. By discharging such duties into a system of control and 
presenting an adequate "paper" system to the court in preparation for a due diligence 
defence, the company, as well as its officers, could expect to escape liability on proof 
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of control summarised in supra note 178. Nevertheless, there might be room for doubt as to 
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against Enterprise Liability" (1971) 34 Modern Law Review 676 at 680. 
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fact that no elaborative attempt was made by their Lordships to distinguish between 
"public welfare offences and true crimes,,208 for the application of the identification 
principle. Nor was an account given for the replacement of the vicarious liability 
doctrine with the identification principle in cases of public welfare offences. 
The confusion of which doctrines should apply in such offences took place again 
in Tesco Stores Ltd. v. Brent London Borough Counci1.209 Tesco Ltd. supplied a video 
recording to a 14-year-old boy who had not attained the age specified in the 
classification certificate, contrary to Section 11 (1) of the Video recordings Act 1984. 
Under Section 11(2)(b) of this Act, it was a defence to a charge under Section 11(1) that 
the defendant neither knew nor had reasonable grounds to believe that the person 
concerned had not attained the relevant age. In this case, the cashier indeed had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the video film was supplied to a person under the age 
of 18. The question raised was whether the company, despite such reasonable grounds 
of its employee, would avail itself of this defence. If the rule of "directing mind and 
will" established in Tesco in 1971 was applied in this case, the same defendant company 
would escape liability with resort to this defence because the reasonable grounds of the 
cashier could not be identified with those of the company. Nonetheless, Staughton L.J. 




"I see no reason why [Section 11(2) of the Act] should necessarily have the same meaning 
as that laid down in Tesco Supermarkets v. Nattrass. The language here draws no 
distinction between [the company or those who are its directing mind and will] and those 
under [the control of the directing mind and will]. The content is concerned with 
knowledge and information, not due diligence. It is .... absurd to suppose that those who 
manage a vast company would have any knowledge or any information as to the age of a 
casual purchaser of a video film. It is the employee that sells the film at the check-out 
point who will have knowledge or reasonable grounds for belief. It is her knowledge or 
reasonable grounds that are relevant. Were it otherwise, the statute would be wholly 
ineffective in the case of a large company, unless by the merest chance a youthful 
purchaser were known to the board of directors.,,210 
It is obvious that the reasonable grounds of the cashier were imputed to the 
Howells, ibid 
[1993] 2 All ER 718; 1 W.L.R. 1037. See also C. Wells, "Corporate Liability and Consumer 
Protection: Tesco v. Nattrass Revisited" (1994) 57 Modern Law Review 817. 
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company and, hence, that the company was held vicariously, not personally, liable for 
its employee's conduct and mental states. The consistent application of the doctrine of 
vicarious liability to the cases of violations of consumer protection statutes or, in the 
broader sense, public welfare offences, may be one of the alternative solutions to the 
problem of confusion mentioned above. Adherence to the doctrine of vicarious liability, 
not to the identification principle, in the area of public welfare offences is also found in 
some academic literature. Professor John Andrews, for example, proposes that 
corporations should only be held liable: (1) "for any offence occasioned by failure to 
fulfill the obligations which are specially imposed by virtue of any activity the 
corporation engages in;" and (2) "for such acts committed by its servants or some other 
person as a private individual standing in the same position to such servant or other 
person would be liable.,,211 Andrews also suggests the availability of a due diligence 
defence as follows: 
"[1]he corporation can evade liability by showing that the responsibility for the offence 
lay with a particular identified person or persons and that it was not occasioned or 
assisted by any lack of diligence elsewhere in the organisation or by any other employees 
or by any practice or by any organisational structure or by any control in any part of the 
organisation falling below the standard which is reasonably to be expected in 
corporations carrying on such activities. ,,212 
Another problem of ambiguity between vicarious liability and identification can 
be observed in Professor Glanville Williams' suggestions.213 In addressing the issue of 
I 
a questionable line drawn in the Tesco case between a small company with two retail 
shops which can easily be identified with branch managers and a giant company with 
hundreds of shops whose directing mind and will can only be located at the 
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persons in control of local branches.214 His suggestions are based on the practical effect 
of the Tesco case that the identification principle confines the basis for corporate 
liability to "the behaviour of a few men meeting even when the activities of the 
corporation are country-wide or world-wide."215 
The scope of the identification principle was indeed extended to cover the figure 
of middle management in the corporate hierarchy in an appeal case from New Zealand, 
Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission?16 In this 
case, an investment manager of the defendant company used funds managed by the 
company to acquire shares in a public issuer with the company's authority, which was 
unknown to the board of directors and managing director. The company thus became 
for a short period a substantial security holder in that public issuer, but did not give 
notice as required by Section 20(3) of the Securities Amendment Act 1988. It was 
apparent that the investment manager would not fall into the category of "directing mind 
and will" under the identification principle ruled in the Tesco case. In addressing the 
classic question of "[ w ]hose act (or knowledge, or state of mind) was intended to count 
as the act etc. of the company," Lord Hoffman, however, seems to establish a new rule 
that "the court must fashion a special rule of attribution for the particular substantive 
rule."217 In other words, the question of whose act and state of mind can be deemed to 
those of the company is one of construction rather than of metaphysics, and, thus, 
depends on how the policy of the statute at issue should be interpreted.218 By 







Ibid Williams goes on to say that: 
Ibid 
"It is an offences of negligence that the limitation of liability imposed in Tesco is most 
injurious. That a company should not be liable for an offence of negligence committed by 
its branch manager, who after all represents the company in the particular locality, is a 
considerable defect in the law .... What is evidently needed is a statutory redefinition of the 
offences whose acts and mental states implicate the company." (Footnote omitted.) 
[1995] 2 A.C. 500, 3 W.L.R. 413. 
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58 
compel, in fast-moving markets, the immediate disclosure of the identity of persons who 
become substantial security holders in public issuers," Lord Hoffman concluded that the 
person who, with the authority of the company, acquired the relevant interest and whom 
the company allowed to do so on their behalf is relevant for corporate liability.219 For 
the purpose of this rule, the acts and knowledge of the investment manager were 
imputed to the company. 220 
It seems reasonable to say that this extended version of the identification 
principle, although considered to be welcomed to some degree by some 
commentators,221 would blur the distinction between corporate personal liability and its 
vicarious liability. This is particularly evident in cases in which the delegation of 
certain power in relation to corporate business is involved. Under the original 
identification principle, a company is held liable for the acts of those to whom the board 
of directors or controlling officer had delegated full power in the running of its affairs.222 
Likewise, the company is to be held vicariously liable for its lower employee's violative 
acts under the delegation principle.223 On the one hand, under the delegation principle, 
which has primarily developed through liquor licensing cases,224 a licensee, for example, 
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delegated his duties and responsibilities. Although the delegate is given a power to 
control certain aspects of business affairs and a discretion in the manner of its exercise 
, 
it is the delegator or employer who is held liable as a principal whilst his delegate or 
employee is as an abettor. 225 
On the other hand, on the criteria of identification, account would be taken by 
the jury of the requisite mens rea and the nature of the relevant status and authority, 
rather than the mere title of the post, of the controlling officers or the delegate who was 
given the independent authority by the controlling officers.226 Central to corporate 
personal liability is not, therefore, a question of who is the directing mind and will of 
the company, but whether the delegate completed or failed to complete his delegated 
tasks.227 Considering that a failure of the delegate to perform his delegated task given 
by the board of directors is imputed to the company anyway, the metaphysical concept 
of the directing mind and will would become of secondary significance.228 As a result, 
whether one should call this "imputation" or "identification" would be a matter of 
semantics, and the basic or structural distinction between vicarious liability and 
identification would be a matter of degree.229 Unless proper interpretation of the 
purpose and policy of the applicable statute is made by the court, the blurred distinction 
between vicarious liability and identification would enable the court to impose criminal 
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functions of management delegated should be substantial; (2) the delegation of functions must be 
a relevant part of the corporation's activities; (3) the activity ofthe individual identified with the 
company is done within the scope of the authority conferred upon him; and (4) one of the 
controlling officers has the whole mental element required for the offence. 
Leigh, A Comparative View, supra note 1 at pp. 1514-1515. 
Ledennan, supra note 8 at 297. 
Leigh, Criminal Liability, supra note 7 at p. 83. 
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will, whose acts and mental states "it is desired to ascribe to the company."230 
In conclusion, several observations in this subsection have shown that the 
extended version of identification doctrine in current trends of English case law is likely 
to lead to ambiguity in the distinction between corporate personal liability and vicarious 
liability. How to distinguish between the two doctrines in their application remains to 
be tested by the courts. These observations themselves are, however, preliminary to 
further questions as to the theoretical basis of both doctrines, which will be dealt with 
in the next chapter. Added to their application, both doctrines carry conceptual 
deficiencies in capturing corporate fault, notably when considered in the context of the 
liability of corporations for manslaughter. In Chapter 3, the emphasis will be placed on 
the reexamination of the theoretical basis for the identification principle and the 
vicarious liability doctrine in cases of corporate manslaughter. 
230 Ibid. at 124. See also Fisse, supra note 12 at 205. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MANSLAUGHTER AND ANTHROPOMORPHIC MODELS 
OF CORPORATE LIABILITY 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, two questions were raised concerning the doctrine of corporate 
criminal liability in English law. The first question was how the doctrine has been made 
compatible with the traditional criminal law aimed at the individual offender in the 
history of English law. By tracing the history of the development of corporate criminal 
liability, it was revealed that the English court dealt with corporate liability in terms of 
putting a company in a position analogous to that of an individual employer. When such 
an employer was considered to incur responsibility either for his failure to maintain the 
public facility or for the acts of his employee, the court saw no reason why corporations 
could not take the same position of responsibility in cases where the business was done 
in the corporate rrame. It was also made clear that two parallel liability models, an 
individual master's vicarious liability for his servants' tort and the liability of quasi-
municipal corporations to maintain and repair the public facility, which had developed 
concurrently for certain periods, contributed to the court's reasoning. l 
The second question raised was whether the theoretical principles behind 
corporate liability were justifiable. Two tort principles have been incorporated by the 
English court to hold a company criminally liable: the doctrine of vicarious liability and 
the principle of identification. The differences between the two principles are practical 
and conceptual. The doctrine of vicarious liability is applied when a company is to be 
held liable for strict liability offences, while the identification principle is applicable to 
mens rea offences. In the former case, the company is to be held vicariously liable for 
the acts of its employees. In the latter case, it is to be held personally liable as if it acted 
by itself. 





Both principles utilise a common concept to hold a company liable; namely, the 
imputation of the acts and mental states of the actual offender. Under the principle of 
identification, the actual offender is limited to the directing mind and will of the 
company, or to the delegate to whom the board of directors had delegated full power in 
the running of corporate affairs. On the other hand, the doctrine of vicarious liability 
allows the acts of any corporate personnel to be imputed to the company. As examined 
in the previous chapter, since the scope of the actual offender under the identification 
principle is extended by the court to cover the middle management in the corporate 
hierarchy, a clear distinction between the two principles is not only difficult to draw but 
also of secondary importance. 
The core of these two questions addressed in the previous chapter can be reduced 
to corporate incapacity to do criminal conduct, to entertain mental states and to suffer 
criminal penalties. In other words, the two tort principles have been borrowed by the 
court in order to evade or circumvent an issue of how to apply human concepts, such as 
actus reus and mens rea, to the corporate offender. 2 Before turning to a closer 
examination of this issue, one more question should be raised concerning the theoretical 
structures of the vicarious liability doctrine and the identification principle.3 It was 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 that a clear line between both doctrines has been so 
obsucured that which doctrine should be applied is determined on a case-by-case basis. 
This is one of the flaws from which they suffer concerning their application. When 
applied to several corporate manslaughter cases, which will be described later,4 they 
both carry more serious theoretical flaws. 
It is the main purpose of this chapter to define these theoretical problems. In the 
Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 9-10. 
The main issue of how to apply the human concepts of actus reus and mens rea to corporate 
liability for manslaughter will thus be dealt with in Chapter 5. 
There have been four corporate manslaughter cases brought to trial in English law: Cory Brothers 
Co. [1927] 1 K.B. 810; Northern Stripping Mining Construction Ltd. (unreported) (1965) T~e 
Times 2,4 and 5 February; P & 0 European Ferries (Dover) Ltd. (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 72; KIte 
and OLL Ltd. (unreported), The Times and The Independent, 9 December 1994. 
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P & 0 case,5 for instance, it was first acknowledged in English law that the 
identification principle can be applied to corporate liability for manslaughter. Whilst 
the court addressed fundamental theoretical issues in the way that might help to extend 
the scope of the application of the identification principle further, its resolution of the 
issues provides limited value as legal precedent. In the following sections, two 
theoretical issues of continuing significance will be addressed. 
The first issue is concerned with the application of the identification principle 
to the case of corporate manslaughter: is this principle still tenable in the context of 
manslaughter? Since the P & 0 case, legal questions seem to be changed: from whether 
a company can be held liable for manslaughter to how the conviction of corporate 
manslaughter can be gained easily.6 However, the issue of corporate manslaughter to 
be addressed here is under what theories corporations can properly be held liable. In 
rebutting the rationales for the identification principle, Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of this 
chapter raises an objection to applying the identification principle to corporate 
manslaughter cases. 
The second issue involves the theoretical basis for the doctrine of vicarious 
liability widely used in the American jurisdictions for corporate homicide: 7 is this an 
acceptable alternative to the identification principle in the case of corporate 
manslaughter in English law? In adopting the extended version of the identification 
principle, as analysed in the previous chapter,8 a clear distinction between corporate 
direct liability and corporate vicarious liability has lost its significance in English law, 
particularly concerning their application. It has thus been argued that effective law 
enforcement aimed at the deterrent effect against corporate manslaughter and incapacity 
5 Per Turner J., in P & 0 European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 72 at 88-89. 
6 See, for example, E. Colvin, "Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability" (1995) 6 Criminal 
Law Forum 1 at 18. 
7 In the US., increasing attention has been paid to the issue of corporate homicide since State v. Ford 
Motor Co. (commonly referred to as the "Pinto case") was delivered. See, in general, M.B. 
Clinard & P.C. Yeager, Corporate Crime (1980, The Free Press, New York); F.T. Cullen, W.J. 
Maakestad & G. Cavender, Corporate Crime under Attack (1987, Anderson Publishing Co., Ohio). 
See Chapter 2, Section 2.6. 
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of corporations to exhibit the culpability for the offence without the concept of 
imputation of at least one individual's mental states support the conclusion that a 
recurrence to a long familiar principle, namely, the vicarious liability doctrine, will be 
the appropriate solution to the issue of corporate manslaughter.9 After Section 3.4 
examines the existing criticism against the vicarious liability doctrine (i.e. the over- and 
under-inclusive aspects of this doctrine), Section 3.5 responds to the arguments in 
favour of identification and vicarious liability by suggesting that recourse to individual 
guilt would overlook the primary aspect of corporate liability - the collective nature of 
criminal responsibility. 
In total, eighteen cases of corporate manslaughter under English, American and 
Australian laws are described in the subsequent sections so as to illustrate various flaws 
of both doctrines and to emphasise the need for a better understanding of the collective 
nature of corporate liability. Focus is placed on the factual backgrounds of the cases, 
rather than on the reasoning and judgments by the courts, so that several important 
questions as to how deaths of victims were caused by corporations, for what type of 
corporate fault corporations should have been blamed, and why both doctrines failed to 
capture the corporate fault can be raised specifically in the context of corporate 
manslaughter. Based on the analysis of several cases, it is concluded that the constituent 
elements of corporate manslaughter should not be captured through the 
anthropomorphic concept of imputation of individual conduct and mental states, but 
should be established on the organisational basis. 
3.2. The Principle of Identification and Corporate Manslaughter 
The most significant characteristics of the identification principle lie in its attempt to 
compare the corporate structure to a human body. In H.L.Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. 
v. TJ. Graham & Sons Ltd.,l0 Lord Denning developed the notion of "the directing mind 
and will." Under this notion, a company is held liable on the following two occasions: 
9 See, in particular, G.R. Sullivan, "Expressing Corporate Guilt" (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 282 at 291 and "The Attribution of Culpability to Limited Companies" (1996) 55 
Cambridge Law Journal 515 [hereinafter cited as Attribution] at pp. 539-546. 






when the company's "hands", namely, mere servants or agents, commit a crime in 
accordance with directions from the nerve centre and brain (the controlling officers); or 
when at least one of the controlling officers himself or herself commits the crime except 
that his or her conduct is against the company's interest. II As far as corporate 
manslaughter is concerned, it is unlikely that one of the controlling officers actually 
performs a positive act of manslaughter. However, if hislher failure or omission is 
considered by law to cause the victim's death, it is possible that the company is held 
liable as a principal. 
On the other hand, the company is to be held liable as an accessory to the 
principal crime committed by an employee, when the controlling officer is involved in 
the principal crime. 12 In such a case, whether this employee has the requisite mens rea 
for his or her conduct, therefore, does not affect the liability of the corporation. What 
is important to corporate liability is how the controlling officer is involved in the 
principal offence of manslaughter. The means of his or her involvement can be divided 
into: (1) the procurement, assistance, or encouragement of the principal and (2) the 
failure to prevent the acts of the principal. 13 The following English case serves as a 
typical example of the former type of involvement. 
Case 1 (Cory Brothers Ltd. 14) 
See Moore v. 1. Bressler Ltd. [1944] 2 All ER 515, cited in Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 
145-146. 
See Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales (1989, Law Com. No. 177) 
[hereinafter cited as A Criminal Code], Clause 30 (2)(b), (4) and (5). 
Law Commission, A Criminal Code, ibid., Clause 30 (4). More than seventy years ago, the type 
of corporate liability was exquisitely categorised by Winn into the following three: (1) liability 
for the acts of a person which are merely performances of direct commands from the board of 
primary representatives; (2) that for the acts done entirely on the initiative and sole discretion of 
the actor or merely within a general scope of authority; and (3) that for the unauthorised acts of 
the person. C.R.N. Winn, "The Criminal Responsibility of Corporations" (1929) 3 Cambridge 
Law Journal 398 at pp. 408-409. According to Winn, corporate liability is to be denied in the 
third case. In addition, the liability of corporations in the second case is deemed vicarious and, 
thus, is also to be denied in the case of manslaughter. Winn limits the scope of corporate liability 
for manslaughter to the fIrst case. 
[1927] 1 K.B. 810. It is not surprising that the defendant company was acquitted in t~is cas~, 
given that the concept of corporate liability for mens rea offences was not fully estabhshed ill 
English law at that time. See Chapter 2, Sections 2.4 and 2.5. Threrefore, stress here is upon 
factual backgrounds of this case which are drawn from The Times, 11 January and 1 March, 1927, 
66 
On 24 August, 1926, an engineer of a colliery company was instructed by the chief electric 
engineer, shift manager and power engineer ofthe company, to put up a "live" wire fence 
around a power house belonging to the company, for the purpose of protecting the bunkers 
against pilfering. The fence in question was erected merely as a precaution against 
trespassers, but it was more accurately described as a barbarous device for catching 
intruders and preventing their escape. 15 
Half an hour later, several young ex-colliers went on a ratting expedition, having 
dogs and a ferret with them. Having worked the river, they reached the tip opposite the 
power house about 8.00 p.m. When one of the dogs chased a rat down the railway line 
and into the coal bunkers, two of the lads were on the part of the tip, and followed their 
dogs. When they got through the electric fence, they were unscathed although they must 
have touched the strands of the fence. 
While the two lads were on the colliery premises, following the dogs, a whistle, 
like a police one, was sounded, which appeared to come from the power house. When 
seeing a shift engineer of the company, the two lads ran away. One of them, the victim 
of this case, made a dash for the electric wire. Just as the shift engineer, who was chasing 
the boy, got near, the boy slipped on a corrugated iron sheet lying near the electric fence, 
and fell face forward, grabbing one of the wires with his right hand. The boy appeared to 
be driven back with the shock, kept on wriggling, and fmally collapsed on the fence. The 
shift engineer tried to pick up the boy by catching hold of the back of his coat, but even 
though he did not touch the boy's body he received a slight shock. Realising that nothing 
could be done, he dashed away to the power house to switch off the current. 
The current entered the boy's body by the right hand and passed out by the left 
hand, taking a direction across the chest, which was most dangerous because of the effect 
on the heart. Moreover, the wet state of the boy's clothing due to the rain would be 
conductive to electrification. The witness of the incident had no idea that there were 
electrified wires on the premises. 
On 10 January, 1927, three engineers (= corporate officials)16 and the colliery 
company were prosecuted for manslaughter of the victim. The summonses alleged that 
the defendants "set or caused to be set a man trap or other engine calculated to destroy 
human life or inflict grievous bodily harm ... upon the trespasser or other person coming 
in contact with it." 
Through his comment on this case, Winn expounded detailed rationales for the liability 
of corporations for the decisions made by what he called "the board of primary 
rather than on the court's reasoning against corporate liability for manslaughter. For the factual 
backgrounds of this case, see also C. Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (1993, 
Oxford Press) [hereinafter cited as Corporations], p. 101. 
15 The fence consisted of three stands of copper wire supported by insulators attached to pit prop 
driven into the ground. The copper stands, ideal conductors of electricity, were connected with 
a powerful switchboard inside the power house. The current of the fence was switched on at 5.30 
p.m. The voltage was allegedly 110 volts. The Times, 11 January 1927, p. 11. 
16 They were at the eating house two nights before the fatality dis~ussing t~e pilfering o~ coal from 
the bunkers and one of them said: - "We will put to a stop to thIS. We WIll put somethmg up and 
I'll switch dn the juice and let some of these - get it in the neck." These expert electrical engineers 







representatives" of the company. In their corporate capacity, according to Winn, the 
directors or primary representatives usually exercise the powers of the corporation 
vested in them as its controllers. As individuals, when nine persons of similar opinions 
"unite to prove to a tenth the infallibility of their position, each will be strengthened, 
confirmed and rendered more obdurate by the support of the others."l7 In this process 
of mutual influence and stimulation unique to groups or associations, they can "go to 
excesses from which alone they would have shrunk."l8 Thus, emphasis should be placed 
upon such "an inexplicable but plainly demonstratable phenomenon of the human mind 
in groups"l9 when it was applied in the case of manslaughter of the colliery company 
described above. The engineers of the company, "who would each and all have shrunk 
from erecting on their own land such a barbarous man-trap,,,20 could reach the decision 
of erecting on the corporate premises a live electrical wire fence in their directorial 
capacity under mutual influence. Viewed in this light, the company should not be held 
vicariously liable for the inferior engineer's conduct in erecting the fence which was the 
originating cause of the victim's death, but it should be as an accessory for officers' 
command to the inferior engineer to do so. 
Under the identification principle, on the other hand, a company is to be held 
liable as an accessory for manslaughter: (1) when one of its controlling officers fails to 
prevent the acts of the servant which lead to the victim's death; or (2) when slhe fails 
to take steps to prevent the occurrence of the victim's death?l In the former, fault of the 
controlling officer is explained as a failure to supervise herlhis inferior employees in 
Winn, supra note 13 at 406. 
Ibid. A similar explanation is given by Ashworth that: . . . 
"The argument is .... that the behaviour of individuals is often shaped by therr relatIOnshIps 
to groups and collectivities .... The thrust is that companies can acquire a momentum and 
a dynamic of their own which temporarily transcend the actio~s of~heir officers." 
A. Ashworth, Principles a/Criminal Law (1995, 2nd ed., Oxford UmversIty Press), p. 115. 
Winn, supra note 13 at 406. 
Winn, ibid. 
In the case of strict liability offences, there may be a due diligence defence that is available to the 
defendant. Both categories would be considered to be some factors for existence or non-existence 
of a due diligence defence on the part of the defendant. 
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order not to perform a criminal act. In the latter, the immediate cause of death is not the 
result of human action, but rather the source of risk. Strictly speaking, there may be 
certain intermediate persons between the source of risk and the criminal consequences: 
namely, the lower-level employees who are in the closest position to the source of risk. 
Nonetheless, it would be more appropriate for two reasons to ascribe the legal cause of 
the consequences to a failure of the controlling officer than to the mere employee's 
conduct regarding the source of risk. Firstly, the employee close to the source of risk 
is not likely to have the requisite mens rea for manslaughter. Rather, s/he should be 
considered to perform as an innocent agent through whose conduct the failure of the 
controlling officer to avoid the risk leads to the fatal consequences. Secondly, there are 
several cases in which the employees were killed by the source of risk. The following 
Australian case provides a good example. 
Case 2 (The Queen v Denbo Pty. Ltd.22) 
On 14 June 1994, an Australian company pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the Supreme 
Court of Victoria. In this case, the company carried on business as an earth moving 
contractor. In February 1991, a truck accident took place on the construction site due to 
the truck's grossly defective brakes. The driver of the truck was killed. As the employer 
of the victim, the company was held responsible for the victim's death on the grounds that 
it failed "to establish an adequate system of maintenance for its plant and vehicles," "to 
properly train its employees," and "[permitted the truck at issue] to be put into use without 
proper maintenance." Teague J. emphasised the fact that the company placed higher 
priority on working the trucks than on the safety of workers. By plea of guilty, the 
defendant company acknowledged criminal negligence. 
In the same proceedings, the individual officer (the owner) of the company also 
pleaded guilty to two breaches of the provisions ofthe Occupational Health and Safety Act 
1985 (Victoria). The particulars were that he failed as an officer of the company to 
maintain a safe working environment for employees of the company. Of this defendant, 
Teague 1. stated as follows: 
"[He] acknowledged that he had been given and had accepted the responsibility 
within the company for the maintenance of vehicles and the training of its 
employees as part of the company's duty to provide and maintain a safe working 
environment for its employees. However, he did not act responsibly. He was aware 
of the poor state of the brakes on [the] trucks but he directed that they be used. 
Moreover, the training which he gave the deceased and the other truck drivers was 
quite inadequate. There was willful neglect in the terms ofs52 of the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act." 
22 Unreported, 14 June 1994, Supreme Court of Victoria, Teague J. I am indebted to the Supreme 
Court library of Victoria for supplying this case. 
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Teague J. based his reasoning for corporate liability upon the individual officer's 
violations of the relevant statute (the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985, 
Victoria). It is obvious that in this case the fault element on the part of the defendant 
company was, under the identification principle, derived from the officer's failure to 
"maintain a safe working environment for employees of the company." Teague J. 
enumerated several facts constituting corporate fault, which included failures to 
"establish an adequate system of maintenance for its plant and vehicles," "to properly 
train its employees," and permitting the truck at issue "to be put into use without proper 
maintenance." Considering that the source of risk in this case was the truck's grossly 
defective brakes, the immediate cause of the truck driver's death should be determined 
by the officer's failure to maintain an adequate system of maintenance for the truck at 
issue, with the result that the truck was permitted to be used. 
There was no fault on the part of the truck driver; if any, the defendant company 
should not be held vicariously liable for his fault partly because he was the victim, but 
mainly because his fault resulted from the controlling officer's failure to "properly train" 
him. Another example as to the identification of the controlling officers' failure with 
the company's fault is illustrated in the following case. 
Case 3 (People v. Ebasco Services, Inc.23) 
(1974) 354 N.Y.S. 2d. 807. In the US., the position and status of the particular corporate agents 
are irrelevant to imposing liability on corporations, as the vicarious liability doctrine is widely 
accepted. Nevertheless, several American corporate homicide cases will be referred to in the 
following sections with the assumption that these cases were decided under the identification 
principle in English law. 
For a general discussion of American corporate homicide cases, see, in general, P.B. 
Rodella, "Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: Has the Fiction been Extended too Far?" 
(1984) 4 Journal of Law and Commerce 95; S.J. Wragg, "Corporate Homicide: Will Michigan 
Follow Suit?" (1984) 62 University of Detroit Law Review 66; J.P. Grogin, "Corporations Can 
Kill Too: After Film Recovery, Are Individuals Accountable for Corporate Crimes?" (1986) 19 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 1411; D.v. Ebers, "The Application of Criminal Homicide 
Statutes to Work-Related Deaths: Mens Rea and Deterrence" (1986) 86 University o/Illinois Law 
Review 969; V.L. Swigert & R.A. Farrell, "Corporate Homicide: Definitional Processes in the 
Creation of Deviance" (1980) 15 Law and Society Review 161; G.A. Clark, "Corporate Homicide: 
A New Assault on Corporate Decision-Making" (1979) 54 Notre Dame Lawyer 911; J.M. Hickey, 
"Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: The Controversy Flames Anew" (1981) California 
Western Law Review 465; A.L. Helverson, "Can a Corporation Commit a Murder?" (1986) 64 
Washington University Law Quarterly 967; G.L. Mangum, "Murder in the Workplace: Cr~inal 
Prosecution v. Regulatory Enforcement" (1988) 39 Labor Law Journal 220; S.R. Wemfeld, 
"Criminal Liability of Corporate Managers for Deaths of their Employees: People v. Warner-
Lambert Co. " (1982) 46 Albany Law Review 655; K.M. Koprowicz, "Corporate Criminall Liability 
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A corporation had been hired by a public utility to perform certain management, 
construction and engineering functions in connection with a $200 million extension to an 
electrical generating station on the East River. A portion of the extension project involved 
the construction of a cofferdam, a temporary metal boxlike structure submerged in the 
waters of the East River so that water could be pumped out in order for workmen to 
descend to the river bottom to construct certain permanent facilities for the overall project. 
The fieldwork was under the supervision of the corporation's executive vice president and 
several supervisors. On 17 August 1973, a portion of the cofferdam collapsed during 
assembly and two workmen drowned. The corporation was charged with criminally 
negligent homicide, by failing to properly construct and supervise construction of a 
cofferdam, and by failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death in the 
construction of the cofferdam, in a manner which constituted a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. 
Whilst the immediate cause of collapse of the cofferdam is unknown from the case 
report, corporate fault is clearly identified; namely, several officers' supervisory fault 
in that they failed to "properly construct and supervise construction of a cofferdam" and 
"to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death" of two workmen during 
construction. Nevertheless, there may be room for further analysis as to what kind of 
risk they failed to perceive. 
This case would have a similar aspect of corporate fault, as is found in the Denbo 
case (Case 2), if the officers failed to perceive the immediate cause of collapse. On the 
other hand, it would be possible to capture corporate fault in this case in terms of the 
officers' failure to organise a safety system for the construction of the cofferdam in 
order to prevent the source of risk from leading to disaster. Usually, corporate business 
for Workplace Hazards: A Visible Option for Enforcing Workplace Safety" (1986) 52 Brooklyn 
Law Review 183; D.l Miester Jr., "Criminal Liability for Corporations that Kill" (1990) 64 Tulane 
Law Review 919; J.E. Stoner, "Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: Can the Criminal Law 
Control Corporate Behavior?" (1985) 38 Southwestern Law Journal 127 5; S.A. Radin, "Corporate 
Criminal Liability for Employee-Endangering Activities" (1983) 18 Columbia Journal of Law and 
Social Problems 39; J.C. Magnuson & G.C. Leviton, "Policy Considerations in Corporate Criminal 
Prosecutions after People v. Film Recovery System Inc." (1987) 62 Notre Dame Law Journal 913; 
K.F. Brickey, "Death in the Workplace: Corporate Liability for Criminal Homicide" (1987) 2 
Notre Dame Journal of Ethics and Public Policy 753; L.C. Anderson, "Corporate Criminal 
Liability for Specific Intent Crimes and Offenses of Criminal Negligence - The Direction of Texas 
Law" (1984) 15 St. Mary's Law Journal 231; J. Uffelman, "Corporate Criminal Liability in 
Oregon: State v. Pacific Powder and the New Oregon Criminal Code" (1972) 51 Oregon Law 
Review 587; E.S. Hochstedler, "Criminal Law, Prosecutions, and Blameworthiness of Corporations 
for Crimes against Life, Health and Safety in the United States" (1992) 9 Nihon University 
Comparative Law 165; D.S. Anderson; "Corporate Homicide; The Stark Realities of Artificial 
Beings and Legal Fictions" (1981) 8 Pepperdine Law Review 367. 
For this case, see, for example, Rodella, ibid. at 101; Wragg, ibid. at 73; Grogin, ibid. 
at 1420; Clark, ibid. at 916; Hickey, ibid. at 480; D.S. Anderson, ibid. at 403; Helverson, ibid. at 
973; Miester, ibid. at 926; Stoner, ibid. at 1280; Radin, ibid. at 48. 
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involving construction, production or transportation entails some risks to the health and 
life of people involved in its activity: workers, customers or even the general public?4 
Therefore, it is a company's duty not only to reduce the probability of the source of risk 
materialising, but also to prevent the source of risk from causing the prohibited 
consequences, even after it comes to the surface. The following case serves as an 
example of corporate failure to organise a safety system. 
Case 4 (Kite, Stoddart & OLL Ltd.25) 
24 
25 
On 22 March, 1993, four school children drowned when, on an activity holiday at the 
Lyme Regis Challenge centre which was organised and operated by a company (OLL 
Limited), their kayaks foundered during an "ill-conceived and poorly executed canoe trip." 
After a talk from the centre's manager about safety arrangement and only one hour of 
basic canoe training in a swimming pool, 23 children and two teachers from Southway 
Comprehensive School, Plymouth, split into two groups and took the so-called "assault 
course." The canoe instructors had only recently attended a basic skill course themselves. 
On the day ofthe trip, eight children opted to go canoeing, the instructors did not 
know the weather forecast was for force 3-4 winds. In addition, several pieces of 
necessary or emergency equipment were not provided by the centre. The children were 
not equipped with gloves, footwear, headwear or distress flares. Although given wetsuits 
and life jackets, they were instructed by one of the instructors not to inflate the latter, 
which was considered to be the single most important factor leading to the subsequent 
children's death. Neither of the instructors had flares or a two-way radio. The only safety 
equipment carried by one of the instructors was a whistle. 
The first signs of trouble appeared soon after they launched when one of their 
kayaks capsized. The teenagers linked their drifting canoes into a raft, but one by one 
their crafts were swamped by mounting seas, and they all ended up in the water. The 
students' canoes did not have spray decks to keep the water out, while the instructors and 
teacher's kayaks did. Without a spray deck, a canoe was "a boat with a great big hole in 
it. " 
Interestingly, it is analysed by Schrager and Short that the company can cause health and safety 
risks in the following three manners: (1) by creating occupational harm to the workers; (2) by 
selling the defective goods and services to consumers and customers; and (3) by deteriorating the 
environment affecting the general public. L.S. Schrager & J.F. Short, "Toward a Sociology of 
Organizational Crime" (1978) 125 Social Problems 407 at pp. 413-416. See also W.A. Spurgeon 
& T.P. Fagan, "Criminal Liability for Life-Endangering Corporate Conduct" (1981) 72 Journal 
o/Criminal Law and Criminology 400 at pp. 401-405. 
Winchester Crown Court, 8 December 1994, unreported. The facts are drawn from The Times and 
The Independent, 9 December, 1994. See also A. Ridley & L. Dunford, "Corporate Killing -
Legislating for Unlawful Death" (1997) 26 Industrial Law Journal 99 [hereinafter cited as Killing] 
at pp. 102-103; and ""No Soul to be Dammed, No Body to be Kicked": Responsibility, Blame 
and Corporate Punishment" (1996) 24 International Journal o/the Sociology o/Law I [hereinafter 
cited as Responsibility] at 1; C.M.V. Clarkson, "Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their 
Souls" (1996) 59 Modern Law Review 557 [hereinafter cited as Kicking] at 561. 
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When the centre's manager realised that there had been no sign of the canoes, he, 
instead of raising the alarm, initiated his own search in a vain attempt to look for them for 
vital hours. The local coastguards, who were given no prior details about the trip, were 
finally notified approximately three hours after the group was expected back. 
Several factors were considered to be critical in bringing charges against the three 
defendants (the company itself, its managing director and the centre's manager) with 
manslaughter.26 First, there was no or little liaison between the layers of management at 
the centre, or between management and staff.27 Secondly, there were no specific 
recruitment criteria to become an instructor at the centre,28 which easily enabled the 
inexperienced instructors to take a group of novice canoeists across the bay. Finally, the 
facts described above, such as the lack of safety equipment, the ignorance of emergency 
procedures among employees, and delays in raising the alarm and directing the search for 
the group, were deemed to contribute to the deaths. 29 
In this case, the source of risk to the victims is inherent in the defendant company's 
operations of the canoe trip. The capsize of kayaks would even be a great adventure to 
the students if they were safely rescued. If the company, however, fails to organise a 
safe and secure operation of the trip, it becomes highly probable that the source of risk 
will endagner their lives. The likelihood of the occurrence of the calamity was increased 
by several factors comprising corporate fault in this case: incorrect instructions by the 
inexperienced instructors included in the canoe trip; the lack of safety and emergency 
equipment; and the managing director's indifference to the risks resulting from the trip 
operations under the above circumstances. 
This case involves a mixture of the controlling officer's fault, such as failures 
properly to train his employees, failures to perceive the source of risk, and failures to 
26 The centre's manager, who had denied four manslaughter charges, was eventually acquitted on 
the direction of the judge when the jury at Winchester Crown Court failed to reach a verdict after 




"The staff who led the expedition could not remember being instructed about emergency 
equipment." The Times, ibid. 
"Candidates had to fill in a form listing their qualifications, and one of the instructors who led the 
trip had ticked "expert" in a number of activities in which he had only basic experience." The 
Times, ibid The other instructor was not sure if she "was familiar with what an emergency was." 
Ibid. 
It was also discovered that nine months before the disaster, two employees had quit as instructors 
after just five weeks at the centre because offear. Their letter was sent to the managing director, 
telling him to take a "careful look" at safety, otherwise he might fmd himself explaining "why 
someone's son or daughter will not be coming home." This fact was considered part of his breach 
of a duty of care to those who took part in the outdoor leisure activities. See G. Forlin & M. 
Appleby, "Corporate Manslaughter by Gross Negligence" (1998) Practical Research Papers-





organise a safe system for the company's adventurous operations of the canoe trip. The 
idea of the failure to organise a safe system would be instrumental in cases where a 
company is charged with endangerment crimes. Unlike crimes of murder or 
manslaughter, the result of the victim's death is not required for the crimes of 
endangerment to be realised.30 In the following two cases, the corporations were 
charged with this type of crime, based on the failure to provide a safe workplace or to 
operate the ship in a safe manner. 
Case 5 (People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Co.3!) 
A wire-coating corporation and its five officials were indicted for aggravated battery and 
reckless conduct. At the plant, wire was coated with various substances and chemical 
compounds, some of which were toxic. However, 42 employees did not work in an 
adequately ventilated area. Neither were they informed of the substances nor provided 
with protective clothing and gear. 
The prosecution alleged that the defendant company and its individual officials, 
while acting in their official capacity, exposed 42 employees to numerous federally 
regulated "poisonous and stupefying" substances in the workplace; failed to provide 
necessary safety instructions and equipment and health monitoring systems in the 
workplace; improperly stored the substances, and provided inadequate ventilation in the 
workplace and maintained dangerously overheated working conditions while the 
employees were exposed to the substances. It was thus alleged that as a result of these 
acts, the defendants violated their duty to provide a safe workplace for employees and 
caused great bodily harm to 42 employees with the conscious awareness that a substantial 
probability existed that their acts would cause great bodily harm. The prosecution also 
charged that the defendants knowingly committed acts which would cause 42 employees 
to take by deception, and for other than medical purposes, the substances. 
The reckless conduct charges alleged that the defendants grossly deviated from 
the standard of care which a reasonable employer would exercise in conducting the 
business of coating wire and thereby violated their duty to provide a safe workplace. 
Case 6 (Seaboard Offshore Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Transport32) 
Examples of the crimes ofendangennent are found in: Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990, 
ss. 1, 11 and 12; Fireanns Act 1968, s. 16; Explosive Substances Act 1883, s. 2; Offences against 
the Person Act 1861, ss. 32-34; Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 (S.l. 1994 No. 570), art. 
7; Criminal Damage Act 1971, s.I(2)(b). See also Shillito v. Thompson (1875) 1 Q.B.D. 12. 
(1987) 510 N.E. 2d. 1173; (1989) 534 N.E. 2d. 962. See also Mangum, supra note 23 at 222, 
Hochstedler, supra note 23 at 170. 
[1994] 1 WLR 541; 2 All ER 99. See also C. Wells, "Corporate Liability for Crime: The 
Neglected Question" (1995) 14 International Banking and Financial Law 42 at 43. For a 
discusion of the liability of ship's masters, see generally S.W. Taylor, "Criminal Liability of Ship's 
Masters" (1981) Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 499. 
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In September 1990, the motor vessel, managed by the defendant company, set sail from 
the River Tyne, bound for Aberdeen. The chief engineer ofthe vessel, who had 27 years' 
experience, had boarded the ship two hours and 50 minutes before she put to sea. Early 
in the morning of 7 September, the main engines and the generators broke down so that 
the ship was plunged into darkness. Even the engine room emergency lighting failed to 
come on. The breakdown was due to an incorrect gravity feed disc which had been fitted 
to the fuel oil purifier, causing the throughput to the service tanks to inadequately meet the 
engine demand. The chief engineer managed to restart the engine twice by hand-pumping 
fuel into the service tanks, and thought that the setting and service tanks were almost 
empty. Then, he opened a valve on one of the bunker tanks which had the effect of 
releasing its contents directly into the starboard service tanks, instead of through the 
settling tank. Consequently, the engines were flooded by water, and the ship came to a 
halt and remained drifting in the North Sea from the evening of 7 September until 11.00 
hours on 8 September, when she was towed back to the River Tyne. 
The defendant company was charged with a contravention of section 31 of the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1988, which provides that "if the owner of a ship to which the 
section applies fails to discharge the duty imposed on him by sub-s (l) he shall be guilty 
of an offence.33 The Justices found that the defendant company had caused the ship to be 
operated in an unsafe manner by allowing the chief engineer insufficient time to 
familiarise himself with the ship before it sailed, but made no finding as to who gave the 
instruction to sail. By rejecting the Justices' view that the defendant should be held 
vicariously liable for the fault of some employee of the defendants other than the senior 
management, the House of Lords applied the principle of identification to this case, with 
the result that the company's conviction was quashed. 
The main difference between the above two cases is whether the prosecution succeeded 
in proving that the controlling officer was involved in life-endangering conduct with 
which the defendant company was charged. In the Chicago Magnet case (Case 5), 
several corporate officers were blamed for the breach of their duty to provide a safe 
workplace for their employees, which resulted in recklessly exposing them to poisonous 
substances in the workplace. In the Seaboard Offshore case (Case 6), on the other hand, 
the prosecution did not or failed to prove who gave the instruction to put to sea when 
the chief engineer had insufficient time to familiarise himself with the ship. The 
prosecution's thought was that fault of the chief engineer should be imputed to the 
defendant company, since they misinterpreted the Act 1988 as imposing vicarious 
liability. Given that the prosecution proved that the instruction to sail was given by the 
senior management, the company could have been held liable under the identification 
principle. In such a case, the company's fault would consist of the senior management's 
decision to sail, which should be considered part of the breach of their duty to secure 
Subsection (1) of the Act 1988 provides: 
" It shall be the duty of the owner of a ship to which this section applies to take all 
reasonable steps to secure that the ship is operated in a safe manner." 
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that the ship is operated in a safe manner. 
3.3. The Problematic Aspects of the Identification Principle 
The previous section surveyed several cases in which corporations were or could have 
been held liable for manslaughter (or for personal injuries in the cases of Chicago 
Magnet and Seaboard Offshore) under the identification principle. It has been pointed 
out by several commentators,34 however, that this principle suffers some flaws. The 
flaws, according to these commentators, flow from its scope. Yet, the identification 
principle is also over-inclusive, since it has been applied to the case where the acts of 
the controlling officer were against the company's interest.35 On the other hand, it is 
under-inclusive36 if the fault of one of the controlling officers cannot be proved. This 
is likely to happen in cases of large complex-structured companies where complicated 
division of authority and accountability makes it almost impossible for the prosecution 
even to pinpoint whose fault contributes to the criminal consequences. 
According to Clarkson, the under-inclusiveness of the identification principle 
results from its failure to "reflect modem corporate practice" or "the reality of modem 
corporate decision-making which is often the product of corporate policies and 
procedures rather than individual decisions. ,,37 In other words, it is with the company 
34 See, for example, J. Gobert, "Corporate Criminality: Four Models of Fault" (1994) 14 Legal 
Studies 393 at pp. 401-401; C.M.V. Clarkson, Kicking, supra note 25 at pp. 561-562; E. Colvin, 




Gobert (ibid at 400) refers to Moore v. Bresler [1944] 2 All ER 515, cited in Chapter 2, text 
accompanying notes 145-146. 
The terms "over- and under-inclusive" originate from criticisms by several American 
commentators against the doctrine of vicarious liability. The issues of over- and under-
inclusiveness of the vicarious liability doctrine will be analysed in the next section. 
Clarkson, Kicking, supra note 25 at 561. Commentators have been united in their belief that the 
identification doctrine is still effective when applied in the cases of small owner-managed 
companies, as found in the Kite & OLL case (Case 4), in which it is not difficult to prove the 
controlling officer's fault. See, for example, Clarkson, Kicking, ibid. See also B. Fisse & J. 
Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (1993, Cambridge University Press), p.1, 
n.1, stating that: 
"Our central concern is the position in relation t~ large-scale business enterprises and 
governmental entities." (emphasis added) 
Ifthese commentators are correct, the theory of corporate liability might arbitrarily be determined 
by the ability or inability of the prosecution to pinpoint the individual offenders in the corporate 






itself, not with specific individuals that the corporate fault lay in the sense that corporate 
policies and operational procedures did not ensure that the result would not occur. 38 
Unfortunately, these criticisms of over- and under-inclusiveness suffer petitio 
principii, a fallacy in reasoning in that they base their justification upon an assumption, 
the adequacy of which needs first to be proved. The assumption is that the concept of 
"corporate policies and practices" would cover the ideal scope of corporate fault and 
liability. As far as the over-inclusive aspect of the identification principle is concerned, 
a company would not, as in the Moore case, be held liable for the act of the senior 
officer which was against the company's interest, at least under the Law Commission's 
Criminal Code Bill, Clause 30 (6).39 Thus, the over-inclusiveness issue could be 
avoided even under the identification principle if a proper consideration is given to its 
application.40 Since the adequacy of the corporate policy approach will be examined in 
the next chapter, the rest of this section will be devoted to the issue of under-
inclusiveness of the identification principle in the context of corporate manslaughter. 
The identification principle has been considered to be under-inclusive in 
situations in which corporations unfairly escaped criminal liability. As for corporate 
liability for manslaughter, several cases are described below. 
Case 7 (Northern Stripping Mining Constructions Ltd.41 ) 
On 5 July, 1964, a welder burner was drowned when a railway bridge which the defendant 
companies, it does not necessarily mean that it is justifiable in the context of small companies. 
See also C.M.V. Clarkson, "Corporate Culpability" (1998) 2 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues 
[hereinafter cited as Culpability]. Those who criticise the identification principle for its under-
inclusiveness support, without exception, the corporate policy or culture approach, one of the 
organisation theories which will be critically analysed in the next chapter. See, for example, 
Clarkson, Kicking, supra note 25 at pp. 569-572 and Culpability, ibid; Gobert, supra note 34 at 
pp. 407-409; Colvin, supra note 6 at pp. 23-42. 
Law Commission, A Criminal Code, supra note 12. Clause 30 (6) of the Bill provides: 
"A controlling officer does not act "within the scope of his office" if he acts with the 
intention of doing harm or of concealing harm done by him or another to the corporation." 
This does not mean, however, that this thesis' position is in favour of the identification principle 
in the case of corporate manslaughter. 
Unreported. The facts are drawn from The Times, 2, 4 and 5 February, 1965. 
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construction company was demolishing at Boughrood, Radnorshire, collapsed and threw 
men working on it into the Wye. The company was charged with unlawfully killing the 
victim. 
The prosecution alleged that the foreman, in charge of demolishing a railway 
bridge, was given oral instructions by the managing director to start in the middle. The 
foreman was not skilled in any particular trade although he had driven tractors. The only 
experience he had in the demolition of bridges was in connection with two others which 
the company demolished in the previous five weeks. He had no appreciation of the 
dangers involved in demolishing work and as far as he was concerned, it did not matter 
how a bridge was demolished. He explained to his men what had to be done and then left 
for another bridge, leaving no one in charge of the work. On the other hand, the managing 
director had said he would visit the bridge on the following Monday. From Thursday until 
Saturday when the bridge collapsed, the managing director never put in an appearance. 
On Sunday morning the foreman instructed the workmen to bum down a 5-foot 
Section in the middle of the bridge and then a 10-foot Section further away. As soon as 
this was done there was a compression force pulling it towards the centre. He instructed 
the burners further to cut "V" pieces. One of the workmen was engaged in doing so when 
the bridge collapsed. Instructions given to the foremen to start in the middle were, 
according to the allegation by the prosecution, almost as ludicrous as telling a man sitting 
on a branch of a tree to saw the branch. It destroyed the whole stability of the bridge. The 
obvious way to start demolishing the bridge was to cut at both ends simultaneously. 
At trial, however, the foreman admitted that it was possible that he made a 
mistake and that he construed the managing director's instructions to cut the top bracings 
in the middle as implying cutting the top cord. To cut a bridge in the middle, standing on 
the bridge was suicidal, and the following collapse of the bridge should have been 
foreseen by any mechanical engineer. Therefore, there might have been some doubt about 
him getting the instructions right. As a matter of fact, the managing director, who gave 
the foreman oral instructions, insisted at trial that he told the foreman to start from the 
ends of the bridge, leaving the upstream girder intact. This means that they would start 
by cutting the top cord in 5 feet lengths to start 10 feet from the end, and work towards the 
middle, not start in the middle of the bridge. As a result, the foreman's conduct was 
regarded as contrary to the managing director's instructions, and the company was 
acquitted. 
The company in this case escaped liability despite its managing director's involvement 
in the demolishion operation at issue. This was because his fault could not be proved 
as to the foreman's misunderstanding of his instructions, which led to the catastrophe. 
Under the identification principle, if one of the controlling officers (as in this case, the 
managing director) was certainly not at fault to the extent of showing reckless disregard 
for the life of the victim who drowned, the company could not be guilty for reckless 
manslaughter. 42 
If the doctrine of vicarious liability was applied to this case, as seen in the 
Supra note 36. 
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American jurisdictions, the company would be held vicariously liable for the act of the 
foreman. Nonetheless, in this case, the company's fault should not be captured by way 
of the imputation of the unskilful, inexperienced foreman's mistake. Neither should the 
company's fault be comprised of managing director's failure properly to supervise the 
process of demolishing the bridge on the construction site. Rather, the company should 
be to blame for putting the foreman in charge of the work, without giving him proper 
training or experience in demolishing bridges prior to the tragedy. 
This case provides a typical flaw of the identification principle, under which 
corporate liability depends upon the particular individual's fault: that is, if no one is at 
fault, the company can escape liability even when there may still be room for assessing 
corporate collective fault. The next American case, in which the company itself pleaded 
nolo contendere to the homicide charge but its senior officer escaped liability due to the 
causation issue, also illustrates the flaw of the identification principle. If this case had 
been decided in English Law, the identification principle would have been applied and 
the result would have been the company's acquittal. The main point at issue here is how 
the senior officer was exempted from liability although his fault was clearly identified. 
The detailed facts of this case are described below. 
Case 8 (State v. Serebin43) 
After Midnight on 7 February, 1976, a nursing home resident (seventy-eight years old) 
walked out of the nursing home into the freezing air of the Wisconsin night. He died of 
exposure to the cold between midnight and 3.00 a.m., when the temperature was between 
8° and 15°F. His body was found near the facility, after the morning shift discovered that 
he was missing. When he left the facility, there were only two aids and one nurse on duty 
for 200 residents on three floors. 
In late 1978, six defendants - the corporation itself, the three primary directors of 
the corporation, and two nursing home administrators employed by the corporation - were 
charged with homicide by reckless conduct for the victim's death (and with 58 counts of 
criminal neglect of nursing residents for the skin deterioration, bedsores and weight loss 
caused by inadequate food and care). 
Because the corporation itself pleaded no contest to the homicide and neglect 
43 (1983) 338 N.W. 2d. 855; (1984) 350 N.W. 2d. 65. See also J. Pray, "State v. Serebin: Causation 
and the Criminal Liability of Nursing Home Administrators" (1986) Wisconsin Law Review 339; 
Hochstedler, supra note 23 at pp. 168-169; C.B. Schdson, A.P. Onellion & E. Hochstedler, 
''Nailing an Omelet to the Wall: Prosecuting Nursing Home Homicide" in E. Hochstedler (ed.), 
Corporations as Criminals (1984, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills), pp. 131. 
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charges, on appeal the issue centred upon whether the individual defendants (in particular, 
one of the nursing home administrators, Serebin) could be guilty of reckless conduct for 
the death of the victim. The evidence submitted by the state indicated several factors 
constituting Serebin's reckless conduct. At the time of the victim's death, Serebin, as the 
officially designated administrator, was responsible for the day-to-day operation of the 
nursing home and supervised the care and treatment of the residents through the licensed 
personnel. He discussed the staffing patterns for the different shifts on the various units 
with directors of nursing, who submitted staffing plans to him. In reviewing their staffing 
plans for feasibility, however, Serebin's main concern was operating within the budget. 
During the winter of 1975-76, he continued to admit patients and reduced the nursing staff 
further, even if it would make it impossible for the rest of nurses and aides to care for and 
supervise patients, especially those who had a tendency to wander around and try to leave 
the building.44 
On the night of the victim's death, 200 patients were housed in three units. The 
overnight staff consisted of one nurse for three units and two aides working part of the 
victim's unit. Before the staff cuts, one nurse was responsible for only two of the three 
units (including the victim's unit), and three aides working exclusively on the victim's 
unit. One of the aides assisted the victim to his room at 11 :40 p.m., but did not see him 
get into bed. Later in the evening, she looked into the victim's room, without entering the 
room, and it appeared to her that the victim was in his bed. The doors leading from the 
unit at issue to the outside could not be kept locked because it was an emergency exit. 
Whilst there was an alarm installed on one door to alert the staff when it was opened, the 
sliding glass doors through which the victim apparently left had no such alarm. 
At trial, both the intermediate appellate and state supreme courts found the 
evidence insufficient to support a conviction for homicide by reckless conduct of Serebin. 
The major obstacle to the conviction was a causal link between the failure of Serebin to 
provide more staff and the victim's death. State regulations required staff to make the 
rounds every two hours, but this was not possible with the reduced number of staff. Under 
the situations, the state argued that had more than two aides or one nurse been available 
for the supervision of residents on the unit at issue, the victim could not have wandered 
away undiscovered, and one could have monitored the halls and doors while the others 
made more careful checks of the rooms. However, what the state proved from the 
evidence was that such a closer bed check might have revealed the victim's absence 
sooner than it actually was discovered. The causal issue considered at trial was whether 
it would have prevented his death. 
The victim's death occurred between midnight and 3:00 a.m. when the aide had 
assisted the victim approximately twenty minutes before midnight. There was no evidence 
concerning how quickly the victim died when exposed to the temperature of between 8° 
44 Prior to the incident, Serebin was repeatedly warned by his own staff and state officials that the 
insufficient staffmg created a situation in which the patients did not receive adequate care and 
supervision, that staffmg deficiencies jeopardized their health, safety and welfare, and especially 
that wandering residents could not be watched. The evidence indicated that Serebin knowingly 
allowed the probability of dangers to exist that (1) elderly patients who require close supervision 
and care would be unobserved when they left the building and were exposed to the elements during 
harsh weather; or (2) they might not receive prompt medical attention when ill or injured. These 
dangers were likely to happen due to the lack of staff and increasing number of the patients. The 
evidence also indicated that Serebin knew that the victim walked away from the ward on prior 
occasions by reviewing the 24-hour reports which were complied by unit nurses daily and detailed 
new admissions, discharges, and changes in conditions. (1984) 350 N.W. 2d. 65 at pp. 69-70. 
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and 15°P. These facts showed that even had the ideal two-hour bed check been possible 
within sufficient staff, the victim might have wandered outside and died of exposure 
within a two-hour interval between bed checks. 
The other factor impeding the Serebin's conviction was the aide's manner of 
checking. She actually peeked into the victim's room from the doorway. Even if this 
cursory check of the unit was in fact the routine followed by the others, it was not clear 
whether this checking manner resulted from the staffing shortage and her inability to 
perform her duties as thoroughly as she would have had more staff members. 
Suppose that in this case the company had not pleaded no contest to the homicide charge 
and the identification principle was applied. Under the circumstances, the focal point 
for corporate liability would have been whether the reckless conduct of one of the 
nursing administrators of the company (Serebin) could be identified with that of the 
company itself. Serebin's reckless conduct consisted in, based on his motive of 
operating the nursing home within the budget, his reducing the staff and accepting 
patients. This caused the situations in which it was impossible for the nurses and aides 
to make the rounds every two hours, as was required by state regulations. 
At trial, the state failed to prove two vital causal links: one between the victim's 
death and the impossibility of the ideal two-hour bed check due to the staff reduction; 
and the other between the staff shortage and the cursory check by the aide who was in 
charge of the victim's unit.45 The state's failure to prove these causal links was due to 
the fact that Serebin's conduct of reducing staffwas over-emphasised. Although such 
conduct contributed to a major extent to the victim's death, account should also have 
been taken of the other factors that could have avoided the victim's death; such as the 
failures to install the alarm on the doors of the building and to train the staff irrespective 
of the staff reduction.46 
Since focusing exclusively upon the conduct of the controlling officer associated 
with the same person's relevant mental states, the identification principle cannot cover 
the full range of factors all of which, as a whole, could have prevented the victim's 
death. The following two cases illustrate another flaw of this principle in relation to the 
45 The issue of how to connect individuals' negligence to corporate fault in the context of corporate 
manslaughter will be dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6. 
46 These factors might have resulted from the Serebin's motive directed at the tight budget, but not 






issue of foreseeability on the part of the controlling officer. 
Case 9 (Commonwealth v. Welanskl7) 
On 28 November, 1942, and for about nine years before that day, a corporation maintained 
and operated a night club in Boston, for the furnishing to the public for compensation of 
food, drink and entertainment, consisting of orchestra and band music, singing and 
dancing. It employed about eighty persons. The corporation, its officers and employees, 
and its business were completely dominated by the defendant, who owned and held in his 
own name or the names of others, all the capital stock of the corporation. He was entitled 
to and took all the profits. Internally, the corporation was operated with regard to 
individual form. Responsibility for the number of condition of safety exits had not been 
delegated by the defendant to any other employees. 
Twelve days before that day, he became suddenly ill and was carried to a hospital, 
where he was in bed for three weeks and remained until discharged on 11 December, 
1942. During his absence, the practice of the night club was usual and regular, apart from 
the lighting of a match described below. 
A little after ten o'clock on the evening of Saturday, 28 November, 1942, the 
night club48 was well filled with a crowd of patrons. 49 There were 250-400 persons in the 
Melody Lounge, 400-500 persons in the main dining room and the Caricature Bar, and 
250 persons in the new Cocktail Lounge. Exclusive of the new Cocktail Lounge, the 
reasonable capacity of the night club was 650 persons. Thus, many persons were standing 
in various rooms. 
A bartender in the Melody Lounge noticed that an electric bulb which was in or 
near the coconut hunks of an artificial palm tree in the corner had been turned off and that 
corner was dark. He directed a sixteen-year boy, who was waiting on customers at the 
tables, to cause the bulb to be lighted. The bar boy got a stool, lighted a match in order 
to see the bulb, turned the bulb in its socket, and thus lighted it. Then, he blew the match 
out, and started to walk away. Allegedly, the flame of the match had ignited the palm tree 
and that had speedily ignited the low cloth ceiling near it, for both flamed up almost 
instantly. The fire spread with great rapidity across the upper part of the room, causing 
much heat. The crowd in the Melody Lounge rushed up the stairs, but the fire preceded 
them. People caught fire while on the stairway which led to the ground floor. The fire 
then spread speedily across the ground floor, where the foyer, the Caricature Bar, the main 
dining room, and the Cocktail Lounge located. Soon after the fire started, the lights in the 
night club went out. The crowd were panic stricken, and rushed and pushed in every 
(1944) 55 N.E. 2d. 902. See also C.M.V. Clarkson & H.M. Keating, Criminal Law - Text and 
Materials (1998, 4th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London), pp. 437-440. 
The night club at issue consisted of several rooms: the Melody Lounge (1895 square feet, 
containing a bar, tables and chairs, at the basement of the night club); the main dining room (3765 
square feet, including a dance floor and about 70 tables each of which was for 2-8 persons, at the 
ground floor); the Caricature Bar (1399 square feet, containing two bars, stools and chairs, at the 
ground floor); and the new Cocktail Lounge (781 square feet, at the ground floor). (1944) 55 N.E. 
2d. 902 at pp. 905-906. 
It was during the business season of the year, and an important American football game in the 
afternoon had attracted many visitors in Boston. Ibid. at 906. 
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direction through the night club, screaming and overturning tables and chairs in their 
attempts to escape. 
There were only some doors at the Cocktail Lounge and a single revolving door 
of the whole building of the night club as entrances and exits intended for the ordinary use 
of patrons, and the exit through the wooded partition from the Melody Lounge for 
employees. At the time of fire, the revolving door soon jammed, but it was burst out by 
the pressure ofthe crowd. A considerable number of patrons escaped through the doors 
at the Cocktail Lounge, but many died just inside the doors. In addition to these doors , 
there were five possible emergency exits from the night club, all on the ground floor. 
Nonetheless, each door of these five exits could not easily be opened at the time offrre due 
to the owner's poor arrangements ofthem. Neither were most of the patrons informed of 
the existence of these doors. 50 After all, some employees and a great number of patrons 
died in the frre. Others were taken out of the building with fatal bums and injuries from 
smoke, and died within a few days. 
The owner of the night club and his brothers were indicted for manslaughter in 
sixteen counts. The alleged misconduct of the defendants consisted in causing or 
permitting or failing reasonably to prevent defective wiring, the installation of 
inflammable decorations, the absence of frre doors, the absence of proper means of egress 
properly maintained and sufficient proper exits, and overcrowding. The defendants' 
wanton or reckless conduct allegedly consisted in the breach of a legal duty to their invited 
members of the general public (= patrons) to use reasonable care to keep its premises safe 
for their use; in reckless disregard of such duty and of the probable harmful consequences 
to the victims. 
This is a case in which the owner of a night club was held responsible for his failures 
both to prevent the fire from causing the death of victims and to use reasonable steps to 
keep his premises safe. As for the relationship between his personal liability and 
corporate liability, the court held that: 
50 The details of each door were: (1) a door at the head of the stairway leading to and from the 
basement Melody Lounge; (2) a door leading from the foyer, near the revolving door; (3) two 
doors from the middle of the wall of the main dining room; (4) the service door at the foot ofa 
stairway leading to dressing rooms on the second floor; and (5) the door leading from a corridor 
separated from the Melody Lounge at the basement. 
The door (1), apparently not visible from the greater part ofthe foyer, was locked by a 
separate lock operated by a key that was kept in a desk in the office. At the time of frre, this door 
was not open until frremen broke it down from outside with axe. Two dead bodies were found 
close to it, and pile of bodies about 7 feet from it. The door (2) could not be opened fully, because 
of a wall shelf. In addition, this door was commonly barred in the evening, as well as at the time 
offrre, by a removable board with clothing hooks on it. The doors (3) could be opened after some 
difficulty. One ofthese doors did not open upon pressure, and it had to be hammered with a table 
before it would open. The other had to be opened after dining tables near the door were moved 
away. The door (4) was known to employees, but doubtless not to patrons, because it led to the 
dressing room to which patrons were not admitted. The door was kept locked by the direction of 
the defendant, and the key was kept in a desk in the office. The door (5) was also unlikely to be 
known to patrons because this door was led from a corridor at the basement into which patrons 
had no occasion to go. This door, too, was kept locked by the direction of the defendant. The 
doors (4) and (5) were locked at the time of fire, and were opened by force from outside by 
firemen and others. Some patrons escaped through the door (4) and (5), but many dead bodies 





"There is nothing in the point that because the corporation might have been indicted and 
convicted, the defendant could not be. The defendant was in full control of the 
corporation, its officers and employees, its business and its premises. He could not escape 
criminal responsibility by using a corporate form.,,51 
Suppose, again, that the company was indicted for the homicide caused by its owner's 
failures and the identification principle was applied in this case. There is no doubt that 
in this case the owner's fault would be identified with that of the company. One point 
would be unclear, however. 
The defendant's fault, of course, resulted from the breach of "a legal duty 
[imposed on the owner to the] invitees to use reasonable care to keep [his] premises safe 
for their use. ,,52 And the Commonwealth specified the nature of the casualties of the 
victims and "the harmful consequences to which acts or omissions of the defendant 
exposed to the several victims and which could have been foreseen by the defendant. ,,53 
It is thus reasonable to assume that the defendant, as the owner of the company, failed 
to organise a safe and secure system regarding fire doors and this failure was legally 
linked with the victims' death. But what about his foresight or foreseeability of the 
immediate cause of fire? His breach of a legal duty included permitting the installation 
of inflammable decorations (as in this case, an artificial palm tree) through which the 
fire occurred and spread. The fire was actually caused by a sixteen-year boy, who was 
unlawfully employed by the defendant. It is definite that this boy's careless conduct 
caused the fire which spread over the building, with the help of the defendant's failures 
to take reasonable steps to keep his premises safe. It is doubtful, however, whether the 
boy's conduct could have been foreseen by the defendant. 
The reasoning developed by the court for the defendant's fault has no relation 
to the boy's misconduct of causing the fire. On the contrary, it was held that: 
"To convict the defendant of manslaughter, the Commonwealth was not required to prove 
that he caused the fIre by some wanton or reckless conduct. Fire in a place of public resort 
is an ever present danger. It was enough to prove that death resulted from his wanton or 
Ibid. at 912. 







reckless disregard of the safety of patrons in the event of fire from any cause. ,,54 
It is suggested that this reasoning is deficient in that it fails to capture the defendant's 
fault relevant to the source of risk. Whilst it may be true that "fire in a place of public 
resort is an ever present danger," a clear line should be drawn in the context of criminal 
liability between the failures to prevent the fire from occurring and the failures to 
prevent the occurrence of fire from causing the consequences. 55 
As the court concluded in this case, the defendant's failures to prevent the 
unlawful employment of minors "plainly had little or no relation to any wanton or 
reckless conduct that might result in manslaughter.,,56 That is, there was no fault on the 
part of the defendant as to the immediate cause of the fire at issue. Nevertheless, the 
defendant was blamed only for his failure to prevent the unforeseeable occurrence of the 
fire from causing the consequences. This is another limitation inherent in the 
identification principle in that one controlling officer's fault cannot cover the full range 
of corporate fault. 
The other example concernmg the Issue of foreseeability on the part of 
controlling officers is described below. 
Case 10 (People v. Warner-Lambert CO.57) 
The defendant company was a manufacturing corporation that produced Freshen-Up 
Ibid. at 912. 
Suppose that in this case, the fIre at issue was caused by one of the patrons' misconduct, or that 
a terrorist group attacked the night club and unintentionally caused the fIre. In these examples, 
it would not be reasonable to assume that the owner of the night club could have foreseen the cause 
of fIre and, hence, could have been expected to taken any preventive steps against it. 
(1944) 55 N.E. 2d. 902 at 908. This is because the purpose of relevant statutes which proscribe 
the unlawful employment of minors is not directed towards the liability of an employer for the 
result of these minors' possible misconduct. See, for example, H.L.A. Hart & T. Honore, 
Causation in the Law (1985, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford), chAo 
(1980) 414 N.E. 2d. 660. See also Grogin, supra note 23 at pp. 1421-1422; Ebers, supra note 23 
at 982; Koprowicz, supra note 23 at pp. 213-216; Hochstedler, supra note 23 at pp. 166-167; 
Radin, supra note 23 at pp. 41-45; Weinfeld, supra note 23 at 655-659. 
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chewing gum, which is retailed in the shape of a square tablet with a jellylike centre. 58 In 
February 1976, the insurance carrier for the corporation inspected its plant and advised 
that the dust condition in the Freshen-Up chewing gum production area presented an 
explosion hazard and the MS concentration was above the LEL, together with 
recommendations for installation of a dust exhaust system and modification of electrical 
equipment to meet standards for dust areas. A variety of proposals for altering the dust 
condition were considered by the defendant individuals (the vice president in charge of 
manufacturing, director of corporate safety and security, plant manager and plant engineer) 
in consultations and communications with each other. Some alternations in the MS 
application were made, and an executive decision was made to work towards the eventual 
elimination ofMS entirely by modification of the Freshen-Up equipment. However, this 
modification had not been accomplished fully; only one of six Uniplast machines had been 
modified, and approximately 500 pounds of MS a day were still used in Freshen-Up 
production at the time of the incident. Employees were wearing face masks and goggles 
to protect their eyes and breathing passages, and just prior to the tragedy, when sweeping 
and airhosing of accumulated MS was in progress, there were rising dust and a "heavy 
fog" or "mist" all around. 
On 21 November, 1976, the corporation was operating six Uniplast machines in 
the production of Freshen-up chewing gum on the fourth floor of its Long Island City 
plant, New York. The machines were almost in constant operation (24 hours per day, six 
days a week, producing two million packages of gum a day). However, at the time of the 
catastrophic explosion near the end of one of the work shifts, only one machine 
(designated the "D" machine) was in operation and employees were cleaning settled MS 
dust off of the base of that machine and the overhead pipes by broom sweeping and by the 
use of air hoses. Suddenly an explosion occurred in the area of the operating machine, 
followed almost immediately by a second, much larger explosion accompanied by flames 
which caused injuries to more than 50 workers in the area (six of whom died) and 
extensive damage to the building and equipment, which was attributed to burning of 
ambient dust and explosion rather than general fire. Apparently, a spark caused an 
explosion around the "D" machine. A primary explosion had occurred at the "D" machine 
which dispersed added MS dust into the atmosphere and could have caused the second, 
greater explosion. The ceiling of the floor below the "D" machine had been covered with 
The manufacturing process ofthis gum involved passing filled ropes of the gum through a bed of 
Magnesium Stearate (MS), a dry, dust-like lubricant which was applied by hand, then into a die-cut 
punch (a Uniplast machine) splayed with a cooling agent (liquid nitrogen), where the gum was 
formed into the square tablets. Both MS and the liquid nitrogen were utilised to prevent the chicle 
from adhering to the sizing and cutting machinery, the tendency to adhere being less if a dry 
lubricant was employed and the punch was kept at a low temperature. This process dispersed dust 
into the air, which accumulated both at the bases of the Uniplast machines and on the plant's 
overhead pipes. Some also remained ambient in the atmosphere in the surrounding area. (1980) 
414 N.E. 2d. 660 at pp. 661-662. 
Both the MS (normally an inert, organic compound that in bulk, powdered form) and the 
liquid nitrogen were considered safe and were widely used in the industry. In bulk, MS will only 
burn or smoulder if ignited; however, if suspended in the air in sufficient concentration the dust 
poses a substantial risk of explosion if ignited. The minimum concentration at which an explosion 
can occur is denominated the Lower Explosion Level (LEL). On the other hand, liquid nitrogen, 
with a boiling temperature of minus 422 degrees Fahrenheit, is an effective cryogenic which might 
playa part in the process of "liquefaction," the production of liquid oxygen in the course of the 
condensation of air on its exposure to a source of intense cold. Liquid nitrogen is highly volatile, 
is easily ignited and, if ignited, will explode. Among possible causes of such ignition of either 
liquid oxygen or ambient MS are electrical or mechanical sparks. Ibid. at 662. 
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peeling paint, indicating that the temperature of that machine was colder than the others 
, 
and the machine's base, made of cast iron, had cracked, perhaps by the reason of the cold. 
The corporation and several of its officers and employees were charged with six 
counts of manslaughter in the second degree and criminally negligent homicide. There 
was no direct proof as to what triggered the initial and second explosions. The 
prosecution's theory of causation was that the initial detonation was attributable to 
mechanical sparkling resulting from the breakup of the metal parts of the "D" Uniplast 
machine, possibly occasioned by the machine's having become overheated or overloaded , 
by vibration, or by slipping of components. Another explanation for the initial explosion 
by the prosecution was that liquid oxygen, produced through liquefaction as air condensed 
on the highly volatile liquid nitrogen - cooled parts of the "D" machine - dripped onto 
settled MS dust at the base of the Uniplast, became trapped there and then, when subject 
to the impact caused by a moving metal part, reacted violently, causing ignition of already 
dispersed MS. 
The New York Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the indictments of 
manslaughter against the defendants. Whilst the defendants were aware of a broad, 
undifferentiated risk of an explosion from substances used in the company's 
manufacturing operations, the evidence submitted by the prosecution was not legally 
sufficient to establish the foreseeability of the actual, immediate, triggering cause of the 
explosion. It is for this reason that the defendants could not be held criminally liable on 
a theory of either reckless or negligent conduct. 
As far as the foreseeability issue is concerned, this case imposed an additional 
requirement in that it focused on the precise chain of physical events leading to the 
prohibited result or the particular cause of death. 59 This means that it would not be 
sufficient to prove that the explosion itself was foreseeable to the defendants. This 
requirement is, however, extremely difficult to satisfy in practice when applied to the 
identification principle. 
In this case, several officers of the manufacturing company were remote from 
specific manufacturing operations. On the other hand, the lower-level workers might 
have the technical expertise or detailed knowledge of the manufacturing process at issue, 
but might not have sufficient authority and responsibility to prevent the hazardous 
conditions. This dilemma cannot be avoided, as the identification principle is concerned 
with conduct and mental states of the particular officer(s) sufficiently high in the 
corporate hierarchy. Fault on the part of the officers (the vice president, director in 
charge of manufacturing safety and security, plant manager and plant engineer in this 
case) should be identified in that they failed to ensure that their proposals for altering 
the hazardous dust conditions had not fully been accomplished. The foreseeability of 





the particular chain of events would be irrelevant to their fault, since the explosions can 
be said to be the consequences of their failure to execute their proposals. 
The following case demonstrates another deficiency of the identification 
principle that focuses exclusively on the particular controlling officers for imposing 
liability on corporations. 
Case 11 (People v. O'NeiI60) 
Film Recovery was engaged in the business of extracting, for a resale, silver from old w-
ray and photographic film. Its sister company, Metallic Marketing, owned 50% of the 
stock of Film Recovery. The recovery process, called cyanide-leaching, was performed 
at Film Recovery's plant.61 Working with the sodium cyanide solution imposed the risk 
of inhaling poisonous gas. Cyanide-contaminated water from open vats, which splashed 
on the plant's floor, posed an additional risk. Film Recovery used Cyanogran brand 
sodium cyanide to reclaim silver. Every container of Cyanogran carried a warning label 
that, in English, read: "Poison. Danger! May be fatal if inhaled, swallowed or absorbed 
through skin. Contact with acid or weak alkalies liberates a poisonous gas.... Do not 
breathe dust or gas. Do not get in eyes, on skin, or clothing. ,,62 
To prevent the danger, similar companies installed hooded vents over each vat 
which removed the poisonous gas from the plant. Film Recovery, however, used a ceiling 
exhaust system which did not remove any contaminated air, but merely moved that air 
around the plant. In addition, Film Recovery mainly employed illegal immigrants from 
Mexico or Poland who spoke little or no English. The employees also wore improper 
respirators; namely, faced masks designed to prevent them from inhaling particulate. 
Indeed, plant workers were not told by the president, plant manager nor two foremen of 
Film Recovery that they were working with cyanide or that compound put into the vats 
could be harmful when inhaled. Nor were they given any safety instructions, goggles to 
protect their eyes, or adequate protective clothing. Their clothing would become wet with 
the solution used in the vats. There were small puddles of the solution as well as the film 
(1990) 550 N.E. 2d. 1090. The facts of this case are also derived from Wall Street Journal, 15 
and 17, June 1985; D.R. Spiegel, "The Liability of Corporate Officers" (1985) ABA Journal 48. 
See also Grogin, supra note 23 atpp. 1425-1433; Ebers, supra note 23 at pp. 982-983;; Magnuson 
& Leviton, supra note 23 at pp. 913-915; Koprowicz, supra note 23 at pp. 218-219; Brickey, 
supra note 23 at pp. 755-763; Miester, supra note 23 at pp. 929-930; Hochstedler, supra note 23 
at pp. 169-170. 
The recovery process involved "chipping" the film product and soaking the granulated pierces in 
large open bubbling vats containing a solution of water and sodium cyanide. The cyanide solution 
caused silver contained in the film to be released. A continuous flow system pumped the silver 
laden solution into polyurethane tanks which contained electrically charged stainless steel plants 
to which the separated silver adhered. The plates were removed from the tanks to another room 
where the accumulated silver was scraped off. The remaining solution was pumped out of the 
tanks and the granulated film, devoid of silver, shovelled out. Finally, the silver flakes are shipped 
to refmery where they are made into silver bullion. (1990) 550 N.E. 2d. 1090 at 1092. 







chips on the plant floor around the vats. As a result of the solution exposing skin and a 
strong and foul odour permeating the plant, they experienced breathing with difficulty and 
pain, dizziness, nausea, headaches and bouts of vomiting. 63 
In December 1982, a 61-year-old non-English speaking illegal Polish immigrant 
began working at Film recovery, pumping and stirring the sodium cyanide solution inside 
the vats with a rake. Shortly thereafter, he began to come home from work with 
headaches, nausea and vomiting. On 4 February, 1983, after becoming sick on the job, 
he brought an interpreter to the plant to ask the plant manager to transfer him away from 
the sodium cyanide vats. The plant manager said that he would try to help, but on the next 
working day, the polish worker was again assigned to the vats. 64 
Six days later, he had difficulty in walking at the vats. When his fellow workers 
noticed his pale face and foam forming at his mouth, they carried him outdoors to the 
parking lot, and called paramedics to the scene. When they arrived, the Polish worker was 
not breathing and had no pulse. He died of acute cyanide poisoning through the inhalation 
of cyanide fumes in the plant air.65 
As a result, a grand jury indicted the president of Film Recovery, plant manager, 
and two plant foremen for murder, by failing to disclose and to make known to the victim 
that he was working with cyanide and substances containing cyanide, and by failing to 
instruct him as to matters involving safety procedures and proper handling of chemicals 
at issue.66 The murder indictment also stated that these individuals failed to provide the 
victim with appropriate and necessary safety and first-aid equipment and sundry health-
monitoring systems for his protection while working with and handling cyanide, and with 
the storage, detoxification and disposition of cyanide. Additionally, they were indicted 
for 20 counts of reckless conduct. On the other hand, Film Recovery and Metallic 
Marketing, a sister company, were indicted for one count of voluntary manslaughter, 
unintentionally killing of the victim, by authorizing, requesting, commanding and 
performing certain acts of commission and acts of omission by their officers, board of 
directors and high managerial agents. 67 
Under the identification principle, the same evidence is used both against the individual 
(= controlling officers) and corporate defendants. Therefore, it is impossible to charge 
each defendant with the different type of crime based on the identical evidence. Unless 
the appropriate penalties for murder are available for the verdict against the corporation, 
(1990) 550 N.E. 2d. 1090 at 1098. On August 1982, a representative ofthe company that supplied 
Film Recovery with fIrst aid kits visited the plant. She observed an overpowering ammonia-like 
odour that burned her eyes, throat and nose. She experienced breathing difficulty and nausea. She 
also noticed that the sodium cyanide vats were overflowing and the floor was covered with crystal-
like chips. The fIrst aid kits were also covered with similar crystal chips. (1990) 550 N.E. 2d. 
1090 at pp. 1099-1100; Grogin, ibid. at 1426-27. 
Wall Street Journal, 15 June 1985, p. 29; Grogin, ibid. at 1427. 
(1990) 550 N.E. 2d. 1090 at 1092. 
Ibid. at 1096-1097. 
Ibid. at 1096. 
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the mental states of individual offenders necessary for murder cannot be utilised for 
corporate liability for manslaughter. In this light, it is not surprising that on appeal the 
intermediate appellate court ruled that the verdicts were inconsistent and remanded the 
case for retrial. 68 
In theory, some commentators have advocated that it is possible to hold 
corporations liable for murder under the identification principle.69 As far as English 
Law is concerned, however, this advocacy is purely "academic,,,70 since murder is 
punishable only with the infliction of imprisonment for life.71 This leads to a conclusion 
that under the identification principle, a company cannot be held liable for murder even 
if its controlling officers perform an act of murder within the scope of their office on 
behalf of the company. This limitation results from the derivative nature of corporate 
liability in that the identification principle requires the charge and verdict against the 
controlling officers to be the same as those against the company. 
The following famous English case provides a vivid example of the derivative 
68 Ibid. at 1098. 
69 See, for example, Winn, supra note 13 at 415, insisting that: 
70 
71 
"Intellectual difficulty is still felt in giving corporate significance to certain kinds of acts, 
and a tendency is still perceptible to regard certain actions as in the nature of things 
incompatible with the intangible non-physical nature of corporations. Perhaps most 
incongruous of all seem to be the two crimes of murder and rape..... Yet it may well be 
urged that such a company as was the East India Company, having wide powers of 
government in a distinct land and employing soldiers to maintain discipline, might be 
rendered guilty of either crime by the orders of its directing body that a day of terror be 
inflicted on a recalcitrant city." 
See also G.O.W. Mueller, "Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code 
Position on Corporate Criminal Liability" (1957) 19 University a/Pittsburgh Law Review 21 at 
23, stating: 
"Why should not a corporation be guilty of murder where, for instance, a corporate 
resolution sends the corporation's workmen to a dangerous place of work without 
protection, all officers secreting from these workmen the fact that even a brief exposure 
to the particular work hazards will be fatal ... ?" 
Obviously, Mueller anticipated the situations in which it would be possible to say that the company 
can murder people through its "inner circle" (consisted of primary agents, the board of directors 
or high managerial agents ofthe company), as are found in the Chicago Magnet Wire case (Case 
5) and the O'Neil case (Case 11). See further W.H. Hitchler, "The Criminal Responsibility of 
Corporations" (1923) 27 Dickinson Law Review 89, 121 at pp. 135-136. 
R.S. Welsh, "The Criminal Liability of Corporations" (1946) 62 Law Quarterly Review 345 at 364. 
P.l. Richardson (ed.), Archbold - Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice (1999, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London), § 19-92. 
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Case 12 CR. v. P & 0 European Ferries (Dover) Ltd.72) 
On the night of 6 March, 1987, the Herald of Free Enterprise, an English "roll-on, roll-
off' ferry, capsized minutes after slipping its moorings at the Belgian port and heading out 
for the Channel, with the result that 192 people were drowned. The immediate cause of 
the capsizing was that the ferry put to sea with its bow doors open. 
The official inquiry into the disaster discovered the fatal chain of errors that led 
to the sinking: the errors made by the assistant boatswain who did not perform his duty to 
close the doors;73 the bosun who failed to supervise the assistant boatswain; the first 
officer in charge ofthe leading docks who did not ensure that the doors had been closed; 74 
the captain of the ferry whose overall responsibility was to check with anyone that, for 
safety, the doors had been closed; the senior master who was responsible for establishing 
a safety system for the ferry; and the directors of Townsend Car Ferries that was taken 
over by the P & 0 European Ferries a month before the tragedy, who had been told of 
previous open-door incidents but had not taken any measures against them.75 Some of P 
& O's ships masters had actually recommended the introduction ofwaming lights on the 
bridge in order to show the captain whether or not doors had been closed, but such an 
appeal had not drawn the attention of management. 76 
At the inquest the jury ignored the coroner's instruction that evidence did not 
support a verdict of corporate manslaughter, and found, based on the report of the 
inquiry,77 that the victims of the Zeebrugge disaster had been unlawfully killed. After a 
new enquiry initiated by the Kent police, a summons alleging corporate manslaughter 
[1991] 93 Crim. App. R. 72; R. v. HM Coroner for East Kent [1989] 88 Crim. App. R. 10. The 
facts are also derived from The Times, 3, 8, 25, 28 April, 25 July, 20 October 1987; The 
Independent, 21 October 1990; The Washington Post, 7 March 1987; The New York Times, 8 
March 1987; Department of Transport, mv Herald o/Free Enterprise (Report of Court No. 8074), 
Formal Investigation (1987, HMSO, London) [hereinafter cited as Sheen Report]; S. Crainer, 
Zeebrugge: Learning from Disaster - Lessons in Corporate Responsibility (1993, Herald 
Charitable Trust, London). 
"He had fallen asleep in his cabin after having worked for ten hours non-stop and failed to hear 
the call "harbour stations". The Times, 20 October 1990. 
The first officer assumed that the assistant boatswain was shutting the doors and the bosun also 
assumed that his first officer had checked on the doors. The Times, ibid. 
It emerged that on fewer than five occasions its ferries has started for sea with bow or stem doors 
open. The Times, ibid. 
This was a critical fact in favour of the case of the defendants that they were not aware of the risk. 
See Gobert, supra note 34 at 406; infra note 80. 
See Sheen Report, supra note 72 at para. 14.1, concluding that: 
"All concerned in management, from the members of the Board of Directors down to the 
junior superintendents, were guilty of fault in that all must be regarded as sharing 
responsibility for the failure of management. From top to bottom the body corporate was 
infected with the disease of sloppiness." 





against P & 0 European Ferries as well as against seven individuals (two representatives 
of senior management, the senior master, the captain, and three other staff members) was 
issued on 22 June, 1989. 
At a preliminary hearing, corporate liability for manslaughter was well established 
in English law by Turner J., the trial judge: 
"if it be accepted that manslaughter in English law is the unlawful killing of one 
human being by another human being (which must include both direct and indirect 
acts) and that a person who is the embodiment of a corporation and acting for the 
purposes of the corporation is doing the act or omission which caused the death the , 
corporation as well as the person may also be found guilty of manslaughter. ,,78 
It was generally demonstrated here that the identification principle which was established 
in the Tesco case79 would be applied in the case of corporate manslaughter if the reckless 
mental states of a person of the "embodiment"of the company were proved. In this case, 
the defendant company could be convicted of manslaughter if it was proved that conduct 
of the board of directors of P & 0 had been reckless, and that it was the cause of the 
deaths. 
Turner J., however, indicated that there was no direct evidence that the controlling 
officers of the defendant company would or should have perceived that there was an 
obvious risk from the open bow doors. Since the Crown failed to prove that the directors, 
senior managers or ship masters ought to have known that there was an obvious and 
serious risk of the ship sailing with its bow doors open, Turner J. directed acquittals 
against P & 0 and five senior employees. 80 Those who perceived such risk were the 
R. v. P & 0 European Ferries (Dover) Ltd. [1991] 93 Crim. App. R. 73 at pp. 88-89. 
Tesco Supermarkets, Ltd. v. Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153. 
R. v. A1cindor and Others (unreported, Central Criminal Court, 19 October 1990), referred to in 
D. Bergman, "Recklessness in the Boardroom" (1990) 140 New Law Journal 1496. See also 
Wells, Corporations, supra note 14 at pp. 68-72; Law Commission, Consultation Paper No.135, 
Involuntary Manslaughter (1994, HMSO, London), paras. 4.38-4.44. Bergman (ibid. at 1496) 
enumerates four reasons why the Crown could not prove recklessness on the part ofP & 0: 
(1) "the system in operation had worked without mishap over seven years in which there 
had been upwards of over 60.000 sailings of Spirit class ships, about 5.000 of the sailings 
being on the Zeebrugge run." ("The mere pronouncement by the Crown that this was a 
disaster waiting to happen and that the system had somehow managed to operate due to 
good fortune was not sufficient to overturn the inference from the above statistics.") 
(2) "a large number of competent and skilled former and present P & 0 Masters and Chief 
Officers .... testified that it had not occurred to them that any risk existed, let alone that 
it was an obvious one of the ship sailing with its bow doors open." ("The Crown's 
response to this was that they were bound to say this since their minds were innured to 
the defects of a system which they were operating daily, and it was for the jury to 
consider whether they thought the system safe .... But as Mr Justice Turner said this can 
be no substitute for evidence of what the hypothetically prudent master or mariner.. .. 
would have perceived as obvious and serious.") 
(3) "four of the five open door incidents - where a ferry, prior to the disaster left port with 
its doors open and which, despite no injury occurring, the Crown contested ought to have 
altered the shore based manners to the defects in the system - were not known by any 
of the defendants .... As Mr Justice Turner said, concerns about these incidents were 
never exported from that particular vessel on which they occurred." 






assistant boatswain who had not closed the bow doors, and the officer of the leading docks 
who had not checked that the bow doors were closed. On October 1990, the prosecution 
dropped all charges against these two on the grounds that they would be "made scapegoats 
for errors committed by the whole community",81 and that it was not in the public interest 
to proceed against them alone.82 
This case involves several similar factors comprising corporate fault that were already 
referred to in the Kite case (Case 4). That is to say, the main three failures by the 
company are legally connected to the victim's death: a failure to prevent the source of 
risk from occurring or causing the prohibited consequences; a failure to train the 
employees who were in the closest position to the source of risk; and a failure to 
organise a safe and secure system in order to prevent their mistakes from triggering the 
disastrous incident. In this case, the source of risk was inherent in the sailing of the 
ferry with the bow doors open. The nearest employee to the source of risk was the 
assistant boatswain who did not close the doors. His failure to close the doors was 
aggravated by his several superior employees' failures to ensure that the doors had been 
closed, namely, the bosun,83 the first officer of the dock, and the captain. These failures 
could not have caused the capsize of the ferry if someone else at the deck noticed that 
the doors were open. However, no one did mainly because the directors of P & 0 took 
no account of the recommendation by several P & 0 ships masters that warning lights 
should be installed on the bridge. 
Although having extended the identification principle to corporate liability for 
manslaughter, Turner 1. also imposed severe limits on this principle. In his view, for the 
company to be held liable for the offence committed by one of its controlling officers, 
it must be proved that slhe is personally guilty of hislher offence.84 In this case, no 
installation of Bridge Lights to indicate that the bow doors were closed, or a system of 
positive reporting." 
The Times, 25 July 1987. 
D. Buries, "The Criminal Liability of Corporations" (1991) New Law Journal 609. 
He was even not aware of his duty to make sure that the assistant boatswain closed the doors or 
that anybody was at the deck in question to close the doors. Sheen Report, supra note 72 at para. 
10.2. 
This limit was followed by the Kite case (Case 4). See A. Ridley & L Dunford, Killing, supra note 
25 at 107, citing R. v. Kite, Stoddart and OLL Ltd. (unreported, transcript p. 18C-G.) 
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controlling officer was proved to have the requisite mental states for manslaughter, so 
that the acquittals of P & 0 and five senior officers were inevitable. 
This derivative nature of corporate liability under the identification principle, 
developed by Turner. J. in this case, is premised upon the fact that the company can only 
act through the controlling mind of its agents. 85 Although this fact is undeniable, his 
argument is a non sequitur. The company can perform a criminal act of manslaughter 
through the acts of its members, but this does not necessarily mean that the members, 
including controlling officers, must be culpable enough to be held personally liable for 
their acts which constitute corporate manslaughter. 
In this case, again, three types of fault are clearly identified on the part of the 
company: the failure to prevent the source of risk from occurring; the failure by the 
middle management to train employees in the closest position to the source of risk; and 
the failure to organise a safe system. Each of them was interrelated and if one or some 
of them which could be avoided did not occur, then the capsize of the ferry could have 
been avoided. Conversely, when these three types of fault concurred, the consequences 
would not have been avoided. The controlling officers (in this case, the directors of P 
& 0) were involved in the last type of failure, which alone was not sufficiently culpable 
to constitute corporate fault. 86 All these things make it clear that even controlling 
officers cannot make a full contribution to the corporate fault. This holds true of such 
cases as the Kite case (Case 4), in which the fault of one of the controlling officers was 
clearly identified with that of the company. To prove fault of a controlling officer is to 
show that s/he was at fault, but not to show that the company was at fault as a 
company. 87 If it is proved that there were some factors other than the controlling 
officer's fault that contributed to the prohibited consequences, then account should be 
taken, irrespective of whether or not the controlling officer was involved in them, of the 
collective aspect of corporate fault. 
85 (1991) 93 Crim. App. R. 72 at 84. 
86 See supra note 55. 







Turner J. also agreed with Bingham L.J.'s rejection of the aggregation theory in 
R. v. HM Coroners for East Kent. 88 Bingham L.J.'s reasoning against aggregating the 
acts and mental states of several employees of P & 0 derived from his application of the 
identification principle to corporate manslaughter, holding that: 
"A company may be vicariously liable for the negligent acts and omissions of its servants 
and agents, but for a company to be criminally liable for manslaughter .... it is required 
that the mens rea and actus reus of manslaughter should be established not against those 
who acted for or in the name of the company but against those who were to be identified 
as the embodiment of the company itself.. .. I do not think the aggregation argument assists 
the applicants. Whether the defendant is a corporation or a personal defendant, the 
ingredients of manslaughter must be established by proving the necessary mens rea and 
actus reus of manslaughter against it or him by evidence properly to be relied on against 
it or him. A case against a personal defendant cannot be fortified by evidence against 
another defendant. The case against a corporation can only be made by evidence properly 
addressed to showing guilt on the part of the corporation as such. ,,89 
It has been suggested that P & 0 could be held liable for manslaughter if the aggregation 
theory was accepted.90 On the other hand, the other solution to what Wells calls "the P 
& 0 problem,,91 may be found in the following American case. 
Case 13 (US v. Van Schaik92) 
A steamboat company was inspected by the US inspectors on 5 May, 1904, and was 
permitted to navigate for a year the waters of the Bay and Harbour of New York, rivers 
tributary Long Island Sound, and coastwise between Rockaway Inlet and Long Branch. 
On 15 June, 1904, while the boat was navigating the East River, a fire broke out. The fire 
was so uncontrolled that many passengers were compelled to jump from the burning ship 
into the water, and some 900 were drowned. 
The deaths of passengers were allegedly caused (1) by unsafe, unserviceable, 
unsuitable, inefficient and useless life preservers, incomplete and unfit equipment of steam 
[1989] 88 Crim. App. R. 10. 
Ibid. at pp. 16-17. 
See, for example, C. Wells, "Manslaughter and Corporate crime" (1989) 139. New Law ~o~rnal 
931 at pp. 931-932; "The Decline and Rise of English Murder: Corpo.rate Cnme ~d Indl.v.lduaJ 
Responsibility" [1988] Criminal Law Review 788 at 799. The aggregatIOn theory wIll be cntIcally 
analysed in the next chapter. 
C. Wells, "Corporate Killing" (1997) New Law Journal 1467 at 1468. 
(1904) 134 F. 592. See also Rodella, supra note 23 at pp. 98-99; Wragg, supra note 23 at pp. 68-
69; Grogin, supra note 23 at 1419; Clark, supra note 23 at 913; Hickey, supra note 23 at pp. 470-
471; D.S. Anderson, supra note 23 at pp. 398-399; Helverson, supra note 23 at pp. 970-971; 
Stoner, supra note 23 at pp. 1277-1278. 
95 
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pumps and hand pumps, and the weak and unserviceable hose that was neither provided 
for nor attached to the steam pumps and hand pumps, and (2) by the wrongful neglect of 
the captain to discipline and train his crew, none of who knew or attached to his duty and 
attempted to unlash and to swing out the lifeboats or the life rafts, in consequence of 
which the passengers were obliged to throw themselves into the water and drowned on 
account of the useless and unfit life preservers. As an owner of the steamboat at issue , 
therefore, the company was indicted under the US federal statute which provided that 
"every owner .... through whose fraud, connivance, misconduct or violation of law the life 
of any person is destroyed shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter and upon conviction 
thereof shall be sentenced to confinement at hard labour.,,93 In addition, several officers 
ofthe company (the captain, managing director, secretary, treasurer and commodore of the 
fleet) were charged with aiding and abetting their corporation. 
In holding the defendant company liable for manslaughter, the court relied on the 
company's breach of legal duties imposed by the relevant statute. The court, at first, 
identified the ship's master as one who should have performed duties for the company, 
and then detailed these duties. According to the court, the duties of the master of the 
vessel in question existed on several levels. While it was not his duty to equip the 
vessel with life preservers and equipment of pumps, yet it was his duty, before 
navigating, to exercise care to know whether the ship had any equipment and whether 
it was apparently sufficient and in accordance with the law. Added to this, it was his 
duty, after the introduction of appliances and equipment, to have some care of its 
maintenance and to discipline or train the crew to know how to use appliances in cases 
where the occasion for their use arises. If any defect of the vessel's condition would be 
discoverable in the exercise of superintendence of the vessel ordinarily demandable of 
a prudent master, then he must be deemed to have discovered it. Thus, it would be his 
neglect of duty ifhe did not exercise due care for the supply or restoration of the omitted 
or defective parts. Another duty would arise on his part to decline to navigate the vessel 
if he knew or should have known some total omission of requisite equipment which 
itself was perilous to human life.94 
There are two points in common between this case and the P & 0 case (Case 
12): the factual backgrounds that the ship sailed in an unsafe manner; and the imputation 
of particular individual's fault to the corporation. Nevertheless, the Van Schaik case is 
noteworthy in that the particular individual (the ship's master) was considered by the 
Rev. St. §5344 (U.S. Compo St. 1901, p. 3629), cited in (1904) 134 F. 592 at 593. 




court to fail to perform legal duties imposed on the corporation, not on him. The 
master's fault, analysed by the court, ranged from his failure to exercise due care to 
discover any defect of necessary equipment to his neglect of duty to train the crew. 
Although the court did not pay attention to how he failed to control the source of risk 
(namely, the immediate cause of the fire), it implied that his conduct imputed to the 
company should be found in his decision to navigate or continue to navigate the vessel 
deliberately, without any care as to the condition of the vesse1.95 
When applied in the P & 0 case, this reasoning would be useful, as the directors 
of P & 0 had decided to let the ferry continue to navigate without due care for the open-
doors situations. Even if the fault element of manslaughter was not fulfilled by these 
directors, the company could be said to fail, through any members of it, to perform a 
legal duty not to disregard the risk to human life. This leads to a conclusion that it is 
necessary to consider not only the controlling officer's state of mind and conduct, but 
also those of any relevant employees in the corporate setting in order to determine 
whether the company performed its duties. 
3.4. The Doctrine of Vicarious Liability and Corporate Manslaughter 
The previous section concluded that full attention should be paid to any relevant conduct 
and mental states of any corporate members in determining corporate fault. The final 
question follows from this conclusion: is the vicarious liability doctrine appropriate to 
assess corporate fault? It is, therefore, desirable to survey several corporate 
manslaughter cases in which this doctrine has been applied. 
Case 14 (US v. Dye Construction Company96) 
Ibid. at 600. 
(1975) 510 F. 2d. 78. See also Koprowicz, supra note 23 at pp. 197-199. For the other American 
corporate homicide cases in which the doctrine of vicarious liability was applied, see, for example, 
People v. Rochester Railway & Light Co. (1909) 88 N.E. 22 (in which a utility company was 
indicted for manslaughter in the second degree resulting from the installation of a water-heating 
equipment in such a grossly improper, unskilful and negligent manner that gas fumes escaped and 
caused death of an apartment tenant by asphyxiation); Commonwealth v. Illinois Central Railroad 
Co. (1913) 153 S.W. 459 (in which a railroad company was indicted for involuntary manslaughter 
when the company's employees unlawfully and with gross and wilful negligence ran railroad cars 
at unreasonable speed so that they collided into the back of another car where the victim was 




On 11 August, 1972, the construction company was laying pipe for a sanitary sewer line. 
The procedure in laying the pipe consisted of having the back hoe excavate a trench which 
was approximately 9-12 feet in depth, and at the bottom was approximately 38-40 inches 
wide. Both sides rose vertically from the bottom for approximately five feet and after that 
were slightly sloped out to the surface where the width was seven and a half feet. The 
head pipe layer and assistant pipe layer were required to work at the bottom of the trench 
so as to fasten the pipe together. In other crews were the superintendent, foreman, back 
hoe operator, and the man on top whose duty was to look for signs of cave-ins. On the day 
in question, the side of this trench caved in killing the assistant pipe layer. The pipe layer 
was knocked aside and escaped an injury. 
The cave-in happened because of the failure to shore by means of sufficient 
strength sides of trenches in unstable and soft material as required by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970.97 There was a trench box on the site which was designed 
to protect workers in the trenches, but it was not in repair. The decision as to whether the 
trench in question was to be shored, had not been made by the superintendent; he had 
delegated the decision to the foreman. The foreman, in tum, delegated the decision to the 
back hoe operator who allegedly decided whether to shore or slope on the basis of the 
condition of the soil; he would shore 'if safety required it.' Since these employees' states 
of mind were regarded as gross negligence to the hazard, the construction company was 
charged with violating the Act by willfully failing to shore or slope the trench prior to cave 
in, resulting in death of the assistant pipe layer. 
In this case, the construction company was held vicariously liable for the "grossly 
negligent" decision made by the back hoe operator as to whether the trench was to be 
shored. The decision had been delegated from the superintendent to the foreman, and 
from the foreman to him. As far as corporate fault is concerned, the fact that the grossly 
negligent decision was made by the back hoe operator implies: (l) that he had not been 
given proper training concerning the operation of excavation; and (2) that the delegation 
of the decision at issue might also be grossly negligent. 
Under the delegation principle, as referred to in the previous chapter,98 the 
principal authorises the agent to act on hislher behalf, leaving the principal liable for 
indicted for criminally negligent homicide committed by its employees who caused the death of 
two individuals in a motor vehicle collision); and Granite Construction Co. v. Supreme Court 
(1983) 197 Cal. Rptr. 3 (in which a construction company was charged with manslaughter after 
seven construction workers were killed in an accident at the power plant project). 
Section 1926.652(b) of the Secretary's regulations (1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 27,552-55) gave the 
specific trenching requirements, providing: 
"Sides of trenches in unstable or soft material, 5 feet or more in depth, shall be shored, 
sheeted, braced, sloped, or otherwise supported by means of sufficient strength to protect 
the employees working within them." 
cited in (1975) 510 F.2d. 78 at 79, n.l. 
Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 223-225. 
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criminal acts of the agent. In other words, the principal cannot escape liability by 
delegating authority to act to the agent, as the responsibility for the acts of the agent 
remains in hislher hand. Given that the delegation was grossly negligent in this case, it 
is not only the conduct of the back hoe operator, but also the delegation system of the 
company for which the company should be held liable. In the context of corporate 
manslaughter, therefore, it is necessary to focus on the grossly negligent or reckless 
conduct of the lower-level employees as well as on their superior personnel's prior 
supervision of the quality of their working skills. As is often the case with corporate 
manslaughter, the source of risk is inherent in the corporate activities such as 
construction, production or transportation. Usually, some lower employees are in the 
closest position to it. If they are neither given proper training as to how to handle the 
source of risk nor adequately supervised by their superiors, there arises a strong 
likelihood that their trivial mistakes will trigger the catastrophic consequences. 
The advantage of the vicarious liability doctrine is that account can be taken of 
some faults that exist at several levels in the corporate setting. Unlike the identification 
principle, it can be expected that the imposition of vicarious liability on a company may 
encourage superior personnel of the middle management to supervise their subordinate 
employees in order to prevent their violative conduct from occurring.99 
The following case illustrates that the middle management was involved in the 
immediate cause by way of his failure to perform supervisory duties concerning the steel 
platform construction. 
Case 15 (British Steel PIc. 100) 
In July 1990 the defendant company wanted to reposition a 7-5 tonne section of steel 
platform at their plant at Sheffield. The operation involved cutting the platform free of its 
support and moving it by crane to a new position. Subcontractors provided two men to 
carry out the repositioning of the platform, a welder and a plater. The subcontract was on 
a labour only basis, with equipment and supervision being provi~ed by the compan~ .. A 
section engineer in the employment of the company was responsIble for the supervIsIon 
99 See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised 
Comment) (1985, Philadelphia) [hereinafter cited as MPC], Vol. 1, pp. 338-339. 
100 [1995] ICR 586. See also Ridley & Dunford, Killing, supra note 25 at pp. 104-106; Sullivan, 
Attribution, supra note 9 at pp. 540-541. 
99 
ofthe repositioning of the platform. On 29 July 1990, the two men cut the platform free 
of nearly all its supports, but neglected to secure it to a crane or by means of temporary 
props so that the platform was unstable. When the plater stepped on to the platform, it 
collapsed and fell on the welder who was working immediately underneath it, killing him. 
The company was charged with the breach of the duty imposed by section 3 (1) 
of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974. 101 The prosecution's case was that 
although the defendant company's delegation of responsibility for supervision to the 
experienced section engineer was perfectly acceptable, he did not plan and supervise the 
operation properly. Moreover, if, the prosecution argued, he had made proper visits to the 
site, he would have detected that essential safeguards were not being followed. The issue 
was whether such fault on the part of the section engineer could be imputed to the 
company; that is to say, whether the Act should be construed as imposing vicarious 
liability. 
In rejecting both the application ofthe identification principle and the availability 
of due diligence defence which does not appear in the section, the court interpreted the 
section as imposing an absolute prohibition and creating the employer's duty to his own 
employees to avert risks to health and safety. The defendant company was fined 
accordingly. 
In this case, the defendant company, as an employer, was held vicariously liable for the 
section engineer's improper discharge of supervisory duties regarding the repositioning 
operation at issue. Whereas the welder and plater's failure to stabilise the platform was 
the immediate cause of the collapse of the platform, the court imputed the section 
engineer's fault as to clear instructions and periodic inspections to the company. The 
company had a legal duty to eliminate the risks, imposed by section 3 (1) of the Health 
and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, to the welder and plater, so that their fault could not 
be imputed to the company. 
3.5. Limitations on Anthropomorphic Models for Corporate Manslaughter 
It is suggested that the doctrine of corporate vicarious liability is a creature of statute and 
statutory construction,102 or "the creation of expediency rather than careful reflection." 103 




Section 3(1) of the Act provides: 
"It shall be the duty of every employer to conduct his undertaking in such a way as to 
ensure, so far as is reasonably practical, that persons not in his employment who may be 
affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or safety." 
R. Card, Card, Cross & Jones Criminal Law (1998, 14th ed., Butterworths, London), para. 21.52. 
J. Moore, "Corporate Culpability under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines" (1992) 34 Arizona 
Law Review 743 at 759. 
100 
alternative theory of liability, 104 apart from the identification principle. Thus, it follows 
that "the only way in which to satisfy the requirement of the criminal law is to focus 
exclusively on a determination of the agent's culpability."I05 
This doctrine has been criticised by several commentators for the scope of its 
application, called "inclusiveness."106 It imputes to the corporation only the act and 
mens rea of the particular agent who committed the crime, but does not consider fault 
of other corporate agents. By imputing fault of any corporate agent to the corporation, 
this "imputed fault theory" blurs a clear distinction between corporate culpability for 
crimes committed with the encouragement of senior management, in accordance with 
corporate policies or procedures, and that for crimes committed by "rogue employees" 
whose act had been prohibited by corporate policy or could not have been prevented by 
careful supervision.107 It is for this reason that the vicarious liability doctrine has been 
subject to criticism of unfair over-inclusiveness. 108 
In the context of corporate manslaughter, the over-inclusive nature of the 
vicarious liability doctrine poses serious legal problems. For the corporation to be held 
liable for manslaughter, as suggested in the Welansky case (Case 9),109 there should be 
a causal link between the source of risk and corporate fault. The difficult issue may 







W.S. Laufer, "Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds" (1994) 43 Emory Law Journal 647 at 654. 
Ibid. 
See, for example, Laufer, ibid at pp. 659-664; Moore, supra note 103 at pp. 758-764; Clarkson, 
Culpability, supra note 38; Colvin, supra note 6 at 8. 
Moore, ibid. 
There have been numerous cases reported in the US. in which corporations were held liable for 
its agents whose conduct had expressly been prohibited by them. See, for example, US v. Basic 
Construction Co. (1983, 4th Cir.) 711 F.2d. 570, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956; US v. Automated 
Medical Lab. (1985, 4th Cir.) 770 F.2d. 399; US v. Hilton Hotels Co. (1972, 9th Cir.) 467 F.2d. 
1000, cert. denied sub nom. Western International Hotel v. US (1973) 409 U.S. 1125; US v. 
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Co. (1970, 3rd Cir.), 433 F.2d. 174, cert. denied, (1971) 
401 U.S. 948; Old Monastery Co. v. US (1945, 4th Cir.) 147 F.2d. 905, cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734. 
For a general discussion of corporate liability for the agent's acts against corporate policy, see, 
in particular, J.V. Dolan & R.S. Rebeck, "Corporate Criminal Liability for Acts in Violation of 
Company Policy" (1962) 50 Georgetown Law Journal 547. 
Supra text accompanying notes 47-56, in particular, n.53. 
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fault on the part of the company or its individual agents contributes to the victim's 
death. In such a case, the vicarious liability doctrine severely holds the company liable 
for the victim's death even when no individual of the company could have foreseen the 
chain of events or the consequences. The following case provides a good example. 
Case 16 (State v. Pacific Powder Co. 110) 
On 7 August, 1959, a truck owned by the dynamite manufacturing company, operated by 
its driver, and loaded with two tons of Dynamite and four and one-halftons of Nitro-Carbo 
Nitrate, was parked on a public street adjacent to a wooded building while the driver left 
to get something to eat. While the truck was parked unattended near the wooden building, 
the wooden building became engulfed in an extremely hot fire, lit up the truck's cargo, 
and resulted in a tremendous blast. The truck's explosion caused the death of a bystander. 
Considering the nature of the cargo in the truck at issue, the driver's acts, in leaving the 
truck unattended at the time and place in concurrence with the fact that the wooden 
building caught fire, were viewed as acts without due caution and circumspection, so that 
the company was indicted for involuntary manslaughter. 
It is not evident from the case report what was the immediate cause of fire that occurred 
at the wooden building, adjacent to the public street on which a truck issue was parked 
at the explosion. What was made clear at trial was the driver's conduct "in leaving the 
truck unattended at the time and place in concurrence with" the building's fire. This 
conduct should be considered negligent, and the defendant company might also be to 
blame for not properly training him prior to the incident. Neither the company nor the 
driver, however, did anything to do with or foresaw the immediate cause of fire. It is 
certain that the victim's death could have been avoided if the driver acted "with due 
caution and circumspection," but any preventive steps, such as organising a safe system 
which was considered in the Welansky, Warner-Lambert and P & 0 cases (Cases 9, 10 
and 12 respectively), were not available to the company in order to prevent the driver's 
conduct from causing the prohibited consequences. In this sense, the vicarious liability 
doctrine that imputes to the company the acts and fault of the lowest-level employee 
results in too much liability in some cases. 
110 
111 
As suggested in the context of the identification principle, III the problem of 
(1961) 360 P. 2d. 530. See also Rodella, supra note 23 at pp. 104-105; Wragg, supra note 23 at 
pp. 72-73; Hickey, supra note 23 atpp. 473-478; D.S. Anderson, supra note 23 at 399; Helverson; 
supra note 23 at 973; Uffelman, supra note 23 at pp. 587-589. 
Supra text accompanying note 39. 
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over-inclusiveness would be resolved by construing the requirements of "the scope of 
employment" and of "benefit" narrowly, so as to exclude the acts that are not authorised 
or permitted by senior management. 112 Unlike the case of the identification principle, 
however, this resolution could easily be marred simply by declaring that the company 
had formal or nominal policy against the agent's act. 113 The requirements of "the scope 
of employment" and "benefit" thus provide "no protection against overinclusiveness."114 
Another troubling feature of the vicarious liability doctrine is concerned with its 
under-inclusiveness. There are some situations where it is obvious that the prohibited 
consequences are caused by the company itself, but there is no individual fault to 
impute, or where the consequences are caused by the innocent employee whose illegal 
conduct is tolerated or encouraged by the company. Some cases which illustrate such 
situations are found in the context of corporate manslaughter. 115 






On 3 April, 1978, a school bus owned by the corporation and operated by one of its 
employees, ran over and killed a 6-year-old school girl when she got off the bus and was 
crossing in front of the bus. The corporation failed to equip the bus with properly adjusted 
mirrors on the front and rear ofthe bus, which would have enabled the bus operator to see 
the victim after she had left the bus. This failure was in violation of the Motor Vehicle 
For detailed arguments of the vicarious liability doctrine in relation to the "scope of employment" 
and "benefit" requirements, see, in particular, Anonymous, "Developments in the Law - Corporate 
Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior through Criminal Sanctions" (1979) 92 Harvard Law 
Review 1227 [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law] at pp. 1246-1251; M.E. Tigar, "It 
Does the Crime But Not the Time: Corporate Criminal Liability in Federal Law" (1990) 17 
American Journal of Criminal Law 211 at pp. 218-226. 
Another solution to the problem of over-inclusiveness may be the availability of a due 
diligence defence to the company, providing it an exculpatory opportunity when it took any 
reasonable steps against the acts of the agent. Full arguments as to the corporate liability model 
based on a due diligence defence will be advanced in the next chapter. 
Moore, supra note 103 at pp. 760-761. See also Fisse, supra note 87 at 607. 
Moore, ibid. at 760. 
See also State v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. (1917) 103 A. 685; (1919) 106 A. 23, the case in 
which a railroad company and others were indicted for manslaughter after some railroad 
locomotives that were, with the gross and flagrant negligence by the company, loaded with 
excessive quantities of highly explosive ammunition, exploded and killed a bystander. 
(1980) 423 A. 2d. 413. See also L.C. Anderson, supra note 23 at 243; Stoner, supra note 23 at 
1283. 
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Code.117 The corporation was charged with the offence of homicide by vehicle, under the 
statute prescribing liability of the unintentional killing of a person while engaging in the 
violation of the Motor Vehicle Code when the violation was the cause of death of another 
person. II8 
Case 18 (Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas CO. II9) 
On 13 March, 1979, a school bus was delivering children to their homes. When 10-year-
old and 6-year-old school children alighted from the bus and were attempting to cross the 
highway, a truck owned by the corporation came on the scene. The truck driver, one of 
the corporate employees, observed the bus about 400 feet ahead, geared down and applied 
the brakes. However, because of the truck's grossly defective brakes, the truck failed to 
stop and struck both children, one of them being injured, and the other being killed 
instantly. The corporation was indicted by the grand jury for manslaughter in the second 
degree with its basis in wantonness. 
What is common in both cases is the fact that the victims' deaths were caused by the 
drivers of the vehicles which had not properly been maintained. Mirrors on the front 
and rear of the bus were not adequately installed in the McIlwain School Bus case (Case 
17), and brakes of the truck were defective in the Fortner LP Gas case (Case 18). It was 
the corporations in both cases that were in charge of the maintenance of the vehicles and 
permitted them to be put into use. Thus, the conduct of the drivers should have been 






75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4551 (Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, No. 81, §1, eff. July 1, 1977), cited in 
(1980) 423 A. 2d. 413 at 415, providing: 
"(a) General Rule. - All school buses and all other vehicles used in the transportation of 
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this subchapter or applicable regulations issued under this subchapter. Violation of this 
section constitutes a summary offense punishable by a fme of not less than $50 nor more 
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A. Foerschler, "Corporate Criminal Intent: Toward a Better Understanding of Corporate 
Misconduct" (1990) 78 California Law Review 1287 at 1307. 
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However, unlike the Denbo case (Case 2), no attempt was made to prove that 
senior management was involved in improper maintenance of the vehicle at issue so , 
that the basis of corporate liability in both cases was obviously the act of the drivers. 
If the vicarious liability doctrine was applied in these cases, some confusion would arise 
as to whose fault should have been imputed to the company. In the circumstances in 
which the vehicle was not properly maintained, the driver could not have avoided the 
prohibited consequences. As suggested in the cases of Denbo (Case 2) and Van Schaik 
(Case 13), it would also be necessary to prove some fault on the part of one of the 
controlling officers who incurred legal duties, imposed by the relevant statute on the 
company, to maintain a safe working environment and to establish an adequate 
maintenance system. 
On the other hand, as found in Warner-Lambert case (Case 10), the controlling 
officers are usually remote from the day-to-day or specific operations of corporate 
business and, hence, are unlikely to have the requisite mental states. As a result, when 
the victim's death is caused by the lower employee's conduct which has been tolerated 
or ignored by hislher controlling officers, the company can unfairly escape liability for 
manslaughter. 
In conclusion, criticisms that address the scope of such anthropomorphic models 
as the vicarious liability doctrine and identification principle are reducible to the dubious 
link between individual conduct and corporate fault. 121 As several cases of corporate 
manslaughter have hitherto demonstrated, there would still be room for assessing 
corporate fault even when no culpable individual conduct is found. There may be three 
possible solutions to overcome the issues of under- and over-inclusiveness. 
The first way to cope with the weakness of the anthropomorphic approaches is 
to remove the link between individual and corporate liability, which has been adhered 
to by the English court. Turner J.' s establishment of the derivative nature of corporate 
liability in the P & 0 case is not a logical consequence from the fact that a company can 
physically act only through the acts of its agent. When the acts of one or some of the 
121 Laufer, supra note 104 at 659. 
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individual agents or controlling officers cause the prohibited consequences, there may 
be fault on the part of the actor(s). But the individual acts orland fault suggest "the 
presence of fault on a more widespread organisational basis."122 To hold a company 
itself liable for such organisational or collective fault, there is no need for the 
individual's acts and fault to be sufficiently culpable for his/her personal liability .123 It 
is for this reason that the American courts have developed the collective knowledge 
doctrine, which enables them to convict the company of crimes requiring knowledge on 
the basis of aggregating an innocent piece of knowledge of several employees as a 
group, even though no single employee possesses sufficient information that the crime 
is committed. The next chapter will critically examine this doctrine. 
The second solution has been suggested by several organisation theorists who 
identify corporate actions and fault as a product of the organisational structure and 
culture, rather than as a mere aggregate of each of individual conduct. They argue that 
the corporation have some distinct features from individual conduct and fault so that it 
can meet the fault requirement of the crime without resort to the concept of imputation 
of individual fault to it. Both the collective knowledge doctrine and organisation 
theories share the view that individual liability is not required to hold the company 
liable. Nevertheless, the organisation theories place their stress on the fact that 
corporate actions are not reducible to individual intentions. The next chapter will also 
examine the features of organisational actions and fault which the organisation theorists 




The third method of resolving the derivative problem of corporate liability is 
Fisse, supra note 87 at p. 603. 
There are a number of cases in the US. in which the jury render inconsistent verdicts when a 
company and its agents are tried together, acquitting corporate agents, but holding the corporation 
liable. See, for example, US v. General Motors Co. (1941, 7th Cir.) 212 F. 2d. 376, cert. denied, 
314 U.S. 613; US v. Austin-Bagley Co. (1929, 2d Cir.) 31 F. 2d. 229, cert. denied, 279 U.S. 863; 
American Medical Association v. US (1942, D.C. Cir.) 130 F. 2d. 233, affd, (1943) 317 U.S. 519; 
Imperial Meat Co. v. US (1963, 10th Cir.) 316 F. 2d. 435, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 820; Pe~ely 
Dairy Co. v. US (1949, 8th Cir.) 178 F. 2d. 363, cert. denied, (1950) 339 U.S. 942. On the subject 
of inconsistent verdicts, see, for example, Developments in the Law, supra note 112 at pp. 1248-
1249; MPC, supra note 99 at pp. 336-337; Moore, supra note 103 at pp. 762-763. 
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reconstructing the fundamental concepts of actus reus and mens rea in cases of 
corporate manslaughter. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the restrictions to the 
development of corporate liability in the history of English law were all concerned with 
corporate incapacity for conduct, mental states and punishment. The reason why such 
concepts as actus reus and mens rea were considered unfit for corporations is 
understandable. The idea of corporate criminal liability has been conceived of as an 
exception to conventional criminal law theories for a long time, during which the 
concepts of actus reus and mens rea have developed through numerous cases in which 
only human individuals were the target of imposing criminal responsibility.124 As a 
result, too much emphasis has been placed upon both the physical aspect of the conduct 
requirement as part of actus reus and upon the subjective aspect of mens rea. Since the 
corporation is apparently devoid of "body" to perform a physical act and of mental 
faculties or "soul" to entertain guilt, the application of such humanly tailored concepts 
to companies has inevitably proved problematic. 
However, once corporations become the target, as well as human individuals, for 
imposing criminal responsibility, necessary steps should be taken to revise the concepts 
of actus reus and mens rea to cover the liability of both natural and legal "persons." In 
its attempt to tailor these concepts to corporate offenders, Chapter 5 will offer the 
appropriate model of corporate liability for manslaughter. 
124 See Gobert, supra note 34 at 394, cited in Chapter 2, n.1 O. The best expression for frustration of 
the idea of corporate liability that appeared in the history of English law may be the invocation 
of Edward, First Baron Thurlow (1731-1806), Lord Chancellor that a corporation has "no soul 
to be dammed, and no body to be kicked." The quote was fIrst cited in M.A. King, Public Policy 
and the Corporation (1977, Chapman & Hall, London), p. 1; and was then given publicity by lC. 
Coffee, ""No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandarized Inquiry into the Problem of 
Corporate Punishment" (1981) 79 Michigan Law Review 386. Since then, this phrase has been 
in some commentators' favour to symbolise theoretical problems of corporate liability in criminal 
law, such as Clarkson, Kicking, supra note 25; and Ridley & Dunford, Responsibility, supra note 
25. For additional infonnation of this Lord Chancellor's phrase, see also H.L. Mencken, A New 
Dictionary of Quotations on Historical Principles from Ancient and Modern Sources (1942, 




ORGANISATION THEORIES AND CORPORATE FAULT 
4.1. Models of Corporate Fault 
Generally, four models of corporate fault have hitherto developed both in the case 
reports and in the academic literature, l each of which is noted for its denial of the 
derivative nature of corporate liability. As will be outlined below, these models seem 
to have certain advantages over the anthropomorphic models discussed in the previous 
chapters, particularly in cases where no individual's fault is proved. However, it has 
been suggested that each suffers flaws in its legal framework. Section 4.2. examines the 
adequacy of each model in the context of several corporate manslaughter cases 
described in the previous chapter. Section 4.3. outlines criticisms that have been made 
by commentators against the four models. Finally, Section 4.4. critically considers the 
criticisms against the existing theories of corporate fault, and raises more fundamental, 
but often neglected, questions as to the way that a company should be held liable. 
4.1.1. The Aggregation Theory 
The aggregation theory, which was rejected by Bingham L.J. in the English case R v. 
HM Coroners for East Kent,2 originates from the American collective knowledge 
Laufer, too, counts four models of corporate culpability in his article. See W.S. Laufer, "Corporate 
Bodies and Guilty Minds" (1994) 43 Emory Law Journal 647 at pp. 664-668. While he has 
analysed "corporate ethos" and "corporate policy" models separately, each of whose content will 
be described in the subsequent subsections, and has not included the aggregation theory in the 
models, this chapter treats both corporate policy and corporate ethos as the same, and analyses 
the aggregation theory along with corporate policy, proactive fault, and reactive fault models. The 
last three are called here "organisation theories." See infra text accompanying notes 26-27. 
The other model of corporate fault is a managerial failure approach that is proposed in 
the Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter (1996, Law 
Commission No. 237, HMSO, London). Since this approach involves several theoretical issues 
that are directly related to the central task of the next chapter (namely, reconstructing relevant 
criminal law concepts), its detailed analysis and discussion will be presented therein. 
[1989] 88 erim. App. R. 10, referred to in the previous chapter, text accompanying notes 88-89. 
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doctrine.3 A vivid disparity between the English court's rejection and the American 
court's general acceptance of this doctrine should be understood when attention is paid 
to the natures of both the identification principle and the vicarious liability doctrine. 
Under the identification principle, the corporation is held directly or personally liable 
for the acts and state of mind of one of its controlling officers as if it committed a mens 
rea offence by itself. By contrast, the vicarious liability doctrine holds the corporation 
liable for the acts and state of mind of another person. 
As far as mens rea offences are concerned, the English court has not clearly 
extended the application of the vicarious liability doctrine to corporate liability, so that 
the corporation is still immune from liability for the acts of another person, namely, a 
lower-level employee. In these circumstances, the aggregation theory finds no place in 
English law because "[ a] case against a personal defendant cannot be fortified by 
evidence against another defendant."4 Under the American federal law, however, 
For a full account of the collective knowledge doctrine in American and other common law 
jurisdictions, see, for example, M.E. Tigar, "It Does the Crime But Not the Time: Corporate 
Criminal Liability in Federal Law" (1990) 17 American Journal of Criminal Law 211 at pp. 221-
226; E. Colvin, "Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability" (1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum 1 
[hereinafter cited as Corporate Personality] at pp. 18-23; A. Rogozino, "Replacing the Collective 
Knowledge Doctrine with a Better Theory for Establishing Corporate Mens Rea: The Duty 
Stratification Approach" (1995) 24 Southwestern University Law Review 423; R.S. Gruner, 
Corporate Crime and Sentencing (1994, The Michie Co., Virginia), ch. 4; A. Zarky, Defending 
the Corporation in Criminal Prosecutions: A Legal and Practical Guide to the Responsible 
Corporate Officer and Collective Knowledge Doctrines (1990, The Bureau of National Affairs, 
Inc., Washington D.C.), pp. 35-56. 
As described later, this doctrine allows the court to gather several corporate employees' 
knowledge as to the relevant facts to hold a company liable as if the company had possessed all 
pieces of knowledge. Gruner refers to this doctrine as "the collective knowledge and action" 
because it actually relates not only to several pieces of knowledge of corporate employees but also 
to their conduct governed by their knowledge. Ibid. This implies that this doctrine is an extended 
version of the vicarious liability doctrine in the sense that any relevant knowledge and conduct, 
whether criminal or innocent, of any corporate agents are utilised to impose criminal liability on 
a company. 
For the sake of convenience, the conventional term "the collective knowledge doctrine" 
is used in this thesis. 
Per Bingham L.J. in R. v. HM Coroner for East Kent, [1989] 88 Crim. App. R. 10 at 16, cited in 
the previous chapter, text accompanying note 89. Thus, roughly speaking, the collective 
knowledge doctrine or aggregation theory is more likely to thrive with the general acceptance of 
the vicarious liability doctrine than with the identification principle. In other words, there is little 
likelihood that the aggregation theory will be accepted by the English court in the future, unless 
the identification principle is either abolished or modified. 
The other possibility of the acceptance of the aggregation theory is to gather only senior 
or controlling officers' conduct and mental states to impute the company. This point will be 




corporate vicarious liability both for strict liability and for mens rea offences is well 
established.5 The American courts have shown no hesitation in imputing to corporate 
defendants the state of mind and conduct of any individual offenders. Even when the 
individual offender is found innocent by the jury, as described in the previous chapter,6 
the corporate defendant may still be held vicariously liable for hislher conduct. 
Under the collective knowledge doctrine which adds more than two innocent 
minds up to a guilty one, the company is to be held liable even when there is no proof 
that any single agent intended to commit the offence or knew that hislher conduct had 
led to the violation. The knowledge and conduct of multiple agents is imputed to the 
corporation "as if the collective knowledge and actions were held and undertaken by a 
single party."7 The derivative nature of corporate liability, which is inherent in the 
identification principle, is totally denied in that the collective knowledge doctrine forms 
the corporate culpable knowledge by combining a piece of innocent knowledge of 
corporate agents. The gist of this doctrine is illustrated in the following two American 
For a general discussion of corporate criminal liability in the US., see, for example, Tigar, supra 
note 3; Gruner, supra note 3, chs. 2, 5 and 7; H.L. Brown, "Vicarious Criminal Liability of 
Corporations for the Acts of Their Employees and Agents" (1995) 41 Loyola Law Review 279; 
lC. Coffee, Jr., "Corporate Criminal Responsibility" in S.H. Kadish (ed.), Encyclopaedia o/Crime 
and Justice (1983, The Free Press, New York), Vol. 1, pp. 253; C.J. Walsh & A. Pyrich, 
"Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its 
Soul?" (1995) 47 Rutgers Law Review 605; C.L. Griffm, "Corporate Scienter under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934" (1989) 45 Brigham Young University Law Review 1227; V.S. Khanna, 
"Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve? (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 
1477; H.M. Friedman, "Some Reflections on the Corporation as Criminal Defendant" (1979) 55 
Notre Dame Lawyer 173; Anonymous, "Developments in the Law - Corporate Crime: Regulating 
Corporate Behavior through Criminal Sanctions" (1979) 92 Harvard Law Review 1227 
[hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]; J.R. Elkins, "Corporations and the Criminal Law: 
An Uneasy Alliance" (1976) 65 Kentucky Law Journal 73; Anonymous, "Corporate Criminal 
Liability" (1973) 68 Northwestern University Law Review 870; S.R. Miller & L.C. Levine, 
"Recent Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability" (1984) 24 Santa Clara Law Review 41 ; 
K.F. Brickey, "Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation" (1982) 
60 Washington University Law Quarterly 393; Corporate Criminal Liability - A Treatise on the 
Criminal Liability o/Corporations, Their Officers and Agents (1984, 1st ed., Callaghan, Illinois); 
and Corporate and White Collar Crime - Cases and Materials (1995, 2nd ed., Little Brown and 
Co., Boston). 
Chapter 3, n.123. 






In US v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc.,9 an interstate motor carrier corporation was charged 
with violating the Federal Highway Administration Regulations which prohibited motor 
carriers from requiring or permitting "a driver to operate a motor vehicle while the 
driver's ability or alertness was so impaired, or so likely to become impaired, through 
fatigue, illness, or any other cause, as to make it unsafe for him to begin or continue to 
operate the motor vehicle."lo Since the company had experienced an increase in 
absenteeism at its Winchester terminal (Virginia) which had caused severe economic 
problems,11 it instituted and implemented a new policy regarding the process of marking 
a driver's name off the roster. In order to discourage and decrease the absenteeism, the 
new program required a driver to submit a doctor's slip or similar certification of his 
illness, without which an unexcused absence letter would issue, stating that the absence 
on a particular day for sickness was unexcused. If the driver submitted verification of 
his illness, however, the unexcused absence letter would be expunged from his record, 
and a second letter excusing the absence would be sent to the driver. It was alleged that 
See also US v. Stockyards Terminal Ry. Co. (1910, 8th Cir.) 178 F.19; Browning v. Fidelity Trust 
Co. (1918, 3d Cir.) 250 F.321; Sarna v. American Bosch Magneto Co. (1935, Mass.) 195 N.E.328; 
Paloeian v. Day (1938, Mass.) 13 N.E.2d 398; Inland Freight Lines v. US (1951, 10th Cir.) 191 
F.2d 313; Slater v. Missouri Edison Co. (1952, Mo) 245 S.W.2d 457; Walker v. State (1953, Ga.) 
78 S.E2d 545; Woodmont. Inc. v. Daniels (1959, 10th Cir.) 274 F.2d 132; Gem City Motors, Inc. 
v. Minton (1964, Ga.) 137 S.E.2d 522; US v. Sawyer Transport, Inc. (1971) 337 F.Supp.29; 
People v. American Medical Centers of Mich. (1982, Mich.) 324 N.W.2d 782; Camacho v. 
Bowling (1983) 562 F.Supp.l012; US v. Shortt Accountancy Corp. (1986, 9th Cir.) 785 F.2d 
1448. But see First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor's Corp. (1988 S.D.N.Y.) 690 F.Supp.256 
("While it is not disputed that a corporation may be charged with the collective knowledge of its 
employees, it does not follow that the corporation may be deemed to have a culpable state of mind 
when that state of mind is possessed by no single employee. A corporation can be held to have 
a particular state of mind only when that state of mind is possessed by a single individual."), citing 
Kern Oil & Refilling Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co. (1986, 9th Cir.) 792 F.2d 1380, pp. 1386-87, cert. 
denied, (1987) 480 U.S. 906. 
(1974) 381 F.Supp.730. 
Interstate Commerce Act, Part II; Motor Carriers, 49 U.S.c. § 322(a) (1963) (repealed 1978), cited 
in ibid. at 733. Section 322(a) of the Act imposed criminal penalties for the knowing and willful 
violation of any of the regulations imposed by the Highway Administrations. Ibid. 
"The Winchester, Virginia terminal receives transport orders at approximately 6 p.m. for runs to 
begin as early as 7 p.m. If drivers telephone the Company's dispatcher and mark off during the 
afternoon there may not be enough drivers for the runs resulting in significant delays in delivery." 




the company refrained from fully notifying the drivers of the details of this new policy, 
producing "an aura of confusion and concern which would coerce drivers into refraining 
from marking off due to illness."12 
The first incident occurred on 8 September 1972, when a line driver telephoned 
the company's dispatcher and asked that he be marked off the roster that evening 
because he had injured his back. The dispatcher told him that his absence would be 
considered unexcused, but allegedly did not explained to the driver that the absence 
would be excused if the driver submitted doctor verification. For fear of the effect of 
the unexcused absence letter, the driver then requested to be placed back in the lineup.13 
The second incident occurred on 21 October 1972, when another driver 
telephoned the same dispatcher on that evening and asked that he be marked off the 
roster because he had an ear infection and was going to a doctor. The dispatcher 
responded in the same way as the first incident, and three hours later, the driver 
telephoned the company (the other dispatcher) and requested to be reinstated for duty. 
This time, however, the driver subsequently became too ill to continue his work and was 
advised by the company to obtain medical treatment. 
The central issue was whether the company had knowledge that the driver was 
ill, so as to constitute the knowing and willful violation of the Act. Because different 
dispatchers were on duty when the sick call was made and when the drivers later 
reported for work, pertinent facts were not acquired by one specific individual who 
would fully comprehend their significance. One dispatcher knew that the driver was ill 
but did not know that he would go back in the lineup; the other dispatcher knew that the 
driver reported to work, but did not know that the driver was ill. The court, however, 
held that the acts and knowledge of the corporate employees within the scope of their 
employment are imputed to the company, which is considered to have acquired the 
collective knowledge of its employees and is held responsible for their failure to act 
Jbid. at 736. 
Jbid. at pp. 733-735. 
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accordingly.14 That is, by combining several dispatchers' knowledge as to the relevant 
facts, the court viewed the defendant company as acting knowingly and willfully. 
Again, in US v. Bank of New England, N.A.,15 the Bank of New England was 
charged with thirty-one violations of the Currency Transaction Reporting Act, which 
required banks to file Currency Transaction Report (CTRs) within fifteen days of 
customer currency transactions exceeding $10,000. 16 A customer came to a bank teller's 
window to request a number of counter checks which he would then make payable to 
cash for sum varying between $5,000 and $9,000. On each occasion the customer 
simultaneously presented to the teller between two and four counter checks, none of 
which individually amounted to $10,000. Each check was reported separately as an 
"item" on the bank's settlement sheets. Once the checks were processed, he would 
receive in a single transfer from the teller the lump sum of cash which exceeded 
$10,000. The bank failed to file CTRs on any of these transactionsY 
It was revealed at trial that the teller was unaware of the Act providing reporting 
requirements for financial institutions for domestic coins and currency transactions 
which exceeded $10,000, but her supervisor, the head teller, and the branch manager 
knew of the CTR filing obligations imposed by the Act. Nonetheless, they did not know 
the fact that the customer's transactions, multiple deposits that were aggregated for the 
purpose of the reporting requirement, would be reportable as required by the Act. On 
the other hand, the bank's project coordinator who worked in the bank's main office 
knew that the meaning of reportable transactions of the Act was expanded to include 
multiple transactions which would aggregate more than $10,000, but had no knowledge 
that the transactions by the customer at issue occurred. I8 





(1987, 1st Cir.) F.2d 844. 
31 U.S.C. §§5311-5322 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). § 5322 provides criminal penalties for violations 
of the Act. 
(1987, 1st Cir.) F.2d 844 at 848. 
Ibid. at pp. 857-858. 
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None of these bank employees' knowledge individually amounted to willfulness 
as required by the Act: the teller's knowledge as to the occurrence of multiple deposits 
exceeding $10,000 as a result of the aggregation; the head teller and branch manager's 
knowledge of the reporting requirement; and the bank's coordinator's knowledge that 
multiple deposits should be aggregated. The willfulness requirement would be fulfilled, 
however, by combining these fragments of knowledge, 19 because the court believed that 
"the acts of a corporation are, after all, simply the acts of all of its employees operating 
within the scope of their employment.,,2o That is to say, even when no single individual 
possessed the requisite knowledge of the violation, the company could still be held 
liable for an offence requiring specific intent which, under the collective knowledge 
doctrine, amounted to a hypothetical sum of each employee's fragment of knowledge. 
19 
20 
The issue of willfulness concerning the collective knowledge doctrine was addressed by the trial 
judge that instructed the jury as follows: 
"There is a similar double business with respect to the concept of willfulness with respect 
to the bank. In deciding whether the bank acted willfully, .... you have to look fIrst at the 
conduct of all employees and offIcers, and, second, at what the bank did or did not as an 
institution. The bank is deemed to have acted willfully if one of its employees in the scope 
of his employment acted willfully. So, if you fmd that an employee willfully failed to do 
what was necessary to fIle these reports, then that is deemed to be the act of the bank, and 
the bank is deemed to have willfully failed to fIle .... 
Alternatively, the bank as an institution has certain responsibilities; as an organization, 
it has certain responsibilities. And you will have to determined whether the bank as an 
organization consciously avoided leaning about and observing CTR requirements. The 
Government to prove the bank guilty on this theory, has to show that its failure to fIle was 
the result of some flagrant organizational indifference. In this connection, you should look 
at the evidence as to the bank's effort, if any, to inform its employees of the law; its effort 
to check on their compliance; its response to various bits of information .... ; its policies, and 
how it carried out its stated policies .... 
If you fInd that the Government has proven with respect to any transaction either that an 
employee within the scope of his employment willfully failed to fIle a required report or 
that the bank was fragrantly indifferent to its obligations, then you may fmd that the bank 
has willfully failed to fIle the required reports." 
Ibid at 855. 
Ibid. at 856. The jury was instructed by the trial judge concerning the collective knowledge 
doctrine as follows: 
"[Y]ou have to look at the bank as an institution. As such, its knowledge is the sum of the 
knowledge of all of the employees. That is, the bank's knowledge is the totality of what 
all ofthe employees know within the scope of their employment. So, if Employee A knows 
one facet of the currency reporting requirement, B knows another facet of it, and C a third 
facet of it, the bank knows them all. So if you fmd an employee within the scope of his 
employment knew that CTRs had to be fIled, even if multiple checks are used, the bank is 
deemed to know it. The bank is also deemed to know it if each of several employees knew 
a part of that requirements and the sum of what the separate employees knew amounted to 
knowledge that such a requirement existed." 
Ibid. at 855. 
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The court held that: 
21 
"A collective knowledge instruction is entirely appropriate in the context of corporate 
criminal liability .... Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements 
of specific duties and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of those 
components constitutes the corporation's knowledge of a particular operation. It is 
irrelevant whether employees administrating one component of an operation know the 
specific activities of employees administrating another aspect of the operation .... ,,21 
It is interesting to note that the court in this case rejected the bank's argument that the 
collective knowledge doctrine would actually hold a company liable for "negligently 
maintaining a poor communications network. ,,22 Yet, some commentators base this 
doctrine's justification upon the company's failure to integrate, coordinate and analyse 
information held by several employees so as to help all of the corporate agents avoid 
illegal conduct.23 It is certain that the effect of this doctrine would encourage corporate 
agents, in particular, corporate officers or decision-makers, to be more conscious of 
transmitting the relevant information held by some employees to the others engaging in 
criminal conduct.24 The aggregation of a piece of knowledge of several employees 
would serve as some factors to demonstrate a company's defective communication 




See, for example, Gruner, supra note 3, §4.1.2; Ragozino, supra note 3 at 438. 
Gruner emphases that the collective knowledge doctrine's main purpose is to encourage "fIrms 
to do better with the information they have, and not to institute new information gathering 
practices." Ibid. at p. 284. On the other hand, Fisse proposes that a company should still be held 
liable for the offence performed by middle- or lower-level employees if it "did not have in place 
a system or procedure calculated to ensure that warnings of the suspected or anticipated 
commission of the offence .... would promptly be communicated to the board of directors .... or 
managing director." B. Fisse, "The Attribution of Criminal Liability to Corporations: A Statutory 
Model" (1991) 13 Sydney Law Review 277 [hereinafter cited as A Statutory ModelJ at pp. 286-288. 
Moreover, Smith has suggested the application of the aggregation theory to offences of negligence, 
although they are not in favour of its application in offences requiring the other types of subjective 
mental states. J.C. Smith, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law (1996, 8th ed., Butterworths, London), 
p. 189, stating that: 
"The company owes a duty of care and if its operation falls below the standard required 
it is guilty of gross negligence. A series of minor failures by officers of the company might 
add up to a gross breach by the company of its duty of care." . 
It is to be noted, however, that Smith's interest in aggregating several individual's fault conSIsts 
ofthree points. At fIrst, the aggregation theory should be applicable only to (gross) negligence 
so that he is not necessarily in favour of American collective knowledge doctrine in the context 
of corporate liability. Next, he is concerned only with the negligence of senior officers, not 
middle- or lower-level employees. Finally, therefore, the aggregation theory is, he believes, an 
extended version of identifIcation principle, not vicarious liability doctrine. Ibid. 
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system between top management and middle- or lower-level employees. Viewed in this 
light, the aggregation theory (or the collective knowledge doctrine) is not only aimed at 
forming the requisite subjective mental state of the company, but also at blaming it for 
not taking precautious or corrective measures, in terms of a poor communication system, 
against its employee's offence. 
4.1.2. Corporate Policy 
Several commentators have critically responded to the derivative nature of corporate 
liability, as American courts have in terms of the collective knowledge doctrine, by 
arguing that a company should be held liable for the offence committed by its agents 
even if no individual is proved to have the requisite mental state. Unlike the collective 
knowledge doctrine under which only individuals' innocent minds are utilised to 
formulate corporate knowledge, however, they attempt to capture corporate fault in 
terms of some features peculiar to corporations.25 Pursuant to organisation theory, 26 they 
25 
26 
See, for example, P.H. Bucy, "Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal 
Liability" (1991) 75 Minnesota Law Review 1095 [hereinafter cited as Ethos]; H.L. Pitt & K.A. 
Groskaufmanis, "Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate 
Codes of Conduct" (1990) 78 Georgetown Law Journal 1559; A Foerschler, "Corporate Criminal 
Intent: Toward a Better Understanding of Corporate Misconduct" (1990) 78 California Law 
Review 1287; l Gobert, "Corporate Criminality: Four Models of Fault" (1994) 14 Legal Studies 
393; D. Hanna, "Corporate Criminal Liability" (1989) 31 Criminal Law Quarterly 452; C.M.V. 
Clarkson, "Corporate Culpability" (1998) 2 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues; A. Rose, 
"Developments in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice - 1995 Australian Criminal Code Act: 
Corporate Crimina Provisions" (1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum 129; Colvin, Corporate 
Personality, supra note 3; D. Stuart, "Punishing Corporate Criminals with Restraint" (1995) 6 
Criminal Law Forum 219; J. Moore, "Corporate Culpability under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines" (1992) 34 Arizona Law Review 743. 
For a general understanding of organisation theory, see, for example, R.H. Hall, Organizations -
Structures, Processes, and Outcomes (1996, 6th ed., Prentice-Hall International, Inc., New Jersey); 
T.E. Deal & AA Kennedy, Corporate Cultures - The Rites and Rituals of Corporate Life (1988, 
Penguin Books, New York); D. Graves, Corporate Culture - Auditing and Changing the Culture 
of Organizations (1986, Frances Printer (Publishers), London); L.B. Mohr, Explaining 
Organizational Behavior (1982, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco); M.B. Clinard & R. 
Quinney, Criminal Behavior Systems - A Typology (1973, 2nd ed., Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
Inc., New York), Ch. 8; D. Vaughan, Controlling Unlawful Organizational Behavior - Social 
Structure and Corporate Misconduct (1983, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago) and 
"Toward Understanding Unlawful Organizational Behavior" (1982) 80 Michigan Law Review 
1377; l Martin & C. Siehl, "Organizational Culture and Counterculture: An Uneasy Symbiosis" 
(1983) 12 Organizational Dynamics 52; L.K. Trevino, "A Cultural Perspective on Changing and 
Developing Organizational Ethics" (1990) 4 Research in Organizational Change and 
Development 195 and "Ethical Decision Making in Organizations: A Person-Situation 
Interactionist Model" (1986) 11 Academy of Management Review 601; B. Victor & lB. Cullen, 
"The Organizational Bases of Ethical Work Climates" (1988) 33 Administrative Science Quarterly 
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maintain that corporate actions are not simply reducible to the aggregate of each 
individual's conduct or the products of individual choice, so that the individual acts 
relating to the company's illegal activities should be considered within complicated 
organisational environments that involve distinct structures, processes of decision 
making and course of conduct, and cultures. Individual decisions and activities are 
shaped by corporate policy.27 In his attempt to equate a human intentionality with 
corporate policy, Peter A. French has developed the sophisticated concept of corporate 
27 
10 1; B.D. Baysinger, "Organization Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations" (1991) 
71 Boston University Law Review 341; J. Child, "Organizational Structure, Environment and 
Performance - The Role of Strategic Choice" (1972) 6 Sociology 1; R.W. Scott, "Developments 
in Organization Theory, 1960-1980" (1981) 24 American Behavioral Scientist 407; B.M. Staw 
& E. Szwajkowski, "The Scarcity-Munificence Component of Organizational Environments and 
Commission of Illegal Acts" (1975) 20 Administrative Science Quarterly 345; J.W. Fredrickson, 
"The Strategic decision Process and Organizational Structure" (1986) 11 Academy of management 
Review 280; R.T. Pascale, "The Paradox of "Corporate Culture": Reconciling Ourselves to 
Socialization" (1985) 27 California Management Review 26; S. Ranson, B. Hinings & R. 
Greenwood, "The Structuring of Organizational Structures" (1980) 25 Administrative Science 
Quarterly 1. 
The term "corporate policy" seems popular among several commentators, such as Foerschler 
(supra note 25 at pp. 1306-1311), Gobert (supra note 25 at pp. 408-409), Hanna (supra note 25 
at p.471) and Clarkson (supra note 25). On the other hand, some argue for the use of the term 
"corporate culture" (Rose, supra note 25 at p.135; Stuart, supra note 25 at pp. 250-254; Colvin, 
supra note 25 at 35), "corporate character" (Moore, supra note 25), "corporate codes of 
conduct" (pitt & Groskaufrnanis, supra note 25) or Greek rhetorical term "corporate ethos ( 180r;)" 
(Bucy, Ethos, supra note 25). The following is what Bucy has to say on this semantic matter: 
"These latter terms [corporate culture and corporate personality] both have specialized 
meanings within their originating disciplines of anthropology and psychology, respectively, 
that may prove limiting. Also, in their popularity, both terms have become homogenized, 
losing much of their clarity." 
Ibid. at 1121, n.98. Pitt and Groskaufrnanis also note that: 
"In this article, we use the terms "corporate codes of conduct," "corporate codes," "and 
codes" synonymously. We defme these terms to include any written statement of ethics, 
law, or policy (or some combination thereof), delineating the obligations of one or more 
classes of corporate employees." 
Ibid at 1559, n.1. The term "corporate culture" is defined in Part 2.5, Section 12.3 (6) of Criminal 
Code Act 1995 (Commonwealth of Australia, No. 12 of 1995 [hereinafter cited as Australian 
Criminal Code Act 1995]) as: 
"an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body corporate 
generally or in the part ofthe body corporate in which the relevant activities take place." 
It is obvious from these defmitional explanations that "corporate policy" may be the vital or 
common component comprising "corporate codes of conduct" or "corporate culture," so that the 
term "corporate policy" has been chosen in this thesis to describe the contours of each 
commentator's theory. On the other hand, Moore has failed to define the term "corporate 
character", but his usage of this term indicates that he is in favour ofthe character theory, one of 
major theories concerning the issue of the requirement of CUlpability. This issue will be treated 









policy.28 According to French, corporations exhibit an intentionality, which cannot be 
reduced simply to the intentionality of its directors, employees or any other agents, 
through a Corporation's Internal Decision Structure (CrD Structure).29 CID Structures, 
which "every corporation has,,,30 consist of both the corporate responsibility flowchart 
that sketches stations and levels within the corporate power structure, and the corporate 
procedural and decision-making recognition rules that are usually embedded in 
corporate policy.3) French continues: 
"The crn Structure is the personnel organization for the exercise of the corporation's 
power with respect to its ventures, and as such its primary function is to draw experience 
from various levels of the corporation into a decision-making and ratification process. 
When operative and properly activated, the CID Structure accomplishes a subordination 
and synthesis of the intentions and acts of various biological persons into a corporate 
decision.... [T]he crn Structure licenses the descriptive transformation of events, seen 
under another aspect as the acts of biological persons (those who occupy various stations 
on the organizational chart), to corporate acts by exposing the corporate character ofthose 
events. A CID Structure incorporates acts of biological persons.,,32 
"[W]hen the corporate act is consistent with an instantiation or an implementation of 
established corporate policy, then it is proper to describe it as have been done for corporate 
reasons, as having been caused by a corporate desire coupled with a corporate belief and 
so, in other words, as corporate intentional.,,33 
Several attempts have been made to incorporate French's concept of corporate 
policy into the legal framework of corporate fault. Bucy, for example, maintains that 
a company should be held liable when the personality, or what she calls "ethos", of the 
organisation encourages corporate agents to commit the particular criminal conduct.34 
Such an ethos may be identified by resorting to circumstantial evidence, including the 
inquiry into corporate hierarchy, goals, efforts to ensure the employees' compliance with 
legal requirements and to investigate the current offence, reactions to past violations and 
P .A. French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (1984, Columbia University Press, New 
York). 
French, ibid. at pp. 39-46. 
Ibid. at p. 41. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. at pp. 41-42. 
Ibid. at p. 44. 





violators, and presence or absence of compensation incentives for legally appropriate 
behavior and the indemnification of employees. 35 
Moore also argues, in his corporate character theory, that one of the following 
three circumstances must be present to find corporate fault: (1) the corporation has 
adopted a policy that is illegal, and an agent of the corporation carries out that policy; 
(2) an illegal act is committed, authorised, ordered or endorsed by a high managerial 
official in the corporation; or (3) the corporation implicitly ratifies or endorses the 
violative act by its employee.36 
A similar legal framework has been suggested by F oerschler to determine 
corporate fault. According to her, the corporate fault may be found in the corporate 
policy or practice when its agent's illegal conduct is accompanied by one of the 
following three criteria: (1) a corporate practice or policy violates the law; (2) it was 
reasonably foreseeable that the corporate practice or policy would result in a corporate 
agent's violation of the law; or (3) a corporation adopts a corporate agent's violation of 
the law.37 
4.1.3. Proactive Fault 
The third model is the proactive corporate fault model in which French's corporate 
Ibid. at pp. 1127-1146. See also P.H. Bucy, "Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart 
before the Horse" (1993) 71 Washington University Law Quarterly 329. 
Moore, supra note 25 at pp. 768-769. The term "a high managerial officer" (or agent) is originally 
used in the American Model Penal Code, §2.07(1)(c), providing that: 
"(1) A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offence if: 
(c) the commission of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded, 
performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high 
managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his 
office or employment." 
The term is defmed in §2.07(4)(c) as: 
"an officer ... or any other agent of a corporation .... having duties of such responsibility that 
his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation .... " 
The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code - Official Draft and Explanatory Notes (1985, 
Philadelphia). 
Foershcler, supra note 25 at pp. 1306-1311. The facts of Commonwealth v. McIlwain School Bus 
Lines ((1980) 423 A.2d 413, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 116-118) and US v. 
T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc. ((1974) 381 F.Supp.730, cited in text accompanying notes 9-14) are used by 
Foerschler as supportive examples for the fIrst and second criteria respectively. 
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policy model is reflected. Unlike the corporate policy model which directly equates a 
human intentionality with corporate policy in relation to the conduct of agents, the 
proactive corporate model pays attention to corporate fault prior to their conduct. That 
is, the proactive corporate fault model finds corporate liability where a corporation, as 
an organisation, fails to exercise due diligence to prevent the crime committed by its 
employee.38 A corporation is held liable when it fails to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that any precautious and preventive steps had been taken by its top or 
decision-making officials at the time of the commission of the employee's crime. The 
types of precautions involve stringent policies and practices both of which had clearly 
and convincingly forbidden the illegal conduct by any employees, and which had 
developed and implemented reasonable safeguards designed to prevent corporate crime, 
such as regular procedures for evaluation and detection. In order for the company to 
satisfy the requirement of reasonable efforts to prevent the crime, senior officials and 
top management would be required to ensure on a regular basis that the precautions 
adopted are sufficiently adequate to prevent violations through internal assessments 
(evaluation) as well as through outside audits and regular compliance reports that bring 
potential or ongoing violations to their attention (detection).39 
The core of this model lies in the fact that the exercise of due diligence by senior 
38 This model was proposed in Anonymous, Developments in the Law, supra note 5 at pp. 1257-
1258. On closer examination, however, the difference between the proactive corporate fault model 
and the vicarious liability doctrine (coupled with the availability of a due diligence defence) 
becomes oflittle significance. Hence, the following commentators should be seen as the advocates 
of this model: Anonymous, "Criminal Liability of Corporations for Acts of Their Agents" (1946) 
60 Harvard Law Review 283; IV. Dolan & R.S. Rebeck, "Corporate Criminal Liability for Acts 
in Violation of Company Policy" (1962) 50 Georgetown Law Journal 547; R. Hamilton, 
"Corporate Criminal Liability in Texas" (1968) 47 Texas Law Review 60; B. Coleman, "Is 
Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?" (1975) 29 Southwestern Law Journal 908; G.R. 
Sullivan, "The Attribution of Culpability to Limited Companies" (1996) 55 Cambridge Law 
Journal 515 [hereinafter cited as The Attribution] and "Expressing Corporate Guilt" (1995) 15 
Oxford Journal of legal Studies 281. 
39 
Two points should be borne in mind. Sullivan argues against the existence of corporate 
culpability which transcends the aggregate of individual culpability or which is disassociated with 
the acts and mental states of at least one individual. In addition, the author(s) of Developments 
in the Law ultimately proposed, in the article, to replace criminal sanctions against corporat~ons 
with civil sanctions such as civil fmes, and pursued the criminal liability oftop corporate offiCIals. 
Ibid. at 1369-1375. This view is shared with E. Lederman, "Criminal Law, Perpetrator and 
Corporations: Rethinking a Complex Triangle" (1985) 76 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 
285. 
Developments in the Law, supra note 5 at 1258. 
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officers is proactive, and it is an affirmative defence, not an element of the crime, so that 
the defendant company is required to prove the presence of the exercise by a 
preponderance of the evidence.4o Considering the combination of a due diligence 
defence with the vicarious liability doctrine, what Sullivan calls "a long familiar 
principle,,,41 the proactive corporate fault model may not be a novel idea. It is to be 
noted, however, that this model places more emphasis upon the reasonableness of 
corporate policies, practices and procedures than the vicarious liability doctrine does.42 
4.1.4. Reactive Fault 
Both corporate policy and proactive corporate fault models use some distinctive features 
of corporations, such as corporate policy, practices or procedures, as proof of corporate 
fault for causally relevant conduct of the corporate agent(s) at or before the time the 
wrongdoing is under way. On the other hand, the reactive corporate fault model, which 
has been proposed by Fisse and Braithwaite,43 finds such traditional timeframes difficult 
to accept in order to capture corporate mens rea, and shifts its focus of corporate liability 
from fault prior at the time of the commission of the actus reus of the offence, to fault 
based on the performance of the corporate defendant in reaction to the occurrence of the 
actus reus of the offence.44 The concept of reactive corporate fault is defined by Fisse 





Sullivan, The Attribution, supra note 38 at 543. For further details of a due diligence defence 
particularly in the context of corporate vicarious liability, see, for example, Gruner, supra note 
3, ch.6. 
Developments in the Law, supra note 5 at 1258. 
See, for example, B. Fisse, "Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, 
Fault, and Sanctions" (1983) 56 Southern California Law Review 1141 [hereinafter cited as 
Reconstructing]; A Statutory Model, supra note 24; "Sentencing Options against Corporations" 
(1990) 1 Criminal Law Forum 211; "Recent Developments in Corporate Criminal Law and 
Corporate Liability to Monetary Penalties" (1990) 13 University o/New South Wales Law Journal 
1; and Howard's Criminal Law (1990, 5th ed., Law Book Co., Sydney) [hereinafter cite~ as 
HowardJ, ch.7; B. Fisse & J. Braithwaite, "The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Cnme: 
Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability" (1988) 11 Sydney Law Review 468; "Corporate 
Offences: The Kepone Affair" in R. Weston (ed.), Combating Commercial Crime (1987, ~aw 
Book Co., Sydney), pp. 31; and Corporations, Crime and Accountability (1993, Cambndge 
University Press) [hereinafter cited as Corporations]. 
Fisse and Braithwaite, Corporations, supra note 43 at p. 47. They argue that it is rare to f~d a 
company displaying an express criminal policy that endorses or encourages criminal behav.lOur 





and Braithwaite as "unreasonable corporate failure to devise and undertake satisfactory 
preventive and corrective measures in response to the commission of the actus reus of 
an offence by personnel acting on behalf of the organisation. ,,45 
Under this model, the corporate fault regarding the commission of the actus reus 
of the offence by its agent(s) may be found in one or other of the following ways: (1) by 
having a policy that expressly or impliedly authorises or permits the commission of the 
offence or an offence of the same type; (2) by failing to take reasonable precautions or 
to exercise due precautions to prevent the commission of the offence or an offence of 
the same type; (3) by having a policy of failing to comply with a reactive duty to take 
preventive measures in response to having committed the external elements of the 
offence; or (4) by failing to take reasonable precautions or to exercise due diligence to 
comply with a reactive duty to take preventive measures in response to having 
committed the external elements of the offence.46 The presence or absence of corporate 
reactive programs was, according to Fisse, originally considered merely a factor relevant 
to mitigation or aggravation of the sentence.47 Later, it has been incorporated into the 
basis of corporate criminal liability under the reactive corporate fault model. 
4.2. Case Studies 
Each model of corporate fault described in the previous section has a common feature: 
Reconstructing, supra note 43 at pp. 1191-1192. 
Fisse and Braithwaite, Corporations, supra note 43 at 48. The reactive programs of a corporation 
following commission of the actus reus of the offence at issue are comprised of: (1) initiation and 
completion of an effective program of internal disciplinary action; (2) modification of compliance 
policies or standard operating procedures which, ifleft in place, would be likely to occasion further 
violations; (3) redress by means of compensation, restitution, or rectification; and (4) facilitation 
ofthe redress of corporate harmdoing by providing public notice oflikely rights of action, impact-
assessment studies, and other means of remedial assistance. Fisse, Reconstructing, supra note 43 
at 1205. 
Fisse, Howard, supra note 43 at p. 605. 
Fisse, Reconstructing, supra note 43 at pp. 1195-1197. See, for example, US v. Olin Corporation 
(1978, D. Conn, 1 June) Criminal No. 78-30, slip op., cited in ibid. (in which a leading firearms 
manufacturer pleaded no contest to a charge of conspiring to ship about 3,200 rifles to South 
Africa in violation of a trade embargo. The maximum fme was $510,000, but the court ordered 
a fine of only $45,000 because of the company's reactive performance.) For the facts of this case, 
see R.E. Tomasson, "Olin's Arms Penalty: 'Donation' Plus Fine" New York Times, 2 June 1978, 
at Dl, col.4. 
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namely, their "effort to move beyond simple imputation of intention and action'~8 of the 
particular individual to a corporation. As a result, the corporation may be held liable for 
its own fault concerning commission of the offence by agents, irrespective of whether 
or not individual's fault is identified. This common feature, however, also shows that 
there is little difference as to the content and the scope of application of each model 
which this subsection examines in relation to corporate manslaughter cases. 
Several cases of corporate manslaughter may provide a strong basis for the 
proactive corporate fault mode1.49 The following factors in these cases may be in favour 
of this model: the company's failure to establish an adequate system of maintenance for 
its plant and vehicle;50 to supervise the construction of a cofferdam;51 to provide a safe 
48 Laufer, supra note 1 at 668. However, emphasis needs to be on "simple" imputation in this 
sentence, which means each model does not adhere to a conviction of the particular individual to 
hold a company liable for his/her offence. As described later, the state of mind and action of 




Most cases of corporate manslaughter which will be used here to demo strate the applicability of 
each model of corporate fault are derived from the previous chapter. However, three cases, 
namely, Cory Brothers Ltd. ([1927] 1 K.B. 810, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 14 
-16), British Steel PIc. ([1995] ICR 586, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 100-101) 
and State v. Pacific Powder Co. ((1961) 360 P.2d.530, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying note 
110) leave no room for the application of four models. At first, in the Cory case, some controlling 
officers' decision to put up the electric fence is well identified with the defendant company's 
reckless mental states constituting the ingredients of manslaughter, so that there is no doubt that 
the identification principle can be applied. 
In addition, in the British Steel case, the prosecution acknowledged that the company's 
delegation system of responsibility for supervision to the experienced section engineer was 
perfectly acceptable and, therefore, it is difficult to detect any fault of the company in relation to 
his failure to supervise the repositioning operation at issue. It seems to be only the vicarious 
liability doctrine that may justify the company's liability in such situations. 
Finally, in the Pacific Powder case, one possible fault on the part of the defendant 
company was its failure to instruct the truck driver not to leave the truck unattended. As pointed 
out in the previous chapter (text accompanying note 110), the immediate cause of the fire that 
occurred at the wooden building was neither proved by the prosecution nor foreseeable to the 
driver or the company itself. In this case, too, only the vicarious liability doctrine may justify the 
defendant company's liability. 
The Queen v. Denbo Pty. Ltd. (unreported, 14 June 1994, Supreme Court of Victoria, Teague J., 
cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying note 22); Commonwealth v. McIlwain School Bus Lines, 
Inc. (1980) 423 A.2d.413, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 116-118; Commonwealth 
v. Fortner LP Gas Co. (1980) 610 S.W.2d.941, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying note 119. 









workplace;52 to allow the chief engineer sufficient time to familiarise himself with the 
ship before it sailed;53 to let the experienced foreman take charge of the demolition of 
bridges;54 and to supply safe and efficient equipment and life preservers for the steam 
boat's passengers and to train the crew to ensure that they were aware of their duty to 
rescue passengers on fire occasions. 55 
In the context of corporate manslaughter, as these factors indicate, the proactive 
corporate fault model may find the corporate fault when it is reasonably assumed that 
a company's failure to take preventive steps causes the victim's death. Preventive steps 
are, of course, to be taken against the source of risk inherent in the particular operations 
of the company's business, such as building and construction, mining, extraction, air, 
sea and rail transportation and production. 56 As analysed in the previous chapter,5? the 
corporate proactive fault may consist of: (l) failures properly to train employees who 
are the closest position to the source of risk so as to prevent them from causing the 
source of risk to materialise; and (2) failures to organise a safety system either to control 
the source of risk directly or to prevent the employees' mistakes in relation to the source 
of risk from causing the prohibited consequences. 
The relationship between these two types of proactive faults is, on one occasion, 
exclusive, and on the other occasions, interactive or supplementary. In such cases as the 
Denbo, MacIlwain School Bus and Fortner LP Gas, the company's failure directly to 
control the source of risk caused the victims' deaths, so that it would be irrelevant 
People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Co. (1987) 510 N.E.2d.1173; (1989) 534 N.E.2d.962, cited in 
Chapter 3, text accompanying note 3 1. 
Seaboard Offshore Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Transport [1994] 1 WLR 541; 2 All ER 99, 
cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 32-33. 
Northern Stripping Mining Construction Ltd., The Times, 2, 4 and 5 February 1965,cited in 
Chapter 3, text accompanying note 41. See also US v. Dye Construction Co. (1975) 510 F.2d.78, 
cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 96-97 (in which the decision as to whether the trench 
at issue was to be shored was delegated by the construction company to the back hoe operator, 
whose wrong decision led to the cave-in, claiming the assistant pipe layer's life.) 
US v. Van Schaik (1904) 134 F.592, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 92-93. 
Sullivan, The Attribution, supra note 38 at 527. 
Chapter 3, text accompanying note 24. 
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whether the company properly trained the employees who were engaged in the particular 
operation that involved the source of risk, in order to prevent their mistakes from 
causing the consequences. Similarly, in cases of Seaboard Offshore, Northern Stripping 
Mining and Dye Construction, the employee who was in the nearest position to the 
source of risk immediately triggered the consequences and, thus, the company had no 
chance to prevent the mistake made by the employee from causing the consequences. 
On the other hand, the Van Schaik case illustrates an example of a mixture of 
two corporate proactive faults: failures properly to train the crew and to provide safe 
equipments to rescue the victims. Although the source of risk, a fire, was not caused by 
any employees of the company in this case, it is reasonable to assume that an accidental 
fire could occur anywhere. Thus, the company's fault was not its failure to prevent the 
fire from occurring, but its failure to prevent the occurrence of the fire from causing the 
victims'deaths.58 If the crew had either been properly trained or the safety equipment 
had been provided by the company to rescue passengers, the consequences could have 
been avoided. 
It is interesting to assume that in these examples, the company's failure to take 
preventive measures had lasted for a certain period prior to the incident. In these 
circumstances, it would be possible that such sloppy practices were embedded and 
routinised in the corporate business. If so, the factors comprising corporate proactive 
fault can also be considered to constitute the basis for the corporate policy model. 
Suppose that in the Van Schaik case, the steam boat company had allowed the boat to 
navigate neither with the safety equipment provided nor with the crew properly trained 
several times prior to the incident.59 Or, the inexperienced workers had frequently been 
assigned by the company to the particular operation involving the source of risk in cases 
58 
59 
Chapter 3, n.55. 
The same may be true of the McIlwain School Bus and Fortner LP Gas cases. As mentioned in 
supra note 37 Foerschler, one of the advocates ofthe corporate policy model, uses the McIlwain 
School Bus c~se as an example for her second prong provided in supra text accompanying note 
37, stating that: .. . . . 
"Assuming that the failure to install mmors was a ~ohcy declSlon or a sta~dard ope~atmg 
procedure, the corporation could properly be conSIdered to have had the mtent to VIOlate 
the vehicle code." 








of the Seaboard Offshore, Northern Stripping and Dye Construction. If this additional 
factor, namely, "pattern ofwrongdoing,"60 is found, both the proactive corporate fault 
and corporate policy models may share the same scope of corporate liability. 
The distinction between the scope of the application of the corporate proactive 
fault model and that of the corporate policy model becomes more blurred if it is 
successfully proved that one of the controlling officers or high managerial officials is 
involved in the illegal act. That is, under Moore's second prong, a company may be 
held liable for such senior management's participation in criminal conduct.61 The 
importance of the involvement of senior management in criminal activities is described 
by Moore as follows: 
"Delegation of authority to [high managerial] officials is one of the primary ways in which 
organizations direct and control the behavior of their agents. Some officials are so closely 
identified with the organization that their participation in or toleration of criminal activities 
sends a message that such activities are consistent with corporate policy .... [T]he behavior 
of high managerial officials is perhaps the most important factor in determining the 
likelihood that a corporation will engage in crime." [Footnotes omitted]62 
The involvement of the senior management in the company's fault in relation to the 
source of risk was proved in cases of the Denbo (the owner), Ebasco (the executive vice 
president and several supervisors), Chicago Magnet (five corporate officials), Van 
Schaik (the captain, managing director, secretary and treasurer), People v. O'Nei163 (the 
president, plant manager and two plant foremen), Kite, Stoddart & OLL Ltd.64 (the 
managing director), Commonwealth v. Welanskl5 (the owner of the night club) and 
Clarkson, supra note 25. 
Supra text accompanying note 36. 
Moore, supra note 25 at 766 and 769. See also the definition of the tenn "a high manage~ial 
agent" by the Model Penal Code provided in supra note 36, in particular, "represent the polIcy 
of the corporation." 
(1990) 550 N.E.2d.1 090, Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 60-67. 
Unreported, The Times and The Independent, 9 December 1994, cited in Chapter 3, text 
accompanying notes 25-29. 




State v. Serebin66 (the nursing home administrator). 
Notably, the defendant corporations in the last three cases were virtually "one-
man" companies owned and controlled by the individual defendants. It is probable that 
in such situations, the decision by senior management simply reflects the company's 
policy so that the successful identification of the controlling officer's fault automatically 
leads to a finding of corporate policy. If the senior management fails or decides not to 
take preventive steps, and their failure lasts for a certain period prior to the occurrence 
of the victim's death, such sloppy corporate practices may inevitably comprise both the 
basis for the proactive corporate fault and that for the corporate policy model. 
As far as the reactive corporate fault is concerned, a typical example to support 
this model may be the Warner-Lambert case.67 The important facts comprising reactive 
corporate fault were that the company was once informed of the illegal situations which 
would potentially lead to the prohibited consequences, but its subsequent remedial or 
corrective actions were so unsatisfactory that the company's insufficient response let the 
previous situations cause the consequences. In the Warner-Lambert case, the defendant 
company was notified by the insurance carrier of the existence of the hazardous dust 
condition in the chewing gum production area, but its executive decision to modify the 
dangerous condition was not fully executed. Although the prosecution failed to detail 
the actual triggering cause of the subsequent explosion that occurred at its plant, it was 
clear that the explosion could be avoided if the company completed its modification 
regarding the dust condition and its manufacturing plan. 
On closer analysis, it is found that the following three conditions should be met 
in applying the reactive corporate fault model to corporate liability for manslaughter: (1) 
a company, in particular, the senior management involved in the corporate decision-
making processes, was informed of illegal conduct by employees or potentially life-
endangering situations inherent in the particular operation which occurred in the past or 
existed at the time of notification; (2) at the time of notification, such illegal conduct or 
(1983) 338 N.W.2d.855 and (1984) 350 N.W.2d.65, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 
43-44. 




dangerous situations had not caused any casualty yet, but it would be reasonably 
foreseeable or would be probable that they would lead to the prohibited consequences 
in the future; and (3) the company's failure to respond to or failure satisfactorily to 
eliminate the previous unjustified harm-causing or risk-taking conditions has a causal 
link with the consequences. Fisse exemplifies the meaning of "notification" by an 
injunctive order issued by a court and orders or notices issued administratively by an 
enforcement agency.68 
However, a reason for the adoption of the idea of notification under the reactive 
corporate fault model, which has been given by Fisse, is puzzling. Fisse argues that: 
"Although strategic mens rea [express or implied policies by a corporation] is a genuinely 
corporate concept of mental state, requiring the prosecution to establish a criminal 
corporate policy at or before the time that the actus reus of an offense is committed would 
make corporate mens rea extremely difficult to prove. Corporations almost never endorse 
criminal behavior by express policy, and boilerplate anticrime policy directives may make 
it very difficult to establish the existence of implied criminal policies. The difficulty of 
proving strategic mens rea, however, may be significantly reduced if the requisite mens 
rea based on corporate policy need not be shown to have existed at or before the time of 
the actus reus of the offense. If the corporate defendant is given a reasonable opportunity 
to formulate a legal compliance policy after the actus reus of the offense is brought to the 
attention of the policymaking officials, the corporation's fault can be assessed on the basis 
of its present reactions rather than its previously designed formal policy directives.,,69 
[Footnotes omitted] 
It could be assumed from this extract that while Fisse generally agrees that a corporation 
should be held liable for its criminal policies under the corporate policy model, the 
reactive corporate fault model is preferable in most cases where it is difficult to prove 
"a criminal corporate policy at or before the time that the actus reus of an offense is 
committed." If so, the reactive corporate fault may offer no advantage over the 
corporate policy model when it is somehow proved that "the policymaking officials" of 
the corporation were informed by their employees (not by the issue of a court order) of 
the hazardous conditions or the commission of the actus reus of the offence. And if it 
is proved that the "policymaking officials" or senior management either decide to ignore 
or do not take their employees' advice seriously, their failure to take satisfactory 
See, for example, Fisse, Reconstructing, supra note 43 at 1205; A Statutory Model, supra note 
24 at pp. 294-296. 
Fisse, Reconstructing, supra note 43 at pp. 1191-1192. 
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remedial measures may constitute the basis for the reactive corporate fault. 
Nevertheless, because the senior management is also involved in the corporate decision-
making processes, it is possible that their ignorance of notices from inferiors reflects 
corporate policy with which the subsequent behaviour of corporate employees are 
consistent. In these circumstances, the application problem may also arise between the 
reactive corporate fault and corporate policy models. 
The puzzling concept of notification also causes another application problem 
between the reactive and proactive corporate fault models. As explained earlier, it is 
necessary for the reactive corporate fault model in the corporate manslaughter case that 
the previous illegal conditions had not caused the prohibited consequences prior to the 
occurrence of the victim's death. The meaning of term "reactive" may lose its 
significance because it is also possible that the senior management's ignorance of 
notices from their inferiors can be interpreted as their decision to continue their failure 
to take preventive steps. The term "proactive" or "preventive" means prior to the 
occurrence of the victim's death or the materialisation of the source of risk. If such an 
interpretation is permissible, the decision by the senior management, namely, the 
company's decision, to continue their failure to take preventive steps against the source 
of risk can simply be considered to comprise the company's proactive fault.70 
In short, organisation theories, consisting of the corporate policy, proactive 
and reactive corporate fault models, have practical problems concerning the scope of 
their application. The possible solution to this problem is to allow the court to consider 
several factors in favour of each model to comprise a hybrid form of corporate fault. 
Consider the following four cases of corporate manslaughter to analyse the idea of a 
Two application problems between the reactive corporate fault model and the proactive corporate 
fault model and between the reactive corporate fault model and the corporate policy model become 
more evident from the following remark by Fisse. In rebutting the argument that a concept of 
reactive corporate fault would result in excessive leniency toward corporations because this model 
fails to capture corporate fault without the issue of court order or any notification, Fisse replies 
that "this Article does not advocates reactive corporate fault as an exclusive basis of establishing 
mens rea: strategic mens rea [corporate policies] or lack of corporate due diligence [proactive 
corporate fault] at or before the time of actus reus of an offense would also be a sufficient mens 
rea." Fisse, Reconstructing, supra note 43 at pp. 1209-1210. 
In contrast, the concept of notification will also be adopted under the proposed approach 
submitted in Chapter 5, in order to make it easy to distinguish between corporate recklessness and 
corporate gross carelessness in cases of corporate manslaughter. See Chapter 5, n.93. 
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hybrid form of corporate fault. 
The first is the Kite & OLL case in which the defendant company's canoe trip 
operation was organised by its managing director. Since the identification principle was 
applied to this case, his fault consisted of failures to train instructors and to provide 
safety equipment was viewed as the company's fault (proactive fault). Under Moore's 
second prong, his proactive fault can be construed as the manifestation of corporate 
policy with which behaviour of his instructors were consonant (corporate policy). 
Furthermore, nine months before the disaster, he received a warning letter from ex-
instructors about safety management of canoe trips which he did not take seriously.71 
His failure to heed the warning may be equivalent to unsatisfactory reactions to the risks 
he was running at that time (reactive fault). 
The second case is Serebin, in which a central issue was whether a nursing home 
administrator could be guilty of reckless conduct for the death of the victim who walked 
out of the nursing home and died of exposure. In this case, too, he was responsible for 
the day-to-day operation of nursing home. His policy decision to admit more patients 
and to reduce the nursing staff further made it impossible for the rest of nurses and aides 
to supervise patients, particularly those who had a tendency to wander around (corporate 
policy). As for the preventive measures againt the victim's death, he failed both to 
install an alarm at the doors through which the victim left, and to give the staff 
instructions concerning proper checking so as to make sure that patients were on beds 
(proactive fault). Moreover, prior to the incident, he had been repeatedly warned by his 
own staff and state officials that the insufficient staffing would make it impossible to 
watch wandering residents. He also knew that the victim had walked away from the 
nursing home on prior occasions by 24-hour reports from his staff. Nevertheless, he 
took no action (reactive fault). 
The third is the 0 'N eil case, in which the president, plant mamager and two 
foremen of the silver-extracting company were charged with murder of the victim. 
Their failure to inform the victim that he was working with cyanide and to supply him 





with appropriate safety equipment may provide the basis for the corporate proactive 
fault. As in the two cases exemplified above, there may be room for considering 
corporate policy to be reflected in their proactive fault if their failures had remained 
unchanged for a certain period and had been embedded in corporate practices prior to 
the victim's death. In addition, it was proved in this case that they were informed of the 
leathal conditions of the plant by one who supplied the company with first aid kits and 
visited the plant four months before the victim's death. Nevertheless, they did not take 
remedial actions.72 
The final case is P & 0, in which a ferry capsized because the bow doors were 
open while the vessel was out at sea. The crew of the ferry were not properly trained, 
in that they were not fully aware of their duty in relation to the bow doors. A month 
before the capsize, although directors of the company knew previous open-door 
incidents, they did not seriously consider the ship masters' recommendation of the 
installation of warning lights in order for the ferry's captain to ensure that doors were 
closed. Added to these proactive and reactive faults, the company was criticised at the 
official inquiry for being infected with the desease of sloppiness concerning its 
management. 73 If such sloppy management was prevalent in corporate practices, it 
would be easy to find culpable corporate policy in this case.74 
It follows from these examples that the application of one model of corporate 
fault does not exclude the others. On the contrary, some factors that seem critical for 
the application of one model can be shared with the application of other models. This 
application issue leads to the conclusion that each model does not have any strong 
reason to exist as an independent theory to capture corporate fault. As indicated through 
case studies in the previous chapter, the most important fact to be considered in the 
context of corporate liability for manslaughter is whether the victim's death could 
Chapter 3, n.63. 
Chapter 3, n. 77. 
If the aggregation theory had been applied to this case, it would have provided corporate reckless 
mental states by aggregating several corporate agents' knowledge. See Chapter 3, text 





readily be avoided by the company. From this point of view, the company's proactive 
fault, reactive fault or illegal policy which encouraged its agents to engage in criminal 
conduct, are merely factors to constitute genuine corporate fault that invokes criminal 
responsibility. To construct genuine corporate fault as one of the elements of 
manslaughter, it is necessary to synthesise and coordinate these models.75 
4.3. Operational and Conceptual Flaws of Corporate Fault Models 
The previous section, through case studies, illustrated the problematic aspect of each 
model in relation to its application, and also provided a temporary solution, namely, a 
hybrid corporate fault. Before advancing this idea, it may be desiable to examine 
criticisms that have been made by commentators against each model. Their criticisms 
are concerned with each model's operational and conceptual flaws. At first, focus is 
placed upon outlining their criticism in relation to operational flaws which each model 
suffers. 
To begin with, the aggregation theory and collective knowledge doctrine have 
been criticised by commentators for their deterrent effects on corporate crime. The 
aggregation theory cumulatively utilises individual pieces of knowledge possessed by 
persons who have no intention to engage in illegal conduct. If A and B, corporate 
employees, are in different departments and have no occasion to communicate on certain 
matters, "it is too impractical to require corporate superiors to become aware of each and 
every piece of information pertaining to corporate affairs."76 As a result, companies are 
given no advance opportunity to know what they are required to do to escape liability.77 
This theory's failure to indicate how corporations can avoid liability may cause the 
At this stage, the concept "genuine" corporate fault, which will be constructed through 
coordination and synthesis of each model in the next chapter, is temporarily called "hybrid 
corporate fault." 
Rogozino, supra note 3 at 467. 
Rogozino, ibid. See also Colvin, supra note 3 at 22; Clarkson, supra note 25, concluding that "In 
short, it is a type of constructive liability, now out of fashion in English law." 
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unnecessary limitation of deterrent effects.78 
Next, a due diligence defence approach, adopted in the proactive corporate fault 
model, is criticised from a practical point of view. The criticism against this approach 
is based on the gap between the extent to which the company can establish a due 
diligence defence to escape liability and that to which the company can actually prevent 
the offence. This gap has been accurately stated by Coffee as follows: 
"On a more theoretical level, once such a [due diligence] defense is recognized, the 
corporation might invest less funds in monitoring and detecting illegal and potentially 
illegal behavior since, once the minimal standard of diligence is met, the corporation 
becomes legally immune and has no remaining incentive to prevent criminal acts by its 
agents, even though further investment might prevent such crime. In theory, the ideal 
position for the corporation would be to invest just enough to establish the defense but not 
to prevent those crimes profitable to the corporation. Yet without the defense, the rational 
corporation would invest in crime prevention by any means (including research or 
experimentation with new techniques) up to the level at which such expenditures equaled 
the expected penalty - that is, the likely fme discounted by the likelihood of apprehension 
and conviction. In short, the absence of the defense creates an incentive to seek new 
methods of prevention not yet established or required by a due-diligence standard. 
Ironically, the more diligence is made a defense, the less it is encouraged.,,79 
Based on this observation, Coffee suggests that account should be taken of any corporate 
due diligence efforts at sentencing, rather than as an affirmative defence. This would 
result in a corporation's incentive to detect guilty individuals so as to reduce its own 
penalty, "whereas otherwise there might exist a desire to avoid such an inquiry for fear 
of detecting still-undiscovered violations."so 
78 Tigar, supra note 3 at pp. 224-225. Rogozino proposes the "duty stratification" approach, which 
may be applied in cases where a lower-level employee plays the active role in the offence but does 
not retain the requisite mens rea. The core of this approach is to impose a legal duty on corporate 
superiors responsible for the acts of subordinates (= the prospective actors of the offence) to make 
sure that employees are aware of their obligation oflaw-compliance and relevant statutes. 
79 
80 
Because the new approach that will be advanced as a possible solution to the issue of 
corporate manslaughter in the next chapter overlaps some aspects of this approach, its detailed 
discussion will be present therein. 
Coffee, supra note 5 at 262. 
Ibid. Coffee submits three reasons for replacing corporate due diligence as an affirmative defence 
with a sentencing consideration: (1) it ensures that violation by an agent will result in a corporate 
conviction, thereby authorising the court to order restitution to victims and to consider 
interventionist strategies that might be implemented through a sentence of corporate probation; 
(2) the conviction would have a res judicata effect on civil litigation brought by injured victims 
ofthe crime, which in turn increases the corporate incentive to monitor; and (3) the court woul? 
gain a wider angle of vision in determining the adequacy of corporate monitoring efforts since It 






Furthermore, the reactive corporate fault model has been criticised for 
uncertainty of its terminology, in particular, as to what corrective steps would suffice 
for a corporation to avoid liability and what offence it would be charged with. 81 This 
model would work when corporate decision-making officials are informed of the 
commission of the actus reus of an offence by a lower-level employee and fail to take 
satisfactory remedial measures against it. One commentator observes that typical 
corrective measures likely to be taken by them are, in most cases, merely circulating a 
corporate memorandum outlining relevant statutory obligations so as to make sure that 
any employees are aware of their legal duties and, thus, that it would be unduly easy for 
companies to escape liability at trial. 82 
As for the applicability of the offence, it has been argued that in cases of 
manslaughter, for example, the prerequisites such as actus reus and mens rea are well-
established, so that it would be a "false labelling" to hold a company liable merely for 
its failure to discipline an employee or to correct the illegal condition created by the 
company.83 In other words, a danger of "false labelling" may arise because a finding of 
culpability from conduct and mental states which occur after the commission of the 
actus reus is "a radical departure from the norm" that requires findings of culpability in 
relation to, not in reaction to, the offence which is charged. 84 
See, for example, Rogozino, supra note 3 at pp. 445-446; Sullivan, supra note 38 at pp. 525-527; 
Clarkson, supra note 25. 
Rogozino, supra note 3 at 446, based on the analysis of the Bank of New England case (supra text 
accompanying notes 15-22). As discussed earlier, this would not be the case in Warner-Lambert, 
in which remedial actions taken by several corporate officials at issue were to reduce the dangerous 
dust condition in the chewing gum production area, ifnot satisfactorily, after the insurance carrier 
inspected the company's plant. Any lower- or middle-level employees were not involved in nor 
contributed to such conditions. 
See, for example, Clarkson, supra note 25, referring to Sullivan, The Attribution, supra note 38 
at 526 and the case ofP & 0 (cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 72-82). 
Sullivan, The Attribution, supra note 38 at 525. The Law Commission, too, rejects the reactive 
corporate fault model for the following similar reason: . 
"We went on to conclude, however, that the present project.. .. was not the appropnate 
occasion to consider a reform which would affect the whole of the criminal law; and that 
it was unnecessary to proceed that far in order to put corporate liability for manslaughter 
on a proper basis." [Footnote omitted] 
Law Commission, supra note 1 at para. 7.35. 
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Finally, criticism has been made against the corporate policy model for its 
attempt to equate corporate policy with a human intentionality.85 The major flaw of the 
corporate policy model is concerned with French's concept of a CID structure which 
blurs a clear line between goals for an organisation and those of an organisation. 86 
Whilst goals for an organisation are, according to Keeley, preferences of people for 
organisational outcomes (i. e., a state of affairs brought about through organisational 
behaviour), the goals of an organisation are outcomes intended by the organisation 
itself. 87 A close look at organisational rules or procedures comprising a crn structure, 88 
as reflected in organisational charts, job descriptions, manufacturing specifications, 
commonly respected customs, and the like, may serve to identify organisational 
behaviour (individual joint behaviour), but does not ordinarily establish the 






To establish the organisational intent of organisational behaviour, it is necessary 
M. Keeley, "Organizations as Non-Persons" (1981) 15 Journal of Value Inquiry 149. 
Keeley, ibid at pp. 150-153. Keeley refers to P.A. French, "The Corporation as a Moral Person" 
(1979) 16 American Philosophical Quarterly 207. 
Keeley, supra note 85 at 150. Keeley also uses the concept of consequences of an organisation 
which means any outcomes of joint behaviour. Ibid 
Cited in supra text accompanying notes 29-33. 
An excellent example is presented by Keeley to describe such concepts as organisational 
behaviour, the organisational intent of organisational behaviour (goals of an organisation), 
organisational procedures, goals for an organisation and consequences of an organisation as 
follows: 
"Consider the game analogy.... If we know the rules of play (i.e., organizational 
procedures), we can often specify which actions count in the game (i.e., organizational 
behavior). And usually we can infer from these rules how various participants intend the 
game to turn out (i.e., goalsfor an organization). But rules of the game do not reveal what 
the game itself intends. In fact, it makes little sense to say that the game itself intends 
anything. The illogic of inferring organizational intentions from game-like properties is 
revealed in ... [the] suggestion that the goal of an organization is inherent in its activities, 
much the same way as the goal of checkmating the king is inherent in the rules of chess. 
The analogy does not appear to support .... French's point that organizations have goals of 
their own. The goal of checkmating in chess is certainly not something the game tries or 
intends to accomplish. Nor is it a shared goal that the participants work together to achieve. 
Rather, checkmating the black king is a goal for one participant, checkmating the white king 
the goal of another, and both work toward their separate purposes within the context of 
mutually agreeable rules. So too in organizations, operative procedures or rules of the game 
may not themselves entail genuinely organizational goals." [Footnote omitted] 





to distinguish consequences intended by an organisation (goals of an organisation) from 
other consequences. Organisations, as systems of human interactions, can certainly 
produce consequences that are attributable to the organisation (e.g., profits), since 
consequences of an organisation are more than the aggregate effects of individual 
behaviour and are independent of their motives. Therefore, it may be possible to 
establish consequences of an organisation by reference to "profits, deficits, goods, 
services, salaries, growth, pollutants, job-induced injuries, racial discrimination, etc,,,90 
all of which may be produced by individual joint behaviour consistent with 
organisational rules or procedures. By its rules or procedures, however, the organisation 
itself can neither explain which are the organisational goal for a profit generator, and 
which are that for a salary or cost generator, nor prefer one over another. Based on these 
observations, Keeley concludes that while goals for and consequences of an organisation 
are identifiable, goals of an organisation cannot be established without resort to the 
intentions of participating individuals.91 
Focus is now shifted from operational to conceptual flaws from which the four 
models suffer. According to Laufer, conceptual flaws become apparent when each 
model of corporate fault is examined in the light of some fundamental legal concepts.92 
One of the problematic features of the corporate fault models is related to the notion of 
CUlpability. It may be useful, at first, to explore the meaning of the term "culpability" 
used in criminal law by reference to the following quotation from Laufer's work. 
"Culpability reflects the notion of blameworthiness and is at issue both prior to and after 
a conviction. Prior to a conviction, culpability is raised in relation to an entity's liability. 
Here, courts will examine whether the corporation is sufficiently to blame so as to render 
it liable. Culpability is considered a second time after conviction, where courts will 
examine a corporation's blameworthiness to determine sentence severity in an effort to 
fashion a proportional sentence. The extent to which an actor is blameworthy has a direct 
effect on a finding of liability which is, after all, a determination of who may be subject 
to any particular law. A court's determination of an actor's liability and culpability in 
Ibid. at 152. 
Ibid. at pp. 152-153. Keeley also views what French attempts to establish by referring to 
statements of purpose as recorded in its certificate of incorporation, annual reports, etc., as 
corporate policy which is not goals a/an organisation, but goals/or an organisation. Ibid. at 153. 
Laufer, supra note 1 at pp. 668-674. 
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relation to an offence will determine a punishment that is proportional. ,,93 
Given the dual aspect of assessing culpability indicated by Laufer,94 a central question 
arises as to whether each model of corporate fault can properly capture corporate 
culpability both at the pre- and at the post-conviction stages. Since the corporate policy 
model places exclusive focus on a causal link between corporate features and the 
employee's illegal conduct under the three circumstances,95 it may fail to capture 
corporate culpability at the post-conviction stage.96 
93 Laufer, ibid. at 650, n.14. This explanation is , of course, only applicable to the common law legal 
system. In such civil law countries' legal system as Germany and Japan, the term "culpability" 
is only used at the pre-conviction stage. It is interesting to note that this term has been used by 
Dando as an English translation of the German concept Schuld, one of the elements ofthe crime 
both in German and in Japanese criminal law. S. Dando, The Criminal Law of Japan: The General 




The German concept Schuld is, roughly speaking, the absence of excuse. After the first 
two elements of the crime, namely, Tatbestand (constituent elements of crime or statutory 
definitions in which conduct and causation issues are addressed) and Rechtswidrigkeit (illegality 
or the absence of justification such as necessity defence) are fulfilled, the issue of whether grounds 
of excuse such as mental abnormality and age exist on the part of the defendant will be treated at 
the last stage, culpability. 
The element of subjective mental state is, unlike mens rea in the common law system, 
examined at all stages in relation to the particular issue. Take knowledge as an example. The 
defendant's knowledge as to the circumstances in which he performed an act is generally 
considered at the first stage (Tatbestand). On the other hand, his knowledge as to the 
circumstances in which he performed the act as a self-defence against someone's imminent and 
unjust infringement will be examined at the second stage (Rechtswidrigkeit) in relation to a self-
defence Gustification). Finally, his knowledge as to illegality of his conduct (or circumstances in 
which he acted without justification) will be examined at the culpability (Schuld) stage. The 
reasonable and prudent person test applies in the first and second stages and, therefore, the grounds 
of excuse such as insanity and age, as well as the defendant's unawareness of illegality of his 
conduct, are considered personal to him. If no ground of excuse is proved on his part, then he is 
finally held criminally responsible and "culpable" for the offence he committed. 
In sum, the concept of culpability both in Germany and in Japan is more restricted for 
the usage than that in common law. 
As for the notion of blame in relation to culpability, Laufer clarifies its usage as follows: 
"The distinction between culpability and blame .... must be explained. To question whether 
one is culpable is to ask whether one is properly to blame for a voluntary act.... But the 
notion of blame changes when the question shifts from whether or not to blame A" to "to 
what extent should A be blamed." The former goes to culpability in relation to liability, 
while the latter goes to blameworthiness in relation to allocation of punishment. The latter 
calls for an assessment of the extent to which the actor should be punished." [Footnote 
omitted.] 
Laufer, supra note I at 670, n.92. 
Supra text accompanying notes 36 and 37. 
Laufer, supra note I at 674. As a matter of fact, Moore, one of the advocates ofthe corporate 
policy model, acknowledges that "the corporate character theory is more suitable for use at 
sentencing than at trial." Moore, supra note 25 at 768. The same may be said, no doubt, of the 





In contrast, both proactive and reactive corporate fault models attempt to form 
the corporate fault in terms of the company's failure to prevent the commission of the 
offence or to correct the situations in which illegal conduct occurred in the past. But 
questions regarding the corporate proactive or reactive fault may have little to do with 
corporate culpability at the pre-conviction stage for two reasons. At first, focus on 
corporate proactive or reactive attitudes towards the commission of the actus reus of the 
offence provides no equivalent to a corporate mens rea. A failure to adopt and 
implement policies and practices to prevent the employee's offence is, for example, not 
necessarily equal to a corporate intent to commit the offence. On the contrary, inquiry 
into the company's proactive failure to prevent the offence can hardly cover or 
distinguish between corporate intent and corporate negligence.97 The same seems true 
of the corporate effort, in reaction to the actus reus, to correct illegal conduct by a 
corporate agent. The corporation's conscious disregard of its agent's harmful act that 
created a substantial and unjustifiable risk is not necessarily tantamount to a corporate 
intent to produce the risk.98 Furthermore, since the reactive corporate fault model still 
relies on the idea of the imputation concerning the external elements of the offence 
(actus reus),99 the gap between the actor's mental state in relation to hislher conduct and 
the company's reactive attitudes towards hislher conduct inevitably occurs. As a result, 
some confusion may arise as to which faults a company should be blamed for, for the 
first violation by the agent or for the company's subsequent failure to take remedial 
knowledge and actions. This theory provides no useful information of corporate efforts to prevent 
or correct the employee's illegal conduct. 
Fisse, Reconstructing, supra note 43 at 1190, n.232. Thus, the proactive corporate fault model 
is best left as a model for an affirmative due diligence defence. 
Laufer, supra note 1 at 673. 
See Fisse, Howard, supra note 43 at pp. 606-607, arguing that: 
"There is reason for holding corporations vicariously liable in relation to the external 
elements of an offence .... In larger companies top managers rarely commit the external 
elements of an offence because managers of high rank are typically far removed from the 
scene of the crime; feats of manslaughter .... are usually performed on distant sites by lower 
and middle level employees. To require that the external elements of an offence be 
committed by a top level manager is thus greatly to limit the range of cases where a 
corporation can be held liable as a principal offender." 
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action. 100 It is for these reasons that both models "are best left as post conviction models 
of culpability."lol 
Even if corporate proactive or reactive attitudes towards the commission of the 
employee's offence can meet the requirement of mental states, Laufer continues, \02 both 
models are unlikely to meet the requirement of contemporaneity that the actus reus and 
mens rea of an offence concur in time. The principle of concurrencel03 is sometimes 
summarised by the maxim that actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not 
make a person guilty, unless hislher mind was guilty). The significance of this principle 





"The principle of concurrence requires that the mens rea (the internal fusion of thought 
and effort) coalesce with the additional manifested effort ("act"), that they function 
externally as a unit to comprise criminal conduct. ... [T]his is a way of making certain that 
the defendant's conduct was criminal, i. e. that his conduct actually expressed a mens 
Bucy, Ethos, supra note 25 at pp. 1161-1162. See also Clarkson, supra note 25, concluding that: 
"The wrongdoing is the original acts or omissions that caused the harm. Culpability must 
be addressed by reference to those acts or omissions." 
It is to be noted, however, that this is not always correct in some individual offender's cases. 
Consider the following example. A driver D accidentally (not with a gross negligence) hit a 
pedestrian V on a lonely road, but decided to desert V. V was grievously bodily injured, but was 
not found nor rescued until he died. D's fault consists both of the fIrst negligent (but not criminal) 
driving and of the second culpable failure to fulfIll a legal duty imposed by Road Traffic Act 1988, 
s. 170, or omission to rescue V. Apparently, D should be blamed for the second conduct. Another 
example may be the case in which D accidentally starts a fIre and, thereafter, intending to destroy 
property belonging to another, fails to take any steps to extinguish the fIre. D will be charged with 
the offence of arson (R. v Miller [1983] 2 A.c. 161), which is consisted of D's subsequent 
omission to take steps to extinguish the fIre and intent to destroy property, not of D's fIrst 
accidental conduct and mental states. For the analysis of the Miller case, see, for example, N. 
Lacey & C. Wells, Reconstructing Criminal Law - Text and Materials (1998, 2nd ed., 
Butterworths, London), p. 48. 
Laufer, supra note 1 at 672. 
Laufer, ibid. at pp. 672-673. 
For further details of this principle, see, in general, Smith, supra note 24 at pp. 79-81 and "The 
Guilty Mind in the Criminal Law" (1960) 76 Law Quarterly Review 78 at pp. 91-96; R. Card, 
Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law (1998, 14th ed., Butterworths, London), pp. 76-79; A. 
Ashworth, Principles a/Criminal Law (2nd ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford), pp. 155-157; P. 
Murphy (ed.), Blackstone's Criminal Practice (1997, Blackstone Press Ltd., London), pp. 15-16; 
E. Colvin, Principles a/Criminal Law (2nd ed., A Carswell Publication, Canada), p. 30; W.R. 
Lafave & A.W. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986, Weet Publishing Co., Minnesota), Vol.1, 
§3.11; G. Marston, "Contemporaneity of Act and Intention in Crimes" (1970) 86 Law Quarterly 
Review 209; A.R. White, "The Identity and Time of the Actus Reus" [1977] Criminal Law Review 
148; J. Hall, General Principles a/Criminal Law (1960, 2nd ed., The Robbs-Merrill Co. Inc., New 
York), pp. 185-190. 
139 
rea. ,,104 
Viewed in this light, both models, in particular, the reactive corporate fault model, may 
be at odds with the principle of concurrence that requires focus to be on culpable mental 
states in concurrent relation to illegal acts, not on fault in reaction to the actus reus. 
"[The reactive corporate fault model]. ... fails to capture a genuine corporate culpability to 
the extent that a reactive program of a corporation reflects an entity's response to the 
discovery of an illegal act, rather than the commission itself. Failure to respond 
adequately to the discovery of an illegality may reveal significant blame, but it is blame 
in relation to the failure to act, not evidence of an intention in relation to acts that gave rise 
to the omission.,,105 
Consequently, both proactive106 and reactive corporate fault models do not reflect all 
types of the state of mind: intention, knowledge, recklessness and (gross) negligence. 107 
Conceptual flaws are also found in the corporate policy model in relation to the 
issue of descriptive and normative usages of the mens rea concept. The difference 
between descriptive and normative uses of this term is best discussed by George P. 
Fletcher. 108 According to Fletcher, the confusion between normative and descriptive 






"The term "intent" may refer either to a state of intending (regardless of blame) or it may 
refer to an intent to act under circumstances (such as failing to inquire about the age of a 
sexual partner [in statutory rape cases]) that render an act properly subject to blame. The 
term "criminal intent" does not resolve the ambiguity, for a criminal intent may simply be 
the intent to do the act, which, according to the statutory definition, renders the act 
"criminal," i.e., punishable under the law .... 
Hall, supra note 103 at pp. 185-186. 
Laufer, supra note 1 at 673. 
Supra note 97. 
Laufer, supra note 1 at 724, n.303, stating that: 
"If, for example, PCF [Proactive Corporate Fault] and RCF [Reactive Corporate Fault] 
were adopted as exclusive fault requirements, corporate culpability would be limited .to, 
at most, reckless corporate action .... [T]he absence of reactive or proactive corporate actIOn 
suggests a disregard of risks.... However, insofar as an offense explicitly considers the 
reactive nature of an accused, RCF reflects a constructive fault. If this disregard is willful, 
then the absence of a reactive or proactive action may reveal a corporate recklessness. If 
the disregard is inadvertent, then there may be evidence of negligence. In either case, 
evidence of failed precautions and reactive measures may not rise to a level of purposeful 
or knowing action." 
Rethinking Criminal Law (1978, Little, Brown and Co., Boston), pp. 395-401. 
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It is obvious that the very word "criminal" is affected by the same tension between 
descriptive and normative illocutionary force. When used normatively, "criminal" refers 
to t~e ~pe of person who by ~i~e of hi~ deeds deserves to be branded and punished as 
a cnmmal. When use~ descnptIvely, as m the phrase "criminal act" it may refer simply 
to any act that the legIslature has declared to be "criminal." Thus the term "criminal 
intent" may mean the intent to act under circumstances that make it just to treat the actor 
as a criminal in the pejorative sense .... "I09 
When these observations are considered in analysing the basis for the corporate policy 
model, it becomes obvious that this model uses such corporate features as policy, 
character, culture, practice and personality in the normative sense to fulfill the fault 
requirement. lIO If these features of corporations are used descriptively, the central 
mission of the pre-conviction stage of culpability assessment must be to prove that they 
"may be said to have intended harm, wilfully engaged in harmful acts, or had knowledge 
ofwrongdoing"lll regardless of blame. In failing to do so, the corporate policy model 
places exclusive focus upon assessing these corporate features which this model already 





Ibid. at p. 397. As for the usage of the term "culpability," Fletcher goes on to say that: 
"It would seem that the term "culpability" ordinarily has normative force, for in non-legal 
English, a person is culpable only ifhe is justly to blame for his conduct. It would follow 
that if conduct were excused by virtue of duress or insanity, the actor would not be culpable. 
Yet the Model Penal Code [supra note 36, §2.02(2)] defmes acting purposely and 
knowingly as "kinds of culpability." Though the code is not explicit in its solecism, it 
would seem to follow that if a person purposely committed larceny while subject to duress, 
he would be acquitted; yet it would still be true that he acted culpably." 
Ibid. at p. 398. 
Laufer, supra note 1 at 674. 
Ibid 
A main reason why the corporate policy model already views corporate features as blameworthy 
before considering whether a corporation, by these features, can be said to "have intended harm, 
wilfully engaged in harmful acts or had knowledge of wrongdoing" may lie in the fact that this 
model fails to provide the appropriate circumstances in which a corporation should be granted 
defences. Some confusion as to the usages of the mens rea or culpability concept may be avoided 
if this model first examines a causal link between corporate features and the prohibited result, then 
considers whether any defences are available to the corporation in the appropriate circumstances 
and, ifnot, fmally views them as blameworthy or culpable. 
To capture corporate culpability both at the pre- and at the post-conviction stages 
properly, thus, three separate issues need to be addressed: at the pre-conviction stage, (1) how to 
formulate corporate fault (and corporate conduct) for which a corporation can be held liable; (2) 
in what circumstances or for what reasons it can escape liability; and, at the post-conviction stage, 
(3) what types of aggravating or mitigating factors should be considered in determining corp?rate 
sentencing. In this thesis, the first one will be addressed in Chapter 5 while the last two WIll be 
dealt with in Chapter 6. 
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As the foregoing criticisms demonstrate, the. four models of corporate fault have 
their own flaws in operationalisation and conceptualisation. Furthermore, as examined 
in the previous section, the scope of the application of each model is so unclear that 
more than two models may be applied to the same case and that the same factors can be 
used in different models' favour to capture corporate fault. The solution to the 
application may be, as implied in the previous section, to attempt to synthesise each 
model. On closer examination of operational and conceptual flaws, the synthesis of the 
four models will be found to be the most effective solution to capture genuine corporate 
fault. The next and final section of this chapter critically analyses the foregoing 
criticisms concerning these flaws to emphasise the need for systhesis, and also provides 
an example for the synthesised model of corporate fault by reference to Section 12 of 
Australian Criminal Code Act 1995. 
4.4. The Need for Synthesising Organisation Theories 
The previous section sketched the outline of criticisms concerning operational and 
conceptual flaws from which each model suffers. While focus in Section 4.2. was on 
finding similarities of the scope of each model's application, emphasis was placed by 
these criticisms on the difference among four models by indicating distinctive 
deficiencies which each model has in relation to some basic principles or concepts of 
criminal law. If operational and conceptual flaws are not surmountable, the synthesis 
of each model to capture genuine corporate fault may become futile. It is suggested, 
however, that operational and conceptual flaws result from the fact that over-emphasis 
is placed by commentators upon one aspect of each model. The first part of this section 
is devoted to establishing this claim. 
Take the operational flaw of the aggregation theory for example. The critical 
point towards this theory is that the corporate fault is created by aggregating several 
individuals' action and mental states of different matters, none of which may be 
pertinent to the particular violation of law. Hence, a corporation may be given, in 
advance, no opportunity to learn what to do to avoid liability.l13 However, this problem 
113 Supra text accompanying notes 76-78. 
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is not peculiar to the aggregation theory. The individual offender can be accused of 
hislher failure to perceive the risk of harm to the others, namely, of gross negligence, if 
legal duties are imposed on himlher to do so. Whether slhe actually knew what slhe was 
required to do about the risk is irrelevant to imposing liability for gross negligence. 
Given that the aggregation theory holds a company liable for its failure to collect 
and analyse information possessed by several employees, 114 the basis for this theory can 
be shared with that for the proactive and reactive corporate fault models, in particular, 
in cases in which proof of gross negligence is required. The main purpose of this theory 
to require the company to collect information of employees is, as mentioned earlier,115 
to encourage it to detect and correct the commission of the actus reus of an offence. If 
the company fails to organise the system of communication network in order to shield 
itselffrom information as to its employee's criminal conduct, the corporate fault can be 
formulated with reference to the aggregation theory, as well as proactive and reactive 
corporate fault models. 
Keeley's criticism against the corporate policy model may provide another 
example. 116 Keeley's argument against this model seems pertinent in that it is 
impossible to establish that a company can intend certain consequences by itself, 
without resort to the intentions of its individuals. However, a company's liability for 
its involvement in employees' commission of the actus reus of the offence can be 
established by reference to corporate policy. In fact, Foerschler and Moore's three-
prong framework117 illustrates the appropriate circumstances in which the company can 
be said to involve itself in the commission of the actus reus of an offence by employees. 
Conceptual flaws indicated by Laufer118 are the other illustrations of the same 
point. Laufer crafts theoretical criticisms against each organisation theory in terms of 
114 Supra text accompanying notes 22-24. 
liS Supra text accompanying note 24. 
116 Supra text accompanying notes 85-91. 
117 Supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
118 Supra text accompanying notes 92-112. 
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such fundamental concepts of criminal law as culpability both in the sense of pre- and 
post-conviction stages and in the descriptive and normative sense, and concurrence of 
actus reus and mens rea. It is certain that all organisation theories fail to meet the 
requirements of assessing culpability either at pre- or at post-conviction stage, or that 
some of them are not consistent with the principle of concurrence. However, it is also 
certain that all organisation theories share some common features which Laufer 
overlooks. The advocate(s) of the proactive corporate fault model suggested that 
corporate response to employee's illegal conduct, such as adequate remedies including 
"disciplining wrongdoers and insuring prompt repair of conditions conductive to future 
violations," should also be the basis for assessing the reasonableness of corporate 
practices and procedures. 119 Foerschler and Moore's three-prong framework, too, 
includes corporate reactive attitudes towards the violative act of employees in three 
circumstances in which a corporation should be held liable under the corporate policy 
model, by use of the terms "endorsement" and "ratification.,,12o Fisse and Braithwaite 
also consider the corporation's failure to take preventive measures, as well as to take 
remedial actions, against the commission of the offence to be the basis for their reactive 
corporate fault model. 121 Such multiple aspects of organisation theories may deny the 
applicability of one or some of Laufer's criticisms to every model. 122 
The fact that criticisms against four models of corporate fault are based on 
commentators' over-emphasis on only one aspect of each model justifies the need for 
synthesis of these models to capture genuine corporate fault. Nevertheless, the lesson 
to be learnt from Laufer's criticisms concerning operational and conceptual flaws is that 
the theory of corporate liability still needs to be consonant with fundamental concepts 
or principles of criminal law, such as concurrence between actus reus and mens rea, 





Developments in the Law, supra note 38 at 1258. 
Supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
Supra text accompanying note 46. 
For example, since the corporate policy considers the corporate reactive attitudes .to~ards the 
employees' violative act, this model does say much about culpability at the post-convIctIOn stage. 
See supra text accompanying note 96. 
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the genuine corporate fault by synthesising each model, it is essential to consider and 
, 
if necessary, reconstruct the relevant principles of criminal law. 
The necessity for reconstructing criminal law in the context of corporate liability 
becomes apparent when the adequacy of Coffee's criticism against the adoption of a due 
diligence defence and of Clarkson's criticism against the reactive corporate fault model 
is examined. Coffee's criticism is based on the gap between how to establish this 
defence and how to prevent the offence. 123 Clarkson's criticism is concerned with 
uncertainty of what corrective steps would be sufficient to exculpate a corporation from 
liability and for what offence. These concerns will be irrelevant if the proactive and 
reactive corporate fault models are properly reconstructed in relation to the issue of 
causation. Namely, the legal framework relevant to causation between corporate 
conduct and corporate fault needs to be presented to cover the appropriate circumstances 
in which the corporate preventive or reactive fault may reasonably be said to have a 
causal link with the prohibited consequences. 
The following legislation may provide an example of a synthesised corporate 
fault model which lacks full considerations of the issue of conduct and causation. The 
rest of this section will be devoted to analysing Section 12 of Australian Criminal Code 
Act 1995. 124 The Act incorporates several approaches of corporate liability: the doctrine 
of vicarious liability; identification principle or high managerial agent approach; 125 
aggregation theory; and proactive and reactive corporate fault and corporate policy 
models. Under the Act, the actus reus or physical elements of an offence are fulfilled 
by reference to the vicarious liability doctrine, so that a corporation may be held 





In cases in which intention, knowledge or recklessness is a fault element (mens 
Supra text accompanying notes 79-80. 
For detailed arguments of this Act, see, for example, Rose, supra note 25; Laufer, supra note 1 
at pp. 678-681; Colvin, supra note 25 at pp. 34-40. 
For this term's definition, see supra note 36. 
Australian Criminal Code Act 1995, Section 12.2. 
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rea) in relation to a physical element of an offence, a corporation may be held liable for 
expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorising or permitting the commission of the offence 
by proving that (l) its board of directors or (2) its high managerial agent intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly engaged in the relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or 
impliedly authorised or permitted the commission of the offence; (3) a corporate culture 
existed within the corporation that directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-
compliance with the relevant provision; or (4) the corporation failed to create and 
maintain a corporate culture that required compliance with the relevant provision. 127 
In cases where negligence is a fault element in relation to a physical element of 
an offence and no individual has that fault element, the corporation may be held liable 
when the corporation's conduct is viewed as a whole, that is, by aggregating the conduct 
of any number of any corporate agents. 128 On the other hand, the corporation may be 
exempt from liability if (1) an individual actor of the corporation was under a mistaken 
but reasonable belief about facts that would have meant that the conduct would not have 
constituted an offence; and (2) the corporation exercised due diligence to prevent hislher 
conduct. 129 
Corporate negligence or failure to exercise due diligence may be proved by the 
fact that the prohibited conduct was substantially attributable to (a) inadequate corporate 
management, control or supervision of the conduct of one or more of its agents; or (b) 
failure to provide adequate systems for conveying relevant information to relevant 





Ibid., Section 12.3. Section 12.3 (4) provides relevant factors to the application of "corporate 
cultures" that appear in (3) and (4) as follows: 
(a) whether authority to commit an offence of the same or a similar character had been 
given by a high managerial agent of the body corporate; and 
(b) whether the employee, agent or officer of the body corporate who committed the offe~ce 
believed on reasonable grounds, or entertained a reasonable expectation, that a hIgh 
managerial agent of the body corporate would have authorised or permitted the 
commission ofthe offence. 
Ibid., Section 12.4. 
Ibid., Section 12.5. 
Ibid., Sections 12.4 (3) and 12.5 (2). 
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Under the Act, corporate liability for mens rea offences (other than offences 
requiring negligence) resorts to several approaches which were already examined in this 
thesis. When senior management are involved in the commission of an offence, the 
corporation is held liable under the identification principle. The involvement may 
consist of direct engagement in the offence, express, tacit or implied authorisation or 
permission of the offence committed by the other(s). Even if such involvement of the 
senior management is not proved, the corporation can still be held liable for its culture 
either which encouraged, tolerated or led to the violation of law, or which the 
corporation failed to create and maintain to ensure that its employees' conduct comply 
with the law. Since corporate cultures can also be proved in a manner that the 
commission of the offence was tolerated by the corporation, account is taken of 
corporate reactive attitudes towards its employee's illegal conduct. The corporation's 
proactive fault, namely, its failure to prevent the conduct by its agent(s) or its senior 
management's authorisation or permission of the offence, is considered to constitute a 
due diligence defence. In addition, the aggregation theory is utilised to hold the 
corporation liable for offences requiring negligence. The Act allows the court to 
aggregate not only the negligence of several senior officers, but also that of any 
corporate agents to comprise corporate negligence. The basis for the aggregation theory, 
that is, the corporation's failure to establish a system for communications concerning 
the relevant information, is also used to prove corporate negligence or absence of due 
diligence. 
On closer examination, some theoretical inconsistencies become evident in the 
Act. Suppose that one of the lower-level employees of a corporation, A, performed a 
violative act with a reasonable expectation that his superior B who, as a high managerial 
agent, would have authorised A's violation. And it is proved that B knew nothing about 
A's conduct and, therefore, could not authorise, permit or tolerate A's violation. In 
addition, there is proof that the corporation failed to create and maintain a corporate 
culture that required compliance with the relevant law. 
In this hypothetical example, the Act would make the corporation liable for A's 
offence requiring knowledge, since proof of A's reasonable expectation about B's 
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authorisation may make it possible to constitute corporate cultures which failed to make 
sure of compliance. 131 As for the actus reus requirement, A's conduct comprises 
physical elements of the offence. Apart from corporate negligence, however, it is not 
certain how the corporation can be blamed for "knowing" violation. Whilst the 
corporate culture existed that failed to ensure the compliance, B' s lack of knowledge as 
to A's violative conduct surely denies one of four ways in which a fault element is to be 
fulfilled. 132 B' s lack of knowledge may imply the fact that the corporation also failed 
"to provide adequate systems for conveying relevant information to relevant person in 
the corporation", 133 which is concerned with corporate negligence. 
If applied in this case, the doctrine of vicarious liability may provide the same 
answer. A's mental states and act are simply imputed to the company which failed to 
prevent A's commission of the offence. Unlike the Act, there is no need to consider the 
existence of a corporate criminogenic culture. B' slack of knowledge as to A's violation 
and the corporation's failure to take precautions may nullify a due diligence defence, so 
that the corporation cannot avoid liability. 
The reason for this is simple: the Act, despite its adoption of several approaches, 
fails to provide the reasonable connection between the employee's conduct and 
corporate fault. Since the Act still depends on the concept of imputation as to physical 
elements, two confusions always arise: (1) whose conduct should fulfill physical 




Supra note 126, Section 12.3(4)(b) ofthe Act. 
Supra text accompanying note 126, (2). As cited in supra note 126, proof of a corporation's 
failure to establish a corporate culture of compliance is one of four ways in which intention, 
knowledge or recklessness is to be proved. Yet, Colvin argues that: 
"a failure to develop a culture of compliance is a form of negligence. This may well be an 
appropriate ground on which to hold a corporation responsible for the commission of 
offenses of negligence. It is questionable, however, whether it is an appropriate ground 
on which to hold a corporation responsible for the intentional, knowing, or reckless 
commission of an offense. The distinction between offenses of negligence and offenses 
requiring subjective fault can be significant for penalty levels and social stigma .. It i.s a 
distinction that should be respected in any scheme of corporate liability, even if subjectIve 
fault is conceived somewhat differently for corporations than for individuals." 
Colvin, supra note 25 at 37. 
Supra text accompanying note 130. In this hypothetical example, A's violative act itself may be 
sufficient to prove the corporation's failure to establish a culture of compliance under the Act. 
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agent, etc, who authorised the offender's conduct? and (2) whose fault in relation to the 
offender's conduct should constitute corporate cultures or proactive fault, the offender's 
fault or his superior's supervisory or proactive fault? If a high managerial agent, for 
example, recklessly authorised his inferior's intentional conduct, which mental states 
should be viewed as corporate fault in relation to physical elements of the offence? And 
which faults should be viewed as causally linked with the prohibited consequences? 
The lesson to be learnt from the Australian Criminal Code Act 1995 is that it is 
not sufficient just to combine several theories to capture corporate fault. Careful 
considerations should be given to the systhesis of each model by reference to 
fundamental principles and concepts of criminal law. This is the central task of the next 
chapter which proposes genuine corporate fault and conduct in cases of corporate 
manslaughter. Attempts are made therein to explore the requirements of actus reus and 
mens rea in order to make the proposed model of corporate liability for manslaughter 
fully compatible with conventional criminal law theories which have been tailored to 




A NEW MODEL OF CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR MANSLAUGHTER 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the applicability of the aggregation theory and several 
organisation theories to corporate manslaughter cases, and indicated the operational and 
conceptual flaws from which each theory suffers. While the operational flaws stem 
from uncertainty or infeasibility of some ideas used in each theory, (e.g. the basis for 
aggregating several individuals' fault, the extent to which a corporation can establish a 
due diligence defence, the relationship between a human intentionality and a corporate 
policy, and the type of corrective actions necessary for the corporation to take), the 
conceptual flaws result from each theory's incongruity with such fundamental criminal 
law concepts as concurrence of actus reus with mens rea, CUlpability both at the pre- and 
at the post-conviction stages, and descriptive and normative usages of mens rea. 
These flaws suggest that the existing theories, including the doctrine of vicarious 
liability and the principle of identification, have failed to provide an exclusive unifying 
model of corporate liability by which both corporate and individual offenders can be 
held liable for manslaughter under the same conditions. The main aim of this chapter 
is to propound a new model of corporate criminal liability for manslaughter, l by 
equating the requirements of conduct and mental states for individual manslaughter with 
those for corporate manslaughter. While Section 5.2. endorses the need for equating 
corporate and individual manslaughter by referring to the Law Commission's recent 
proposals for reform of the present law of involuntary manslaughter,2 the subsequent 
sections address the following three issues. 
The first issue to be dealt with is how to distinguish between individual and 
This will later be called the "risk-oriented theory." 
Law Commission No.237, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter (1996, 
HMSO, London) [hereinafter cited as Involuntary Manslaughter]. 
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corporate blameworthiness. In most cases of corporate manslaughter, as Chapter 3 
revealed, the particular individual's conduct is the immediate cause of the catastrophic 
consequences, so that several commentators have argued that blame for the prohibited 
result should directly be attached to this individual actor, rather than to the corporation 
itsele However, as far as corporate manslaughter cases are concerned, it is likely that 
the particular individual's conduct related to the result implies the existence of fault on 
a "more widespread organisational basis". 4 In referring to several theories of the 
requirement of culpability, Section 5.3. delineates the appropriate circumstances in 
which the corporation, rather than any individual, should be blamed for the prohibited 
result. 
The second issue also concerns the issue of corporate CUlpability: for what type 
of conduct should the corporation be blamed? As described in the proceeding chapters, 
all of the existing theories have recourse to the particular individual's conduct in order 
for the corporate defendant to fulfill the requirement of conduct. It is from this recourse, 
however, that the gap occurred between corporate fault and the individual conduct and, 
thus, the concurrence of actus reus with mens rea had been ignored. A clue to this issue 
is the concept of the risk, which has been necessary to determine the type of conduct in 
most cases of individual manslaughter. Section 5.4. formulates corporate conduct by 
analysing the meaning of the risk. 
The third and final issue is how to construct the requisite mental states of the 
corporation, namely, corporate recklessness and corporate gross carelessness in cases 
of manslaughter. As examined in the previous chapter, the organisation theories have 
See, for example, E. Lederman, "Criminal Law, Perpetrator, and Corporation: Rethinking a 
Complex Triangle" (1985) 76 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 285; R. Hamilton, 
"Corporate Criminal Liability in Texas" (1968) 47 Texas Law Review 60; B. Coleman, "Is 
Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary" (1975) 29 Southwestern Law Journal 908; P.B. 
Rodella, "Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide - Has the Fiction Bee~ ~xtend~d to~ F~?" 
(1984) 4 Journal of Law and Commerce 95; S.J. Wragg, "Corporate HomICIde: WIll ~Ic.hIgan 
Follow Suit?" (1984) 62 University of Detroit Law Review 65; D.v. Ebers, "The ApphcatIOn of 
Criminal Homicide Statutes to Work-Related Death: Mens Rea and Deterrence" (1986) 86 
University of Illinois Law Review 969; S.R. Weinfeld, "Criminal Liability of Corporate Manag.ers 
for Deaths of their Employees: People v. Warner-Lambert Co." (1982) 46 Albany Law Review 
655. 
B. Fisse, Howard's Criminal Law (1990, 5th ed., Law Book Co., Sydney), p. 603. 
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attempted to form the corporate fault by reference to such unique features of the 
corporation as policies, practices, cultures or ethos, but have also been subject to 
criticism that they encounter some difficulty in reconciling the use of these features with 
fundamental criminal law principles. The reason for this, as mentioned earlier, stems 
from their failure to equate the type of corporate fault with that of individual fault, in 
particular, in cases of manslaughter. The notion of corporate policy is, for example. 
hardly found in cases of individual manslaughter, so that it cannot be regarded as 
equivalent to the relevant concept of criminal law which has been aimed at individual 
offenders, such as recklessness. By examining the Law Commission's recent proposals 
for reform of the present law of individual manslaughter, Section 5.5. provides an 
alternative concept of corporate mental states required for corporate manslaughter. 
Then, Section 5.6. compares the new approach suggested in this chapter with other 
theories of corporate liability, in its attempt to justify several advantages over the 
existing models of corporate liability. 
5.2. Individual and Corporate Manslaughter 
For the requirements of actus reus and mens rea for offences of manslaughter to be 
clarified, a good place to start is Law Commission's recent proposals for legislating 
involuntary manslaughter.5 In its attempt to legislate new types of the offence of 
unintentional killing, the Law Commission has made some interesting proposals for 
reform of the present law. Under the proposals, offences of unintentional killing are 
mainly divided into individual and corporate manslaughter. The offence of individual 
manslaughter is subdivided into reckless killing and killing by gross carelessness.6 As 
for individual manslaughter, on the one hand, the new offence of reckless killing would 
Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, supra note 2. For a useful.c0n.unent on this re~o~: 
see M. Stallworthy, "Rationalising the Law of Manslaughter and Dabblmg m Corporate Cnme 
(1997) 61 Journal o/Criminal Law 324. 
No modification has been made by Law Commission concerning the existing offences of motor 
manslaughter (causing death by bad driving) and the concept of omissions (namely, the duty to 
act governed by the common law). Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, supra note 2 
at paras. 5.62-5.56 and paras. 5.42-5.45 respectively. In addition, it has been recommen~ed that 
unlawful act manslaughter or constructive manslaughter, in which a person is held responsIble for 
causing a result that he did not intend or foresee, and which would not even have been foreseeable 





be committed "if (1) a person by hislher conduct causes the death of another; (2) s/he 
is aware of a risk that his/her conduct will cause death or serious injury; and (3) it is 
unreasonable for him/her to take that risk, having regard to the circumstances as s/he 
knows or believes them to be."7 Next, the new offence of killing by gross carelessness 
would be committed "if (l) a person by hislher conduct causes the death of another; (2) 
a risk that hislher conduct will cause death or serious injury would be obvious to a 
reasonable person in hislher position; (3) slhe is capable of appreciating that risk at the 
material time; and (4) either (a) hislher conduct falls far below what can reasonably be 
expected ofhimlher in the circumstances, or (b) slhe intends by hislher conduct to cause 
some injury, or is aware of, and unreasonably takes, the risk that it may do so, and the 
conduct causing (or intended to cause) the injury constitutes an offence."g 
On the other hand, a special offence of corporate killing broadly corresponds to 
the individual offence of killing by gross carelessness. Like the individual offence, "the 
corporate offence should be committed only where the defendant's conduct in causing 
the death falls far below what could reasonably be expected." However, unlike the 
individual offence, "the corporate offence should not require that the risk be obvious, 
or that the defendant be capable of appreciating the risk; and for the purposes of the 
corporate offence, a death should be regarded as having been caused by the conduct of 
a corporation if it is caused by a failure, in the way in which the corporation's activities 
are managed or organised, to ensure the health and safety of persons employed in or 
affected by those activities.,,9 As for the issue of causation, it has been recommended 
that" it should be possible for a management failure on the part of a corporation to be 
a cause of a person's death even if the immediate cause is the act or omission of an 
individual. ,,10 As regards potential defendants of the offence of corporate killing, an 
individual is regarded under the proposal as incapable of the offence of corporate 
Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, ibid. at para. 5.13. 
Ibid. at para. 5.34. 
Ibid. at para. 8.35. The tenn "a failure, in the way .... to ensure .... " is referred to as a "management 
failure." Ibid. at para. 8.19. 
Ibid. at para. 8.39. 
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killing, "even as a secondary party.,,11 
The most noticeable difference between individual and corporate manslaughter 
under the proposals lies in the Law Commission's view that corporations are "only 
metaphysical entities,,,12 which leads to the omission of two key requirements of 
individual manslaughter; the awareness of the risk in the offence of reckless killing and 
the obviousness of the risk to a reasonable person in the offence of killing by gross 
carelessness. 
"To hypothesise a human being, who could be in the same position as the corporation is 
a logical impossibility, and it would therefore be meaningless to enquire, as in the offence 
of killing by gross carelessness, whether the risk would have been "obvious" to such a 
person. Moreover, corporations have no "capacity", in the sense in which we use that tenn 
in this report in relation to an individual, so that it would be equally impossible to enquire 
whether the defendant corporation had the capacity to appreciate the risk. It is also, in our 
view, unnecessary. In judging the conduct of an individual defendant, the law must in 
fairness take account of such personal characteristics as may make it harder for her to 
appreciate risks that another person would appreciate; but the same considerations scarcely 
apply to a corporate defendant."[Footnote omitted] 13 
The logical inconsistency inherent in this quotation is, of course, concerned with the 
term "capacity" to appreciate the risk. If corporations are considered incapable of 
appreciating the risk because they are "only metaphysical entities," they must also be 
considered incapable of fulfilling the conduct requirement. Nevertheless, the Law 
Commission has clearly recommended that the legal requirement under the present law 
to identify individuals within the company whose conduct is to be attributed to the 
company itself should be removed. 14 As suggested in Chapter 2,15 the Law Commission 
Ibid. at para. 8.58. 




Ibid. at para. 8.4. Yet, the Law Commission envisages juries finding whether a risk "was, or 
should have been, obvious to any individual or group of individuals within the company who were 
or should have been responsible for taking safety measures, in deciding whether the comp~ny's 
conduct fell below the required standard." Ibid. On this point, see, in particular, G.R. SullIvan, 
"The Attribution of Culpability to Limited Companies" (1996) 55 Cambridge Law lournal515 
at 531, indicating that: 
"If, despite talk by the Commission of the existence of an organisational liab~lity not 
reducible to individual liability, we take seriously its professed belief that corporatIOns are 
legal as opposed to real entities, a finding of sufficiently egregious failure must. rest on ~e 
managerial or organisational failures of associated individuals. This must lead, lITes~ec.tIve 
of the Commission's intentions, to the use of aggregation in obtaining corporate conVIctIons 
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may still adhere to the opinion that it is easier to construct corporate omissions than 
corporate positive acts. The new concept introduced under its proposals "a management 




However, the requirement of a failure or omission to act in offences of omission 
is premised upon the fact that the defendant was capable of performing a certain positive 
act at the material time. 16 Thus, the logical conclusion must be that if corporations are 
such metaphysical entities that they have no capacity to appreciate the risk, they are also 
incapable both of positive acts and of omissions. If it is desirable to regard the 
corporation as capable of fulfilling the fault element in terms of the introduction of the 
concept "a management failure," instead of resort to the idea of imputation, the 
subjective (namely, awareness and obviousness) and physical (conduct) elements should 
be fulfilled in the same way. As Clarkson has pointed out, the creation of a separate 
offence of manslaughter "would be perceived as different from 'manslaughter' or the 
new substitute offences [individual manslaughter by recklessness and gross 
carelessness]", which "could lead to a downgrading of the stigma and seriousness of the 
enforcement." 17 
For the corporation's conviction for corporate manslaughter to achieve the same 
degree of the stigma as the offence of individual manslaughter, it is necessary, not to 
abandon the subjective elements of individual manslaughter partially in the offence of 
and should this occur .... "[Footnote citing the same paragraph of the Law Commission's 
report quoted above omitted] 
Chapter 2, n.1 03. 
See, for example, A. Ashworth, "The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions" (1989) 105 Law 
Quarterly Review 424 [hereinafter cited as Omissions] at pp. 449-451 (in which the term 
"capacity" to act is used). See also §2.01(1) of the American Model Penal Code (1985, The 
American Law Institute, Philadelphia), providing that: 
"A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct that includes 
a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable." 
C.M.V. Clarkson, "Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls" (1996) 59 Modern Law 
Review 557 at 569. He goes on to say that: 
"If a company has killed recklessly or by gross carelessness, there are strong fair l.abelling 
reasons that only a conviction for the full offence will convey adequately the senousness 
of the crime and communicate the appropriate degree of rejection of the wrongdoin~." 
Ibid. atpp. 569-570. The Law Commission's management failure approach itself will be exammed 
in Section 5.6. 
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corporate manslaughter, but to equate the requirements of individual manslaughter and 
those of corporate manslaughter. The issue of how to apply the physical and subjective 
elements of individual manslaughter by recklessness and gross carelessness under the 
Law Commission's proposals to corporate manslaughter will be addressed in the 
subsequent sections. 
5.3. Corporate Culpability and Collective Actions 
To equate the physical and subjective elements of individual manslaughter with those 
of corporate manslaughter, the first step to be taken is to apply several theories 
concerning the requirement of culpability in cases of individual offenders to a 
corporation so as to justify the imposition of criminal liability for manslaughter upon 
a corporate offender independently of its personnel. A general issue of how to justify 
the imposition of criminal liability upon an (individual) offender has often been the 
subject of controversy in Anglo-American law. I8 For the offender to be guilty of a mens 
rea offence, the state must provide proof not only of the existence of mens rea but also 
of the absence of any defence raised. The central question is why the offender is to be 
18 On this subject, see, in general, M.D. Bayles, "Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility" 
(1982) 1 Law and Philosophy 5; A. Brudner, "A Theory of Necessity" (1987) 7 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 339; N. Lacey, State and Punishment - Political Principles and Community 
Values (1988, Routledge, London), pp. 58-78; J. Hampton, "Mens Rea" (1990) 7 Social 
Philosophy and Policy 1; M.S. Moore, "Choice, Character, and Excuse" (1990) 7 Social 
Philosophy and Policy 29; L.A. Locke, "Personhood and Moral Responsibility" (1990) 9 Law and 
Philosophy 39; R.A. Duff, "Auctions, Lotteries, and the Punishment of Attempts" (1990) 9 Law 
and Philosophy 1; P. Arenella, "Character, Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Character 
to our Moral Culpability Judgments" (1990) 7 Social Philosophy and Policy 59 [hereinafter cited 
as "Character"] and "Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship between 
Legal and Moral Accountability" (1992) 39 UCLA Law Review 1511 [hereinafter cited as 
"Reassessing"]; J. Horder, "Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory" (1993) 
12 Law and Philosophy 193. 
The name of this subject varies according to commentators, such as "the theory of 
criminal responsibility" (Bayles), "the principles of criminal culpability" (Horder), "the concept 
of culpability (Hampton), ''the theory of excuse" (Moore), ''the philosophical basis of the principle 
of responsibility" (Lacey), or "the problem of moral culpability" (Arenella). Since the question 
raised and addressed in this section is concerned with the concept of "culpability" briefly referred 
to in the previous chapter (Chapter 4, text accompanying note 93), the term "requirement of 
culpability" is chosen here. 
It is also to be noticed that the main purpose of describing each theory on this issue here 
is neither to examine their adequacy critically nor to advance an exclusive unitary theory of 
culpability, but, as will be seen later, to clarify the difference between the practical basis for 
individual culpability and that for corporate culpability by applying each theory to the case of 
corporate crime. 
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blamed for his conduct when the requirement of culpability pertaining to the crime at 
issue is met. 
In general, three theories have hitherto been advocated by commentators to 
justify the requirement of culpability: theories of defiance, choice or capacity and 
character. 19 The defiance theorist argues that one who causes harm intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly should be considered to act in defiance of those legal norms 
which he has a duty to obey, and should be condemned and punished for what he does.20 
In cases where he "chooses to defy what [he] knows to be an authoritative moral 
command in the name of the satisfaction of one or more of [his] wishes,,,21 his 
intentional, knowing or reckless conduct of causing harm becomes a sign of the defiance 
in attitude towards the legal command. Whilst the sign of the offender's defiant mind 
is the mark of culpability, the existence of conditions of justification or excuse on his 
part would provide evidence to rebut any inference of his defiant attitude towards the 
law.22 
Moreover, the choice or capacity theorists argue that the intentional or reckless 
wrongdoer who, instead of exercising his capacity to avoid wrongdoing, chooses to 
engage in wrongdoing should be culpable for his choice.23 In cases where the offender 
acts in self-defence, under duress or provocation, he is excused "because and only 
because at the moment of such action's performance, one did not have sufficient 
19 The other theory is called "an agency theory," which claims that the offender's culpability ~s 
shaped by how close to or how distant from the paradigm that the actual occurrence of harm IS 
equal to the harm intended by the offender through his conduct. Horder, supra ~~te ~ 8 at p~. 20:-
214. However, as properly indicated by Clarkson, this is not a theory ofculpablhty m that It falls 





Hampton, supra note 18 at pp. 2-10. 
Hampton, ibid. at 15. 
Ibid. at 25. 
Moore, supra note 18 at 57. The Law Commission calls this theory "subjectivist theory." See Law 
Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, supra note 2 at "Part IV." 
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capacity or opportunity to make the choice to do otherwise. ,,24 A similar explanation is 
given by Hart that in making a culpability judgment, a central question is whether the 
offender had both the physical and moral capacity to control his actions, and a fair 
opportunity to avoid performing the wrongful act. 25 If he had the capacity and 
opportunity to do otherwise than he did and genuinely chose to act, but left the capacity 
unexercised and missed the opportunity, it would be fair to blame him. As a result, 
those who lack the moral capacity (children or insane persons) or physical capacity 
(persons acting under duress) cannot be blamed for their actions due to the lack of a fair 
opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. 
Finally, the character theorist maintains that a CUlpability judgment is a matter 
of focusing on undesirable character traits displayed by the offender who causes the 
harm to the victim.26 Namely, to cause harm intentionally, recklessly or negligently, and 
without valid justifications or excuses, is to demonstrate a practical indifference to the 
interests of the victim which deserves blame.27 The existence of any exculpatory 
defence can, however, rebut an inference of bad character of the actor whose moral 
characters are neither mature (in cases of children) nor ordinarily developed to display 
in action (in cases of the insane). 
The foregoing discussion suggests that the basis for the requirement of 
CUlpability varies according to each theory, such as the offender's defiant attitude, 
choice, capacity or bad character which manifests itself through hislher wrongful 
conduct. One thing, however, is common among each theory: account is not adequately 
taken of corporate offenders. In cases of individual offenders, it is always the same 
person who intentionally, recklessly or negligently acts and causes the harm to the 
victim and, who has the physical and moral capacity or a fair opportunity (the choice or 
24 Moore, supra note 18 at 29. The concept of "choice" is, of course, premised upon a comparison 
between alternative courses of action. See A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability 




H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968, Clarendon Press, London), pp. 181-182, 201 
and 22-23. 
Bayles, supra note 18 at 7. 
Ibid. at 18. 
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capacity theory) to dissuade him/herself from engaging in wrongful conduct. This 
formula also holds true of the defiance theory and character theory: one who actually 
performs the wrongful conduct and one who has the defiant attitude towards the legal 
norm (the defiance theory) or undesirable bad character traits (the character theory) is 
identical in cases of individual offenders. 
These observations can also be applied to some cases of individual offenders in 
corporate contexts. When, for example, the corporate personnel who decided to defy 
the legal norm (the defiance theory), chose to engage in wrongdoing, left hislher 
capacity to avoid wrongdoing unexercised (the choice or capacity theory), or undesirable 
character traits (the character theory), intentionally performed the violative act, such a 
violation is merely this rogue individual's crime committed in hislhers personal 
capacity. 28 Nevertheless, there are many cases, in particular, cases of corporate 
manslaughter examined in Chapter 3, in which only a corporation should be blamed for 
the prohibited result even if some individuals are involved in the particular causal chain 
28 Colvin has suggested that even in cases in which a rogue individual intentionally commits an 
offence, a corporation can and should be held liable for its negligence in the following special 
circumstances: 
"Suppose.... that a manufacturer of firearms and ammunition fails to take adequate 
precautions in hiring employees and in exercising custody of its products. An employee 
then steals an automatic weapon and uses it to commit mass murder. The corporation can 
be blamed for the deaths and, if the degree of negligence was sufficiently great, should be 
held liable for manslaughter. It is immaterial that the murders may have given no benefit 
to the corporation, that it suffered the loss of the weapon, and that the use of the weapon 
was unconnected with any manufacturing operations. Corporations can and should take 
care to prevent the foreseeable use of their structures and resources to cause harm in the 
pursuit of private, as well as organizational ends." [Footnote omitted] 
E. Colvin, "Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability" (1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum 1 
[hereinafter cited as Corporate Liability] at pp. 28-29. Colvin applies "the established common 
law duty to exercise reasonable care" to the above example when the corporation was in charge 
of dangerous things. Ibid. at 28, n.75. See also J. Gobert, "Corporate Criminality: New Crimes 
for the Times" [1994] Criminal Law Review 722 at pp. 732-733, stating that: 
"For example, assume a company has on its premises dangerous explosives which it leaves 
unattended. The explosives are stolen and used in a terrorist bombing. Under the proposed 
test the company may be criminally liable - not as an accessory to the bombing, but for 
failing to prevent the theft. The company's fault lies in not taking adequate precautions 
to safeguard the explosives from theft. Of course, the company would have available a 
defence of due diligence if it could show that it in fact took reasonable steps to avert the 
theft." [Footnote omitted] 
It should be noted that whilst Colvin maintains that the company should be held liable for the 
deaths of the potential victims, Gobert asserts that corporate liability is based on its failure. to 
prevent the theft, not for the deaths ofthe victims. The point is that in both cases, the corporatIOn 




of the prohibited result. For example, when it is proved that the corporation failed 
properly to train or supervise its employees who were in the nearest position to the 
source of risk at issue and, accordingly, their conduct caused the prohibited result, it is 
not these individuals, but the corporation itself that should be held CUlpable for its lack 
of the relevant supervision or training system. 
Therefore, for each theory of culpability to be applied to the corporate offender, 
it is necessary to regard acts of any individuals as cogs of the whole safety systems 
designed to prevent the prohibited result, and to determine whether such a system 
adopted by the corporation is sufficiently effective to reduce the probability of the 
occurrence of the result at the material time. If it is proved that the relevant safety 
system is not sufficient, then it is reasonable to assume that it is not the individuals 
behind the corporate mantle, but organisations that "are blamed in their capacity as 
organisations for causing harm or taking risks" or for failing "to exercise [ their] 
collective capacity to avoid the offence which blame attaches. ,,29 
In considering corporate culpability or blameworthiness, the emphasis should 
be placed upon the fact that "corporate" blame is attached to the corporation which 
collectively (or as an organisation) fails to avoid (1) the prohibited consequences in 
terms of the lack of safety system; or (2) the violative conduct of individuals who are 
not properly trained or supervised by the corporation. Although corporations "are 
merely fictions of law to better deal with .... claims and obligations of [natural persons], 
"there is nothing fictitious or figurative about group action itself.,,30 Any members of 
a corporation (including senior officers) who are involved in group or collective action 
B. Fisse & J. Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime andAccountability (1993, Cambridge University 
Press), p. 25. 
J.F. Francis, "Criminal Responsibility ofthe Corporation" (1924) 18 Illinois Law Review 305 at 
pp. 306 and 308 respectively. For the concept of collective responsibility, see, for example, P.A. 
French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (1984, Columbia University Press, New York); 
H. Mannheim, Group Problems in Crime and Punishment and Other Studies in Criminology and 
Criminal Law (1971, 2nd ed., Patterson Smith, New Jersey), ch.2; L. May, The Mor~lity .0J 
Groups: Collective Responsibility, Group-Based Harm, and Corporate Rights (1987, UmversIty 
of Notre Dame Press, Indiana). 
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should be considered "mere replaceable cogs in the ever-spinning corporate wheel,,,3l 
because "the entire personnel of an organisation may change without reshaping the 
corporate culture. ,,32 Central to the concept of corporate blame is not these individuals, 
but a corporation which "may have the intellectual, technical, and financial resources 
to take protective actions that would be beyond the capacity of an individual actor,"33 
through whose conduct the corporation's collective action causes harm to the victim. 
31 
To develop these observations as to collective actions and corporate blame, it 
may be useful to refer to Benjamin's work on the concept of collective responsibility.34 
Benjamin has classified the form of collective action and responsibility into the 
following three types. The first type is exemplified in a case in which A, B, and C, 
comprising the department X, all buy dope and sell it to students. In this case, the X's 
collective responsibility for the buying and selling of dope is "nothing more than an 
aggregate of the individual responsibilities", 35 and each actor is to be held liable as a 
Goint) principal. 
The second type exemplified by Benjamin is that each member of X does not 
perform the whole part of the conduct of buying dope and selling it to students. A buys 
large quantities of narcotics in New York (he alone has the contracts); B packs and 
stores the stuff in his basement (he alone has the safe storage space); and C makes the 
transactions with the students (he alone has their trust). In this case, too, there is no 
H.J. Glasbeek, "Why Corporate Deviance is not Treated as a Crime - The Need to Make "Profits" 
a Dirty Word" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 393 at 434. 
32 Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 29 at p. 22. The reason why conduct and mental states of 
controlling officers or high managerial agents are considered those ofthe corporation consist~ in 
the fact that they are likely to or reasonably assumed to represent the relevant corporate polIcy. 
See §2.07(4)(c) ofthe American Model Penal Code, cited in Chapter 4, n.36. As po~~ed o~t in 
Chapter 2 (text accompanying note. 230), ther~f~re, those w~?se acts and me~;al state~ It IS desrre~ 




or "high managerial agents." 
Colvin, Corporate Liability, supra note 28 at 27. 
M. Benjamin, "Can Moral Responsibility be Collective and Nondistributive?" (1976) 4 Social 
Theory and Practice 93. 
Benjamin, ibid. at 94. 
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difficulty in blaming X for each member's piece of conduct.36 Benjamin observes that 
"One factor common to each of these cases is that any justifiable ascription of moral or 
legal responsibility to the collective is distributive without .... remainder over the 
members comprising the group.,,3? 
The third type of collective action and responsibility is illustrated by the 
following example in which the moral or legal responsibility of the group is not 
reducible to the responsibility of its members. 
"Imagine a small frontier township in the nineteenth-century American West. For 
purposes of law and order the citizens form themselves into a vigilante committee. From 
the very beginning, however, the committee has not been concerned with administrating 
proper justice, but with protecting the interests of its citizens against those of strangers and 
citizens of other nearby townships. It has become the common practice, in any dispute, 
to uphold the "rights" of a local citizen, and to drive the stranger out of town. Suppose 
that, after some thirty years of this practice, a typically unjust decision is made against a 
wandering cowboy, who is then driven out of town. A newspaperman in a neighboring 
town writes "Vigilante committee of X-ville is responsible for injustice against cowboy.,,38 
It is reasonable to assume that each individual of X-ville or its vigilante committee was 
implicated in the unjust practice through which the cowboy received rough treatment, 
because "[ e ]ach .... would risk ostracization or worse, for himself and his family if he 
tried to oppose the practice,,39 which had become universal in X-ville. Benjamin argues 
that for the vigilante committee of X-ville to be held collectively liable for injustice, it 
would be necessary to find any particular individuals responsible for any unjust 
treatment the cowboy received. Considering the above circumstances in which each 
individual of X-ville followed the unjust practice, it is difficult to pinpoint the individual 
fault that is distributed over X-ville and, Benjamin concludes, the appropriate (moral) 






Ibid. at 95. 
The example of the third type is extracted by Benjamin from D. Cooper, "Responsibility ~d ~he 
System" in P.A. French (ed.), Individual and Collective Responsibility (1972, Schenken Pubhshmg 
Co., Massachusetts), pp. 87-88. 
Benjamin, supra note 34 at 96. 




Benjamin's argument is however based upon a non sequitur. The fact that the 
individual fault which is distributed over X-ville is difficult or impossible to identify 
does not lead to the conclusion that X-ville itself should not be held responsible for its 
unjust practice. Whether the individual fault can be pinpointed is the basis for its 
distributiveness of over X-ville, but not for X-ville's responsibility. Since X-ville is 
blamed for its practice resulting in the unjust treatment against the cowboy, the central 
issue to its responsibility is not whether the individual fault in relation to the treatment 
at issue is identifiable or distributed over X-ville, but whether the treatment itself is 
institutionalised in the practice of X-ville, whether such a practice can be said to cause 
the undesirable result, and whether it reaches the standards in the administration of 
justice reached by other towns. Thus, an investigation of whether each individual has 
fallen below standards which can reasonably be expected of an individual under the 
circumstances may provide little guidance as to the responsibility of collective entities. 
The lesson to be learnt from these examples of collective action and 
responsibility is that the distribution of a particular individual's fault in a group or 
organisation is not the prerequisite for the organisation's collective responsibility. As 
mentioned earlier,41 each individual in the organisation should be viewed as playing a 
certain part of the whole practice or system adopted by the organisation. What is 
necessary for the corporation to be held liable is: (1) the (continued) existence (or lack) 
of the practice, policy or system which has a causal link with the prohibited 
consequences; and (2) the fact that the individuals behave in accordance with the 
system. Therefore, the corporate conduct, for which corporations should be blamed and 
made culpable, corresponds to the existence (or lack) of a safety systems causally linked 
to the particular consequences, which needs to be followed by individuals collectively 
and systematically.42 
5.4. The Concept of Risk and Corporate Conduct 
Supra text accompanying note 3 1. 
Unlike the corporate policy model examined in the previous chapter, the concept of corpor~te 
policy or practice is used here as the basis for corporate conduct governing a company's collectIve 
action. How to apply this concept to the requirement of corporate conduct required for corporate 






5.4.1. The Meaning of "Risk" 
The conduct in cases of manslaughter is usually expressed in relation to the risk, such 
as "taking an unjustifiable risk," "failing to avert (or rule out) a risk" or "creating an 
obvious risk." Namely, the type of conduct necessary for manslaughter is determined 
by what the defendant did or was expected to do about the risk. F or instance, for the 
individual defendant to be held liable for the new offence of reckless killing under the 
Law Commission's proposals, two conditions must be met: (1) hislher awareness of a 
risk that hislher conduct will cause the prohibited result (death or serious injury); and 
(2) unreasonableness ofhislher risk-taking concerning the circumstances as slhe knows 
or believes them to be.43 In cases of the new offence of killing by gross carelessness, on 
the other hand, the following three conditions must be met: (1) the obviousness of the 
risk to a reasonable person in his/her position; (2) hislher capacity for appreciating the 
risk at the material time; and (3) either (a) hislher conduct falls below what can 
reasonably be expected of himlher in the circumstances; or (b) slhe intends by hislher 
conduct to cause some injury or is aware of, and unreasonably takes, the risk that it may 
do SO.44 Therefore, in order to establish the type of corporate conduct for manslaughter, 
it is essential to explore the meaning of risk. 
The term "risk" is sometimes replaced with "the possibility of the consequence 
occurring.,,45 The defendant is blamed for running the risk (in cases of positive act) or 
for permitting the risk to materialise (in cases of omission) unreasonably, despite hislher 
foresight of the risk of some harm resulting from hislher actions. Whether the risk (or 
his/her risk-taking action) is reasonable or unreasonable "depends on the social 
f h .c b·dd . ,,46 importance of the acts and on the chances 0 t e lor 1 en consequences occurnng. 
Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, supra note 2 at 136 ("Draft of a Bill to create new 
offences of reckless killing, killing by gross carelessness and corporate killing to replace the 
offence of manslaughter in cases where death is caused without the intention of causing death or 
serious injury" [hereinafter cited as Draft Bil[J, Section 1. 
Law Commission, Draft Bill, ibid, Section 2. 
See, for example, C.M.V. Clarkson & H.M. Keating, Criminal Law - Text and Materials (1998, 
4th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London), p.156, referring to the Cunningham ([ 1957] 2 Q.B. 396) or 
subjective approach to the defmition of recklessness. 
Clarkson & Keating, ibid. 
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In determining the reasonableness of the risk, both a degree of social importance and 
that of chance of the occurrence of the consequences may be counteractive. That is to 
say; 
"If the act is one with no social utility, - for example, a game of "Russian roulette" or an 
armed robbery - the slightest possibility of any harm should be enough. If the act has a 
high degree of social utility - for example, the performance of a surgical operation - then 
only such a very high degree of probability of grave harm as outweighs that utility will 
suffice to condemn it as a reckless act.,,47 
When applied to corporate manslaughter cases, the concept of risk has some unique 
features as to these two factors. The risk is usually consequent upon particular 
operations run by corporations. In most cases, such operations as construction,48 canoe 
or ferry trips or navigation,49 manufacture or production,50 running public facilities51 or 
driving vehicles,52 have a very high degree of social utility:3 Thus, it is unlikely that 
running these kinds of operations itself is considered unjustifiable or unreasonable. 
However, it is also inevitable that these operations involve some sources of risk, which 
may be direct triggers of the cause of harm if mishandled. As described in Chapter 3, 
the sources of risk can be vehicles, vessels, working places, certain substances, fire or 
a victim's tendencies regarding his/her behaviour. In cases in which these sources of 
risk are not managed properly, the likelihood of the occurrence of any harm becomes 
very high. Furthermore, these operations usually involve corporate workers or 







See cases of Denbo (Chapter 3, text accompanying note 22), Ebasco (Chapter 3, text 
accompanying note 23), Northern Stripping (Chapter 3, text accompanying note 41), Dye 
Construction (Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 96-97), British Steel (Chapter 3, text 
accompanying notes 100-101). 
See cases of Kite (Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 25-29), Seaboard Offshore (Chapter 3, text 
accompanying notes 32-33), P & 0 (Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 72-82), Van Schaik 
(Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 92-93). 
See cases of Chicago Magnet (Chapter 3, text accompanying note 31), O'Neil (Chapter 3, text 
accompanying notes 60-67). 
See cases of Serebin (Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 43-44), Welansky (Chapter 3, text 
accompanying notes 47-50), Warner-Lambert (Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 57-58). 
See cases of Pacific Powder (Chapter 3, text accompanying note 110), McIlwain (Chapter 3, text 
accompanying notes 116-118), Fortner LP Gas (Chapter 3, text accompanying note 119). 
See Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, supra note 2 at para .8.6, in particular, n.7. 
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employees, who are in the closest position to the source of risk. Thus, the chances of 
the occurrence of the consequences may also depend upon whether these corporate 
employees are properly trained or supervised so as to handle the source of risk. 
In determining the possibility of the occurrence of the consequence in cases of 
corporate manslaughter, the source of risk and corporate employees assume great 
significance in that they are intermediate factors between corporate conduct and the 
prohibited consequences. It is not difficult to assume that once a fire breaks out at the 
building, for example, the likelihood of the occurrence of harm caused by the fire 
becomes high if an owner of the building has failed to installed fire sprinklers andl or to 
exercise any fire drill. Similarly, "if a lorry driver employed by a company .... was 
overtired .... in consequence of a requirement to work excessively long hours .... , and the 
company had no adequate system of monitoring to ensure that this did not happen",54 
it may be likely that she causes death by dangerous driving in the course of the 
company's business. 
Viewed in this light, how the corporation acted upon the source of risk andlor 
its employees before the incident or at the material time can shape the degree of 
corporate culpability. That is, a corporation can be blamed if: (1) any safety measures 
were not taken by the corporation against the source of risk or the particular operation 
itself; andlor (2) its employees who were either not properly trained or incapable of 
handling the source of risk were put in the position close to it. 55 Consider the following 
two Japanese cases56 that correspond to (1) and (2) mentioned above respectively. 
54 Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, ibid. at para. 8.21. 
55 
56 
(1) is concerned with the company's foresight of causation between the source of risk or the 
particular operation and the consequence, whilst (2) is with the issue of "acting through an 
innocent agent." See Law Commission, Law Com. No.177, A Criminal Code for England and 
Wales (1989, HMSO, London) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Code], Vol. 2, para. 7.17 
("Supervening causes") and paras. 9.10-9 .15 respectively. 
The cases from Japan examined here are cited from Saiko Saibansho Keiji Hanrei Shu (A 
Collection of Criminal Court Cases) [hereinafter cited as "Saihan Keishu"] or Hanrei Jiho (Case 
Reports). The name of the case in Japan (or in most civil law jurisdictions) is not usually the title 
ofthe case. Cases are generally cited by the number they are given in the particular collection of 
reports. Unless otherwise stated, Japanese materials including cases are translated from the 
Japanese into English for use in this thesis. 
166 
In the case of Fire Accident in Hotel New Japan,57 the chief executive officer and 
manager of a hotel (named "Hotel New Japan") were charged with a crime of "death or 
bodily injury, etc. caused by negligence in conduct of business" prescribed in Article 
211 of the Penal Code of Japan,58 under the following circumstances. 
In the very early morning of 8 February, 1982, a fire which originated from a hotel guest's 
smoking in bed (on the eighth floor) flashed out of control and ran over the hotel through 
the corridors. The hotel, irrespective of having previously received repeated advice and 
recommendation by the Metropolitan Fire Board, had not installed sprinkler systems or 
any alternative fire prevention equipment on the fourth, fifth, seventh and ninth floors. 
Nor had a fire drill been held for hotel employees. As a result of the fire, the death toll 
reached thirty-three, and twenty-four people were injured.59 
Suppose that a corporation, instead of or as well as individuals, is charged in these 




(1987) 1244 Hanrei Jiho 36 (Tokyo District Court, 20 May 1987). 
Law No.45, 24 April 1907 [hereinafter cited as "Japanese Penal Code"]' Unlike Article 210 
(prescribing a crime of manslaughter caused by negligence in the general sense), Article 211 of 
Japanese Penal Code, as cited below, adds some special conditions under which the offender is 
held liable for manslaughter by (gross) negligence: namely, the engagement in, or performance 
of, profession, occupation or routines [hereinafter cited as "a crime of manslaughter by 
professional negligence"]. 
"A person who fails to take necessary precautions in the conduct of business and thereby 
causes death or injury to another shall be punished with penal servitude or imprisonment 
for not more than five years or a fme of not more than five hundred thousand yen. The 
same shall apply to a person who, by gross negligence causes death or injury to another." 
Three points need to be made. First, the concept of "(gross) negligence" (Fahrlaj3igkeit) in both 
Japan and Germany is slightly different from that used in English law. Considering the lack of 
direct counterpart of the concept of recklessness in both Japan and Germany, Japanese and German 
concept of negligence used in criminal law may overlap the scope of both objective (Caldwell) 
and subjective (Cunningham) recklessness in English criminal law. Secondly, the theory of 
corporate criminal liability for any crime prescribed in the penal code has strongly been rejected 
in both Germany and Japan, and actual offenders or top management are instead held liable for 
the crime of manslaughter by negligence. Thirdly, the term "manslaughter" is used here for the 
sake of convenience. Yet, there is no distinction between murder and manslaughter in Japanese 
Penal Code. In cases in which the victim's death is caused by the offender's negligence (in the 
Japanese sense), the term "negligent homicide" is usually used by both Japanese courts and 
commentators. 
For the theoretical and practical status of corporate liability in Japan, see, for example, 
N. Kyoto, "Criminal Liability of Corporations - Japan" in H.d. Doelder & K. Tiedemann (eds.), 
La Criminalisation du Comportement Collectif(Criminal Liability of Corporations) (1996, Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague), pp. 275; G.O.W. Mueller, "Mens Rea and the Corporation: A 
Study of the Model Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability" (1957) 19 University 
of Pittsburgh Law Review 21 at pp. 32-33. For the concept of mental states such as intention and 
negligence used in Japanese criminal law, see S. Dando, The Criminal Law of Japan: The General 
Part (1997, Fred B. Rothman & Co., Colorado), p.155, n.72 and pp. 186-187, n.l73. 
(1987) 1244 Hanrei Jiho 36. The defendants were found guilty as charged, and their convictions 
were afflrmed at both the appellate and supreme courts. See (1993) 1481 Hanrei Jiho 15. 
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Commission's proposals. The corporation should be blamed for having failed 
collectively "to design a fire prevention or fighting plan, to carry out periodic fire drills 
based on the plan, to check and maintain fire fighting equipment and to operate them 
effectively in case of fire. ,,60 
The other Japanese case is concerned with corporate employees' error that 
caused the consequences. In the case of Kita Gas Carbon Monoxide Poisoning,61 two 
part-time workers employed by a gas utility company, its managing director and section 
chief were held liable for a crime of manslaughter by professional negligence. The facts 
of this case are as follows. 
On October 1974, the Hokkaido gas utility company was engaged in changing the heat 
capacity of home gas from 3,600 calories to 5,000 calories. For the heat capacity of home 
gas to be changed, certain technical adjustments of each home's gas fittings was needed. 
Because of adjustment errors made by two gas fitters who were employed and sent to each 
home by the company, carbon monoxide poisoning accidents occurred on sixteen 
occasions in one month, claiming nine lives and causing injury to twenty-three people. 
On one of the occasions when carbon monoxide poisoning occurred, a gas fitter was sent 
to the victim's home by the company. For the change of the heat capacity of a gas geyser 
installed at the victim's flat, a different type of nozzle pipe needed to be replaced, which 
he did not prepare at the time when he was engaged in the adjustment operation. He then 
left the flat with the plan that he would come back to complete the adjustment operation. 
However, he had so many of the adjustment operations assigned by the company that he 
forgot the fact that the adjustment operation of the victim's flat was unfinished, and he 
failed to return there. On 19 October 1974, a huge amount of carbon monoxide gas was 
emitted from the defective geyser when the resident of the flat switched it on, and two 
residents in the flat died from carbon monoxide poisoning.62 
What is interesting to note here is the fault determined by the Sapporo district court on 
the part of two supervisors (section chief and managing director) of the gas fitters, who 
were in charge of the adjustment operation plan. According to the court's reasoning, 
their faults consisted of several failures: (i) a failure to consider each gas fitter's 
technical ability and the number needed to calculate the appropriate quantity of quotas 
assigned to them; (ii) a failure to give them sufficient time in advance for an on-the-spot 
investigation as to what type of instruments would be needed for the adjustment 
operation; and (iii) a failure to exercise the ex post facto inspection of gas fittings so as 
60 (1987) 1244 Hanrei Jiho 36 at pp. 72-74. 
61 (1986) 1186 Hanrei Jiho 24 (Sapporo District Court, 13 February 1986). 
62 Ibid. at 28. 
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to detect and correct any possible adjustment error that might be made by the gas fitter 
on the previous occasion.63 
63 
In this case, the source of risk was inherent in the adjustment operation itself. 
If the gas utility company was charged with the offence of manslaughter by gross 
carelessness, it might be blamed for its system of plan: (a) which imposed heavy quotas 
upon each worker and, thus, induced possible adjustment errors by them; and (b) which 
lacked well-organised preparation for the on-the-spot investigation as to the status of 
each house's gas fittings and reasonable corrective measures against possible adjustment 
errors. Although the direct cause of the carbon monoxide poisoning was the gas fitter's 
elementary error, it is the company that should be blamed for causing the consequences 
through his mistake.64 
5.4.2. Risk-Averting Duties and the Type ojCorporate Conduct 
In the previous subsection, it was revealed that the concept of risk provides the basis for 
Ibid. at pp. 27-28. 
64 Some Japanese commentators characterise the fIrst type of fault (exemplifIed by the case of Fire 
Accident in Hotel New Japan) as "structural fault" and the second (represented by the case ofKita 
Gas Carbon Monoxide Poisoning) as "disastrous fault or disaster-triggering fault." Under the 
concept of disastrous fault, the company or individual supervisor's fault is considered secondary 
in that despite the existence of a safety system, a trivial error made by the lower-level employee 
who fails to follow the relevant operating procedures triggers the catastrophe. The company or 
individual supervisor's fault is usually identifIed as a failure properly to train or supervise him 
before or at the material time of the disaster. On the other hand, under the concept of structural 
fault, the design error of the relevant operating system or the lack of a safety system is regarded 
as the direct cause of, or potential for, the consequence. See, for example, H. Itakura, "Kigyo 
Saigai to Atarashii Keiho Riron (Corporate Disaster and a New Criminal Law Theory)" (1976) 
333 Kenshu 3. The characteristics of structural fault was referred to by the Japanese court as 
follows: 
"In cases of structural fault, fault is usually built in the course of large-sized companies' 
activities. When any fault exists in the corporate managerial decision, the subsequent 
operations by individuals in accordance with this decision become deficient continuously 
and repeatedly. It is not rare that immeasurable degree of damage and casualty would 
occur in such cases." 
(1979) 931 Hanrei Jiho 6 (Kumamoto District Court, 22 March 1979); (1982) Hanrei Jiho 17 
(Fukuoka Appellate Court, 6 September 1982) at 21; and (1988) 42 Saihan Keishu 314 (the 
Supreme Court, 29 February 1988) in the case of Kumamoto Minamata Mercury Poisoning 
Pollution. For the details of this case, see, for example, F.K. Upham, "Litigation and Moral 
Consciousness in Japan - An Interpretative Analysis for Four Japanese Pollution Suits" (1976) 10 
Law & Society Review 579; J. Gresser, K. Fujikura & A. Morishima, Environmental Law in Japan 
(1981, the MIT Press, Massachusetts); US Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee of the 
Judiciary, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, Corporate Crime (1980, US 





blaming a corporation for its safety system. In particular, the social utility and the 
chance of the occurrence of the result comprising the meaning of risk are critical factors 
in determining corporate conduct and culpability. 
The concept of risk also provides firm guidance as to what the corporation 
should do about the risk in cases of manslaughter: namely, risk-averting duties. Legal 
opinions differ as to whether it is necessary to impose a general duty upon corporations 
to avert the risk, or it is sufficient to rely upon the well-established common law duty. 
On the one hand, Clarkson maintains that in cases of corporate omissions, "[the 
imposition of a general duty upon corporations] seems unnecessary as such companies 
could almost inevitably be construed as having created a dangerous situation by 
operating in an unsafe manner, and therefore would be under a common law duty to 
prevent the dangers materialising.,,65 On the other hand, Colvin proposes the imposition 
of the general duty upon corporations "to guard against their operations causing harm 
and their structures and resources being used to cause harm. ,,66 
The mistake that both commentators make is in thinking that the breach of duties 
to prevent the dangers constitutes only the offence of manslaughter by gross negligence 
(carelessness) by omission.67 Clarkson, for example, exemplifies the company's 
Clarkson, supra note 17 at 570, citing Miller [1983] 2 A.C. 161, referred to in Chapter 4, n.100. 
The Miller case includes two different issues here: the source of a legal duty to constitute criminal 
omissions ("prior dangerous act," Ashworth, Omissions, supra note 16 at pp. 439-440); and 
"supervening fault" (Law Commission, Criminal Code, supra note 55, paras. 8.52-8.55. The 
former issue is referred to here and in Chapter 4. 
Colvin, Corporate Liability, supra note 28 at 26, asserting the codification of the following 
provision: 
"A corporation has a duty to avoid or prevent injury to any person, or damage to any thing 
or place, occurring as a consequence of an undertaking commenced or contemplated by 
it or of the use of its structures or resources by any person." 
Ibid. at n.69. 
The difference between omission and negligence should be noted. Whether negligence is a state 
of mind or an objective failure to comply with standards of a reasonable person for avoiding 
causing harm to others has been the subject of controversy in common law. See, for example, 
Clarkson & Keating, supra note 45 at pp. 185-187; A. Ashworth, Principles o/Criminal Law 
(1995, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford) [hereinafter cited as Principles], pp. 189-193; E. Colvin, 
Principles o/Criminal Law (1991, 2nd ed., A Carswell Publication), pp. 147-150; W.R. LaFave 
& A.W. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986, West Publishing Co., Minnesota), §3.7. Even 
if negligence is construed as the failure to comply with a standard of behaviour objectively 
assessed, it is for the offender's failure to exercise due care that she is blamed. Thus, "she cannot 
be punished for this failure if the risk in question would never have been apparent to her, no matter 
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positive acts as "pumping effluent into a river" and omissions to act as "failing to 
. 1 t c. ty " . 1 68 Imp emen a sale system respectIve y. It may be reasonable to assume that in 
Clarkson's mind, the term "failing to" do something may fit the form of omission. The 
company's failure to implement a safety system, however, could also be construed as 
positive acts. In Clarkson's hypothetical example of omissions, the possible victims of 
the company's lack of a safety system are workers and customers.69 In both cases, the 
company can be said to continue its operation through its workers and expose them to 
the risk, and to invite the customers to a place (such as a ferry) without a safety system. 
Given that the lack of a safety system itself does not create any risk to the victim, it may 
be more appropriate to pay attention to the company's continuance of the operation in 




how hard she thought about the potential consequences of her conduct. If this criterion is not 
insisted upon, the accused will, in essence, be punished for being less intelligent, mature or capable 
than the average person." Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, supra note 2, paraA.20. 
The offender may fail to exercise due care concerning the risk either (1) during her 
actions or (2) after the risk which she was capable of perceiving is already under way. Whilst 
negligence is committed by her positive act in case (1), it is by her omission in case (2). On the 
other hand, the omission is part of conduct, so that the offender can intentionally, recklessly or 
even negligently omit to do the required acts. 
The marked overlap between omission and negligence may be found in the case where 
the offender fails to perceive the ongoing risk which she has a legal duty to stop. Nevertheless, 
both can be distinguished in terms of two different legal duties she owes to the victim concerning 
the risk: a duty to perceive the ongoing risk of harm to the victim and a duty to prevent the ongoing 
from causing harm to the victim. As will be discussed later, the discharge of the latter duty is 
premised upon that ofthe former. In cases of corporate offenders, it has been considered that they 
are incapable of perceiving the risk (supra text accompanying notes 13), so that both concepts have 
been erroneously confused when applied to corporations. 
Clarkson, supra note 17 at 570. 
As for the former, the Law Commission examines several cases in which a common law duty is 
imposed upon an employer to take care for the safety of employees, in particular, to provide a safe 
system of work. Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, supra note 2 at para.S.l 0-S.34. 
With regard to the latter, the best example is the P & 0 case in which numerous passengers were 
drowned. 
The offences of omission is classified by Ashworth into three groups: (1) offences of failing to do 
certain required acts; (2) hybrid act-omission offences; and (3) offences phrased in terms of acts, 
for which omissions may suffice. Ashworth, Omissions, supra note 16 at 433. Ashworth attaches 
importance to the third group in cases of individuals, in his attempt to analyse certain offences that 
cannot be committed by omission. Ibid at 434. 
In cases of corporate manslaughter, on the other hand, the second group may be of great 
significance, rather than the first and third groups. The first group is based on the existence of a 
duty to do certain acts required by law (for example, the establishment of a safety system), but the 
very reason for the imposition of such a duty in the context of corporations consists in the 







By contrast, the risk of harm to victims may occur after the company invites 
them. In the case of Fire Accident in Hotel New Japan,71 a fire occurred after the 
company's lack of a safety system and its invitation of guests. The fire was not caused 
by any fault on the part of the company, so that the finding of the company's fault 
needed to be retroactive to the lack of a safety system (omissions) before the incidents. 
The main point at issue is that neither the creation of a general duty nor the use 
of the existing common law duty provide any solution to distinguish between corporate 
positive acts and corporate omissions. As Ashworth observes, "we owe [both] negative 
duties (e.g. not to kill or injure) .... [and] positive duties (e.g. to render assistance, to 
support) .... "n Despite the difference between the two concerning the scope of victims 
(namely, whilst in the former "all people," in the latter "a special circumscribed group 
of people with whom there exists a special relationship,,73), the emphasis on the aspect 
of breach of duty in cases of corporate manslaughter would make little or no difference 
between corporate positive acts and corporate omissions. Since the victim to whom the 
corporation owes a duty to prevent the risk may range from its workers and customers 
to the general public,74 any effort to limit the scope of victims of the company's lack of 
safety system is unnecessary to clarify the type of corporate conduct. 75 
All things considered, the source of a duty to prevent the risk (namely, a 
common law duty or not) is not so significant as to determine the type of corporate 
conduct. As Ashworth has argued, 
the company's failure in the duty is prevailing. 
Supra text accompanying note 59. 
Ashworth, Omissions, supra note 16 at 424. 
Ibid. at pp. 424-425. 
See Chapter 3, text accompanying note 24. 
The reason why the scope of victims seems limited in cases of corporate manslaughter may lie in 
the commentators and courts' special attention to the relationship between the particular corporate 
operation containing or producing the risk and the potential victims involved in it .(such as 
workers). Yet, this relationship should obviously be considered in relation to the Issues of 
causation and foresight of the consequences. Thus, the company's breach of duty either to p.revent 
the risk or to implement a safety system is not always limited to the cases of gross neghgence 
(carelessness) or omissions. Supra note 67. 
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"Some ~orporations operate in spheres of such potential social danger, and wield such 
~ower ~m terms of e~onomic resources and influence), that there is no social unfairness 
m holdmg t~em to ~Ig~er ~tandards.t~an in~ividuals when it comes to criminal liability, 
so ~o~~ as .fatr warnmg IS gIVen. ThIS IS partIcularly so when they engage in commercial 
actIVItIes m spheres where pubbc safety may be at risk. The same cannot be said of 
individuals.... Thus the conflict between social welfare and fairness to defendants should 
be resolved differently according to whether the defendant is a private individual or a large 
corporation. ,,76 
Given that material, financial and technical resources are usually available to 
corporations to take risk -averting actions, higher standards of care should be expected 
of them than individuals. It is for this reason that legal duties to avert the risk resulting 
from the relevant corporate activity should be imposed upon corporations.77 
As for the type of corporate conduct in cases of manslaughter, balance 
considerations between the social utility and the probability of the occurrence ofharm78 
76 Ashworth, Principles, supra note 67 at p. 161. See also Colvin, Corporate Liability, supra note 
28 at 27; Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 29 at pp. 29-30. 
77 
78 
The standard of care is, of course, also determined according to the status of the defendant. 
Parents incur an overall legal duty to take care of their child against any risk. But a corporation, 
as an employer of its workers, owner of facilities or buildings, or guarantor of its products, is 
responsible for the safety of its working place, facilities or products to the victims. Thus, it is not 
the company's fault if one ofthe hotel's guests dies of hunger during his stay at the hotel. 
SchUnemann has submitted three grounds for the imposition of a legal duty upon 
employers for criminal omissions in the context of corporate activities: (1) the relationship between 
an employer's (legal) power to order (rechtliche Befehlsgewalt) and the employees' obedience; 
(2) the amount of the relevant information (fiberlegenen Informationsfundus) and knowledge 
(Herrschaftswissen) possessed by the employer superior to employees; and (3) the virtual 
accomplishability (faktische Durchsetzbarkeit) of the employer's order to employees, which is 
similarly found in the case of the offender's use of an innocent agent. B. SchUnemann, 
Unternehmenskriminalitat und Strafrecht (1979, Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, Cologne), pp. 97-
102. According to SchUnemann, the employer who locates the top of the corporate hierarchy 
usually has indirect control over the source of risk through his employees, who are in the nearest 
position to it. Thus, the employer's duty to avert the risk inherent in the corporate operation is 
determined according to the extent to which he performs a duty to supervise his employees directly 
or a duty to organise the delegation system of supervision. Ibid. at pp. 95-98. 
The term ''to control the source of risk" used in this thesis mainly comes from this book 
("Oberherrsschaft fiber gefahrliche Sachen ["control over dangerous things"]). SchUnemann's 
main concern in this book is how to hold the individual employer liable for omissions in the 
corporate hierarchy. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier (supra text accompanying notes 67-75), 
the employer's failure to control the (source of) risk is not always limited to the offence of 
omissions. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that corporate criminal liability is not accepted 
in German criminal law, so that it is inevitable that SchUnemann's main target of criminal liability 
is directed at the individual. For the useful work on the issue of criminal omissions in German 
criminal law, see, for example, G.P. Fletcher, "Criminal Omissions: Some Perspectives" (1976) 
24 American Journal of Comparative Law 703. 
Supra text accompanying notes 46-54. 
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may playa critical role in distinguishing between corporate positive acts and corporate 
omissions. Since the harm-causing conduct in reckless manslaughter is shaped by such 
balance considerations, a distinction between corporate positive acts and corporate 
omissions should be drawn according to (1) when the risk involved in the particular 
operations or in the source of risk materialises; and (2) whether the company's conduct 
at the material time still has a certain degree of social utility that is tolerated by law. 
Consider the P & 0 case in chronological order. The lack of a safety system, which was 
caused by the disease of sloppiness infecting the company,79 preceded the company's 
invitation to the prospective victims (= passengers) of the ferry trip. As mentioned 
earlier,80 however, the lack of a safety system itself did not create any risk of harm to the 
victims before the company actually invited them on board. At the time when the 
company did invite them and the ferry sailed, there was no or little chance left to the 
company to prevent the risk from materialising. Under the circumstances, it is difficult 
to fmd any social importance to the company's invitation to the victims of the ferry trip, 
so that the causal link should be determined between the victims' deaths and the 
company's invitation. 
As compared to the P & 0 case, the case of Fire Accident in Hotel New Japan 
leads to a different conclusion. When the hotel invited the guests to stay in the hotel, 
there already existed the lack of a safety system. But the cause of a fire was one of the 
guests' smoking in bed after the hotel's invitation of guests, so that no risk of harm was 
created by the hotel's lack of a safety system or by its invitation prior to the occurrence 
of the fire at issue. That is, at the time of the hotel's invitation, there existed a certain 
degree of social utility on the part of the hotel. Therefore, it is not the hotel's invitation 
(positive acts), but its lack of a safety system ( omissions) that should be causally linked 
with the victims' deaths. 81 
79 Sheen Report, cited in Chapter 3, n.77. 
80 
81 
Supra text accompanying note 70. 
However, there may exist certain situations in which it is appropriate to regard th~ hotel's 
invitation of guests as positive acts. Assume that a time bomb was planted by a terron~t group 
at the hotel, and a bombshell statement was mailed. But the hotel ignored the warnmg and 
continued inviting guests thereafter. Under these circumstances, since the hotel was aware of the 
probable and substantial risk ofhann, the subsequent invitation of the guests to the hotel could 
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5.5. Corporate Mental States and the Scope of Risk-Averting Duties 
5.5.1. Corporate Mental States 
In examining the relationship between the meaning of risk and corporate conduct, the 
previous section concluded that the risk-averting duties result from the fact that the 
corporation engages in the particular risk-involving operation and has enormous 
resources to take risk-averting actions. It was also suggested that the type of corporate 
conduct should be determined by balance considerations between the social utility and 
the probability of the occurrence of actual harm. The final issue is how to construct 
corporate recklessness and gross carelessness for the offence of manslaughter. To 
address this issue, it is first necessary to summarise the Law Commission's proposals 
for both an offence of reckless manslaughter and that of manslaughter by gross 
carelessness, which are considered capable of the commission only by individuals. 
In short, an individual offender is held liable under the Law Commission's 
proposals for reckless manslaughter when slhe took the risk unreasonably despite hislher 
awareness of it. In the case of manslaughter by gross carelessness, slhe is held liable 
when slhe failed to perceive but took the risk obvious to a reasonable person, despite 
his/her capacity for the appreciation of it. Roughly speaking, the offence of reckless 
manslaughter corresponds to hislher breach of duty to avert the risk, while the offence 
of manslaughter by gross carelessness corresponds to hislher breach of duty to perceive 
the risk. 82 Because it is difficult to assume that slhe could be expected to avert the risk 
be considered positive acts that created the risk ofhann to the guests, who were invited after the 
hotel's awareness of the risk. 
Since Adomako ([1994] 2 All ER 79), the Caldwell ([1982] A.c. 341) recklessness defmition (or 
objective recklessness) is no longer applicable to manslaughter. See Ashworth, Principles, supra 
note 67 at p. 183. Thus, the tenn "recklessness" referred to here means advertent or subjective 
recklessness. Any substantial overlap between (gross) negligence and Caldwell reckless 
concerning the defendant's failure to give his mind to the possibility of a risk or his erroneous 
judgment of the existence of a risk is treated as part of (gross) negligence thereinafter. For a 
distinction between the two, see, for example, Clarkson & Keating, supra note 45 at pp. 174-175. 
The type of fault is best explained by P. Murphy (ed.), Blackstone's Criminal Practice 
(1997, 7th ed., Blackstone Press Ltd., London), p.20, as follows: Consequence (a) desired 
(intention); (b) foreseen as virtually certain (intention may be inferred); (c) foreseen as probable 
or (d) possible (typically subjective recklessness); (e) not foreseen but ought to have be~n 
(negligence or objective recklessness); and (f) even reasonable man would not foresee (strIct 




without hislher awareness of it, a duty to perceive the risk should be considered to be 
part of a duty to avert the risk. In other words, slhe is held liable for manslaughter by 
gross carelessness when slhe failed to discharge the initial part of the duty to avert the 
risk, whilst slhe is liable for reckless manslaughter when slhe, based upon hislher 
awareness of the risk, subsequently continued hislher risk-causing conduct (in case of 
positive acts) or failed to prevent the pre-existing risk from causing the prohibited result 
(in case of omissions). 
In addressing the issue of foreseeability of the risk in Japanese criminal law, 
Hiroshi Otsuka has provided an interesting analysis of the process of the individual's 
perception of the risk. 83 In order for corporate mental states to be established based on 
an analogy with individual mental states, it may be useful next to refer to his work. 
According to Otsuka, the individual offender's failure to perceive the risk or lack of due 
care in cases of gross carelessness may be divided into the following three groups: (1) 
s/he does not pay attention to collecting any information in relation to the risk; (2) s/he 
does collect the relevant information to the risk, but fails to concentrate on analysing it 
so as to conclude the possibility of the existence of the risk (e.g. because of his/her 
preoccupation with something else); and (3) slhe collects information relevant to the 
risk, pays attention to it, but misjudges it so as to conclude the existence of the risk. 84 
The first category can be characterised as hislher failure to use hislher sensory organs 
to respond to stimuli from the outer world (collection errors). In the second category, 
at pp. 72-73. 
H. Otsuka, "Yoken-Kanosei no Handan-Kozo to Kanri-Kantoku Kashitsu (Structural Judgments 
on the Issue of Foreseeability and Supervisory Fault),' (1997) 36 Keiho Zasshi 359 at pp. 366-367. 
Otsuka's purpose is to use subjective (an offender) and objective (a reasonable person) standards 
properly to determine the foreseeability of the risk, in terms of analysing the process of the 
individual's perception ofthe risk in chronological order. The main target of the imposition of 
liability for negligence under Otsuka's approach is, of course, an individual offender. The new 
approach suggested here is an applied version of Otsuka's biological analysis of human perception 
of stimuli from the outer world to corporations. 
Several commentators view this third category as distinguishing between negligence and Caldwell 
recklessness. See, for example, Clarkson & Keating, supra note 45 at p.165; R. Card, Card, Cross 
& Jones Criminal Law (14th ed., Butterworths, London), p.76; Smith, supra note 47 at p.72. On 
the other hand the second case seems similar to Caldwell recklessness, but still requires, not the , . 
objective standard, but the offender's capacity for appreciating the risk, based on the assumptIOn 
that s/he would have appreciated the risk if s/he concentrated on analysing the relevant 
information. 
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hislher sensory organs actually respond to stimuli from the outer world, but hislher brain 
refuses their transmission (transaction errors). In the third category, hislher brain fails 
properly to judge the information transmitted by sensory organs, so that it cannot send 
back subsequent orders to take risk-averting (in)actions Gudgment errors). 
In cases of reckless manslaughter, hislher sensory organs respond successfully 
to stimuli from the outer world (1), and transmit them to hislher brain (2) in which 
positive judgments as to the existence of the risk are made (3). The critical points for 
hislher recklessness consist in hislher brain's incorrect assessments as to the probability 
of the potential harm, which affect hislher subsequent (in)action (assessment errors). 
Hislher incorrect assessments may be based on (4) the underestimation of the scale or 
extent of the risk involved; and/or (5) erroneous reliance upon, or the overestimation of, 
the feasibility or effectiveness of hislher risk-averting (or risk-minimising) skills to 
prevent the prohibited result. 85 
The subject matter here is how to apply these observations of human risk-
perceiving process to corporate offenders. Since a corporation is a fictitious entity, it 
is not realistic to assume that it uses its own sensory organs to respond to stimuli from 
the outer world.86 In relation to collection errors, it is thus inevitable to rely upon any 
85 Some may argue that subjective recklessness should be reconsidered in a way that an offender 
makes a correct assessment of the risk, coupled with indifference as to whether the prohibited 
result occurs. See, for example, R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (1990, 
Blackwell, Oxford), pp. 162-164, referred to in C. Wells, "Corporations: Culture, Risk and 
Criminal Liability" [1993] Criminal Law Review 551 atpp. 562-563. However, as Smith points 
out (supra note 47 at pp. 71-72), whether slhe is indifferent to the risk or the prohibited result can 
be known only by reference to evidence as to hislher "general character and habits the law of 
evidence does not allow. It is submitted that indifference to a particular risk, where it is proved 
to exist, is an aggravating factor, but not an element in the defmition of the required fault." 
[Footnote omitted] See also Card, supra note 84 at para. 3.47. (stating that "[a] person who 
consciously takes an unjustified risk which he hopes will not materialise is generally also 
subjectively reckless." [Footnote omitted]). In this thesis' position, thus, central to determining 
the existence of recklessness on the part of the offender is not whether slhe is indifferent to the 
risk or the prohibited result, but how slhe assesses the risk. 
86 Based on Dan-Cohen's concept of "personless corporations" (M. Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, 
and Organizations - A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic Society (1986, University of California 
Press, Berkeley), ch.3), Sullivan provides an interesting example to describe an "inherently 
corporate mental state." See Sullivan, supra note 14 at pp. 536-537. . 
"The claim that there can be an inherently corporate mental state is made most starkly If 
we take company X to be one ofDan-Cohen's personless corporations, a company of.so~e 
future time which can come into legal being, all legal formalities satisfied, as an artIfiCial 
intelligence system operated by robots. Once the system is set up, it manufactures products, 
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corporate personnel's sensory organs to determine whether the corporation pays 
attention to collecting any information in relation to the risk involved in its operation. 87 
Under the new approach here, however, no particular individual's failure to perceive the 
obvious risk is imputed to the corporation. Rather, the first type of corporate gross 
carelessness may be found if the corporation fails to establish any effective systems 
which enable its personnel to collect information relevant to the risk. This type of 
corporate fault may be proved by evidence that the defendant corporation places an 
87 
takes and executes orders and so forth without any further human intervention. Because 
of the sophistication of its programme, company X can respond to the fact that a particular 
country may not lawfully acquire its products by creating false certification, arranging 
intermediate destinations for its shipment in order to continue trading with that country. 
Assume that no human individual, past or present, is in any way at fault for the fact that 
company X is trading and will continue to trade with a proscribed country: if there is any 
knowledge present here at all, it can only be the knowledge of company X." 
In this hypothetical example, it would be possible to regard company X's sophisticated programme 
as the authentic equivalent of human mental faculties. Yet, it would also be difficult to justify any 
legal reason to treat company X as a legal or juristic person, rather than as a mere factory, mainly 
because a corporation is a legal person created by law "as a short hand or algebraic expression 
for the determination of the relative claims and obligations of individuals engaged in a joint 
enterprise." Francis, supra note 16 at 307. In short, ifno individual is involved, there are no 
claims and obligations for law to deal with. On the purpose of forming an association or 
corporation, see also G.F. Canfield, "Corporate Responsibility for Crime" (1914) 14 Columbia 
Law Review 469 at 469 ("When two or more persons agree to act together in association for any 
purpose, they think of the association as something different from themselves, and they think of 
the acts done in the name and on behalf of the association as acts of the association considered 
as a separate individual, rather than as the acts of themselves as joint parties in interest.. .. [I]t is 
obvious that, in general, you can best give effect to the intentions of these persons and so decide 
justly questions involving the rights and liabilities growing out of associate action, if you treat the 
association as if it were an individual or legal person having the same capacity for rights and 
liabilities as a natural person possesses."); E. Hacker, "The Penal Ability and Responsibility of 
the Corporate Bodies" (1924) 14 Journal of American Institute o/Criminal Law & Criminology 
91 at 91 ("The social, political, mental and economic power and value of the human race increases 
enormously by organizing. That which one man when alone cannot even dream of realizing 
becomes possible when allied with others .... The duration of the life of one individual is too short 
for realizing such purposes"). 
The new approach suggested here is relatively similar to a "brain-hand" or "brain-nerve" analogy 
between human and corporate bodies expressed in the Bolton case (Chapter 2, text accompanying 
note 168). The main difference between the two is concerned with how to treat each individual 
in the corporate hierarchy. In the former analogical approach, on the one hand, only the acts and 
mental states of corporate "brains" (= controlling officers) become the target for identifying those 
of the company, so that any other "hands" are eliminated from any consideration. This is also true 
ofthe vicarious liability doctrine, since any other individuals than an actual offender are usually 
regarded as irrelevant to the liability of the corporation. On the other hand, under the new 
approach, each individual is deemed to playa certain role in the whole system of the corporation 
(supra text accompanying notes 30-33), in order to determine whether or not the company takes 
collective actions to avert the risk at issue. Thus, even if the particular individual, whether a 
controlling officer or lower-level employee, has the requisite conduct and mental states, hislher 
conduct and mental states are not automatically imputed to the corporation. The difference 
between the new approach and the aggregation theory will be referred to in the next section. 
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unskilful or unsupervised individual, who is in the closest position to the source of risk 
or engages him/her in the particular corporate operation that needs professional skills. 
In these circumstance, such an individual is obviously incapable both of completing the 
task assigned by the corporation and of appreciating any risk involved in the operation. 
Yet, the risk at issue can be perceived by the corporation if it: (i) gave him/her proper 
training prior to the occurrence of harm; (ii) rendered hislher work supervised by 
experienced superiors at the material time; or (iii) assigned the task to a more capable 
worker. 88 
With regard to transaction errors, it is first necessary to regard corporate 
decision-making officials (= controlling officers) as corporate "brains," as formulated 
in the Bolton case.89 Since these figures are usually so remote from the corporation's 
day-to-day operations involving the risk of harm that it is most unlikely that they directly 
88 In the Ebasco case (Chapter 3, text accompanying note 23), it was held that the company failed 
"to properly construct and supervise construction of a cofferdam," and failed "to perceive a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death in the construction of cofferdam, in a manner which 
constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in 
the situation." The fieldwork was under the supervision of several corporate officers, so that their 
failure to perceive the risk was obviously imputed to the corporation. The critical difference 
between this vicarious liability approach and the corporate collection errors proposed here is that, 
in the former, individuals in question were capable of perceiving the risk whilst the latter approach 
is applicable to the case in which the individuals in question were incapable of appreciating the 
risk and their work were unsupervised at the material time. Such fault of the corporation can be 
equated with the corporation's failure to make positive efforts to collect the information of the risk 
which would result from the individual's probable errors. 
89 
The applicable cases of corporate collection errors may be Seaboard Offshore (Chapter 
3, text accompanying notes 32-33, in which the defendant company allowed the chief engineer 
insufficient time to familiarise himself with the ship before it sailed, so that his subsequent 
technical errors caused the ship to stop and to remain drifting in the North Sea), Northern 
Stripping Mining (Chapter 3, text accompanying note 41, in which an inexperienced foreman was 
assigned to the operation of demolishing the railway bridge and, accordingly, his 
misunderstanding of oral instructions given by the defendant company's managing director caused 
the subsequent death of the victim), and British Steel (Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 100-
101, in which the repositioning operation was not supervised by the section engineer of the 
company who thus failed to detect that essential safeguards were not being followed at the 
material time). 
Supra note 87. Corporate "brains" proposed here are similar to the term "controlling officers" 
used under the identification principle. It should be noticed here, however, that corporate "brains" 
used under the proposal mean those who are in the position to make decisions (in particular, 
financial decisions) as to necessary risk-averting actions. In the case of a fire accident at the 
building or hotel, for example, those who could make decisions, in their directorial capacity, to 
install expensive fire equipment or exercise a fire drill collectively, may fall into this categ0I?" 
If s/he does not affect relevant corporate decisions as to necessary risk-averting actions, s/he WIll 
not be considered part of "brains," no matter high his/her position is in the corporate hierarchy. 
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collect the relevant information of the possible occurrence of the risk. The most 
probable individuals in the corporate hierarchy who collect the relevant information to 
the risk are: (i) the lower-level employees who are in the closest position to the source 
of risk; or (ii) their immediate supervisors (middle management). When the risk of 
harm is involved in the particular corporate operation, any necessary preventive actions 
to avert the risk should be taken in terms of decisions by corporate "brains." The point 
is that those who actually appreciate the possible occurrence of the risk and those who 
subsequently make decisions as to risk-averting actions are different in cases of 
corporate manslaughter.90 For the subsequent risk-averting actions to be taken, it is vital 
for the corporation to establish the communication system (or "central nervous system") 
between lower or middle-level employees and the top management, which enables 
smooth and prompt transactions of the relevant information to the risk.91 Therefore, 
under the proposed transaction errors, corporate gross carelessness may also be found 
in cases in which the relevant information to the risk possessed by employees fails to 
90 Corporate gross carelessness based on transaction errors proposed here can overcome some 
difficulty the identification principle suffers, which has acutely been described by Fisse as follows: 
91 
"Not surprisingly, the [identification] principle has often been watered down to cover 
middle managers in the absence of any fmding that they have been delegated an unfettered 
power by the board. This dilution of the [identification] principle is readily understandable 
but no clear criteria have emerged for deciding whether a representative of a company has 
the requisite corporate manna. The reason is not difficult to understand. In a corporate 
world of diffuse organisational responsibilities many employees have an input in 
management and the people at the top of an organisational hierarchy are often remote from 
the day-to-day sources of operational power. This invites the conclusion that there is little 
future in trying to defme the personal identity of a company." [Footnotes omitted]. 
Fisse, supra note 4 at 601. See also Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 58-59 . Under the new 
approach, if it is proved that the top management of the corporation responsible for corporate 
policies and decisions concerning risk-averting actions ignored or did not know any message of 
the existence of the risk sent from the middle management, the corporate defendant would be 
considered to fail to give thought to whether there was a risk which was capable of appreciation 
by it. 
As found in examining the Warner-Lambert case (Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 57-59), the 
identification principle suffers the dilemma that top officers are usually remote from specific 
corporate operations but have sufficient authority to implement a risk-averting policy whilst t~e 
lower-level workers do have the technical expertise ofthe operations at issue, but lack the authonty 
to do so. The other possible solution to this dilemma is to extend the scope of identification to 
the middle management, as found in the Meridian case (Chapter 2, text accompanying notes.216-
220). However, ifthose who perceived the risk failed to report upon the existen~e of th.e nsk to 
the top management, so that the top management had no chance to take risk-avertmg.actlOns, the 
corporation's fault would be neither their failure to report nor top management's faIlure to take 
risk-averting actions, but its own failure properly to instruct employees so as to inform th~ top 
management of the existence of the risk prior to the occurrence of harm. Such a corporate faIlure 
can be inferred from the lack of the communication system. 
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transmit to the decision-making officers due to the lack of effective communication 
system.92 
Furthermore, for the corporate judgment errors to be found, it is necessary to 
prove that the corporation does not make either collection or transaction errors described 
above: namely, (1) those who are assigned the risk-involving task are so properly trained 
or supervised as to perceive the risk at issue (the absence of collection errors); and (2) 
the corporation establishes the appropriate communication system between the top 
management and them, through which they actually inform the top management of the 
existence of the risk involved in their operation (the absence of transaction errors). The 
corporation's judgment errors are, then, to be made by its top management who fail to 
take their inferior employees' information seriously and wrongfully rule the existence 
of the risk out. In this situation, the corporation can properly be said to "[stop] to think 
whether there is a risk, [conclude] there is no risk and consequently [act].,,93 
The most applicable case to this type of corporate gross carelessness, if not 
perfectly, may be the Kite case.94 In this case, the managing director of the activity 
company himself created an unjustifiable risk by failing properly to train his instructors 
(collection errors) and to maintain a safe system for the execution of an outdoor leisure 
92 Any controlling officer's lack of the relevant knowledge to the risk, the lack of any safety measures 
that should have been taken against the risk, and the risk at issue which would be obvious to a 
reasonable person or was in fact perceived by employees would suffice for proof of the 
corporation's transaction errors. 
93 
94 
Clarkson & Keating, supra note 45 at p.165. See also supra note 82. As a matter of evidence, 
a distinction between corporate judgment errors and corporate assessment errors (namely, 
corporate gross carelessness and corporate recklessness) may be difficult to draw. It is critical to 
examine whether corporate "brains" actually believed the existence of the risk involved in the 
particular corporate operation in terms ofthe information transmitted by their inferior employees. 
If they decided to ignore their inferiors' advice as to the existence of the risk, such ignorance 
would be considered judgment errors on the existence of the risk. On the other hand, if they 
acknowledged the existence of the risk but underestimated the extent of the risk, then such an 
attitude would be viewed as assessment errors on (or indifference to) the risk of harm. To draw 
a clear line between "ignorance" and "underestimation" regarding the risk, it may be preferable 
to incorporate the concept of notification from authorities concerned, advocated in the reactive 
fault model (Chapter 4, text accompanying note 68). Once the corporation receives court orders 
or notices issued administratively by an enforcement agency as to the existence ofthe risk involved 
in the particular corporate operation, it will be easy to deny that the corporation rules the risk out 
(namely, corporate judgment errors). 
Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 25-29. 
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95 
activity. He also failed to establish liaison between management and staff (transaction 
errors). Nevertheless, he received a warning letter from ex-instructors, which informed 
him of the probable occurrence of the risk ofharm to customers (= students). Thus, this 
case would provide an example for the corporate judgment errors that were made by the 
managing director, who failed to heed the warning from the ex-instructors and continued 
the outdoor leisure activities without a safe system. 
With respect to corporate recklessness, corporate assessment errors need to be 
proved as to the probability of the occurrence of the risk. As mentioned earlier, such 
assessment errors made by the offender's brain may be based on the underestimation of 
the extent of the risk and/or on the overestimation of his risk-averting skills to prevent 
the prohibited result. The former type of assessment errors are more likely to occur to 
corporate "brains" than the second type for two reasons. Firstly, corporate operations 
involving the risk of harm, such as transportation, production or construction, usually 
have a very high degree of social utility, so that the top management of the corporation 
may be apt to decide the continuance of the operation at issue without the 
implementation of any necessary risk-averting actions. Secondly, the implementation 
of safety systems or risk-averting actions usually makes less contribution to the main 
purpose of corporate business, namely, profit-maximisation, than the operation at issue. 
Thus, unless they are keenly informed by employees of the high probability of the 
occurrence of the risk or the ongoing risk of actual harm, they may be apt to underrate 
the scale of the risk. 
Examples of corporate assessment errors based on the underestimation of the 
extent of the risk are easily found. In the Serebin case,95 the nursing home administrator 
was repeatedly warned by his staff and state officials that insufficient staffing had 
created an unjustifiable risk to the patients, but continued to admit more patients and 
reduce the nursing staff further. He was so concerned about how to operate the nursing 
home within the budget that he took no alternative safety actions, such as proper training 
of the staff as to a closer bed check or the installation of alarms on doors to inform the 
staff of the occurrence of the patients' walking out of the building. Furthermore, in the 
Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 43-46. 
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P & 0 case, the directors of the corporation were informed of previous open-door 
incidents and received the recommendation from the ship masters that warning lights 
be installed for the ferry's captain to ensure that doors were closed. However, they did 
not take the recommendation seriously, perhaps because the capsize did not happen on 
the previous occasions when the ferries sailed with their bow doors open (the 
underestimation of the scale of the risk).96 Or suppose that in the cases of Denbo 
---"=-=, 
McIlwain School Bus and Fortner LP Gas,97 the controlling officers of the corporation 
were informed and recommended by drivers that some parts of their vehicles had been 
so defective that they would need repairs. Again, suppose that because of the cost of the 
necessary repairs and the number of vehicles, the corporate "brains" ignored the 
situation which involved a high probability of the risk of harm to drivers and 
pedestrians. Such a cost-benefit analysis may well prove that it was unreasonable to 
take the risk at issue.98 
On the other hand, the second type of assessment errors as to the probability of 
the occurrence of the risk may occur if the corporation already implements a safety 
system in general. Nevertheless, the corporation can be blamed for its top 
management's assessment errors if, at the material time of the occurrence of the risk, the 
96 Sullivan has suggested that an inexpensive electrical device (warning lights) was available at the 
time of the tragedy, but not widely used in the British ferry industry, so that the failure to install 
such a device could not be regarded as conduct falling far below the standard that could reasonably 
have been expected from P & 0 in the circumstances. Sullivan, supra note 14 at 542. 
97 
98 
However, the issue of what kinds of actions were needed to avert the risk is usually 
determined by the type of risk created by the defendant. Thus, whether or not conduct fell far 
below the standard that could reasonably have been expected from the defendant in the 
circumstances is not determined by the fact that the type of risk-averting actions was widely 
accepted or popular in the industry, but by the type of the risk itself created by the defendant. It 
is certain that if warning lights were too costly for P & 0 to install, such unavailability of the 
necessary risk-averting actions could be a defence. But it is also certain that sailing the ferry with 
its bow doors open was not a "widely" accepted manner in the British ferry industry even at the 
time of the tragedy. 
Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 22, 116-118 and 119 respectively. 
See also State v. Ford Motors Co in M.B. Clinard & P.C. Yeager, Corporate Crime (1980, The 
Free Press, New York); F.T. Cullen, W.J. Maakestad & G. Cavender, Corporate Crime under 
Attack (1987, Anderson Publishing Co., Ohio); D.J. Miester, "Criminal Liability for Corporations 
that Kill" (1990) 64 Tulane Law Review 919 at pp. 927-929 (in which Ford expected that the costs 
of adding the safety bladder for 12.5 million vehicles ("Pinto"), whose gas tank was defective, 
would be 137 million whilst the total costs of settling with the victims of these vehicles (dead or 
injured) would be $48 million, and, thus, decided to release the Pinto onto the market without the 
safety bladder). 
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safety system does not work sufficiently to prevent the casualties, which could be 
avoided if the safety system was properly maintained and monitored on a regular basis. 
The typical example of this type of assessment errors is the Warner-Lambert case. 
Several officers were informed by the insurance carrier that the dust condition in the 
corporation's factory had created an explosion hazard, so that they made proposals for 
altering the duct condition. Before the proposals were fully implemented, however, they 
allowed the manufacturing operation of the product at issue to resume and, as a result, 
the catastrophic explosion occurred. 
99 
5.5.2. The Scope of Risk-Averting Duties 
The corporate mental states described in the previous subsection are established by 
addressing the issue of what the corporation is expected to do concerning the risk 
involved in the particular corporate operation. As mentioned earlier,99 blame should be 
attached to a corporation when it fails to implement a safety system to prevent the 
source of risk from causing harm, and/or to train and supervise individuals who are in 
the closest position to the source of risk. Corporate risk -averting duties are thus, 
concerned with both the establishment of a safety system and proper supervision of 
corporate personnel. For the scope of risk-averting duties to be clarified in relation to 
corporate mental states, it may be first useful to refer to an interesting classification of 
risk-averting duties that has been made by Ishizuka. According to Ishizuka, risk-
averting duties consist of: 
"1. a duty to instruct or train employees not to make any mistakes resulting in casualties 
during the course of daily operations; 
2. a duty to establish particular systems designed to prevent the employees' mistake (for 
example, in some work places, to colour connecting lines so as to prevent 
connection error between machines); 
3. a duty to establish a system whereby even if an employee does make some mistake, 
that mistake will not give rise to a dangerous result (for example, to install an alarm 
device or fire prevention equipment); 
4. a duty to ascertain whether each employee behaves in accordance with systems 
established; and 
Supra text accompanying notes 28-33. 
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5. a duty to ascertain how the established systems operate." 100 
The structure of risk-averting duties described above is well-organised in the sense that 
any possible and effective actions required to prevent the occurrence of the risk of harm 
are combined in chronological order. The initial and elementary step to avert the risk 
is to supervise the lower-level employees, who are most likely to trigger the cause of the 
prohibited consequences through their mishandling of the source of risk ("1"). 
Furthermore, for the catastrophic consequences to be avoided, it would be effective not 
only to supervise them directly, but also to contrive some device or plan useful to 
prevent their mistake ("2"). 101 Yet, since human errors inevitably occur no matter how 
diligently employees are trained and supervised, double check systems need to be 
implemented to prevent such errors from causing the prohibited result ("3"). Finally, 
in order for these risk-averting systems to operate effectively at the material time, 
periodic inspections as to the qualifications and adequacy of each employee and the 
established systems should be required ("4" and "5"). 
Originally, Ishizuka has advocated that the above risk-averting duties should be 
imposed upon supervisory individuals who are sufficiently high in the corporate 
hierarchy.102 In addition, the issue of whether those supervisory individuals properly 
discharged the risk-averting duty is addressed under the Japanese criminal law only after 
it is proved that they actually perceived the risk or that the risk at issue was 
foreseeable. 103 Therefore, when applied to corporate offenders, the model of risk-
averting duties submitted by Ishizuka should be considered in relation to each type of 
corporate errors described in the previous subsection. 
The first component of corporate risk-averting duties is to allocate skilful 





A. Ishizuka, "Kantoku-sha no Keiji-Kashitsu Sekinin ni tsuite" (On the Criminal Negligence of 
Supervisors) (1980) 942, 946, 948 Hanrei Jiho 3, 3, 10 at (948) 11. 
Apart from the example listed in point "2" (to colour connecting lines), the assignment of 
appropriate quotas to employees may be included in this type of duty. 
Ishizuka, supra note 100 at (942) 3. 
Ishizuka, ibid. at (948) 11. 
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inexperienced employees are supervised by experienced superiors during their operation 
(the establishment of supervision and training system to prevent collection errors). This 
type of corporate duty obviously overlaps with the first type of the risk -averting duties 
advocated by Ishizuka. The second component of corporate risk -averting duties is to 
establish the communication system or liaison between corporate policy-making 
officials and those who are likely to detect prospective deficiencies of the risk-averting 
systems (the establishment of a communication system to avoid transaction errors). 
The establishment of liaison may be conductive to discharging the second and third 
types ofIshizuka's risk-averting duties in order both to help the employees not to make 
mistakes and to prevent their possible mistakes from causing the prohibited result. The 
final component of corporate risk-averting is to conduct periodic inspections of the 
existing risk-averting systems (Ishizuka's fourth and fifth types of risk-averting duties), 
in order for corporate policy-making officials properly to assess the existence of the 
risk. 104 If any information as to some deficiency of the established risk-averting systems 
is transmitted to corporate policy-making officials, the imposition of periodic inspection 
duties may induce them to take prompt measures to correct it prior to the occurrence of 
the disastrous result. 
Together with Ishizuka's classification of risk-averting duties, the following 
methods may make it more appropriate to find corporate assessment errors on the extent 
of the risk involved in the corporate operations: (1) the introduction of the concept of 
notification adopted in the reactive fault model; 105 and (2) the imposition of a legal duty 
to assess the risk duty upon it. A legislative example of the risk assessment duty (2) is 
found in the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992, which 
requires corporate and individual employers of all types of work (except sea transport) 
104 
105 
Periodic inspections may also be conducted through "outside audi~s and regul~r compliance 
reports." See Anonymous, "Developments in the Law - Corporate Crune: Regulatmg Corporate 
Behavior through Criminal Sanctions" (1979) 92 Harvard Law Review 1227 at 1258, as referred 
to in Chapter 4, text accompanying note 117. 
Supra note 93. As for a legislative model of "notices," see, for ~x~ple, ~;ctio~s. ~ I and ~2 0,: 
the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 ("improvement notices and prohlbltI~n notlc~s 
respectively, issued by an inspector, who is appointed by the relevant enforcing authonty (sectIOn 
19 of the Act). 
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to assess risks and neutralise them. 106 Regulation 3(1) states: 
"Every employer shall make a suitable and sufficient assessment of-
(a) the risks to the health and safety of his employees to which they are exposed whilst 
they are at work; and 
(b) the risks to the health and safety of persons not in his employment arising out of or 
in connection with the conduct by him of his undertaking 
for the purpose of identifying the measures he needs to take to comply with the 
requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him, by or under the relevant statutory 
provision. ,,107 
According to Forlin and Appleby, the requirements of risk assessments are also referred 
to in the Code of Practice relating to the Regulations and approved by the Health and 
Safety Commission, particularly, in their Preface and the heading of "General Principles 
of Risk Assessment" as follows: 
"[Preface] - Although failure to comply with any provision of this code is not in itself an 
offence, that failure may be taken by a Court in criminal proceedings as proof that a person 
has contravened the regulation or sections of the [Health and Safety at Work etc] 1974 
Act." 
"[General Principles of Risk Assessment] - A risk assessment should usually involve 
identifying the hazards present in any undertaking (whether arising from work activities 
or from other factors, e.g. the layout of premises) and then evaluating the extent of the 
risks involved, taking into account whatever precautions are already being taken. In this 
Approved Code: 
(a) a hazard is something with the potential to cause harm (this can include substances 
or machines, methods of work and other aspects of work organisation); 
(b) risk expresses the likelihood that the harm from a particular hazard is realised; 
( c) the extent of the risk covers the popUlation which might be affected by a risk, i. e. 
the number of people who might be exposed and the consequences to them. 
Risk therefore reflects both the likelihood that harm will occur and its severity.,,108 




See G. Forlin & M. Appleby, "Corporate Manslaughter by Gross Negligence" (1998) Practical 
Research Papers - Crime - Offences - Homicide (Sweet & Maxwell, London), pp. 10-11. 
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulation 1992, SI 1992/2051, Regulation 3 "Risk 
Assessment". "The Regulation makes provision for review and requires that where there are five 
or more employees that the risk assessment is recorded in writing." Forlin & Appleby, supra note 
106 at 10. 
Forlin & Appleby, supra note 106 at 10. The term "risk" used in the H~adin~ of "General 
principle of risk assessment" corresponds precisely to one used throughout thIS theSIS. See supra 
text accompanying note 45. 
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assess the risk as proof in criminal proceedings that s/he is in violation of the relevant 
provision of the Act. Under the proposed model of corporate liability for manslaughter 
here, the employer's duty to assess the risk at issue is viewed as part ofhislher duties 
to avert the risk. Thus, if it is proved that the corporate employer's failure properly to 
take risk-averting actions is (1) based on its breach of the risk assessment duty and (2) 
causally linked to the prohibited result, it can be held liable for reckless manslaughter: \09 
that is, the corporation is to be blamed for its conduct (lack of, or insufficient, safety 
systems) in relation to mental states (improper risk assessments). 
Forlin and Appleby properly point out that risk assessments "require the 
b t · ,,110 "P t'" f . h company to e proac lve. roac lve means,o course, pnor to t e occurrence of 
the actual harm. Given that the risk expresses the probability or likelihood of the 
occurrence of harm, the type of necessary risk-averting actions may vary according to 
the degree of the likelihood of harm. Accordingly, carrying out the risk assessment, to 
echo Forlin and Appleby, "is not the end of the matter. Once a risk assessment has been 
carried out the company has to consider it and introduce mechanisms to reduce the 
risk."111 This leads to the conclusion that the risk assessment should be made prior to 
the occurrence of the actual harm, whilst the risk -averting actions may be required to 
be taken prior to or reactive to the occurrence of the likelihood of harm. 
5.5.3. A Statutory Model of Corporate Liability for Manslaughter under the Risk-
Oriented Theory 
The new approach that has so far been suggested is called here the "risk-oriented 




Forlin & Appleby argue that failure to carry out a risk assessment may constitut~ n:gligence 
(carelessness) for manslaughter. Ibid. As described earlier, the risk assessment an~ nskJudgment 
is to be distinguished in this thesis' position in terms ofthe offender's state ofmmd to~ard ~he 
existence of the risk. Once slhe acknowledges the risk itself, hislher subsequent underes~atIOn 
of the scale of the risk and overestimation of hislher risk-averting skills are considered hls/her 
breach of duty to assess the risk. 
Forlin & Appleby, ibid. 
Ibid. 
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model. 1 12 
112 
1. - (1) A corporation which, by its lack of a sufficient safety system, causes death f 
. ·1 f 0 a person IS gUl ty 0 reckless manslaughter if -
(a) it is aware, through its decision-making officers, of a risk that its lack of a 
sufficient safety system will cause death or serious injury; and 
(b) it is unreasonable for it to take that risk having regard to the circumstances 
as it, through its decision-making officers, knows or believes them to be. 
(2) the corporation's awareness of the risk may be established by proving that its decision-
making officers fail to make a suitable and sufficient assessment of -
(a) the risk to the health and safety of its employees to which they are exposed 
whilst they are at work; and 
(b) the risk to the health and safety to persons not in its employment arising out 
of or in connection with the operation by it of its undertaking 
for the purpose of identifying the measures, it, through its decision-making officers, 
needs to take to comply with the requirements and prohibitions imposed upon it, by or 
under the relevant statutory provision. 
(3) the corporation's failure to make a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risk may 
be established by proving that it, by its decision-making officers, fails to take 
reasonable steps to avert the risk after its receipt of notice as to the existence of the risk, 
issued by a court or administrative agency. 
2. - (1) A corporation which, by its lack of a sufficient safety system, causes the death of 
a person is guilty of killing by gross carelessness if-
(a) a risk that its lack of a sufficient safety system will cause death or serious 
injury of a person would be obvious to a reasonable corporation in its 
position: 
(b) it is capable, through its decision-making officers, of appreciating that risk 
at the material time; and 
(c) the relevant safety system falls far below what can reasonably be expected 
of the corporation in the circumstances. 
(2) There is a lack of a sufficient safety system by a corporation if it is established that the 
way in which its risk-involving operations are managed and organised fails to ensure 
the health and safety of persons employed in or affected by those operations; by 
(a) proving that it fails to establish proper training or supervision systems ~ 
order to employ competent staff for risk-involving operations, to tram 
unskilful employees, and/or to ensure that inexperienced workers are 
supervised by experienced superiors during their operation; 
(b) proving that it fails to establish the communication system or liaison between 
corporate policy-making officers and workers involved in the relevant 
operations; and/or 
(c) proving that it fails to use the established communication system stated in 
Defences available to the corporation will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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(2)(b) or to conduct periodic inspections as to the existing safety st' 
d fi . d .. k' ys em m or er or Its ec~slOn-ma mg officers to make proper judgments as to the 
presence of the nsk. 
(3) A la~k of a ~ufficient sa~ety sy~tem may ~e regarded as a cause of a person's death 
notwlthstandmg that the Immediate cause IS the act or omission of an individual. 
(4) ~ this section, "~orporate ~:cision-ma~ing ~f!icers" means officers of the corporation 
with such executive authonties that theIr deCISions may fairly be assumed to affect risk-
involving operations and safety systems of the corporation. 
3. In the above sections 1 and 2, 
(1) the risk expresses the likelihood that the harm from a particular hazard (including 
machines, methods of work and other aspects of work organisation) or operation is 
realised; 
(2) the risk reflects both the likelihood that harm will occur and its severity. 
5.6. A Comparison with Other Approaches 
The risk-oriented theory is based on the Law Commission's proposals for individual 
liability for manslaughter, and reflects, to some degree, organisation theories examined 
in the previous chapter. The idea of corporate "policy," "practices" or "cultures" is built 
in the term "system" used by the risk-oriented theory, such as the establishment of 
supervision and training system (designed to prevent collection errors), communication 
system (designed to avoid transaction errors), periodic inspection system (designed to 
prevent judgment errors and/or assessment errors). The aim of incorporating the 
concept of "system" into the risk-oriented theory is, unlike the corporate policy model, 
to capture corporate conduct, not corporation' mental states. l13 As suggested earlier, the 
lack of sufficient risk-averting systems may imply either corporate intention, 
recklessness or negligence in relation to the prohibited result. It cannot, however, tell 
us which corporate states of mind existed at the material time. Thus, the required 
corporate mental states (recklessness or gross carelessness) should be proved by 
evidence that one or more of these types of errors on the part of the corporate defendant 
existed at the material time. 
In addition, the model of corporate proactive fault is also reflected in the risk-
oriented theory. Any corporate failure to exercise due diligence to prevent the 
occurrence of the risk of harm is enumerated in terms of "errors" mentioned above. As 
113 Supra note 42. 
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will be referred to in the next chapter, the corporation will be granted a defence if it 
makes an all-out effort to avoid these errors. Unlike the proactive model, however, the 
burden of proof is not reversed under the risk-oriented theory. As Clarkson properly 
indicates, "Convicting companies of the same offences [= common law offences such 
as manslaughter], established in the same way as those committed by individuals, is the 
best route to emphasising the seriousness of the crime and expressing the appropriate 
d f ,,114 T . taO th d f egree 0 censure. 0 mam m e same egree 0 censure for both corporate and 
individual fault, no special modification should be made concerning the burden of 
proof. I IS 
Finally, the idea of notification used under the reactive fault model is reflected 
in the risk-oriented theory.116 The main purpose of incorporating the concept of 
notification is to draw a clear line between corporate judgment errors and corporate 
assessment errors in relation to the existence of the risk. Once any notice issued by a 
court or administrative agency is sent to the corporation, its top management are 
presumed to perceive the risk. It should be noted here, however, that corporate gross 
carelessness under the risk-oriented theory is not limited to the case in which it fails to 
establish a safety system in reaction to the risk. The corporation's duty to avert the risk 
ranges from its proactive to reactive efforts to prevent the risk, depending on the degree 




Apart from these organisation theories, there are four other theories for corporate 
Clarkson, supra note 17 at 572. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, n.24, corporations have been considered to cause health and sa~ety 
risks either by creating occupational harm to workers, by selling the defective goods and servIc.es 
to consumers and customers, or by deteriorating the environment affecting the general pubhc. 
These risk-causing activities are already regulated in English law in terms of codifying offences 
of strict liability. The meaning of prosecuting corporations for manslaughter is to attach severer 
blame to them than that for strict liability offences. The following is what Clarkson goes on to 
say on the matter: . . .. 
"[T]ransforming all known offences in English law into prima jacie. crimes of ~tnct lIabIhty 
simply because they are committed by companies smacks of overkill and unfarrness. More 
significantly, it could be counter-productive in that 'corp~rate m~nslaughter' wou.ld be 
perceived as different from 'manslaughter,' which could agam contrIbute to the contmued 
marginalisation of such offences." 
Clarkson, supra note 17 at 572. 
Supra notes 93 and 105. 
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liability: the duty stratification approach; constructive corporate liability approach; 
aggregation theory; and management failure approach. In order to demonstrate several 
advantages of the risk-oriented theory over these theories, each theory will be outlined 
and critically examined below. 
5.6.1. The Duty Stratification Approach 
The duty stratification approach has been intended by Rogozino to "apply in situations 
where acts constituting a statutory violation have occurred, but no individual retains the 
requisite mens rea.,,!!7 The first step of this approach is to call for an adoption of an 
adequate compliance program which requires a corporation to ensure that each of its 
employees understands the laws relevant to the corporation's activitiesYs In 
determining whether the corporation actually implements compliance programs, this 
approach focuses on the roles of individuals who are in two different positions: lower-
level employees who actually perform violative acts but do not retain the requisite mens 
rea, and their superiors upon whom a duty is imposed to make their inferiors aware of 
the statutory obligations. This approach would find corporate liability when its superior 
(or those to whom the superior delegates hislher responsibility) "fails to inform lower-
level employees of a pertinent statute, or fails to fully explain its application to an 
employee's conduct.,,119 In other words, the superior's breach of such a duty is 





A. Rogozino, "Replacing the Collective Knowledge Doctrine with a Better Theory for Establishing 
Corporate Mens Rea: The Duty Stratification Approach" (1995) 24 Southwestern University Law 
Review 423 at 448, arguing that since the vicarious liability is imposed on a corporation in the US, 
there is no need to apply this approach to cases in which an actual offender retains the requisite 
mens rea. Ibid. at 457. 
Rogozino, ibid. at pp. 449-454. Corporate compliance programs have been mandated in the US 
since the new Federal Sentencing Guidelines (issued by the United States Sentencing Commission) 
became effective for organisations on 1 November, 1991. US Sentencing Commission, Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual (1998, ch.8, available through http://www.ussc.gov./), which will be analysed 
in the next chapter. 
Rogozino, supra note 117 at 456. 
Under this approach, a corporation will be held liable if (1) the superior is found to h~ve 
knowingly or intentionally breached hislher duty to assure compliance, or (2) the supenor 
properly informed the lower-level employees of statutory obligations, but the employees a~te,d 
knowingly for the benefit of the corporation. Rogozino, ibid. at pp. 457-458. As for the supenor s 
personal liability, slhe will no be held liable when properly discharged hislher duty, or when 
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One noticeable feature of this approach is that corporate liability is based on the 
superior's breach of a supervisory duty to infonn lower-level employees of statutory 
obligations. This is a similar aspect of the risk-oriented theory which would find 
corporate collection errors when inexperienced or poorly-trained workers are engaged 
in the risk-involving operations. However, the most obvious disadvantage of the duty 
stratification approach lies in the fact that it is "only concerned with crimes requiring 
some proof of intent" 121 , so that it is difficult to apply it to the cases of manslaughter 
which requires proof of recklessness or gross carelessness. Even if applied, the duty 
stratification approach would focus only on the superior's reckless or negligent breach 
ofhislher duty to train the employees and, then, the other aspects of corporate fault, such 
as the lack of safety system, might be neglected. As discussed in the previous 
subsection, the top management's failure in supervisory duty may comprise corporate 
recklessness or carelessness in some situations, but more detailed and extensive analysis 
may be needed as to the role of each corporate personnel in the whole corporate system 
in cases of corporate manslaughter. 
5.6.2. The Constructive Corporate Liability Approach 
Next, the constructive corporate liability approach has been advocated by Laufer. 122 
This approach consists of constructive corporate actions and corporate mental states. 




"corporate intentionality and action may be found in: (1) agents whose actions and 
intentions are related to each other in such a way that they come to take on characteristics 
ofthe organization, (2) agents whose relationship to the organization is such that their acts 
and intents are those of the organization, and (3) aspects of the organization, such as 
policies, goals, and practices, that come to reflect more that the collective nature of agents' 
intentions and actions (primary action and intentions). Corporations may be distinguished 
from aggregations of individuals on the basis of their structure, decisionmaking, size, 
formality, functionality, and complexity." [Footnotes omitted]123 
I . 'art' I t tute's merely negligent or reckless in that slhe did not fully or clearly exp am a p ICU ar s a 
relation to an employee's conduct. Ibid. at 458. 
Ibid. at 466. 
W.S. Laufer, "Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds" (1994) 43 Emory Law Journal 647. 
Laufer, ibid. at pp. 676-677. 
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As for corporate actions, on the one hand, Laufer insists that "an act that is owned or 
d b h . ,,124 b'd'fi authore y t e corporatIOn may e 1 ent11ed through an objective test where: 
"it is detennined that given the size, complexity, fonnality, functionality, decisionmaking 
precess, and the structure of the corporate organization, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the agents' act are the actions of the corporation.,,125 
Under the reasonableness test used to identify the agent's act as the actions of the 
corporation, "the stronger the agent-entity relationship, the more reasonable it is to 
consider an agent's action to be a construction of corporate conduct. 126 
"As the agency-entity relationship increases, actions (in the fonn of choices and decisions) 
become impersonal. Agents who have been given the authority, through delegation, to 
carry out their duties, with a certain power and responsibility, act for the organization, on 
behalf of the organization, and with a consideration of organizational goals and 
objectives." [Footnote omitted] 127 
In a word, the reasonableness of the construction of corporate conduct is based on the 
strength of the relationship of the agent to the entity, and if the strength of the 
relationship is considered sufficient to determine the corporation's authorship of the act 





Ibid. at 682. 
"Both "ownership" and "authorship" are critical terms for the proposed models. The former 
reflects the connectedness between an agent's acts or intents and the organization's. The 
latter reflects an action or intention that is not attributable to any single agent or group, but 
rather comes from the organization. Such actions and intentions will almost always be 
derivative of individual or group action." 
Ibid. at n.132. 
Ibid. at 682. Thus, proof of corporate "primary" actions is constructive under Laufer's approach. 
The following is what Laufer has to say on the matter: 
"The term "constructive" will be used throughout the balance of this Article in relation to 
primary acts and intents. The word is used to reflect the process of construing facts, 
circumstances, conduct, and results. In cornmon legal practice, a constructive X is not an 
actual X, but an interpretation of X in the context of its legal significance. Thus, 
constructive assent, authority, or knowledge is not actual assent, authority, or knowledge 
but a legal construction that is inferred or assumed. A model of constructive corporate fault 
is not actual fault, but the legal construction of corporate intention based on reasonableness 
judgments. Construction of a legal term, unlike interpretation, allows for refe~ence to 
aspects ofthe term's character that it assumes in the context in which it is used, gIven the 
policies that underwrite its utility and existence." 
Ibid. at 680, n.123. 
Ibid. at 687. 
Ibid. 
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As for corporate mental states such as purpose, knowledge, recklessness and 
negligence,128 on the other hand, Laufer considers "a wide range of states of mind 
derived from organizational attributes, feature, processes, and structures in relation to 
the actions of corporate agents.,,129 Under the constructive corporate culpability model, 
each corporate state of mind may be found as follows: 
"Purpose: 
A corporation acts purposely if its object or goal is to engage in conduct or cause 
a result and, if the offense involves attendant circumstances, there is an awareness 
of such circumstances, or a belief that they exist. 
Knowledge: 
A corporation acts knowingly when there is an awareness that conduct exists of a 
certain nature, or there is an awareness that it is practically certain that its conduct 
will cause a result. 
Recklessness: 
A corporation acts recklessly when there is a knowing disregard of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that a material element of the offense exists or will result. The risk 
must be such that its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct expected of a corporation in its situation. 
Negligence: 
A corporation acts negligently when it should be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the material element of the offense exists or will result. The 
risk must be such that failure to perceive it involves a gross deviation from the 
standard of care exercised by the average corporation in its situation.,,13o 
128 These types of state of mind correspond to those provided in Section 2.02. of the American 




Laufer, supra note 122 at 715. The terms such as "attributes," "features," "processes" or 
"structures" are frequently used in organisation theories, which are examined in the previous 
chapter. Yet, Laufer emphasises that unlike the models of corporate policy, reactive fault and 
proactive fault, the model of constructive corporate fault can properly assess all types of mental 
states (ibid. at 715, n.269), by providing numerous examples of organisational variables, such as 
size (e.g., the number of employees), goals (e.g., statements and evidence oflong-term corporate 
objectives), strategies (e.g., plan of action with a consideration of resource allocation), culture 
(e.g., central or key values, norms, and beliefs shared by organisation), specialisation ~e.g, exte~t 
to which tasks are divided into job assignments), formalisation (e.g., extent to whIch there IS 
written documentation of organisational behaviour and activities), hierarchy of authority (e.g., le:el 
of employee responsibility in relation to span of control), centralisation (e.g., extent to WhICh 
authority is maintained at the highest levels ofthe hierarchy of authority, or delegated to lower 
levels), and complexity (e.g., the number of levels within the hierarchy; the number of corporate 
locations; and the number of job across an organisation). Ibid. at 725 ("Table 5"). 
Laufer, ibid. at 725 ("Table 5"). 
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The above constructive corporate liability approach is based on Laufer's understanding 
of the concept of culpability, which takes an intermediate position between descriptive 
and normative theories of culpability.!3! At first, Laufer argues that "[t]he difference 
between and among purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent wrongdoing is 
incidental to a normative assessment. Differences in the descriptive hierarchy of mental 
states are important only if they reflect important differences .... " !32 Yet, Laufer rej ects 
an explicitly normative theory that dispenses with proof of a state of mind,133 by 
asserting that descriptive mental states are relevant to moral and legal responsibility so 
that they are indispensable. 134 Laufer then concludes that reference to culpable mental 
states still needs to be made in determining the defendant's criminal liability, "but those 
mental states need not be proved by an entirely subjective standard": corporate mental 
states can be proved "with reasonable judgments." 135 
"[C]onstructive corporate culpability facilitates proof of the presence of a corporate mental 
state. It permits fact finders to move beyond the strictures of subjective evidence of 
culpability in order to fmd corporate states of mind that may be more reasonably deduced 
or inferred - with or without the assistance of subjective evidence proffered by the 
defendant. The search is for the best possible estimation of a corporate mental state 
through actual knowledge, as well as through reasonable inferences. Did the actions of 
the corporation, given the circumstances, objectively manifest intention or purpose, 
awareness or knowledge, indifference or recklessness? Would the average corporation of 
like size, structure, and complexity have known ofthe risks of injury? Notwithstanding 
any evidence of actual knowledge, there are the central questions of constructive fault.,,!36 
Despite its sophistication, this approach can be criticised for two reasons. The first 







See Chapter 4, text accompanying notes 108-112. 
Laufer, supra note 122 at 702. 
Laufer cites G.P. Fletcher, "The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis" (19?1) 
119 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 401 at 414 ("if mens rea refers not.to a sp~cJfic 
subjective state, but to the actor's moral culpability in acting as it does, then there mIght logIcally 
be a way to establish personal culpability without referring to a state of mind."). Laufer, supra 
note 122 atpp. 702-703. 
Laufer, supra note 122 at 703. 
Laufer, ibid. at pp. 703-704. 
Ibid. at pp. 704-705. 
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actions and requisite mental states. Like corporate policy, ethos, or character theories \37 
, 
this approach requires fact finders and prosecutors to consider innumerable 
organisational variables. 138 Given that most evidence concerning corporate policy, 
practice, goal or ratification of illegal actions are likely to be internal to the corporation, 
labourious efforts may be required for the prosecution to obtain "corporate records, 
internal memos, and the cooperation of witness whose interest may be adverse to those 
of the government.,,139 As a result, it may place "an enormous burden on prosecutional 
resources.,,140 Added to this, the assessment of these variables involves fact finders in 
mere fact-dependent inquiry and, therefore, it provides them with little guidance in 
determining the specific corporate state of mind. 141 As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the existence of organisational rules or practices itself cannot explain exactly 
what result the corporation intended to cause. 142 
It is for this reason that the risk-oriented theory, unlike the constructive corporate 







Chapter 4, Subsection 4.1.2. 
Supra note 129. Laufer provides the following examples required for proof of each type of state 
of mind: 
"Purpose: desire to commit an illegality, coupled with foresight that action will result in 
harm; policy or practice encourages illegality; goal or objective of action is the 
illegality; the ratification or endorsement of the violation by the corporation; 
express or tacit authorisation of illegality; 
Knowledge: tolerated or permitted the illegality; consented or indulged the activity; willing 
to have crime occur; 
Recklessness: deliberate inattention to substantial risks of harm; willful neglect; knowing 
indifference; 
Negligence: inadequate management, control, or supervision of employees; mana~e~.ent 
should have known of a substantial risk of harm given employee actIvItIes; 
failure to make reasonable efforts or take reasonable precautions to prevent crime 
commission' proactive due diligence; unreasonableness of corporate practices 
, " 
and procedures; harm was foreseeable but did not prompt corporate response 
Laufer, supra note 122 at 725 ("Table 5"). 
J. Moore, "Corporate Culpability under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines" (1992) 34 Arizona 
Law Review 743 at 778. 
Moore, ibid. 
Moore, ibid. at 777; Ragozino, supra note 117 at 442. 
Chapter 4 text accompanying notes 85-91. Thus, Moore suggests that these f~ct~r.s that are 
. ' . h h t th . s for corporate hablhty should 
consIdered under the corporate polIcy, et os or c arac er eone . 
be assessed at sentencing. Moore, supra note 139 at 778. 
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not to form the requisite corporate mental states, but to form corporate conduct. Once 
it is proved that the lack of, or insufficient, risk-averting systems is one of the causes of 
the prohibited result, the risk-oriented theory then infers corporate mental states 
(recklessness or gross carelessness) from the existence of corporate errors in relation to 
these systems. 
The second criticism of the constructive corporate liability approach results from 
its effort to construe corporate action. As referred to earlier,143 this approach 
incorporates the unique concept of "authorship" or "ownership" for construing corporate 
action. Since Laufer attempts to maintain a concurrent relation of corporate action to 
corporate culpability (mental states), 144 the reasonable inference standards are again 
utilised to determine the strength of the agent-entity relationship. Once the degree of 
this relationship is deemed under the reasonable inference standards strong enough to 
consider the corporation to author or own the agent's act at issue, then that act is 
construed as part of corporate actions. Despite its novelty, however, the concept of 
authorship or ownership provides little explanation as to how it can be distinguished 
from "imputation" or "identification" in this context. 
Suppose that the agent performs an illegal conduct in accordance with the 
corporation's policy or practice. Once it is proved that the act is done within the scope 
of hislher employment on behalf of the corporation, the vicarious liability doctrine 
allows hislher act to be imputed to the corporation. Under the corporate constructive 
liability approach, the same result may be obtained because hislher conduct simply 
manifests corporate illegal policy. The only difference between the two is whether to 
say "hislher conduct is imputed to the corporation" or "it is owned by the corporation 
through its policy." The same is true of the identification principle or the high 
145 Ih . 'd 'fi d managerial agent approach. As mentioned in Chapter 2, s e IS 1 entl Ie as a 
controlling officer or high managerial agent under these theories simply because hislher 
position and authority in the corporate hierarchy are considered likely to make himlher 
143 Supra text accompanying notes 124-127. 
144 
Laufer, supra note 122 at 686. 
145 Chapter 2, text accompanying note 230. 
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represent corporate policy.146 Similarly, the higher hislher position is in the corporate 
hierarchy, the more likely that the agent-entity relationship is viewed as strong under the 
reasonable inference standards, so that it is made reasonable by this approach that an 
agent's action is owned by the corporation. 
Given the fact that a corporation cannot perform criminal conduct in the physical 
sense, it is undeniable that proof of corporate conduct is somewhat constructive. This 
does not necessarily mean, however, that the agent's act should be regarded as the whole 
part of corporate conduct in relation to corporate fault. It is for this reason that under 
the risk-oriented theory, any corporate personnel's conduct is considered a mere cog in 
the corporate wheel in relation to the risk. 147 
5.6.3. The Aggregation Theory 
Apart from the prosecution's theory in the P & 0 case,148 the aggregation theory 
can be found in Section 12.4. of Australian Criminal Code Act 1995 as follows: 
"(1) The test of negligence for a body corporate is that set out in section 5.5. 
(2) If: 
(a) negligence is a fault element in relation to a physical element of an offence; and 
(b) no individual employee, agent or officer of the body corporate has that fault 
element; 
that fault element may exist on the part of the body corporate if the body corporate's 
conduct is negligent when viewed as a whole (that is, by aggregating the conduct of 
any number of its employees, agents or officers). 
(3) Negligence may be evidenced by the fact that the prohibited conduct was substantially 
attributable to: 
(a) inadequate corporate management, control or supervision of the conduct of one or 
more of its employees, agents or officers; or 
(b) failure to provide adequate systems for conveying relevant information to relevant 
. h b d t ,,149 persons m teo y corpora e. 
Subsection (2) expresses the aggregation theory as to negligence, whilst subsection (3) 
146 See §2.07(4)(c) of the American Model Penal Code, cited in Chapter 4, n.36. 
147 Supra text accompanying notes 31-33 and 41-42. 
148 Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 88-90. 
149 Chapter 4, text accompanying note 128. 
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provides the way in which negligence may be proved. Subsection (3)(a) is very similar 
to the concept of collection errors under the risk-oriented theory, whilst subsection 
(3)(b) is similar to transaction errors. Unlike the risk-oriented theory, however, this Act 
fails to provide any sound reason why proof of subsection (3)(a) or (b) establishes 
corporate negligence. Consider the following quotation. 
"Treating corporations as potential objects of blame in their own right penn its a more 
sophisticated law of corporate negligence. One advantage is that aggregation of individual 
negligence not only becomes possible but also is given a clear rationale. When a number 
of individuals within a corporation have been negligent to some degree, the corporation 
may well be judged to have been grossly negligent. The failure of the corporation to guard 
against a widespread pattern of negligence by its individual representatives may amount 
to a more serious breach of its own duty of care .... ,,150 
It is apparent that this line of argument is based on a non sequitur, since no explanation 
is given as to why the aggregation of several senior officers' mere (namely, not gross) 
negligence can amount to corporate gross negligence. Unless and until each 
individual's negligence interrelates in particular contexts, such as risk-involving 
operations, to follow Wells' metaphor, two plus two still equals four, not five. 151 
As mentioned above,152 the risk-oriented theory views each individual's 
negligence a mere cog in the whole corporate fault. But this does not mean that the 
aggregate of individuals' negligence amounts to corporate negligence. The relationship 
between individual and corporate fault should be compared to a chemical formula that 
H2 + 02 = H2O. That is to say, each individual's conduct is either hydrogen or oxygen, 
which by itself does not amount to water. For both hydrogen and oxygen to be 
combined into water, a certain chemical treatment or action is needed. Under the 
particular corporate risk-averting action or system, each individual is assigned a certain 
role to play in order for the system to operate. Even if some of individuals are negligent 
in playing their roles, it is still not certain whether the whole risk-averting system fails 




Colvin, Corporate Liability, supra note 28 at 27. See also Smith, supra note 47 at p. 189, cited 
in Chapter 4, n.24. 
C. Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (1993, Clarendon Press, Oxford), p.88 ("2 
+ 2 = 5?") 
Supra text accompanying note 147. 
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"error" needs to be inherent in the system itself (= a chemical treatment or action). If, 
for example, poorly-trained workers are assigned a certain operation in relation to the 
source of work (= collection errors), and their probable mistakes trigger the disaster, it 
is both their probable mistake and inadequate supervision or training system that 
combine to form the prohibited result, for which the corporation should be blamed. 153 
Under the risk-oriented theory, one or some of the errors inherent in the 
corporation's risk-averting system is or are considered causally linked to the prohibited 
result. Whether it is held liable for reckless manslaughter or manslaughter by gross 
carelessness is determined according to the type(s) of error. However, the aggregation 
theory adopted in the Australian Criminal Code Act provides no firm guidance as to 
what connects each individual's negligence, or as to why the aggregation of their 
negligence can be said to be causally linked to the result. 
5.6.4. The Management Failure Approach 
As referred to earlier,154 a management failure approach has been recommended by the 
Law Commission. Under Section 4 of its draft bill, 
153 
154 
"(1) A corporation is guilty of corporate killing if -
The idea of the relationship between individual and corporate fault developed here has been 
inspired by the dramaturgical model, one of the organisation theories submitted in 1. Mangham, 
Interactions and Interventions in Organizations (1978, Wiley, New York). Under this model, the 
role of each corporate personnel in organisational activities is compared to that of figures in the 
dramaturgical world: corporate representative or top executive official to producer; board of 
directors to playwright; managerial agents or supervisors to directors; and employees to actors. 
The central question here is: if a play amounts to an illegal act ofpomography, who is to blame? 
Mangham attempts to answer this question by dividing the corporate decision-making structure 
into a bottom-up and top-down ones. In the former case, a "producer" has primary and overall 
responsibility for the illegal act, but a "playwright" who writes the scripts at issue, directors who 
have a chance to modify the scripts, and actors who have a chance to refuse to play their role, may 
share the responsibility. In the latter case, on the other hand, the scripts are written in a process 
of negotiation between actors and directors. Thus, if the scripts are criminogenic, responsibility 
lies with both the actor and the director. Furthermore, the dramaturgical model is applicable to 
responsibility of those who are outside the organisation - the critics (a regulatory agency) and the 
audience (customers). That is, a regulatory agency cannot escape responsibility if the 
company's violation of the law is tolerated or ignored by hirnJher. The customers as responsible 
agents may arises when the violation is demanded by them - an audience at a night club which 
throws objects on the stag when the script does not allow the performer to take offhislher clothes. 
For further details of some organisation theories, see, for example, Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 
29, ch.4. 
Supra text accompanying notes 5-11. 
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( a) a management failure by the corporation is the cause or one of the causes of a 
person's death; and 
(b) that failure constitutes conduct falling far below what can reasonably be expected 
of the corporation in the circumstances. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above _ 
(a) there is a management failure by a corporation if the way in which its activities are 
managed or organised fails to ensure the health and safety of persons employed in 
or affected by those activities; and 
(b) such a failure may be regarded as a cause of a person's death notwithstanding that 
the immediate cause is the act or omission of an individual. 
(3) A corporation guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on 
indictment to a fine. 
(4) No individual shall be convicted of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring an 
offence under this section but without prejudice to an individual being guilty of any 
other offence in respect of the death in question.,,155 
Apart from inadequacy of the omission of the requirements of recklessness and 
obviousness in gross carelessness,156 one of the noticeable features of its draft bill is the 
replacement of the individual's gross carelessness with corporate management failure, 
specified in subsection (2)(a). This concept is based on an employer's duty to provide 
a safety system of work for employees in the body of civillaw.157 This duty consists of 
several branches: (i) to provide a safe place of work, including a safe means of access; 
(ii) to employ competent staff; (iii) to provide and maintain adequate appliances; and 
(iv) to provide a safe system of work 158 
As compared with the risk-oriented theory, failure to perform duty (ii) may 
amount to collection errors, whilst duties (i), (iii) and (iv) are all concerned with the 
corporation's risk-averting actions after its "brains" perceive the probable occurrence 
of harm. However, there is no equivalent of the concept of transaction error or Section 





Law Commission, Draft Bill, supra note 43. 
Supra text accompanying notes 12-17. 
Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, supra note 2 at paras. 8.10-8.34. As Sullivan points 
out, however, "[t]he Law Commission was, of course, using this case law as a guide to corporate 
liability for any deaths causally related to the company's activities and not merely the work related 
deaths of its employees." Sullivan, supra note 14, n.122. This is reflected in subsection (2)(a) 
(" .... the health and safety of persons employed in or affected by those activities"). 
Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, supra note 2 at para. 8.12. 
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proposal. This is an unfortunate omission by the Law Commission, since it is probable 
that the corporation's failure in one or some of the duties (i)-(iv) may results from the 
lack of an adequate system for conveying relevant information from employees (who 
detect some deficiency in the established safety system or appliances) to corporate 
decision-making officials. Together with the establishment of corporate recklessness 
based on the concept of assessment errors, the risk-oriented theory has certain 
advantages over the management failure approach at this point. 
Other features of the draft bill are subsections (l)(a) and (2)(b), which specify 
express provisions of causation. These subsections display this draft bill's obvious 
advantage over the aggregation theory adopted in Section 12.4(3) of the Australian 
Criminal Code Act 1995. As mentioned in the previous subsection of this chapter, the 
aggregation theory adopted in the Australian code provides no explanation as to why 
each individual's negligence should be aggregated to form corporate negligence and, 
accordingly, this theory may obscure a clear line between individual and corporate 
negligence. The Law Commission's draft bill seems to succeed in drawing a line 
between the two, by way of emphasising a causal link between corporate management 
failure and the prohibited result. There are two conceivable cases where the corporate 
management failure and individual conduct fault coexist: (1) the immediate cause of the 
death at issue is a deliberate act or omission by an employee; and (2) the immediate 
cause was a mere operational negligence by her. The Law Commission thought that in 
the former case, the chain of causation between the corporate management failure and 
the result would be broken,159 whilst in the latter case, any consequence of the 
individual's negligence should be treated as a consequence of the corporate management 
fault if her negligence was foreseeable. 
159 
"For example, the immediate cause of the death might be the failure of an employee, 
through lack of attention, to give a signal which she was employed to give. Indeed, 
depending on the circumstances, the employee in question may personally be guilty of our 
proposed offence of killing by gross carelessness. It does not, in out ~ie,:,. follow that the 
employee's conduct should in itself absolve the corporation from ~tablhty, .because the 
management failure may have consisted in a failure to take precau~IO~s agamst. the veI?' 
kind of error that in fact occurred. If a company chooses to orgamse Its operatIOns as If 
all its employees were paragons of efficiency and prudence, and they are not, the company 
Ibid. at para. 8.36. 
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is at fault; if an ~mployee then displays human fallibility, and death results, the company 
cannot be permItted to deny responsibility for the death on the ground that the employee 
was .to blame: The company's fault lies in its failure to anticipate the foreseeable 
neglIgence of Its employee, and any consequence of such negligence should therefore be 
treated as a consequence of the company's fault"l60 
Unfortunately, the last sentence of this extract demonstrates the Law Commission's 
contradiction, which was mentioned earlier. 161 Foreseeable to whom? Since the Law 
Commission has rejected the view that the corporation in itself can foresee the risk 162 , 
more convincing explanations should be given to holding the corporation liable for its 
management failure even if the employee's operational negligence is the immediate 
cause of the death. 163 
The key solutions to the issue of causation in relation to the concurrence of 





Ibid. at para. 8.37. 
Supra text accompanying notes 5-11. 
Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, supra note 2 at para. 8.3. 
It may be for this contradiction that Sullivan sees little difference between the management 
approach and the aggregation theory. 
"From consideration of the grounds ofliability under the Commission's proposal, it would 
seem that aggregation need not to be invoked whenever the managerial or organisational 
failings of at least one associated individual fall far below of what could reasonably have 
been expected and constitutes one of the causes of the fatality. In such a case it is 
immaterial if the failings of other individuals are added to bolster the case against the 
company. As long as at least one individual has exhibited the culpability required, we 
encounter a form of vicarious liability restricted to those who perform managerial or 
organisational tasks. The Report insists however, that corporate liability should not be 
confmed to circumstances where it can be proved that a managerial individual possessed 
the requisite culpability. It is asserted that liability may be imposed without demonstrating 
that any individual was culpable. Yet if the culpability does not inhere in the corporation 
as a thing in itself, there can only be a collective judgment on the performance of the 
relevant class of individuals. If a finding of corporate culpability is made in circumstances 
where it cannot be said of any individual member of the class that his conduct fell far 
beyond what could reasonably be expected and was also in a causal relationship to the 
death, we encounter aggregation by whatever name called... If [the Commission's proposal] 
does not involve aggregation, the basis ofliability for this offence is obscure in what is the 
most prominent part of its potential application. The obscurity results from the lack of any 
informing theory. The Commission accepts that companies are mere legal entities, yet it 
essentially treats them as real entities. We are given no explanation of the reality of 
companies and how they may possess a culpability that is inherently their own. 
Consequently, it is difficult to determine what matters juries might appropriately take into 
account if they should ever be called upon to decide what deaths are corporate killings." 
[Footnotes omitted] 
Sullivan, supra note 14 at pp. 531-532. 
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both faults should be considered corporate one; and (2) to specify the availability of 
defences to the corporation. Under the risk-oriented theory, task (1) is already 
completed in terms of incorporating the concepts of collection, transaction, judgment 
and assessment errors. These errors are, of course, made by any corporate personnel. 
Since the risk-oriented theory views any individuals as cogs in the corporate wheel, 
however, their errors are usually considered in the light of corporate risk-averting 
systems which the corporation is expected to establish and operate properly.164 As a 
result, if the individual fault is regarded as related to one of these corporate errors, a 
causal link is properly established between corporate conduct and the prohibited 
consequences. 
Solution (2) is to be more instrumental in distinguishing cases where, on one 
hand, the corporation should be held liable for manslaughter and those where, on the 
other hand, it should be immune from liability. Yet, the available corporate defences 
are not limited to the case in which the causal link is broken. Rather, they also result 
from the unavoidability of the risk inherent in the particular corporate operation and the 
unforeseeability of the risk to the corporation. Together with the issue of aggravating 
and mitigating factors at corporate sentencing, task (2) will be addressed in the next 
chapter. 







DEFENCES AND SENTENCES FOR CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER 
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a new approach to the issue of corporate manslaughter, the 
"risk-oriented theory," was advanced, under which a corporation is to be held liable for 
manslaughter either by gross carelessness consisting of its collection, transaction and/or 
judgment errors in relation to the risk involved in its particular operation, or by 
recklessness consisting of its assessment errors of the risk. The most conspicuous 
advantage the risk-oriented theory offers is to equate the requirements for corporate 
manslaughter with those for individual manslaughter under the Law Commission's 
proposals for involuntary manslaughter. 1 Unlike other approaches examined in the 
proceeding chapters, no individual's fault is directly regarded as corporate fault. 
Attention is paid to the roles played by the corporate personnel in the whole corporate 
risk-averting systems, rather than to their personal fault. 
Under the statutory example of the risk-oriented theory,2 a corporation is held 
liable (1) when its lack of a safety system is "regarded as a cause of a person's death 
notwithstanding that the immediate cause is the act or omission of an individual;"3 (2) 
when, through its decision-making officers, it is aware of (or capable of appreciating) 
the risk;4 and (3) when it fails to take reasonable steps to avert the risk, or its relevant 
safety system falls far below what can reasonably be expected of the corporation in the 
circumstances. 5 These three occasions are all concerned with one of the issues that 
Law Commission No.237, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter (1996, 
HMSO, London) [hereinafter cited as Involuntary Manslaughter]. 
Chapter 5, Subsection 5.5.3. 
Ibid., Section 3(3) ofthe statutory provision. 
Ibid., Sections l(l)(a) and 2(1)(b) of the statutory provision. 
Ibid., Section 1(3) and 2(1)(c) of the statutory provision. 
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needs to be addressed in this chapter: in what circumstances should the corporation be 
immune from liability? Whilst several attempts have been made by commentators, as 
described in Chapters 4 and 5, to capture corporate fault and to extend the scope of 
corporate liability, little attention has been given by them to this issue.6 As indicated in 
the last part of the previous chapter, when individual and corporate fault are concurrent, 
the risk-oriented theory usually considers the former fault to be part of the latter, as long 
as it is related to corporate collection, transaction, judgment or assessment errors. The 
main concern here is how to distinguish between individuals' personal fault and their 
fault as part of corporate errors. Added to this, the statutory model provided in the 
previous chapter did not specify what part of the risk at issue the corporation (through 
its decision-making officers) should be aware of or be capable of appreciating. Lastly, 
there may be some cases in which the corporation, not its personnel, cannot reasonably 
be expected to avoid or avert the risk of harm: for example, in cases in which necessary 
risk-averting actions may be so costly as to damage corporate assets seriously. In 
addressing these questions, Section 6.2. completes the new approach by providing 
guidance as to the circumstances in which the corporate defendant should escape 
liability for manslaughter. 
The other issue to be dealt with here is related to corporate sentencing. There 
may be several cases in which corporations' efforts or attitudes in relation to the risk at 
Sullivan, for example, argues for corporate liability for manslaughter on the basis of the vicarious 
liability tempered by a due diligence defence in the following articles: G.R. Sullivan, "The 
Attribution of Culpability to Limited Companies" (1996) 55 Cambridge Law Journal 515 
[hereinafter cited as Attribution] (stating that "[a] company .... should be allowed to argue that 
despite a grossly negligent act or omission on the part of one or more of its personnel, its safety 
procedures and practice were all that could be reasonably asked of it at [the material] time."); 
"Expressing Corporate Guilt" (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 281 [hereinafter cited 
as Guilt] (stating that " .... if a death attributable to gross negligence occurs during the course of 
corporate activity, the matter merits investigation in terms ofthe safety standards obtaining in the 
organization. It is pertinent to ask whether matters could have been so organized, within the 
requirements of regulatory law and current good practice, to prevent .... an incident ~r make it .less 
likely. Better still perhaps, it should be for the company to demonstrate that Its operatIOns 
conformed with regulatory law and current good practice."). 
Unfortunately, no clear explanation or specific defmition ofthe terms "reasonably" and 
"good practice" is given by Sullivan and, hence, several important questions remain unresol~ed 
in his suggestion, such as: (1) what constitute(s) due diligence; (2) to what extent a corporatIOn 
should exercise due diligence at the material time so as to escape liability; and (3) how to 
distinguish between a due diligence required to escape liability for manslaughter and that for 




issue should be considered aggravating or mitigating factors for the severity of sentence. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2,7 new or revised penal codes have appeared in France, Spain, 
Portugal and Slovenia in relation to the issue of corporate criminal liability in 1990s, 
and proposals for legislating involuntary manslaughter (including corporate killing) have 
been submitted by the Law Commission. Nevertheless, no legislative solutions have 
hitherto been provided to resolve the issue of what types of sentencing factors should 
be considered for corporate sentencing, except the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 
which were promulgated on 1 November 1991 in the US. It has been indicated by 
American commentators that since the promulgation of these Guidelines, increasing 
attention has been paid both to imposing heavy economic sanctions on corporations and 
to considering incentives for them to prevent and detect violations of law in the US.8 
Although a discussion of whether the imposition of financial sanctions on corporate 
offenders serves the purposes of criminal law is beyond the scope of this thesis, a critical 
examination of several sentencing factors provided in the Guidelines may be helpful in 
determining the severity of sentence in cases where corporations are held liable for 
manslaughter in English law.9 While Section 6.3. is devoted to outlining the Guidelines, 
Section 6.4. examines the adequacy of the Guidelines by reference to some criticisms 
they are currently subject to. 
6.2. Corporate Defences 
Chapter 2, n.1. 
l.S. Rakoff, L.R. Blumkin & R.A. Sauber, Corporate Sentencing Guidelines: Compliance and 
Mitigation (1993, Law Journal Seminars-Press, New York), "Forward." 
9 This point is emphasised by C.M.V. Clarkson, "Corporate Culpability" (1998) 2 Web Journal of 
Current Legal Issues, arguing that: . 
"What is being argued here is that such CCPs (Corporate ComplIance ~rograms) [adopted 
under the Guidelines] could be utilised in England and Wales as eVIdence of (lack of) 
corporate culpability. Obviously, if a crime has been committed b~ a .company ,:i~h a CCP, 
this means the CCP has failed. However, in terms of estabhshmg culpabIhty at the 
substantive stage, the inquiry would then shift to why, given the existence of~he C~P, the 
crime was committed. For example, it might be that while such a CCP was m eXIstence, 
it was not rigorously enforced. If an offence were one with a d~e .diligence d~f~nce, a 
company without a CCP could have extreme difficulty in establIshmg the reqUISIte due 
diligence. If the crime required proof of mens rea, the absence of .a. CCP would be 
important evidence towards the establishment of the reqUISIte degree of 
blameworthiness .... " [Footnote omitted] 
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Under the risk-oriented theory, a corporation is to be held liable when it is proved that, 
first, its insufficient risk-averting systems are causally linked with the prohibited result 
(actus reus); and, secondly, there are concurrent corporate errors with these systems 
(mens rea). As far as corporate gross carelessness is concerned, the following three 
conditions must be met: (1) a risk that the corporation's insufficient risk -averting system 
caused death or serious injury would be obvious to a reasonable corporation in its 
position; (2) the corporation was, by avoiding relevant collection, transaction or 
judgment errors, capable of appreciating that risk at the material time; and (3) its 
insufficient risk-averting systems constitute conduct falling far below what can 
reasonably be expected of the corporation in the circumstances. 1o In cases of corporate 
reckless manslaughter, proof of corporate assessment errors suffices for corporate 
awareness of the risk. 11 Whether it is reasonable for the corporation to take the risk, 
having regard to the circumstances as it knows or believes them to be,12 will be 
determined by corporate brains' decisions as to improper risk-averting (or unreasonable 
risk-causing) actions. 13 
Corporate defences arise in relation to the above conditions: in particular, when 
the individual fault in question is considered irrelevant to to corporate risk-averting 
systems; or when corporate risk-averting systems in question do not constitute conduct 
falling far below what can reasonably be expected of the corporation in the 
circumstances. The remainder of this section is devoted to exploring these situations. 
6.2.1. Causation 






Chapter 5, Subsection 5.5.3, Section 2(l)(a), (2) and (l)(c) respectively ofthe statutory provision. 
Ibid Section 1(2) of the statutory provision. 
Ibid. Section (1 )(b) of the statutory provision. 
Ibid, Section 1(2) of the statutory provision. Thus, the risk-oriented theory may have some similar 
aspects to the identification principle as far as the requirement ofunreasonabl~n~ss is .c?ncemed. 
As will be discussed in the following subsections, however, corporate brams declSlons as to 
improper risk-averting or unreasonable risk-causing actions are not always identified with 
corporate assessment errors under the risk-oriented theory. 




what can reasonably be expected of him/her in the circumstances, a corporation can 
independently be blamed for its insufficient risk-averting systems relevant to the 
prohibited result. Since each individual is viewed as a cog in the corporate wheel under 
the risk-oriented theory, the fact that they have followed the safety systems 
systematically and collectively suffices to comprise the corporate conduct. Yet, it is still 
necessary to prove a causal link between the corporation's lack of safety systems and the 
prohibited result. 
In most cases, the safety or risk-averting systems, including supervision and 
training, liaison, and periodic or ex post facto inspections, are reflected in corporate 
policy-making officials' decisions. As mentioned in the previous chapters,15 in cases 
where these systems are insufficient to avert the risk, it may be easier to find the 
required causal link between corporate conduct and the prohibited result by reference 
to these officials' decisions. Practical difficulties, however, may arise in determining 
the causal link when it is proved that corporate risk-averting systems were sufficiently 
effective at the material time, but the prohibited result was nevertheless caused by an 
intervening act or event (a novus actus interveniens) by individuals who were not 
. 
involved in the relevant corporate risk-averting activities. With what standards can the 
intervening act or event of those individuals be considered sufficient to override the 
initial cause? This question usually arises in relation to the issue of causation, because 
of the concurrent nature of more than two persons' faults. 
In relation to this issue of concurrent causes, an excellent analysis has been made 
by Nishihara. 16 It may be useful here to outline his argument on this issue. Based on 
Chapter 4, text accompanying notes 36-37 (the first prong of Moore and Foerschler's suggestions 
under which a corporate policy itself is illegal) and Chapter 5, n.64 (the Japanese concept of 
structural fault). 
H. Nishihara, "Kantoku-Sekinin no Genkai-Settei to Shinrai no Gensoku (Limitations on the Scope 
of Supervisory Fault and the Reliance Rule)" (1978) 30 Hoso Jiho 181 and 365. As referred to 
in the previous chapter (Chapter 5, n.60), the relevant and applicable article of Japanese Pe~al 
Code in the context of corporate risk-involving operations is concerned with Article 211, whIch 
prescribes a crime of manslaughter by professional negligence. The term ''person'' which appears 
in this article has been interpreted as excluding corporations in Japan. 
The other type of classification may be found in H.L.A. Hart & T. Honore, Ca~sation 
in the Law (1985, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford), ch.8 ("Concurrent Causes and ContrIbutory 
Negligence"). According to Hart and Honore, cases of concurrent causes fall into the following 





the direction of faults towards the result, Nishihara first divides the forms of concurrent 
causes into the type of opposite concurrence of faults and that of parallel concurrence 
offaults.
17 
The opposite concurrence offaults is found in cases where both an offender 
and the victim's fault contribute to the result. This type of concurrent causes is usually 
called contributory negligence in the English law of torts, and is "not directly relevant" 
in corporate manslaughter cases. 18 Thus, focus should be shifted to the type of parallel 
concurrence offaults, where more than two offenders' faults are related to the harm to 
the victim. 
Nishihara then subdivides the type of parallel concurrence of faults according 
to (1) time frame and (2) causation. Namely, (1) the parallel concurrence of faults based 
on the timeframe is categorised into the following forms of the relationship between 
faults: (1-1) vertical coexistence and (1-2) horizontal (or temporal) concurrence, whilst 
(2) that based on causation is into (2-1) mere unrelated coincidence; (2-2) piled-up or 
one on top of another; and (2-3) cumulative coexistence (See Figure 1).19 
Central to the timeframe categorisation of the parallel concurrence of faults (1) 
is, on the one hand, whether more than two faults occur on different occasions (1-1: 
vertical coexistence) or concur at the same time (1-2: horizontal or temporal 
concurrence). Suppose that a building collapsed and two causes of the collapse were 
found: a design error of the building's particular part made by an architect and the use 
of low-quality materials made by builders for the same part of the building. In this 
hypothetical example, the architect's design error obviously preceded the use of low-
quality materials made by builders in chronological order (1-1: vertical coexistence), but 
the harm); (2) additional causation (in which one act is not a necessary condition ofthe harm s~ce 
there is some other independent wrongful act sufficient to produce the harm); and (3) alternatIve 
causation (in which even if the defendant had complied with the law, either this or another event, 
which would then have happened, would have produced similar harm). 
As will be found later (infra note 21), Nishihara's analysis is more detailed than Hart and 
Honore's, hence Nishihara's classification of concurrent faults will be presented and examined 
here. 
Nishihara, supra note 16 at pp. 184-185. 
G. Forlin & M. Appleby, "Corporate Manslaughter by Gross Negligence" (1998) Practical 
Research Papers - Crimes - Offences - Homicide (Sweet & Maxwell), p.11. 
Nishihara, supra note 16 at pp. 186-187. 
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Nishihara's Categorisation of the Concurrence of Faults 
=> Opposite Concurrence (concurrence of the victim's fault and the offender's one) 
(The Victim's Fault ---+ THE RESULT +- The Offender's Fault) 
=> Parallel Concurrence (concurrence of more than two offenders' (A & B) faults) 
(A & B's Faults =4 THE RESULT) 
(1) Timeframe 
(1-1 ) Vertical Coexistence 
A's Fault ---+ B' s Fault ---+ THE RESUL T 
(1-2) Horizontal (or Temporal) Concurrence 




(2-1) Mere Unrelated Coincidence 
A's Fault --+ THE RESULT 
i 
B's Fault 
(2-2) Piled-Up or One on Top of Another 
A's Fault ---+ THE RESULT 
(B's Fault) 
(2-3) Cumulative Coexistence 
A's Fault + B's Fault ==> THE RESULT 
Figure 1 
both faults which were related to the same part of the building contributed to its 
collapse. An example of the horizontal or temporal concurrence (1-2) is that the 
collapse of the building was due to the fact that several builders cut comers on different, 
but contiguous parts of the building simultaneously, but that each builder did not know 
that the other builders cut comers as well.20 
Nishihara, ibid. at 186. 
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On the other hand, the categorisation based on causation is to be made by 
addressing an issue of whether one fault has the causal chain of the result without the 
other; namely, alternative concurrence. The case of mere unrelated coincidence of 
plural faults (2-1) is that the architect's design error was sufficiently powerful to cause 
the collapse of the building without the builders' use of low-quality materials for the 
same part (or vice versa), or that one builder's comer-cutting was sufficiently serious 
so as to cause it without the others' . 
Furthermore, the case of the "piled-up or one on top of another" relationship 
between faults (2-2) is, according to Nishihara, that each fault is causally linked to the 
result, but one fault is based on a failure to prevent another fault from causing the result. 
For example, the architect's design error was at first overlooked by a building client who 
made a contract with the architect as to the design of the building and, then, neglected 
by a senior building supervisor employed by the construction company or subcontractor. 
It is certain that in this hypothetical example, the architect's design error itself had the 
causal chain of the collapse of the building. However, but for the absence of the 
subsequent several failures in proper ex post facto inspections, it could not cause the 
result. 
Finally, the form of cumulative coexistence (2-3) can be found in cases in which 
one fault is not sufficiently powerful to have a causal chain of the result, but it becomes 
so when combined with others. For example, it is proved that either the architect's 
design error or the builders' use of low-quality materials regarding the same part of the 
building could not cause the collapse but, due to the vertical coexistence of both faults 
in the timeframe, both faults actually caused it.21 
21 Nishihara, ibid. at pp. 186-187. This category is virtually the case in which several individual 
faults are aggregated (namely, in which the aggregation theory applies). 
Hart and Honore's three groups of concurrence causes (supra note 17) may roughly 
correspond to Nishihara's categorisation as follows: 
Hart & Honore 
Contributory Causation ---+ 
Additional Causation ---+ 
Nishihara 
Opposite Concurrence (and Cumulative Coexistence (2-3)) 
Mere Unrelated Coincidence (2-1) 
Alternative Causation ---+ Vertical Coexistence (1-1) and 
Horizontal or Temporal Concurrence (1-2) 
The reason for the inclusion of Nishihara's cumulative coexistence (2-3) in the first group of Hart 
213 
In detennining whether the intervening act or event by individuals who are not 
involved in the relevant corporate risk-averting actions excludes the original corporate 
actions from the legal cause of the result, Nishihara's analysis of concurrent faults 
described above may provide certain guidance. First of all, in cases of mere unrelated 
coincidence of faults as part of the parallel concurrence based on causation (2-1) and of 
horizontal or temporal concurrence of faults as part of the parallel concurrence based on 
the timeframe (1-2), it is difficult to see the chain of causation broken. This is because 
either individual in question is actually concerned with the particular corporate risk-
involving operation or with the relevant corporate risk-averting systems, so that hislher 
fault is considered to comprise a corporate error that renders a corporation liable for 
manslaughter under the risk-oriented theory. Consider the following hypothetical 
example based on the Cory case.22 The victim was electrocuted on the colliery premises 
because a shift manager of the colliery company, who chased and got near him, pushed 
him into the electric wire fence by mistake. And the shift manager did not know the fact 
that the electric wire fence was established a few hours before the incident. In these 
circumstances, the company's faults are, through its controlling officers' managerial 
decisions, an establishment of the electric wire fence and a subsequent failure to put a 
notice board that could warn the victim of the fence. These faults, however, have little 
to do with the shift manager's personal fault and, accordingly, both the shift manager's 
fault and the company's fault (through its officers) are unrelated. As is often the case 
with the liability of the individual offender (whose victim, after being shot by the 
offender, died in hospital due to negligence of the hospital staff,23) the shift manager's 
fault would not affect the colliery company's liability for manslaughter of the victim. 
Similarly, the "plied up or one on top of another" relationship between faults (2-
2) is usually found in cases in which the top or middle management is responsible for 
and Honore (contributory causation) is that Hart and Honore considers not only the victim's 
negligence but also third party's voluntary conduct in this group. See Hart & Honore, supra note 
16 at p. 217. Therefore, when one individual fault is viewed as irrelevant to eit~er corp?rate err~r 
but the other's fault is as relevant, it is possible to assume that the fonner fault IS the thIrd party s 
fault under the Hart and Honore's group of contributory causation. 
22 Cory Brothers Ltd. [1927] 1 K.B. 810, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 14-16. 
See, for example, R. v. Mellor [1996] 2 Crim. App. R. 245. 23 
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a particular corporate operation or supervising hislher employees. It can be said that but 
for hislher fault in supervision, hislher inferior work of fault would not have caused the 
prohibited result. Under the risk-oriented theory, the top or middle management's 
supervisory fault is likely to constitute either corporate collection, judgment or 
assessment errors, so that the chain of causation will rarely be broken.24 In the British 
Steel case,25 for example, the immediate cause of the collapse of the platform was a 
welder (the victim of this case) and a plater's failure to secure it to a crane or by means 
of temporary props so that the platform was unstable. Yet, it was alleged that a section 
engineer in the employment of the company failed to supervise the repositioning 
operation properly. Either the section engineer or these workers' fault suggests the 
existence of corporate collection or judgment errors and, thus, there is little room for 
arguing the issue of causation.26 
However, Nishihara's subgroup of vertical concurrence of plural faults based on 
the timeframe (1-1) and of cumulative coexistence of plural faults (2-3) may provide 
certain conditions on which the chain of causation can be broken. Take a fire accident 
case as an example. In the Welansky case,27 the defendant individual who owned a 
night club was held liable for manslaughter that resulted both from insufficient exit 
doors and from his use of defective wiring and inflammable decorations in the night 
club. The immediate cause of the fire at issue was, however, a sixteen year old 
bartender's mishandling of a match, which he used in order to light the bulb. Since both 
24 The Law Commission may be of the similar opinion that the company's management failure may, 
in some cases, consist in a failure to take precautions against its employee's error. That is, the 
relationship between the company's management failure and the employee's error is "one on top 
of another." See Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, supra note 1 at para. 8.37, cited 




[1995] ICR 586, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 100-101. 
These observations hitherto made in relation to Nishihara's subgroups 1-2 (horizontal or temporal 
concurrence), 2-1 (mere unrelated coincidence of faults) and 2-2 (plied up or one on top .of 
another) would not, of course, apply in cases in which both individual faults are no~ conce~ed WIth 
the relevant corporate operations to the risk. As for mixed cases of2-3 (cumulatIve coeXIstence) 
and 1-1 (vertical coexistence) in which a causal link between corporate errors and the result can 
be broken, see infra text accompanying notes 27-32. 
(1944) 55 N.E.2d 902, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 47-56. See, in particular, 
Chapter 3, n.5 5. 
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the owner and bartender's faults were concerned with the same risk-involving operation 
of the company (namely, the running of the overcrowded night club), it is difficult to 
regard either fault as an intervening cause of the result. However, if the immediate 
cause of the fire was the third party's act (for example, a terrorist's arson) or an "act of 
God" (for example, lightning), a causal link between the owner's fault and the result 
would be broken. 
Similarly, in the Fire Accident in Hotel New Japan case,28 the immediate cause 
of the fire that occurred in the hotel was the guest's smoking in bed. All the hotel could 
do to prevent the fire from occurring in this case was to warn the guests by notice 
boards that "Smoking in bed is strictly forbidden," so that it is difficult to find any fault 
on the part of the hotel concerning the immediate cause of the fire. The owner of the 
hotel was accused of his failure "to design a fire prevention or fighting plan, to carry out 
periodic dire drills based on the plan, to check and maintain fire fighting equipment and 
to operate them effectively" in case of fire. 29 At the time when the guests were invited 
to the hotel, however, his failures mentioned above produced no risk of actual harm to 
them. As far as the conduct requirement is concerned, his failures would correspond to 
criminal omissions/o which nevertheless had no connection to the cause of fire. 
In such cases as fire accidents at the building or hotel, it cannot be denied that 
fire in a place of public facility is "an ever present danger.,,3l However, it does not 
follow that proof of a causal link between the result and the failure to prevent the 
occurrence of a fire from causing the result, rather than the failure to prevent a fire from 
occurring, is "enough [for the defendant's criminal responsibility] .... in the event of fire 
from any cause.,,32 This is particularly so when the fire at issue was caused by the third 






Chapter 5, text accompanying note 62. 
See Chapter 5, text accompanying note 71. 




party's fault. Such a hypothetical case would belong to the category of Nishihara's 
subgroups 1-1 (vertical concurrence of faults based on the timeframe) or 2-3 
(cumulative coexistence of faults) in which either individual fault is not related to any 
corporate errors of the risk of actual harm, so that the corporation should be granted a 
defence that negates its liability. 
6.2.2. Foresight of the Risk 
In analysing several cases of corporate manslaughter, Chapter 3 illustrated some 
common features of corporate fault. In cases of fire accidents just mentioned above, for 
example, a corporation's fault should be located both in corporate failure to control or 
minimise the cause of fire (the source of risk) to prevent its occurrence and in corporate 
failure to establish a safety system to p~event the occurrence of the fire from causing the 
result. For the defendant corporation to be held liable for manslaughter, therefore, it 
must be proved that the risk of harm required to be aware of by the corporation (in cases 
of recklessness) or to be obvious to a reasonable person (in cases of gross carelessness) 
resulted both from the former (failures to prevent the risk from occurring) and from the 
latter (failures to prevent the occurrence of the risk from causing the result). In other 
words, proof that the corporation was aware of or capable of appreciation of both "risk-
producing factors" in its activities (in cases of the former type of failures) and "the 
absence of risk-preventing factors" in its subsequent (in)actions (in cases of the latter 
type offailures) is necessary for corporate liability for manslaughter.33 
Two points need to be emphasised as to the above classification of the types of 
33 The name of each word is based on the translation of Japanese words used in Y. Otsuka, 
"Y oken-Kanosei no Handan Kozo to Kanri-Kantoku Kashitsu (Structural Judgments on the Issue 
of Foreseeability and Supervisory Fault)" (1997) 36 Keiho Zasshi 359 at pp. 367-374. 
Under the risk-oriented theory, the corporation's awareness of the risk at issue is, on the 
one hand, determined by assessment errors made by corporate decision-making officers who have, 
in their directorial capacity, choices to make decisions to take risk-averting actions. The former 
type of corporate awareness (= failures to prevent the risk from occurring) may result from. their 
underestimation of the extent of the risk, while the latter type of corporate awareness (= faIlures 
to prevent the occurrence from causing the result) from their overestimation of the effectiveness 
of the subsequent risk-averting actions. . . 
In cases of the corporation's gross carelessness, on the other hand, corporate capacItIes 
for appreciation of both types of risk-relating factors (namely, risk-~roducing factors an~ the 
absence of risk-preventing factors) are considered so as to determme whether there eXIsted 
collection, transaction and/or judgment errors at the material time. 
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risk-relating factors. Firstly, in cases of reckless manslaughter, it must be proved that 
the defendant, whether corporate or individual, was aware of both factors: if it is proved 
that the defendant was only aware of either factor, then the liability of reckless 
manslaughter should be denied. Instead, the liability of manslaughter by gross 
carelessness may apply if the defendant was grossly careless of the other factor. 
Secondly, if neither factor was obvious to a reasonable person and/or was capable of 
appreciation by the defendant, then the defendant could not be held liable even for 
manslaughter by gross carelessness. 
In such cases of corporate manslaughter as Denbo,34 McIlwain School Bus35 and 
Fortner LP Gas,36 both risk-relating factors were located very closely. The sources of 
risks in these cases were defective vehicles which had been used by the companies for 
the relevant operations, and their awareness of the defectiveness of the vehicles would 
automatically prove their awareness of the absence of preventing factors of the risk that 
resulted from the defective vehicles. The Ebasco37 and British Steel cases may provide 
a similar example in which the construction work (in the Ebasco case) or repositioning 
operation (in the British Steel case) was "inherently dangerous.,,38 Since the source of 
risk is often inherent in this kind of operation, once the risk materialises it is difficult 
or almost impossible to prevent the occurrence of the risk from causing the result. In 
these cases, therefore, the offender's foresight of the risk-producing factors inevitably 
absorbs that of the absence of risk-preventing factors. 
The same observation should hold true of the Serebin case39 in which the court 
held that the causal link between the victim's death and a nursing home administrator's 







Chapter 3, text accompanying note 22. 
Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 116-118. 
Chapter 3, text accompanying note 119. 
(1974) 354 N.Y.S.2d 807, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying note 23. 
[1995] ICR 586 at 588. 
(1983) 338 N.W. 2d. 855; (1984) 350 N.W. 2d. 65, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 
43-44. 
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nursing staff was not proved. The staffing shortage was alleged to make it impossible 
for the staff on duty to make the ideal two-hour bed check, but it was held that the 
victim died of exposure to the cold so soon that even the ideal two hour bed check could 
not have prevented his death. The mistake the court made in this case was in requiring 
both factors (risk-producing and risk-preventing) to be causally linked to the result 
separately. In this case, the source of risk was the victim's tendency to walk out of the 
nursing home at any time. In addition, the defendant's failure to prevent the source of 
risk from materialising, namely, his failure to install alarms on the relevant doors to alert 
the reduced nursing staff when they were opened, automatically led to the subsequent 
situations in which even the ideal two-hour bed check could not prevent the victim's 
death. Thus, it was immaterial whether the ideal two-hour bed check could have 
prevented the victim's death as long as the defendant's initial failure was, in due course, 
causally linked to the result and he was aware of the victim's tendency to walk out of 
the home. 
However, in cases where there exists a certain time span between the occurrence 
of risk-producing factors and that of risk-averting factors, it is possible to take into 
consideration the defendant's reasonable reliance upon the existing effective risk-
averting systems. In the cases of O'NeiI40 and Chicago Magnet Wile, certain 
occupational hazards such as the proliferation of poisonous substances were inherent in 
the manufacturing process. The corporations in these cases were actually accused of 
failing to take effective measures to reduce the risks of harms to workers. Assume that 
in these cases, adequate remedial action is taken by the corporations to modify 
dangerous working conditions at the factory (for example, the issue of poisonous gas), 
in terms of supplying safety equipment and effective ventilation to workers, but it is 
nevertheless proved that these risk-averting systems do not operate due to the victim's 
personal fault or the third party's intentional conduct. For example, the victim (one of 
the workers) is, despite the company's instructions, so careless in handling his face mask 
designed to prevent him from inhaling the poisonous gas that it is damaged; or a third 
40 (1990) 550 N.E.2d.1090, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 60-67. 
41 (1987) 510 N.E.2d.1173; (1989) 534 N.E.2d.962, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying note 31. 
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party (someone outside the company) breaks the factory's ventilation duct so that the 
factory reeks of poisonous gas. 
In these hypothetical examples, it can be said that the corporation is aware of the 
risk-producing factors (the inherence of the source of risk in the particular operation), 
but not of the absence of the risk-averting factors. Therefore, the corporation should be 
granted a defence on the ground of the absence of foresight or, on some occasions, the 
absence of foreseeability of the risk at issue.42 
6.2.3. Avoidability of the Risk 
In cases where it is proved that the risk (or the result) at issue could not reasonably be 
avoided, the liability of the defendant should be denied. If, for example, a father who 
could not swim found his son drowning in a river, and no one was available for the 
father to ask to rescue his son, it would be difficult to blame the father for his failure to 
rescue his son despite his awareness of the risk. This is because no effective risk-
averting measures were available to him. When gross carelessness is the requisite fault 
element of an offence of manslaughter, foreseeability of the risk is the only factor in 
determining whether or not the risk could be avoided, since, as referred to in the 
previous chapter,43 foresight of the risk at issue is part of risk-averting measures. 
The Law Commission has recommended that in cases of individual manslaughter 
42 See clause 17 of the Law Commission's Draft Criminal Code Bill 1989 (Law Commission 
No.177), providing that: 
43 
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), a person causes a result which is an element of an 
offence when -
(a) he does an act which makes a more than negligible contribution to its occurrence; 
or 
(b) he omits to do an act which might prevent its occurrence and which he is under a 
duty to do according to the law relating to the offence. 
(2) A person does not cause a result where, after he does such an act or makes such an 
omission, an act or event occurs -
(a) which is the immediate and sufficient cause ofthe result; 
(b) which he did not foresee, and 
(c) which could not in the circumstances reas.o.nably have ?e~n foreseen. . 
It is obvious that Law Commission, unlike this thesis pOSItIOn, treats thIS Issue as part of ca~satIO~. 
Nonetheless, given clause 17(2), the practical difference between Law Commission and this theSIS 
positions is of little importance. 
Chapter 5, text accompanying note 82. 
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by gross carelessness, the risk at issue must be capable of appreciation by the defendant. 
The reason for this is explained as follows: 
"Since the fault of the accused lies in her failure to consider a risk, she cannot be punished 
for this failure if the risk in question would never have been apparent to her, no matter 
how hard she thought about the potential consequences of her conduct. If this criterion 
is not insisted upon, the accused will, in essence, be punished for being less intelligent, 
mature or capable than the average person.,,44 
It follows from the above extract that it is the intellectual, mental and physical capacities 
of the defendant, not those of the average person, which ought to be considered to 
address the issue of whether the risk could be foreseen to him/her. These personal 
capacities should also be considered in cases of reckless manslaughter in order to 
determine whether or not the ris~ could be avoided despite hislher awareness of it. The 
need for considering the defendant's personal capacities concerning the risk should be 
emphasised, particularly when hislher conduct itself is lawful and has a certain degree 
of social utility.45 
In cases of a corporate defendant, too, account needs to be taken of its material, 
financial technical and human resources that should be used to take necessary and 
reasonable risk-averting actions.46 That is, ifit is proved that the corporation had no or 
insufficient financial or material resources to detect the risk in its activity and/or to take 
necessary risk-averting actions,47 the corporation should be granted a defence of 




See Chapter 5, text accompanying note 46. 
See Chapter 5, text accompanying note 77. 
This point is argued in S. Field & N. Jorg, "Corporate Liability and Manslaughter: Should We Be 
Going Dutch" [1991] Criminal Law Review 156, referring to the Dutch criminal law's doctrine 
of corporate "power" to prevent the possibility of harmful consequen~es and. corpo~ate 
"acceptance" ofthem as useful criteria applicable to English la,:. ~or t~e ~e~a~!s. OfthiS doctr~e, 
see also N. Jorg, "The Promise and Limitations of Corporate Cnmmal LIabIlIty m 'Y.~. Lofqu~st, 
M.A. Cohen & G.A. Rabe (eds.), Debating Corporate Crime (1997, Academy ofCnmmal JustIce 
Sciences, Kentucky), pp. 99. . . .. . 
It may be argued that the corporation should not engage m a particular .nsk-mvolvrng 
operation in the fIrst place unless it has sufficient resources to detect the probable nsk. However, 
as discussed in Chapter 5 (text accompanying note 84), it is difficult t? assume that the defe.ndant 
corporation could be expected to avert or minimise the risk without Its awareness, perceptIOn or 
foresight ofthe risk. It is also difIcult to expect the corporation to take all-out efforts to det~ct ~y 
risks involved or inherent in its operation before engaging in it. In the P & 0 case (cIted m 
Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 72-82), for example, the risk at issue was the ferry put to sea 
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unavoidability of the risk. A difficult issue to be dealt with here is how to delineate the 
appropriate circumstances in which the risk can or cannot reasonably be said to be 
avoided in the context of corporate manslaughter. 
For this issue to be resolved, reference to Spurgeon and Fagan's useful analysis 
of the types of the risk in relation to corporate blameworthiness may prove helpfu1.48 
In determining the degree of corporate blameworthiness, Spurgeon and Fagan address 
two questions concerning the types of the risk involved in corporate activities: whether 
the risk at issue is discoverable; and where it is, whether the risk can be avoided and at 
what COSt. 49 As for the first question, Spurgeon and Fagan insist that: 
"Society would not morally condemn corporations and individuals for creating an 
unknown and unforeseeable risk. However, corporations must have a duty to take all 
reasonable precautions to discover the risk. If a corporation rushes production of a 
particular item without thoroughly testing for and solving faults that may cause injury, the 
corporation may be subject to moral blame.,,5o 
As discussed in Section 5.5. of the previous chapter, the corporation's failure to discover 
the risk is not limited to cases in which it "rushes production of a particular item without 
thoroughly testing for and solving faults." It may also result from its failures to employ 
48 
with its bow doors open, but, as Sullivan correctly suggests (Guilt, supra note 6 at 290), "it cannot 
be grossly negligent nowadays to operate a rolro ferry per se, even though, as everone now knows, 
the most dangerous treat to life comes from the very nature of the vessel itself." 
W.A. Spurgeon & T.P. Fagan, "Criminal Liability for Life-Endangering Corporate Conduct" 
(1981) 72 Journal Criminal Law and Criminology 400 at pp. 412-420. 
49 
50 
Ibid. at pp. 416-417. The fIrst question may correspond to, under the risk-oriented theory, whether 
there exist corporate collection, transaction orland judgment errors to perceive the risk, whilst the 
second question to whether there exist assessment errors to avoid the risk. 
Ibid at 416. An example of the case in which "a corporation rushes production of a particular item 
without thoroughly testing for and solving faults that may cause injury" has been presented by 
Spurgeon and Fagan (ibid. at 416, n.76) by referring to the case of "Firestone 500" (cited from 
US Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 96th 
Congress, 2nd Session, Corporate Crime (1980, US Government Printing Office, Washington) 
[hereinafter cited as Corporate Crime], pp. 3-8) as follows: . 
"The Firestone radical 500 tire incidents present a possible example of such blame. WhIle 
all American tire manufacturers experienced some development problems with producing 
radial tires Firestone was the fIrst company to market such a tire. Firestone itself 
experienced more difficulty with the 500 tire than with other st~el-belted. radials, which it 
took more time to develop. Firestone accepted back more 500 trres from Its c~stomers and 
settled more claims involving the 500 than it did for its other steel-belted r~d1als ..... T~us, 
it may be inferred that the 500 tire's problems stemmed in part fr?m ~~hmg the trre mto 





competent staff (collection errors), to establish liaison between top management and 
workers (transaction errors) and/or to judge the existence of the risk properly GUdgment 
errors). Since this issue was already addressed, the second question posed by Spurgeon 
and Fagan will be dealt with here. 
In addressing the second question, Spurgeon and Fagan attempt to distinguish 
between morally blameworthy corporate conduct and excusable conduct by using their 
unique balance considerations between benefit (which the relevant corporate activity 
supply to society) and harm (which it does to society).51 Corporate conduct that should 
be viewed as blameworthy can be found (1) when a corporation fails to prevent cheaply 
avoidable risks, or (2) when it poses a great degree of danger but still costs a great deal 
to avoid. An example of the type (1) is presented by Spurgeon and Fagan as follows: 
"[C]onstruction laborers working at great heights are exposed to the possibility of injury 
upon falling. Scaffolding and safety lines greatly reduce this risk. As compared to the 
value of a life or the economic cost scaffolding adds to the construction project, failure to 
provide safety devices would represent an unjustified disregard for human life, because 
the harm of the conduct (death or serious injury) would be disproportionate to the benefit 
(economic reduction in cost of buildings constructed without the use of safety devices)." 
[Footnote omitted]52 
Several corporate manslaughter cases examined in Chapter 3 may fall into this first type 
of morally blameworthy corporate conduct categorised by Spurgeon and Fagan. In the 
P & 0 case, for example, the risk at issue could have been avoided if "an inexpensive 
electrical device had been fitted to P & 0 ferries.,,53 The same is true of the Serebin 
case in which the risk of harm to the nursing home's resident could have been avoided 
if alanns had been installed on each door of the building. Similarly, in the cases of 
Denbo, McIlwain School Bus, Fortner LP Gas, the risk of harm to the victim(s) could 
Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 48 at pp. 416-418. 
Ibid. They also refer to the Ebasco case ((1974) 354 N.Y.S.2d. 807) as falling into this category. 
Ibid. at 417, n.78. 
Sullivan, Attribution, supra note 6 at 542 (referred to in Chapter 5, n.96). See also Field & Jorg, 
supra note 47 at pp 170-171, insisting that: . . 
"Collective management response to several requests by Masters for ~ow-door md~c~tor 
lights was at best casual. They made no attempts to assess the effectlveness of eXIstmg 
monitoring procedures. If they had been, management WOUld. s~ely ha~e uncovered ~e 
previous failures in the system.... They had the power to install mdicator lIghts or otherwIse 





have easily been avoided if the vehicle at issue had been properly maintained by the 
corporation. 
An example of the type (2) is presented by Spurgeon and Fagan by reference to 
the Buffalo Creek incident,54 in which the collapse of a dam in Buffalo Creek, West 
Virginia, claimed 125 lives of people who lived in this area, and destroyed a thousand 
homes. A mining company was engaged in the mining process that produced slag - a 
wide assortment of waste materials - and liquid waste for disposal. For the water to be 
available for future use, the impurities needed to be settled out of it, so that the company 
dumped new slag on top of old to form a barrier behind which the water could be stored 
and reused. Eventually, the dam collapsed and the 132 million gallons of waste water 
and solids roared through the breach. 
Two unique balance considerations are given by Spurgeon and Fagan to this 
case: one between the benefit of the company's mining activity to society and its harm; 
and the other between the harm and the amount of the corporation's settlement. 
"The harm of the mining company's conduct was death and destruction of property. The 
benefit of the activity to society at large was the production of coal. The inhabitants of the 
Buffalo Creek area benefited from the use of streams not directly contaminated by the 
company's liquid effluent. The coal company benefited from being able to dispose of its 
slag while retaining waste for later use in the mining process. In balancing the 
proportionality of these benefits against the harm, the danger was disproportionate to the 
benefit received by the coal company. When the destruction of a community is at stake, 
the risk should be avoided. In 1974, the company settled a damage suit for thirteen-and-a-
half million dollars. Instead of paying damages, the company could reasonably have used 
these monies [sic] to reinforce the dam or to fmd an alternate means of storing waste 
water. The company's failure to do so was unjustified and therefore blameworthy." 
[Footnotes omittedf5 
This type of morally blameworthy corporate conduct is also found in cases such as Kite 
examined in Chapter 3, in which the danger to school children posed by the company 
was disproportionate to the benefit to society (running the outdoor leisure activities), 
o 'N eil, Chicago Magnet and W arner-Lambert, 56 in which the danger to workers 
The facts of this case are drawn from US Subcommittee, Corporate Crime, supra note 50 at pp. 
1-3. 
Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 48 at 418. 
(1980) 414 N.E.2d. 660, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 57-58. 
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(namely, poisonous working conditions) was disproportionate to the benefit to society 
(manufacturing products). The same can be said of the cases ofWelansky (in which the 
construction of more exit doors might have been costly to the owner of the night club, 
but the danger of the occurrence of a fire to a number of patrons was clearly 
disproportionate to the benefit to society (running the night club)) and Van Schaik57 (in 
which the danger of harm to passengers of the vessel was disproportionate to the benefit 
to society (the navigation of vessels)). 
As for the the category of corporate conduct which should be viewed by 
Spurgeon and Fagan as excusable, it may be found in cases where the harm the 
corporation does to society is not necessarily disproportionate to its benefit. 58 An 
example of this category is presented by them as follows: 
"The health hazards associated with asbestos and vinyl chloride used in the manufacturing 
process illustrate this kind of behavior. Asbestos has more than three thousand 
commercial applications, but is also associated with significant health risks. Similarly, the 
vinyl chloride industry accounted for one percent of the gross national product in 1976, 
yet this chemical has been associated with liver cancer in workers and with birth defects. 
The substances present the harm of death or serious illness. However, society 
gains the benefit of using fire-resistant products and items containing plastic. In this case, 
the harm may not necessarily be disproportionate to the benefit. Here we are confronted 
with the conflicting social goals of valuing human life and of social progress. No life 
should be sacrificed needlessly, but taking some risks may be a constituent part of society. 
Ifmanufacturers adhere to standards which reasonably protect the health of workers, their 
conduct cannot be so unjustified as to warrant moral blame simply on the basis of a 
costlhealth balancing test. [Footnotes omitted],,59 
As Spurgeon and Fagan observe, corporate conduct has simultaneous beneficial and 
detrimental effects upon our modem life. On the one hand, it supplies modem society 
with "our transportation vehicles, process [ es] the food we eat, construct [ s] the buildings 
in which we live .... , make [ s] a myriad of goods we use everyday .... , provides 
employment and also affects our environment.,,60 On the other hand, it also endangers 
the health of customers by selling unsafe cars, drugs and foods, poses life and health 
57 (1904) 134 F. 592, cited in Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 92-93. 
Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 48 at pp. 418-419. 58 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. at 400. 
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risks to industrial workers by hazardous working conditions and toxic chemicals used 
in the manufacturing process, and threatens public health by water and air pollution and 
the dumping of toxic chemicals.61 Since the use of criminal law for holding a 
corporation criminally liable for manslaughter involves "the challenge of curtailing [the 
corporation's] socially harmful activity without stifling the industrial process,,,62 balance 
considerations presented by Spurgeon and Fagan between the benefit of the relevant 
corporate activity to society and its harm are inevitable. 
Viewed in this light, it is difficult to deem the corporation's risk-taking actions 
or its insufficient risk-averting systems to be unreasonable or to fall far below what can 
reasonably be expected in the circumstances in which the harm caused by the relevant 
activity is not disproportionate to the benefit to society. In such cases, therefore, the 
corporation should be granted a defence of unavoidability of the risk. 
6.3. An Overview of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 
In addressing the issue of what should be considered to be aggravating or mitigating 
factors at sentencing for corporate defendants the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines63 which took effect on 1 November 1991 in the US may provide a starting-
Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 US Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1998, ch.8, available through 
http://www.ussc.gov./) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines]. For detailed arguments of the Guidelines, 
particularly its ch.8, see generally, Rakoff, Blumkin & Sauber, supra note 8; R. Gruner, Corporate 
Crime and Sentencing (1994, Michie Co, Virginia) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Crime], chs. 
8-12, "Towards an Organizational Jurisprudence: Transforming Corporate Criminal Law through 
Federal Sentencing Reform" (1994) 36 Arizona Law Review 407, "Just Punishment and Adequate 
Deterrence for Organizational Misconduct: Scaling Economic Penalties under the New Corporate 
Sentencing Guidelines" (1992) 66 Southern California Law Review 225 [hereinafter cited as Just 
Punishment] and "Beyond Fines: Innovative Corporate Sentences under Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines" (1993) 71 Washington University Law Quarterly 261 [hereinafter cited as Beyond 
Fines]; B.T. Thompson & J.P. Carty, SOS - Navigating the New Corporate Sentencing Guidelines 
(1992, National Association of Manufacturers, Washington D.C.); J. Moore, "Corporate 
Culpability under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines" (1992) 34 Arizona Law Revie:v 743: ~.K. 
Webb, S.F. Molo & J.F. Hurst, "Understanding and Avoiding Corporate and Executive Cnmmal 
Liability" (1994) 49 Business Lawyer 617; D.K. Webb & S.F. Molo, "Some P~actical 
Considerations in Developing Effective Compliance Programs: A Framework for Meetmg the 
Requirements of the Sentencing Guidelines" (1993) 71 Washington University Law Quarterly 375; 
E.H. Miller III, "Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants" (1993) 46 
Vanderbilt Law Review 197; M. Tonry, "Sentencing Commission and their Guidelines" (1993) 
17 Crime & Justice - A Review of Research 137; LH. Nagel & W.M. Swenson, "The Federal 
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point. This section is devoted to outlining the Guidelines. 
The Guidelines consist of two major parts: the general application principles of 
the Guidelines and the determination of the fine under the Guidelines. The Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 provided several criminal sanctions against corporations, such as 
criminal forfeiture, probation, restitution, orders of notice to victims and community 
service.64 Pursuant to the Act, the Guidelines specify the detailed application principles 
of these sanctions. "Introductory Commentary" of the Guidelines states that: 
"As a general principle, the court should require that the organization take all appropriate 
steps to provide compensation to victims and otherwise remedy the harm caused by or 
threatened by the offense. A restitution order or an order of probation requiring restitution 
can be used to compensate identifiable victims of the offense. A remedial order or an 
order of probation requiring community service can be used to reduce or eliminate the 
harm threatened, or to repair the harm caused by the offense, when that harm or threatened 
harm would otherwise not be remedied. An order of notice to victims can be used to 
notify unidentified victims of the offense. ,,65 
Under the Guidelines, probation is ordered by the court if necessary to safeguard the 
corporation's ability to pay a monetary penalties (such as restitution, fine or special 
assessment), or to ensure that changes are made within the corporation to reduce the 
likelihood of future criminal conduct or to have an effective program to prevent and 




Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and 
Some Thoughts about their Future" (1993) 71 Washington University Law Quarterly 205; J.S. 
Parker, "Rule without...: Some Critical Reflections on the Federal Corporate Sentencing 
Guidelines" (1993) 71 Washington University Law Quarterly 397; EJ. Zagrocki, "Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: The Key to Corporate Integrity or Death Blow to Any Corporation Guilty 
of Misconduct?" (1992) 30 Duquesne Law Review 331; R.J. Maurer, "The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines for Organizations: How Do They Work and What Are They Supposed to Do?" (1993) 
18 University of Dayton Law Review 799; J.W. Nunes, "Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: 
The Conundrum of Compliance Programs and Self-Reporting" (1995) 27 Arizona State Law 
Journal 1039. 
18 U.S.C. §§3551, 3553-3556. 
US Sentencing Commission, Guidelines, supra note 63, §8, Part B. 
The Guidelines, ibid., §§8Dl.l. and 8D1.4.(c). Pursuantto the Sentencing Reform Act (1~ .U.S.c. 
§§3555 and 3563), §§8D1.3.-1.4. of the Guidelines also.provides several other condltIOn~ of 
probations as follows: (1) the organisation shall not commit another federal, .stat.e or local ~n~e 
during the term of probation (§8DI.3.(a)); (2) the court may order the org~Ills~tIOn to pubhclse, 
at its own expense, the nature of its offence, its conviction and the step It Will tak~ t~ prevent 
similar offences in the future(§8D1.4.(a)); (3) the organisation is required to make peno~~c reports 
on its fmancial conditions, results of business operations and accounting for the diSpOSitIOn of all 
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notice and explanation of the conviction to victims of the offence by mail, by advertising 
in a specific area or through specific media, or by other appropriate means.67 A remedial 
order or community service is to be imposed as a condition of probation in order for the 
corporation to remedy or repair the harm caused by the offence, and to eliminate or 
reduce the risk that the instant offence will cause future harm.68 Finally, the court may 
enter a restitution order for the full amount of the victim's loss and, if necessary, can 
also reduce the fine to the extent that imposition of such fine would impair the 
corporation's ability to make restitution to victims.69 It is obvious that 






funds received to a probation officer (§8D1.4.(b)(1)); (4) it is also required to submit to 
~n~n~ounced examinations of its books and records, and to interrogation of knowledgeable 
mdividuais (§8D1.4.(b)(2)); (5) the court may order the organisation to inform the court or 
probation officer of any adverse changes in its business or financial conditions; and (6) the court 
is authorised to impose other conditions that "are reasonably related to the nature and 
circumstances ofthe offence or the history and characteristics of the organization" and "involve 
only such deprivations of liberty or property as are necessary to effect the purposes of sentencing" 
(§8D1.3.(c)). 
Ibid., §8B1.4, §5F1.4. 
Ibid., §§8B1.2, 1.3. 
Ibid, §§8B1.1(1) and 8C3.3(a). 
This has been followed by Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, supra note 1, paras. 8.72-
8.76. A close study of corporate punishment is beyond the scope of this thesis. On this subject, 
see, for example, Gruner, supra note 63, Corporate Crime, ch.12 and Beyond Fine, D. Bergman, 
"Corporate Sanctions and Corporate Probation" (1992) New Law Journal 1312; J. Braithwaite, 
"Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control" (1982) 80 Michigan 
Law Review 1466; 1.e. Coffee, ""No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry 
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment" (1981) 79 Michigan Law Review 386 [hereinafter cited 
as An Unscandalized Inquiry] and "Making the Punishment Fit the Corporation: The Problems 
of Finding an Optimal Corporate Criminal Sanction" (1980) 1 Northern Illinois University Law 
Review 3; J.C. Coffee, R. Gruner & C.D. Stone, "Standards for Organizational Probation: A 
Proposal to the United States Sentencing Commission" (1988) 10 Whittier Law Review 77; J. 
Gobert, "Controlling Corporate Criminality: Penal Sanctions and Beyond" (1998) Web Journal 
o/Contemporary Legal Issues; M.H. Levin, "Corporate Probation Conditions: Judicial Creativity 
or an Abuse of Discretion?" (1984) 52 Fordham Law Review 637; W.S. Lofquist, "Legislating 
Organizational Probation: State Capacity, Business Power, and Corporate Crime Control" (1993) 
27 Law & Society Review 741; J.B. McAdams, "The Appropriate Sanctions for Corporate Criminal 
Liability: An Eclectic Alternative" (1978) 46 Cincinnati Law Review 989; 1.S. Parker, "Criminal 
Sentencing Policy for Organizations: The Unifying Approach of Optimal Penalties" (1989) 26 
American Criminal Law Review 513 [hereinafter cited as The UnifYing Approach]; F.L. Rush, 
"Corporate Probation: Invasive Techniques for Restructuring Institutional Behavior" (1986) 21 
Suffolk University Law Review 33; G. Slapper, "Corporate Punishment" \19~4) 144 New L~ 
Journal 29; C.A. Wray, "Corporate Probation under the New OrganIzatIOnal Sentencmg 
Guidelines" (1992) 101 Yale Law Journal 2017; B. Fisse, "Communi~ Service as a Sa~c~ion 
against Corporations" (1981) Wisconsin Law Review 970, "Reconstructmg Corporate Cnmmal 
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In determining the fine, the Guidelines provide interesting guidance consisting 
of "base fine," "culpability score," and "minimum and maximum multipliers.,,7l At 
first, the base fine is determined in one of the following three ways, whichever results 
in the highest amount:72 it may be set at the amount of pecuniary gain obtained by the 
organisation from the offence; it may be set at the amount of pecuniary loss from the 
offence caused by the organisation, to the extent that the loss was caused intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly; and in cases in which neither pecuniary gain nor loss are high 
sufficiently to reflect the severity of the offence adequately, the court is directed to 
chapter two of the Guidelines, where the "Offense Level Fine" is determined according 
to each crime's seriousness.73 Commentary to the Guidelines states that: 
Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault and Sanctions" (1983) 56 Southern California Law Review 
1140, "Sanctions against Corporations: The Limitations of Fines and the Enterprise of Creating 
Alternatives" in B. Fisse & P.A. French (eds.), Corrigible Corporations and Unruly Law (1985, 
Trinity University Press, San Francisco) and "Sentencing Options against Corporations" (1990) 
1 Criminal Law Forum 2111; B. Fisse & J. Braithwaite, The Impact o/Publicity on Corporate 
Offenders (1983, State University of New York Press, Albany); C.D. Stone, Where the Law Ends: 
The Social Control o/Corporate Behavior (1975, Evanston, New York). 
71 Guidelines, supra note 63, §§8C2.4, 2.5, and 2.6. The following figure may be helpful in 
understanding the whole process of determining the fme under the Guidelines. 
Detennining the Fine within the Range 
J' 
Base Fine x Minimum or Maximum Multipliers = Guideline Fine Range 
I • 
Culpability Score Departure from the Range 
72 Ibid. §8C2.4(a). 
73 "Offense Level Fine Table" is provided in ibid., §8C2.4(d) as follows: 
Offense Level Amount ($) Offense Level Amount ($) 
6 or less 5000 23 1,600,000 
7 7:500 24 2,100,000 
8 10000 25 2,800,000 
9 15'000 26 3,700,000 
10 20 '000 27 4,800,000 
11 30:000 28 6,300,000 
12 40000 29 8,100,000 
13 60' 000 30 10,500,000 
14 85' 000 31 13,500,000 
15 125'000 32 17,500,000 
16 175' 000 33 22,000,000 
17 250' 000 34 28,500,000 
18 350' 000 35 36,000,000 
19 500' 000 36 45,500,000 
20 650' 000 37 57,500,000 
21 910:000 38 or more 72,500,000 
22 1.200,000 
The offence level is attached to each offence provided in §2 ofthe Guidelines. To take homicide 
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"As a general rule, the base fine measures the seriousness of the offense. The 
determinants of the base fine are selected so that, in conjunction with the multipliers 
derived from the culpability score in §8C2.5 (Culpability Score), they will result in 
guideline fine range appropriate to deter organizational criminal conduct and to provide 
incentives for organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and 
reporting crimina conduct. In order to deter organizations from seeking to obtain [mancial 
reward through criminal conduct, this section provides that, when greatest, pecuniary gain 
to the organization is used to determine the base [me. In order to ensure that organizations 
will seek to prevent losses intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused by their agents, 
this section provides that, when greatest, pecuniary loss is used to determine the base [me 
in such circumstances.,,74 
The gain and the loss from the offence mentioned above are limited to pecuniary ones, 
but the calculation of these factors is not to be used if it would "unduly complicate or 
prolong the sentencing process".75 
The culpability score considered next under the Guidelines is an index that 
exhibits the degree of the defendant corporation's culpability. The culpability score 
starts with five points, and increases to as high as ten or decreases to as little as zero by 
the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Aggravating factors that affect the 
score consist of: (1) the number of employees the ccirporation has (the higher the 
number, the more aggravating the corporate sentencing), (2) the involvement of "high-
level personnel" or "substantial authority personnel" of the corporation in the offence 
in question, (3) the existence of the corporation's criminal, civil or administrative 
adjudication based on similar past misconduct, (4) the fact that the commission of the 
offence in question violated a judicial order or injunction, or a condition of probation, 
and (5) the corporation's willful or knowing obstruction of justice during the 




as an example (§2A), fIrst degree murder (§2A1.1) - 43; second degree murder (§2A1.2) - 33; 
voluntary manslaughter (§2A1.3) - 25; involuntary manslaughter (§2A1.4) - 14 (recklessness), -
10 (criminal negligence); conspiracy or solicitation to commit murder (§2Al.5) - 28. 
Guidelines, supra note 63, §8C2.4., "Background." 
Ibid., §8C2.4( c). 
Ibid., §8C2.5(a)-(e). The term "high-level personnel" of the organisation is defmed in ibid., 
§8A1.2. (Commentary, Application Notes 3(b)) as: . . . 
"individuals who have substantial control over the orgamzatton or who have a substantIal 
role in the making of policy within the organization", 
including: . b· f fun f I 
"a director; an executive offIcer; an individual in charge of maJor usme~s 0.. c IO~a 
unit of the organization, such as sales, administration, or fmance; and an mdlvldual WIth 
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are the following two: (1) the existence of an effective program to prevent and detect 
violations of law (as well as the fact that high-level or substantial authority personnel 
were not involved in the offence in question); and (2) the corporation's self-reporting 
of the offence to appropriate governmental authorities, full cooperation in the 
investigation, and/or clear demonstration of recognition and affirmative acceptance of 
responsibility of its criminal conduct prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or 
government investigation and within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware 
of the offence.77 
77 
Finally, the base fine is multiplied under §8C2.6. (Minimum and Maximum 
a substantial ownership interest." 
The term "substantial authority personnel" means: 
"individuals who within the scope of their authority exercise a substantial measure of 
discretion in acting on behalf of an organization", 
including: 
"high-level personnel, individuals who exercise substantial supervisory authority (e.g., a 
plant manager, a sales manager), and any other individuals who, although not a part of an 
organization's management, nevertheless exercise substantial discretion when acting within 
the scope of their authority (e.g., an individual with authority in an organization to negotiate 
or set price levels or an individual authorized to negotiate or approve significant 
contracts). " 
The Guidelines underscore that whether an individual falls within [either] category must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis." Ibid. Roughly speaking, controlling officers used in the 
identification principle may belong to the category of "high-level personnel" while high managerial 
agents used in §2.07(1)(c) of American Model Penal Code (cited in Chapter 4, n.36) may fall into 
the category of "substantial authority personnel." 
The culpability score is determined as a result of a combination of these aggravating 
factors. For example, if(1) the corporation had more than 5.000 employees and (2) its individual 
within high-level personnel participated in the offence, five points are added to the original five 
points according to §8C2.5(b)(1). Moreover, (3) if the corporation committed any part of the 
offence in question less than 5 years after a criminal adjudication based on similar misconduct, 
two more points are added under §8C2.5(c)(2)(A). Furthermore, (4) if the commission of the 
offence violated a judicial order, two more points are added under §8C2.5(d)(1)(A). Finally, (5) 
if the corporation willfully encouraged obstruction of justice during the investigation of the offence 
in question, three more points are added according to §8C2.5(3). In the above circumstances, the 
culpability score is in total 17 points. 
Ibid., §8C2.5(f)-(g). Under §8C2.5(f), the existence of an effective program to prevent and deter 
violations oflaw subtracts three point. §8C2.5(g) provides that: the corporation's self-reporting 
of the offence, full cooperation in the investigation, and clear demonstration of recognition and 
affIrmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct subtract five points; its full 
cooperation in the investigation and clear demonstration of recognition and affirmative acceptance 
of responsibility for its criminal conduct subtract two points; and only its clear demonstration of 
recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct subtracts one 
point. Aggravating and mitigating factors under the Guidelines will be explored in more detail 
in the next section. 
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Multipliersf8 to reach the organisation's "guideline fine range,"79 corresponding to its 
culpability score. For example, if a corporation's base fine is $85,000 (in cases of 
reckless manslaughter) and its culpability score is five, $85,000 is multiplied by 1.0 and 
2.0 to reach a fine range of$85,000 - $170,000. Even after the Guideline fine range is 
determined, however, factors such as the seriousness of the offence at issue, the 
organisation's role in the offence, any collateral consequences of conviction (including 
civil obligations arising from the organisation's conduct), any non-pecuniary loss caused 
or threatened by the offence, or any prior criminal or civil misconduct by the 
organisation which were not taken into account in determining the culpability score can 
be considered by the court in order to avoid an unusually high or low amount of fine. 80 
In unusual cases, departures from the fine range are authorised for several 
reasons. A downward departure may be warranted in cases in which: (l) the 
organisation has provided substantial assistance to authorities; (2) it is a public entity; 
(3) its members or beneficiaries are direct victims of the offence; (4) no individual 
within substantial authority personnel participated in the offence and the organisation 
at the time of the offence had an effective program to prevent and detect violations; or 
(5) the organisation has paid remedial costs arising from the offence that greatly exceed 
the gain that the organisation received from the offence.8! A upward departure may be 
warranted in cases in which: (1) the offence resulted in death or bodily injury, or 
involved a foreseeable risk of death or bodily injury; (2) the offence constituted a threat 




Culpability Score Minimum Multiplier MaxImum MultIplIer 
10 or more 2.00 4.00 
9 1.80 3.60 
8 1.60 3.20 
7 1.40 2.80 
6 1.20 2.40 
5 1.10 2.00 
4 0.80 1.60 
3 0.60 1.20 
2 0.40 0.80 
1 0.20 0.40 
o or less 0.05 0.20 
Ibid., §8C2.7. 
Ibid., §8C2.8. (Detennining the Fine Within the Range). 
Ibid., §8C4.1., 4.7., 4.8., 4.9. and 4.11. respectively. 
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to national security; (3) the offence presented a threat to the environment; (4) the offence 
presented a risk to the integrity or continued existence of a market; or (5) the 
organisation, in connection with the offence, bribed or unlawfully gave a gratuity to a 
public official. 82 
6.4. Sentencing Factors for Corporate Manslaughter 
Despite their complexity, the Guidelines provide some useful guidance as to what 
aggravating or mitigating factors should be considered to determine the degree of 
corporate culpability and the severity of corporate punishment. The sentencing factors 
that are enumerated in the Guidelines consist of: (1) the pecuniary gain or loss as a result 
of the offence a corporation committed; (2) prior history; (3) obstruction of justice and 
cooperation with authorities; and (4) compliance programs to prevent and detect 
violations of laws (including (non-)involvement of high managerial officials). The 
subsequent sections are devoted to examining how these factors can be used under the 
risk-oriented theory presented in the previous chapter. 
6.4.1. Pecuniary Gain or Loss 
Under the Guidelines, the underpinning principles for determining the fine consist of the 
seriousness of the offence ("Offense Level Fine") and the culpability of the corporate 
defendant. 83 The seriousness of the offence is reflected in its "base fine," which is 
determined by the pecuniary gain to the corporation from the offence or the pecuniary 
loss from the offence caused by it. As for the use of the seriousness of the offence in 
determining the fine, it is of course reasonable to differentiate the amount of fine 
according to the type of the offence the defendant committed. However, it is not certain 
why the pecuniary gain and loss as a result of the commission of the offence should be 
one of the fine-setting standards under the Guidelines. 
The purposes of the adoption of the pecuniary gain and loss as determinants of 
the base fine are "to deter organizational criminal conduct and to provide incentives for 
82 Ibid., §8C4.2., 4.3., 4.4., 4.5. and 4.6. respectively. 
83 Ibid., ch.8, Introductory Commentary. 
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organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting 
criminal conduct", "to deter organizations from seeking to obtain financial reward 
through criminal conduct", and "to ensure that organizations will seek to prevent losses 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused by their agents ... ,,84 The term "pecuniary 
gain" is defined in §8A1.2. of the Guidelines as "the additional before- tax profit to the 
defendant resulting from the relevant conduct of the offense. Gain can result from either 
additional revenues or cost savings.,,85 
Two supporting arguments for using the standard of the pecuniary gain under the 
Guidelines are provided by Gruner.86 To begin with, corporate fines should be set 
sufficiently high, according to the pecuniary gain, to deter most "gain-motivated" or 
"economically motivated" offences, in order for corporations to be encouraged to 
monitor the actions of their employees and to incorporate the results of this monitoring 
into corporate reward and discipline systems. Furthermore, given the fact that detection 
and prosecution rates of corporate crime are usually low and, accordingly, only a 
fraction of all corporate offences are punished, it is not only necessary to use the 
standards for imposing gain-based fines, but also desirable to increase corporate fines 
to offset the economic benefits of corporate illegal conduct. 
However, these arguments are hardly convincing since it is impossible to 
determine the ideal amount of fine which should be imposed upon offenders so as to 
84 Ibid., §8C2.4., Commentary, Background. 
85 Ibid, §8Al.2., Commentary, Application Notes 3(h). Examples given by the Guidelines are as 
follows: dd· . I 
"For example, an offense involving odo.meter tam~~ring can produce a. ItIOna revenue. 
Ibid. 
In such a case, the pecuniary gain IS the addItional revenue receIved ?ecause. the 
automobiles appeared to have less mileage, i.e., the ~ifference betw~en the pnce receIved 
or expected for the automobiles with the apparent m~leage ~d the faIT market value of the 
automobiles with the actual mileage. An offense mvolvm~ defen~e procurement ~aud 
related to defective product testing can produce pecuniary gam resultmg from cost savmgs. 
In such a case, the pecuniary gain is the amount saved because the product was not tested 
in the required manner." 
86 Gruner, Just Punishment, supra note 63 at pp. 236-238. 
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h· h . d 87 ac Ieve t e maXImum eterrent effects. They are also inconsistent when applied in 
cases of corporate manslaughter, since the pecuniary gain received by a corporation 
through the commission of manslaughter is not obviously limited to the financial one. 
Thus, these arguments seem to be nothing more than a claim that low corporate fines 
cannot deter illegal conduct by corporate employees, and provide little guidance as to 
whether the standard of the pecuniary gain should be considered in determining the 
optimal fine. 
The use of pecuniary losses suffered by victims in determining the amount of 
fine is explained differently. According to Gruner, 
"loss-based fines may .... impose "just deserts" for corporate offenses. A sentencing 
system premised on just-deserts principles imposes punishment to condemn blameworthy 
offenses. Under this rationale, punishment should mirror the blameworthiness of the 
offender as measured by the scope of harm involved in an offense and the culpability of 
the offender. Similarly blameworthy crimes should receive similar sentences; more 
blameworthy offenses should receive harsher sentences than less blameworthy offenses. 
[Footnotes omitted],,88 
It may be true that in cases where corporations are offenders, "corporate offences 
causing greater victim losses reflect more serious organizational misconduct than those 
that cause lesser harms. Hence, offenses causing greater losses deserve greater 
87 
88 
Gruner suggests that the ideal amount of fine is equal to the amount of illegal benefit obtained from 
an offence in a situation in which a prosecution rate is 100 percent. Thus, a crime prosecuted in 
10 percent should have a fme equal to approximately ten times the gain from that offence. Ibid. 
at 237. This view is sometimes called the "optimal deterrence" or "optimal deterrence based on 
harm" approach. See, in general, Parker, The Unifying Approach, supra note 70; Miller III, supra 
note 63; Coffee, An Unscandalized Inquiry, supra note 70; R.A. Posner, "Optimal Sentences for 
White-Collar Criminals" (1980) 17 American Criminal Law Review 409. 
This calculation is, of course, premised upon the fact that the prosecution rate of the 
offence at issue would never change and, thus, is purely academic. As a result, the relevant statutes 
providing the amount of fine would unnecessarily be subject to modificat~on according to the result 
of the annual survey on prosecution rates of numerous offences, WhICh needs to be made to 
calculate the ideal amount of fme. 
Gruner Just Punishment, supra note 63 at 251 For a full account of just deserts as a basis for 
crimin;l punishment, see, in particular, A. von Hirsch, Doing Jus.tice: The .Choice of Punishments -
Report o/the Committee/or the Study o/Incarceration (1976, HIll and W~g, New :o~k) and Past 
or Future Crimes: Deservedness and Dangerousness in the Sentencmg of Crlmmals (1985, 
Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick). In the corporate conte~t, see: ~~r example, A. von 
Hirsch "Deserts and White-Collar Criminality: A Response to Dr. BraIthwaIte (1982) 73 Journal 
0/ Cr/minal Law & Criminology 1164; K. Schlegel, Just Deserts for Corporate Criminals 
(1991, Northeastern University Press, Boston). 
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condemnation and fines than offenses causmg lesser losses."89 Yet, as Gruner 
acknowledges, this rationale does not account for the Guidelines' position that the hann 
which should be reflected in determining the fine is limited to the pecuniary loss 
suffered by the victim.90 On the contrary, the Guidelines may be subject to criticism that 
they may not adequately determine corporate fines to reflect the full seriousness of the 
offense including non-pecuniary harms such as personal injuries, as is often the case 
with corporate manslaughter.91 In addition, the harms, whether pecuniary or not, are 
already reflected in determining the "offense level"92 and, accordingly, it may be 
superfluous to consider the harms in determining the base fine. 
6.4.2. Prior History, Obstruction of Justice and Cooperation with Authorities 
Unlike the determinants of the base fine discussed above, some factors that are 
enumerated in relation to the corporate defendant's culpability score under the 
Guidelines carry reasonable grounds. Prior history and obstruction of justice serve as 
examples of aggravating factors. 93 Prior misconduct is, for example, one of the most 
accessible sources of information about an offender's culpability, so that a question of 
whether s/he is a first offender or a recidivist has been considered crucial to the 
sentencing of individual offenders.94 As Moore suggests, 
"A first offender can plausibly argue that an offense was an anomaly, a lone departure 
from past standards of behavior. The act should not really be attributed to him, the 
offender can argue, because it was not "in character." After the first offense, however, this 
claim lacks credibility. Repetition has the effect of "endorsing" the earlier offense. It 
becomes safe to conclude that subsequent offenses are genuinely a product of the 






Ibid. at pp. 251-252. 
A possible and immediate solution to the weakness ofthe Guidelines is, t~erefore, t.o .include the 
number of victims and the degree of non-pecuniary harms suffered by them m determmmg the base 
[me, in particular, in cases of corporate manslaughter. 
Supra text accompanying note 73. 
The involvement of high managerial officials in the offence and the s.ize of.the co~pany, b~th of 
which are the other aggravating factors for the organisational sentencmg, WIll be dIscussed m the 
next subsection. 









This reasoning is of course true of corporate or organisational offenders. The recurrence 
of the same misconduct by corporate employees suggests that a corporation has failed 
adequately to respond to the first offence by changing its crime-preventive systems and 
by disciplining the offenders internally. It may also imply that the repetition of the 
misconduct as well as the first offence have been ignored or endorsed within the 
corporate structure. Accordingly, it cannot claim that the offence at issue was 
committed outside the scope of the offender's employment.96 
Similarly, the Guidelines' inclusion of the corporation's willful obstruction of 
justice during the investigation, prosecution or sentencing of the instant offence in 
assessing corporate culpability is also reasonable. This aggravating factor should be 
best understood in conjunction with a mitigating factor of its self-reporting, cooperation 
and acceptance of responsibility under the Guidelines.97 The corporation's obstruction 
of justice by concealing an offence or by protecting an employee who has violated the 
law suggests that it is the corporation's intent to endorse or encourage the offence; "an 
organization with a "good" character would likely have disciplined or fired the 
offending employees. ,,98 
The Guidelines allow the court to subtract as many as five points from the 
culpability score in cases of the corporation's full self-reporting of the offence to the 
authorities concerned, full cooperation with them and affirmative acceptance of 
responsibility. 99 The meaning of "cooperation" is explained by the Guidelines as 
Moore, supra note 63 at 788. 
In cases of corporate manslaughter, as mentioned in Chapter 5 (n.93), the fact that similar incidents 
occurred in the past (as found in the P & 0 case) and the issue of notification b~ the court or law 
enforcement agency that the relevant corporate risk-averting syst.ems need to be unprove.d should 
be included in prior history not only in determining the corporatIOn's awar~n~ss of the nsk at the 
pre-conviction stage, but also in assessing its culpability at the post-convIctIOn stage. 
Guidelines, supra note 63, §8C2.5.(g), referred to in Moore, supra note 63 at 789. 
Moore, supra note 63 at 790. Moore goes on to say that "Eliminating a criminal employee from 
the organizational decision-making process improves the corporate character and represents an 
important step in the reform of the organization." Ibid. 
Guidelines, supra note 63, §8C2.5.(g), referred to in supra text accompanying note 77. 
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follows: 
"To be thorough, the cooperation should include the disclosure of all pertinent infonnat' 
kn b h " . Ion own y t e orgamzatIon. A pnme test of whether the organization has disclosed all 
pertinent information is whether the information is sufficient for law enforcement 
personne~ t~ identify the nature and extent of the offense and the individual(s) responsible 
for the crn~lln~l c~nduct. However, the cooperation to be measured is the cooperation of 
the orgamzatIon Itself, not the cooperation of individuals within the organization. If, 
because of the lack of cooperation of particular individual( s), neither the organization nor 
law enforcement personnel are able to identify the culpable individual(s) within the 
organization despite the organization's efforts to cooperate fully, the organization will still 
be given credit for full cooperation. ,,100 
The adoption of this mitigating factor seems to be aimed at lowering law enforcement 
costs and increasing the likelihood of conviction, but it is believed that it actually 
encourages the corporation to uncover violations by agents and to "express remorse, 
contrition and renunciation of the crime."IOI 
6.4.3. Compliance Programs 
Under the Guidelines, the corporation's culpability score is reduced by three points "[i]f 
the offense occurred despite an effective program to prevent and detect violations of 
law. ,,102 An "effective program to prevent and detect violations of law," sometimes 
called a "compliance program," is defined by the Guidelines as "a program that has been 
reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that it generally will be effective in 
preventing and detecting criminal conduct.,,103 The Guidelines emphasise that failure 
to prevent or detect a certain offence is not, by itself, evidence that the corporate 
compliance program is ineffective. Instead, the "hallmark" of an effective program is 
that the corporation exercises due diligence in seeking to prevent and detect criminal 






Guidelines, ibid., §8C2.5., Commentary, Application Notes (12). 
Moore, supra note 63 at 790. 
Guidelines, supra note 63, §8C2.5.(f), referred to in supra text accompanying note 77. 
Guidelines, supra note 63, §8A1.2., Commentary, Application Notes 3(k). 
Ibid. However, the mitigation credit for the adoption of ~,comp1ian~e ~r~gram does n~t apply: 
(1) when an individual within "high-level personnel. or an. mdlvldual r~sponsl?le for 
administrating and enforcing a compliance program was mvolved m th.e o~ence, or (2) If. afte.~ 
becoming aware of an offence, a corporation unreasonably delayed reportmg It to the government. 
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the Guidelines, requires "at a minimum" that the corporation take the following types 
of steps: 
"(1) The organization must have established compliance standards and procedures to be 
followed by its employees and other agents that are reasonably capable of reducing the 
prospect of criminal conduct. 
(2) Specific individual(s) within high-level personnel of the organization must have been 
assigned overall responsibility to oversee compliance with such standards and procedures. 
(3) The organization must have used due care not to delegate substantial discretionary 
authority to individuals whom the organization knew, or should have known through the 
exercise of due diligence, had a propensity to engage in illegal activities. 
(4) The organization must have taken steps to communicate effectively its standards and 
procedures to all employees and other agents, e.g., by requiring participation in training 
programs or by disseminating pUblications that explain in a particular manner what is 
required. 
(5) The organization must have taken reasonable steps to achieve compliance with its 
standards, e.g., by utilizing monitoring and auditing systems reasonably designed to detect 
criminal conduct by its employees and other agents and by having in place and publicizing 
a reporting system whereby employees and other agents could report criminal conduct by 
others within the organization without fear of retribution. 
(6) The standards must have been consistently enforced through appropriate disciplinary 
mechanisms, including, as appropriate, discipline of individuals responsible for the failure 
to detect an offense. Adequate discipline of individuals responsible for an offence is a 
necessary component of enforcement: however, the form of discipline that will be 
appropriate will be case specific. 
(7) After an offense has been detected, the organization must have taken all reasonable 
steps to respond appropriately to the offense and to prevent further similar offenses -
including any necessary modifications to its program to prevent and detect violations of 
law.,,105 
Three additional points are noted by the Guidelines, concerning the necessary actions 
that should be taken by the corporation for effective compliance programs described 
above. Firstly, the requisite degree of formality of a compliance program will vary with 
the size of the corporation; namely, "the larger the organization, the more formal the 
program typically should be."lo6 Secondly, a corporation is expected to pay special 
attention to the occurrence of the particular offences which, because of the nature of its 
In addition, the involvement of "substantial authority personnel" creates a rebuttable presumption 
that the corporation lacked an effective program. Ibid., §8C2.5.(t). 
105 Ibid., §8A1.2., Commentary, Application Notes 3(k). 
106 Ibid. The Guidelines go on to say that "[a] larger organization generall~ should have establishe? 
written policies defining the standards and procedures to be followed by Its employees and agents. 
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business, is very likely. For example, 
"if an organization handles toxic substances, it must have established standards and 
procedures designed to ensure that those substances are properly handled at all times. If 
an org~ization employs sales personnel who have flexibility in setting prices, it must have 
establ~sh~d standards and procedures designed to prevent and detect price-fixing. If an 
orgamzatIOn employs sales personnel who have flexibility to represent the material 
characteristics of a product, it must have established standards and procedures designed 
to prevent fraud."I07 
Thirdly, a corporation's prior history is used to determine what types of offences need 
to be anticipated and prevented, and recurrence of similar misconduct "casts doubt on 
whether it took all reasonable steps to prevent such misconduct."lo8 
Moore evaluates the adoption of a compliance program as mitigating credit in 
determining the corporation's culpability score under the Guidelines as "the most 
innovative and controversial element."lo9 "The most controversial" may be correct 
whilst "the most innovative" may not. On closer examination, the content of the 
necessary steps for a compliance program is far from novel; while steps (1 )-(3) 
described above merely enumerate general requirements that a corporation adopt an 
effective compliance program, steps (4)-(7) are concerned with how it exercises due 
diligence and what types of preventive and corrective measures it should take against 
the occurrence of offences by its employees. Neither is it an innovative idea that the 
mitigation credit for a compliance program is inapplicable if "high-level" or "substantial 
authority" personnel of the corporation are involved in the offence, because such 
personnel are most likely to be responsible for establishing the relevant preventive or 
corrective systems against violations of law. 
The adoption of a compliance program as a mitigating factor under the 
Guidelines is controversial because of two flaws from which the Guidelines suffer. The 
first is that the content of necessary steps for a corporation to enforce an effective 
compliance program is concerned with corporate liability, rather than corporate 
sentencing. The Guidelines appear to offer the corporation an opportunity to rebut the 
107 Ibid 
108 Ibid., referred to in supra note 96. 
109 Moore, supra note 63 at 791. 
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assumption that an offence committed by its employee(s) was encouraged by corporate 
policies. To do so, the corporation must show that offence occurred "despite an 
effective program to prevent and detect violations of law."110 If the corporation 
succeeds in rebutting the assumption, three points are subtracted from its culpability 
score, although it is still held liable for the offence by its employee(s) which, despite its 
efforts, the corporation failed to prevent from occurring. This is akin to imposing strict 
liability on corporations. 111 Thus, when applied to cases of corporate manslaughter in 
English law, the Guidelines would causes some practical problems. That is, irrespective 
of whether or not a corporation is blamed for its reckless or grossly careless risk-
averting systems which caused the death of the victim, the presence or the absence of 
the compliance program is uniformly considered to be a mitigating or aggravating factor 
at sentencing, so that such a consideration fails properly to reflect the corporation's 
requisite mental states. Moreover, no matter how diligently the corporation made all-out 
efforts to prevent and detect violations of law by its employees, it is held liable in any 
event just as in the case of strict liability and its efforts are only considered in 
determining the degree of culpability at the post-conviction stage. As discussed in 
Section 6.2. of this chapter, the corporation's adoption of an effective compliance 
program or effort to prevent the occurrence of the offence by its employees should be 
considered in terms of causation, foreseeability or avoidability in order to determine 
whether it is liable, and not to what extent it should be blamed. 
The second flaw concerning the content of the Guidelines' adoption of a 
compliance program as a mitigating factor is related to the requisite degree of formality 
of a compliance program according to the size of the organisation based on its number 
of employees. The Guidelines give larger organisations more aggravating points and 
smaller organisations fewer points in determining their culpability score. 112 They 
particularly do so in cases where high-level officials participate in the offence, believing 
110 Guidelines, supra note 63, §8C2.5.(t), cited in supra text accompanying notes note 77 and 102. 
III This is not surprising since the vicarious liability doctrine has been widely accepted in the US case 
law. 
112 Supra note 106. See also supra note 76 (the number of employees the corporation had as one of 
aggravating factors for the culpability score). 
241 
that the size of the organisation is interrelated to the degree of its culpability. The 
following three reasons are given by the Guidelines for the increased culpability scores 
in cases of the involvement of high-level officials in the offence: 
"First, an organization is more culpable when individuals who manage the organization 
or who have substantial discretion in acting for the organization participate in, condone, 
or are willfully ignorant of criminal conduct. Second, as organizations become larger and 
their managements become more professional, participation in, condonation of, or willful 
ignorance of criminal conduct by such management is increasingly a breach of trust or 
abuse of position. Third, as organizations increase in size, the risk of criminal conduct 
beyond that reflected in the instant offense also increases whenever management's 
tolerance of the offense is pervasive. Because of the continuum of sizes of organizations 
and professionalization of management, subsection (b) [of §8C2.5. Culpability Score] 
gradually increases the culpability score based upon the size of the organization and the 
level and extent of the substantial authority personnel involvement. ,,113 
Obviously, the second reason has little to do with the assessment of corporate 
culpability. It may be true that the involvement of a large organisation in an offence 
causes more serious damage than in cases of that of a small organisation's management; 
but this is about "the seriousness of the offense, not [about] the culpability of the 
organization.,,1l4 The third reason is more confusing because the opposite may be true. 
The smaller the size of the corporation, the more closely its high-level personnel are 
involved in the corporation's day-to-day operations, the more direct influence they exert 
over subordinates. In a larger corporation, as pointed out in Chapter 3,115 high-level 
personnel are more remote from specific corporate operations, their control over 
subordinate are usually indirect, and the organisational decision-making process is 
usually more complicated. Therefore, "small firms whose officials tolerate illegal 
activity may well be more culpable than larger firms.,,1l6 





Guidelines supra note 63, §8C2.5., Commentary, Background. The degree of pervasiveness of 
managem~nt's to tolerance of the offence (that appe~s.in the thir~ reason). depends on "the 
number, and degree of responsibility, of individuals wlthm substantIal au~ho~lt:Y personnel who 
participated in, condoned, or were will~lly igno~an~ o.fthe offense: Fewer m~lvldu~ls need to be 
involved for a finding of pervasiveness If those mdlvlduals exerCIsed a relatIvely hIgh degree of 
authority." Ibid., §8C2.5., Commentary, Application Notes 4. 
Moore, supra note 63 at 787. 
Chapter 3, text accompanying notes 57-59. 
Moore, supra note 63 at 787. This observation may be true of the Kite case. 
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Given the flaws indicated in the previous subsection, the Guidelines may require 
modification, particularly in cases of corporate manslaughter. That is, in determining 
the degree of corporate culpability at sentencing, careful account should be taken of the 
relationship between the type of the risk at issue and the relevant corporate risk-averting 
systems, rather than of the mere absence or presence of a compliance program or of the 
company's size. As discussed in the earlier section of this chapter,117 questions of 
whether the risk could cheaply be avoided and of whether the danger to the victim posed 
by the particular corporate operation was disproportionate to the benefit to society may 
also be of practical use in assessing corporate culpability for manslaughter. Firstly, if 
it is proved that the risk at issue was cheaply discoverable and avoidable, but the 
corporation failed to do so, the degree of corporate culpability should be at its highest. 
Secondly, in cases where the corporation poses a great degree of danger, which might 
still cost a great deal to avoid, the degree of corporate culpability should be determined 
by addressing the question of whether the danger posed by the corporation is 
disproportionate to the benefit to society. If it is proved that the danger exceeded the 
benefit, then the corporation should be culpable for its failure to avert the risk, though 
less culpable than in cases in which the risk was cheaply discoverable and avoidable. 
Thirdly, if it is proved that the danger posed by the corporation was not necessarily 
disproportionate to the benefit to the society and was very costly to avoid, the 
corporation should not be blamed for its failure to avert the risk, and a defence of 
unavoidability of the risk should be granted to escape liability. 
Under the risk-oriented theory advanced in the previous chapter, the first and 
second cases mentioned above can be further subdivided according to the type of the 
requisite corporate mens rea, in order more accurately to determine the degree of 
corporate culpability. In both cases, the corporation's failure to discover the risk may 
stem from its failure to employ competent staff (collection errors), to establish the 
communication system between management and employees (transaction errors), or to 
acknowledge the existence of the risk through its top management Gudgment errors) 
whilst the corporation's failure to avoid the risk may result from its failure to estimate 
117 See Section 6.2., in particular, Subsection 6.2.3. 
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the risk properly or the existing risk-averting systems (assessment errors). Usually, the 
offence of reckless manslaughter is regarded as more serious than that of manslaughter 
by gross negligence ( or carelessness), 118 so that, in both cases, corporate reckless 
manslaughter based on assessment errors should similarly be regarded as a more 
culpable offence than corporate manslaughter by gross carelessness based on collection, 
transaction and/or judgment errors. 
Given that the risk is cheaply avoidable in the first case, the corporation's failure 
to avert the risk due to its assessment errors should be regarded as blameworthy. 
Corporate conduct should also be viewed as culpable when the corporation foresaw but 
failed to avert the risk which was disproportionate to the benefit received from society 
through the relevant corporate activity. Nevertheless, the first case obviously illustrates 
more culpable corporate conduct than that in the second case, mainly because of the 
easiness of discovering the risk. In addition, the degree of corporate culpability in cases 
of corporate manslaughter by gross carelessness may be further subdivided. If the 
corporation made all errors, namely, collection, transaction and judgment errors, and it 
is proved that such errors are all causally linked to the prohibited result, the corporation 
should be blamed more severely than in cases in which it made one or two of them. 
118 See, for example, Law Commission, Involuntary Manslaughter, supra note 1, para. 5.47. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
One commentator argued in 1984 that "Corporations don't commit crimes. People do .... 
The theoretical underpinnings of corporate liability are underdeveloped .... Without a 
rationale that is internally consistent and in alignment with the criminal law generally 
and the elements of the crime, there can be no justification for corporate criminal 
liability."l More than fifteen years later, there are enough theoretical underpinnings and 
rationales that can generally be consistent with the criminal law and the elements of the 
offence of manslaughter in order for corporations to be held liable for their risk-
producing activities. The public's increasing attention to disasters and fatal accidents 
caused by corporate activities, coupled with the Law Commission's recent proposals for 
legislating offences of involuntary manslaughter/ "make this an ideal time to re-
examine the law and methods by which corporations are held criminally liable"J for 
manslaughter. 
In this thesis, "the law and methods by which corporations are held liable" for 
manslaughter were re-examined. A survey of the historical development of corporate 
criminal liability in English law revealed that English courts originally held corporations 
liable with resort to two parallel liability models: an individual master's vicarious 
liability for his servants' tort and the liability of "quasi-municipal" corporations to 
maintain and repair the public facility. Whilst a corporation is still considered fictitious 
and thus incapable of criminal conduct and mental states of its own, its criminal , , 
liability had long been viewed as comparable with that of individual offenders. 
N. Parisi, "Theories of Corporate Criminal Liability" in E. Hochstedler (ed.), Corporations as 
Criminals (1984, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills), pp. 63-64. See also G.O.W. Mueller, "Mens 
Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal 
Liability" (1957) 19 University o/Pittsburgh Law Review 21 at 23 (suggesting that "While the 
law of corporate criminal liability is easy to understand or, for any given jurisdiction, easy to 
ascertain, the rationale of corporate criminal liability is all but clear. It is safe to say that, for the 
most part, the law has proceeded without rationale wtahsoever - pm:icularly in th~ ~~a ~f 
regulatory and absolute liability offenses. It simply rests on an assumption that such lIabilIty IS 
a necessary and useful thing."). 
2 Law Commission No.237, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter (1996, 
HMSO, London). 
3 W.S. Laufer, "Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds" (1994) 43 Emory Law Journal 647 at 730. 
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Nevertheless, the doctrines of corporate liability utilised by courts (namely, the doctrine 
of vicarious liability and the identification principle) are far from comparable with those 
of individual liability in criminal law. This is particularly so in cases of manslaughter. 
Under English law, an individual defendant is not held vicariously liable in cases in 
which hislher employees commit an offence of manslaughter within their scope of 
employment on hislher behalf. Neither is s/he liable when hislher "alter ego" is 
involved in criminal conduct which causes the death of a victim. Added to this, these 
anthropomorphic approaches suffer from practical flaws: in cases where a culpable 
individual offender cannot be identified in the corporate hierarchy, there is no corporate 
criminal liability. This is because the liability of a corporation under these models is 
derived from that of the actual offender. 
In attempting to modify the derivative nature of corporate liability, courts and 
commentators have invented alternative theories under which a corporation can be held 
liable even when the requisite conduct and mens rea of the particular individuals cannot 
be proved. The collective knowledge doctrine, for example, enables a corporation to 
incur liability by aggregating innocent minds of several corporate employees. By 
emphasising such unique features of corporations as cultures, policies, practices and 
procedures that govern corporate employees' conduct, several organisation theories have 
attempted to identify a corporation's fault of its own. However, these alternative 
theories prove unsuccessful in reconciling the concept of corporate fault with traditional 
criminal law principles due to the operational and conceptual flaws from which they 
suffer. Most of these theories fail properly to capture corporate fault both at the pre- and 
at the post-conviction stages. Moreover, under these theories it is difficult to distinguish 
between corporate intent, recklessness and negligence mainly because corporate policies 
or cultures forming the basis of the concept of corporate fault cannot tell, in most cases, 
what result a corporation intended, was reckless or negligent about at the material time 
of the occurrence of an offence. 
The main reason why the existing theories of corporate liability suffer from 
various types of flaws lies in the fact that only few attempts have so far been made to 
advance a model of corporate liability for a particular offence. The doctrine of 





to cases in which corporations were held liable for numerous types of offences. In 
addressing the question of how to capture genuine Corporate fault, organisation theorists 
have argued that their models of corporate liability can generally be incorporated into 
the existing statutes that impose liability on corporations for a variety of offences.4 
Nevertheless, the nature of corporate conduct and mental states under these theories 
usually fail to be flexible according to the type of offence for which a corporation is to 
be held liable. This is an unfortunate oversight by courts and commentators because, 
in cases of individual offenders, most of them acknowledge that the type and nature of 
the requisite conduct and mental states vary from offence to offence in English criminal 
law.
5 
It was for this reason that this thesis formulated a new model of corporate liability 
applicable only to corporate manslaughter. 
Under the Law Commission's proposals, an individual offender is to be held 
liable for manslaughter when, despite his/her awareness of a risk that hislher conduct 
will cause the death, s/he unreasonably takes that risk in the circumstances as slhe 
knows or believes them to be (reckless manslaughter), or when, despite the obviousness 
of the risk to a reasonable person in hislher position and hislher capacity for appreciating 
the risk at the material time, slhe takes the risk and such risk-taking conduct falls below 
what can reasonably be expected ofhimlher in the circumstances (manslaughter by gross 
carelessness).6 The central issue was how a corporation can be held liable for 
manslaughter under the same conditions described above. Under the risk-oriented 
See, for example, W.S. Laufer, "Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds" (1994) 43 Emory Law 
Journal 648 at 694 (addressing a question of how models of corporate fault should be defmed in 
the American Model Penal Code's hierarchy of mental states); B. Fisse, "The Attribution of 
Criminal Liability to Corporations: A Statutory Model" (1991) 13 Sydney Law Review 277 at 280 
(providing a statutory model of corporate reactive fault for "[a] provision of the Law of the 
Commonwealth relating to indictable offences or summary offences"). 
See, for example, R. Card, Card, Cross and Jones Criminal Law (1998, 14th ed., Butterworths, 
London), pp. 34 ("Of course, the nature of the requisite act varies from offence to offence.") and 
44 ("The expression mens rea refers to the state of mind expressly or impliedly required by the 
defmition of the offence charged. This varies from offence to offence .... "); A. Ashworth, 
Principles a/Criminal Law (1995, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press, Oxfo~d), pp. 103 ("we I?ust make 
the point that not all criminal offences are formulated so as to reqUIre proof of a partIcular type 
of act) and 151 ("It should not be assumed that there is a single fault requirement for each 
offence .... "). 
Law Commission, supra note 2, "Draft of a Bill to create new offences of reckless ~illing, killing 
by gross carelessness and corporate killing to .replace the offe~ce ~f ~an~,laugh~er m cases where 
death is caused without the intention to causmg death or senous mjury, SectIOns 1-2. 
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theory, the requisite conduct and fault elements on the part of a corporation are, as in 
cases of individual offenders, determined by the concept of risk which plays a central 
role in offences of manslaughter. By regarding any corporate personnel's actions as part 
of the relevant corporate risk-relating systems, the risk-oriented theory can hold a 
corporation liable for its own conduct that causes the prohibited result, even when no 
culpable individuals are found. Secondly, corporate recklessness and gross carelessness 
which are necessary for the offences of manslaughter can be found by reference to the 
type of errors made in the relevant corporate risk-averting systems. In cases in which 
competent staff are not employed in relation to risk-involving operations (collection 
errors), liaison between employees and management is not properly established 
(transaction errors) or top management improperly rule the existence of the risk out, a 
corporation is to be held liable for manslaughter by gross carelessness. In cases in 
which top management fail to make proper assessments on the causal link between the 
existing risk in the particular corporate operations and the possible result, it is to be held 
liable for reckless manslaughter. 
The risk-oriented theory also provides firm guidance as to the situations in which 
a corporate defendant should be granted a defence, and as to the aggravating and 
mitigating factors that affect the severity of corporate sentences. In relation to corporate 
defences, three situations were described by this thesis, in which corporations should 
escape liability for manslaughter: in cases where it is proved that a causal link is broken 
between corporate risk-relating systems and the prohibited result; in cases where the risk 
at issue is not foreseeable to the corporation; and in cases where the risk is not 
avoidable. As for sentencing factors, it was found that factors such as the size of a 
corporation, the involvement of high managerial personnel in the offence, prior criminal 
history and obstruction of justice have been considered under the US Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines to be aggravating factors while the existence of an effective 
compliance program and cooperation with authorities have been viewed as mitigating 
factors. By examining the feasibility of each aggravating and mitigating factor in cases 
of corporate manslaughter, additional sentencing factors were provided, such as whether 
the risk was easily discoverable, whether the danger posed by the corporation was 





made in relation to its relevant risk-averting systems. 
As noted in Chapter 1,7 increasing demands for corporate criminal liability for 
causing public disasters have emerged in the last decades, and it is difficult to imagine 
that these demands will diminish in the future as long as our health, environment and 
lives are exposed to danger through processes and conditions of transportation, 
construction, production and sales of goods, working places and public services, all of 
which are dominated by corporations in modem society. It is hoped that this thesis 
successfully demonstrates that criminal law can be used to deter unreasonably risk-
producing activities by corporations. However, given the scale of casualties and damage 
caused through illegal corporate activities, further studies of corporate crime and 
liability should be encouraged. 
It is conceivable that future studies on the issue of corporate criminal liability 
will be made from a number of different perspectives. In relation to the issue of 
corporate manslaughter, two different approaches need to be taken: one from 
comparative perspectives; and the other from statutory perspectives. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2,8 whether or not a corporation can be held liable for manslaughter in criminal 
law is still the subject of much debate in a number of civil law jurisdictions. In those 
jurisdictions in which corporate criminal liability is not widely accepted, there are 
instead advanced legal systems that hold individuals criminally liable for corporate 
crime and impose administrative and civil sanctions against corporate entities.9 Whether 
these systems are, as compared to common law approaches of using criminal law against 
corporations, sufficiently effective to deter corporate risk -producing or life-endangering 
activities needs to be carefully examined. Given that the more widespread and 
internationalised corporate activities become, the less regard they pay to the differences 
in legal regimes, a greater understanding of the operation of two different legal traditions 
in this area should be encouraged. Although only a few references were made to a 
Chapter 1, text accompanying notes 1-3. 
Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 1-5. 
See, in general, H.D. Doelder & K. Tiedemann (eds.), La Criminalisation. du Comportement 
Coliectif(Criminal Liability of Corporations) (1996, Kluwer Law IntematI?nal, The Hague); 
Council of Europe, Liability of Enterprises for Offences (1990, RecommendatIon No. R (88) 18, 
Strasbourg), Explanatory Memorandum. 
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theoretical comparison of some principles of criminal law in both jurisdictions, 10 clearer 
analysis of structures of German offences such as Unterlassungsdelikte (crimes of 
omission) or F ahrlaj3igkeitsdelikte (crimes of recklessness or negligence) and German 
concepts such as Tatbestand (statutory defInitions of crime), Rechtwidrigkeit (illegality) 
and Schuld (culpability) may contribute to comparative solutions between German 
(including Austrian, Swiss, Japanese and South Korean) and common law jurisdictions. 
In addition, as referred to in Chapter 3,11 it is argued that there are three ways by 
which corporations can cause harm: (l) by creating occupational harm to the workers; 
(2) by selling the defective goods and services to consumers and customers; and (3) by 
deteriorating the environment affecting the general public. Although this thesis 
specifIcally examined several cases of corporate manslaughter so as to formulate the 
new model of corporate liability, it would be more effective to characterise each case 
according to these three categories. The major benefIt that can be obtained from this 
method is that it is easier to coordinate corporate liability models under relevant statutes 
such as the Environmental Protection Act 1990, Consumer Protection Act 1987 or 
Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (in cases of English law).12 Since these statutes 
provide legal duties in relation to corporate risk-averting operations, \3 it would be more 
practical to refer to them in order to delineate the area in which corporations are subject 
to legal duties and to consider what type of conduct is required for corporations to 
undertake to avoid liability in specifIc situations. 
Moreover, fIeld studies relevant to the issue of general corporate liability may 





See, for example, Chapter 4, n.93; Chapter 5, n.58. 
Chapter 3, text accompanying note 24. 
For detailed arguments of corporate liability according to these three categories, see, for example, 
N.K. Frank & MJ. Lynch, Corporate Crime, Corporate Violence - A Primer (1992, Harrow and 
Heston, New York); S.L. Hills (ed), Corporate Violence - Injuries and Death for Profit (1987, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, Inc., Maryland). In relation to occupational hazards and 
workplace injuries under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, see, for example, D. 
Bergman, Deaths at Work - Accidents or Corporate Crime (1991, WEA, London); The Perfect 
Crime? _ How Companies Escape Manslaughter Prosecutions (1994, HASAC, London). 
See Chapter 5, text accompanying notes 106-109. 
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tendency to engage in illegal activities or what type of crime is likely to be undertaken. 14 
Furthermore, the sociological and criminological inquiry into the status of corporate 
crime or illegality and the use of criminal sanctions may provide certain guidance as to 
how to control corporate crime effectively in the general sense. As far as corporate 
criminal sanctions are concerned, several options have been suggested by commentators, 
such as equity fines, corporate probation, adverse publicity, restitution, community 
service, suspension of particular corporate business, and corporate dissolution. 15 
Nevertheless, these sanctions are "all options as yet untested in" "the criminal justice 
system of imagination or commitment to overcome the limitations of financial 
penalties" (namely, fall-out or spill-over effects on a number of innocent individuals).,,16 
An issue of which sanctions to be adopted should be carefully treated in the future. 
Finally, further attempts (especially comparative ones) should be made to 
formulate appropriate models of corporate liability for other types of offences such as 
business or economic crime.17 This thesis was only concerned with offences of 
manslaughter. However, if the conception of corporate criminal liability becomes more 
"entrenched in the public mind,,18 both in common law and in civil law jurisdictions in 
the future, the next step to be taken may be to depart from the ineffective or 
"imperfect,,19 identification principle and to seek for more workable, flexible approaches 
suitable for corporate liability for specific offences. It will be desirable in the future to 
develop the issue of corporate criminal liability from the perspective of dealing 
particularly with offences which have transnational implications and may involve 
different traditions. 
14 On this subject, see, for example, J. Braithwaite, Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
(1984, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Boston); F. Pearce & S. Tombs, Toxic Capitalism: Corporate 
Crime and the Chemical Industry (1998, Ashgate, Rants). 
15 On this theme, see Chapter 6, n.70. 
16 C. Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (1993, Clarendon Press, Oxford), p. 147. 
17 For a comparative study on the European status of economic crime, see, for example, L.R. Leigh 
(ed.), Economic Crime in Europe (1980, The Macmillan Press, London). 
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